Opinion
3:22-CV-00242-SPB
02-07-2024
SHAWN L. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff v. COII STEPHEN POBORSKY, CO1 BRADLEY MORGANJR., CO11 C.A. NEYMAN, CAPTAIN JEREMY JONES, REBECCA REIFER, VINCENT DEFELICE, CO11 JONES, CO 11 ELLIOT YOUNG, BETH RUDZIENSKI, FREDDY NUNEZ, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT
ECF NO. 29
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' partial motion to dismiss Plaintiff Shawn L. Williams' Complaint (ECF No. 29) be GRANTED and that the following claims be dismissed: (1) all claims for money damages against the Defendants in their official capacities; (2) Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claims based on unhealthy cell conditions and/or deliberate indifference to medical needs; (3) Plaintiffs First Amendment “access to courts” claim; (4) all claims against Defendants Defelice and J. Jones; (5) Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment due process claims; (6) Plaintiffs First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Reifer; and (7) Plaintiffs state law tort claims.
II. Report
Plaintiff Shawn L. Williams, an individual in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”), initiated this pro se civil rights action against ten individuals employed at the State Correctional Institution at Houtzdale (“SCI-Houtzdale”): Unit Manager Defelice, Captain J. Jones, Sergeants S. Jones and Young, Grievance Coordinator Reifer, Hearing Examiners Nunez and Rudzienski, and Corrections Officers Poborsky, Morgan, and Neyman (collectively, “Defendants”). Williams claims that the Defendants retaliated against him in violation of his rights under the First Amendment, subjected him to cruel and unusual conditions of confinement and acted with deliberate indifference to his health and safety in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment, issued false misconduct charges against him and denied him due process at his disciplinary misconduct hearings in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and harassed him and caused him emotional distress in violation of Pennsylvania state law. He brings his claims against each Defendant in his or her individual and official capacities and seeks declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief.
Williams' Complaint does not organize his claims into counts. Thus, the Court must attempt to identify his causes of action from the facts and legal theories raised in the pleading.
Defendants have moved to dismiss certain claims asserted in the Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and filed a brief in support of the motion. ECF Nos. 29, 30. Williams was directed to respond to the Defendants' motion by July 28, 2023. See ECF No. 31. When no response was received by the deadline, the Court issued a “show cause” order directing Williams to either explain his failure or file his response by January 10, 2024. See ECF No. 44. Williams filed a “Response/Objection” to the show cause order stating several reasons for his failure to file an opposition brief, none of which the undersigned finds compelling. See ECF No. 46. As such, the undersigned will issue this report and recommendation on Defendants' motion without the benefit of an opposition brief.
The motion to dismiss does not challenge the First Amendment retaliation claim asserted against S. Jones, Morgan, Poborsky, Young, and Neyman in their individual capacities. See ECF No. 30, p. 1 n.l.
A. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002). The “court[] generally considers] only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim” when considering the motion to dismiss. Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 222 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig, 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997)).
In making its determination under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice, and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Furthermore, a complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional Rule 12(b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 (1957)).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as explained in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”). Put another way, in assessing a motion to dismiss, while the Court must view the factual allegations contained in the pleading at issue as true, the Court is “not compelled to accept unwarranted inferences, unsupported conclusions or legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 211 (3d Cir. 2007). Expounding on the Twombly!Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212,221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp, 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Finally, because Williams is proceeding pro se, his Complaint will be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a pro se litigant's complaint to state a valid claim upon which relief can be granted, it should do so despite the litigant's failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax, and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969).
B. Material Facts
The facts below are summarized from Williams' Complaint (ECF No. 15) and accepted as true for purposes of Defendants' motion to dismiss.
On January 28, 2021, Williams was released from SCI-Houtzdale's Diversionary Treatment Unit (“DTU”)-a type of Restrictive Housing Unit (“RHU”)-and placed in general population. After telling another guard that he hated Williams, Defendant S. Jones ordered Williams to cell D-B-#17 (“Cell 17”). Upon entering the cell, Williams “observed a very strong and foul stench of body odor, urine, and feces,” as well as “used soap and human hair in the sink and toilet, garbage and debris scattered about the cell floor, residue and urine stains on the toilet seat, and other substances about the cell fixtures.” Id., ¶ 15. Williams also thought that Cell 17 s previous inmate had COVID-19.
Williams went to the officer's desk to ask for cleaning supplies and a winter blanket. In response, “S. Jones falsely claim[ed] that D-B unit block workers had already cleaned and sanitized [Cell 17] prior to [his] arrival to the housing unit, and continued to refuse [Williams] appropriate disinfect chemicals, cleaning supplies, and a winter blanket.” Id. (cleaned up). Williams told S. Jones that he intended to file a “grievance if [he] was not provided a winter blanket, disinfect chemicals, and an opportunity to clean cell #17.” Id., ¶ 17. S. Jones replied: “f*** you and your grievances.” Id. Williams then “requested the presence of supervisor personnel to informally resolve the matter.” Id. S. Jones responded by ordering Williams to “lock-in” his cell. Id., ¶ 18. Williams replied that he wanted to return to the RHU “because his request to speak with a supervisor personnel was being rejected.” Id., ¶ 19. In response, S. Jones “slammed [Williams'] cell door shut and wheeled the property cart holding [his] property off of the housing unit.” Id.
That afternoon, two prison supervisors “observed the deplorable condition of [Williams'] cell” and “directed S. Jones to return [Williams'] property, provide cleaning chemicals and supplies, and an opportunity to clean [Cell 17], but forgot to order Defendant Jones to provide [him] with a winter blanket.” Id., ¶ 20. S. Jones subsequently ordered another inmate to bring Williams “a mop and bucket full of used mop water, and a spray bottle of window cleaner,” but denied his request for disinfectant, and a “toilet brush, broom, and dustpan.” Id., ¶ 21. S. Jones also informed him that his supervisors required Williams to “be locked inside the cell when cleaning it.” Id. S. Jones then said, “get down on your knees and clean your floor like your ancestors did.” Id., ¶ 22. He “then shoved the mop bucket, mop, and property cart into [Williams'] cell” and “slam[ed] the cell door.” Id.
Later that day, Williams saw a nurse distributing medication nearby. He turned to S. Jones to tell him he was diabetic and “need[ed] to check his blood glucose levels” and “receive his evening dosages of diabetic and psychiatric medications.” Id., ¶ 23. But S. Jones “ignored [Williams] and deliberately failed to inform the medication nurse of [Williams] serious need for diabetic monitoring and medications.” Id., ¶ 23. An hour later, Jones “began to taunt, provoke, and harass [Williams] by calling [him] a ‘B****.” Id., ¶ 24. After Williams again announced his intention to file a grievance against him and asked for two grievance forms, S. Jones responded with an obscene comment and gesture and then slammed his cell door. Id. S. Jones then informed him “that he was going to ensure that the ‘Unit Manager' did not provide [him] a pillow, cable cord, or winter blanket.” Id.
On February 14, 2021, S. Jones told Williams that he was “trying to get [him] kicked off of the housing unit,” and Defelice and Neyman intended to move him to D-B-#23 Cell (“Cell 23”). This cell was occupied by an unwell inmate and “soiled with urine and feces.” Id., ¶ 26. S. Jones “laughed and stated ‘go ahead and write your stupid grievance.. .that was Defelice's decision.. .1 only made the suggestion.'” Id.
Two days later, Defelice and Neyman ordered Williams to pack his belongings and move to Cell 23. Williams asked if the cell had been cleaned. Neyman said it had not. Williams asked if he could clean and sanitize the cell before moving. Neyman said he could not. Williams “therefore refused to move into [Cell 23] and requested informal resolution with supervisor personnel.” Id., ¶ 28. Defelice and another supervisor “visited [Williams] cell and repeated the order,” “however, [Williams] still refused in fear of his health and safety.” Id. (cleaned up). Later, Neyman issued Williams Misconduct D492968 for “#35 Refusing to obey an Order.” Id., ¶ 29. Williams was then placed back in the RHU's DTU.
Thereafter, Williams submitted Grievance 915084 against Defendant S. Jones. Because of the nature of Williams' claims, the grievance was forwarded to the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) team. The next day, Neyman came to his cell. He “brag[ged] and taunt[ed]” Williams about causing his disciplinary placement. Id., ¶ 30. He also “attempted to coerce plaintiff to sign an actual copy of the DOC Defendants' (ECF No. 27) ‘Motion to Dismiss plaintiffs 2020 civil lawsuit (l:20-cv-00208-SPB-RAL) instead of standardized legal mail sign-off form.” Id. Neyman told Williams that “he was following the direction and orders of Defendants Poborsky and Rebecca Reifer.” Id., ¶ 31. Williams refused to sign the pleading.
Poborsky and Morgan then arrived at Williams' cell. Poborsky “verified that [he] did in fact direct Defendant Neyman to visit Williams' cell inappropriately.” Id., ¶ 35. Poborsky later returned to “request[] a signature regarding [his] February 16, 2021 PREA allegations against Sgt. S. Jones,” and “threatened to issue [Williams] a false misconduct report if [he] cooperated with the PREA investigation.” Id., ¶ 36. Morgan then “deliberately st[uck] his finger into the bean portion of [Williams'] lunch tray.” Id., ¶ 37. Although Poborsky saw this, he and Morgan “refused to exchange [Williams'] lunch tray and ignored [his] verbal request for DC-ADM 804 Grievance forms.” Id.
Williams asked Morgan for grievance forms again that afternoon. Morgan responded with obscenities. Id., ¶ 38. Williams advised Morgan that he would get the forms from other prison staff and repeated his intent to grieve Morgan and Poborsky s conduct. Morgan then responded in the presence of an inmate and some officers with an obscenity and referred to Williams as a “snitch” and a reference to “PREA Jonesie [sic].” Id., ¶ 39. A day later, on February 17, 2021, Morgan issued Williams Misconduct D093927, “which falsely alleged that [Williams] ‘became disruptive yelling out his door' calling Defendant Morgan ‘Faggot Homosexual ProudBoy', and that [Williams] refused Defendant Morgan's repeated orders ‘to get off of his door.'” Id., ¶ 40.
The next morning, Morgan ignored Williams' “request for yard and shower [sic], despite [his] compliance with yard/shower procedures.” Id., ¶ 41. He later refused to give Williams his breakfast tray, even though Williams “was at his cell door standing with his cell light on, ready to receive” it. Id., ¶ 42. When Williams complained to Poborsky, he “falsely alleg[ed] that he heard [Williams] refuse to eat.” Id. Williams told “Poborsky and Morgan that he is a diabetic and hypertensive inmate who needs to eat food, specifically with his diabetic medication. Id., ¶ 44. In response, they “laugh[ed] and stat[ed] T guess you will do us all a favor and die.'” Id., ¶ 44. Williams experienced “stomach pains, cramps, nausea, and possible damage to [his] gastrointestinal lining” as a result. Id., ¶ 44. At 10:48 A.M., as he was collecting Williams' lunch tray, Morgan stated “at least you're smart enough to hand over your tray you dumb n*****;' and advised [Williams] to kill himself when [he] asked Morgan to stop harassing him.” Id., ¶ 45. When other inmates “expressed their disapproval of Defendant Morgan's harassment,” Morgan again responded with an obscenity and stated, “that snitch...he needs to die.” Id. As Williams gave Morgan his tray, Morgan said to him: “I should slam your f***ing hand.” Id. He also told Williams: “I can get away with whatever I want to do to you,” “I got all the support from the captains and lieutenants.” Id., ¶ 46. He added that he and Poborsky were “going to make sure that [Williams] stayed in the RHU ‘forever.'” Id.
Shortly before this interaction, Grievance Coordinator Reifer had disclosed the contents of Williams' grievance to Young, Morgan, and Poborsky, including “the names and cell numbers of' Williams' five “inmate witnesses.” Id., ¶ 47. Thereafter, Poborsky issued Williams Misconduct D508252, “which falsely alleged that Defendant Poborsky ‘personally witnessed' [Williams] ‘attempting to get [the inmate witnesses] to file false paperwork on officer Morgan.” Id., ¶ 48. That afternoon, Morgan told inmate witness Cruz that Williams “was a ‘snitch'” and “that he would cause problems for [him] if he assisted [Williams] in any way.” Id., ¶ 51. Poborsky similarly told inmate witness Gentilquore that if he assisted Williams, he “could go days without eating.” Id., ¶ 53.
On February 19, 2021, Hearing Examiner Nunez “coerced” Williams “into voluntarily waiving his right to have a Disciplinary Hearing for” Misconduct D492968. On February 23, 2021, Hearing Examiner Rudzienski presided over a disciplinary hearing for Misconduct D508252. Rudzienski dismissed the misconduct without prejudice. But because Rudzienski did not “provide a reasonably specific disposition of evidence and facts relied on,” Poborsky rewrote Misconduct D508252. Id., ¶ 55. Williams received this misconduct the next day.
Nunez presided over the disciplinary hearing for Neyman's misconduct (D492968) on February 25, 2021. Nunez “fabricated his written disposition and refus[ed Williams'] request” to call his five inmate witnesses. Id., ¶ 57. Nunez also “falsely alleged that” Williams pled not guilty, since Williams, in fact, did plead guilty. Id., ¶ 58. Nunez “ultimately sanctioned [Williams] to thirty days in disciplinary confinement.” Id., ¶ 57.
Nunez presided over the disciplinary hearing for Morgan's misconduct (D093927) on February 25 as well. “Nunez called Defendant Morgan to personally testify but. .. denied [Williams'] request for witness [sic] to be called.” Id., ¶ 59. Thereafter, Nunez announced: “I know these guys,” “they wouldn't write you up for no reason.” Id., ¶ 60. He then postponed the hearing for “video review.” Id., ¶ 60. Nunez dismissed the misconduct without prejudice on March 11, 2021, because the “video evidence contradicted and belied Defendant Morgan's written misconduct report version.” Id., ¶ 71. “Thus, the relevant HD unit video footage was not preserved and/or intentionally destroyed by Defendants Reifer and Nunez, per direction and authorization of supervisor Defendants J. Jones and Reifer.” Id., ¶ 72.
Nunez postponed the disciplinary hearing for Poborsky's misconduct (D508257) so “Poborsky could personally appear and testify to his written misconduct report version.” Id., ¶ 61. At the March 1 hearing, Nunez “claimed that he did not receive [Williams'] DC-141 Part 2(A) Request for Representation and Witnesses. However, non-party CO Wilt and Defendant Reifer confirmed that [Williams] did in fact submit his request for witnesses.” Id., ¶ 62. Nunez also “lied” when he stated that Williams “informed the examiner verbally that he (plaintiff) rescinds his request for video evidence to be reviewed because he (plaintiff) does not want to sign a waiver to continue hearing.” Id., ¶ 63 (cleaned up). “Nunez ultimately found [Williams] guilty of charge #29 Unauthorized Group Activity, and sanctioned [him] ¶ 30 days disciplinary confinement.” Id., ¶ 65.
“On March 5, 2021, supervisor Defendant/Captain Jones attempted to coerce [Williams] into withdrawing grievances and investigations against Defendants Morgan and Poborsky by claiming that Defendant Morgan was removed from working on the DTU/HD unit because of [Williams'] numerous complaints.” Id., ¶ 67. Four days later, Poborsky arrived at Williams' cell with J. Jones and yelled “Whats [sic] up N*****.” Id., ¶ 68. “J. Jones observed and laughed.” Id. Poborsky also called Williams “apiece of s***.” Id.
That day, Poborsky directed another officer to deny Williams' yard time. Later that day, an inmate told Williams that “Morgan threatened him with retaliation for providing a witness declaration for [Williams] against Defendant Morgan.” Id., ¶ 70.
On June 15, 2021, Poborsky “boasted and bragged” to Williams about issuing him “the February 18, 2021 false misconduct report in retaliation, and continued to yell threats and obscenities” at him. Id., ¶ 73.
C. Plaintiffs Claims
The Complaint appears to assert the following causes of action:
• An Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim against S. Jones, Neyman, and Defelice for “refusing to provide [Williams] a winter blanket, placing [him] in a filthy Corona virus contaminated cell,” and “denying [him] necessary disinfectant cleaning chemicals and supplies to clean designated unsanitary living quarters,” ECF No. 15, ¶ 75, and against supervisors J. Jones and Defelice for “contribut[ing] to and proximately caus[ing]” Defendants' Eighth Amendment violations. Id., ¶ 78.
• An Eighth Amendment supervisory liability claim against J. Jones and Defelice for “fail[ing] to take disciplinary or other corrective action to stop the campaign
of harassment and retaliation against [him] by” S. Jones, Neyman, and Young. Id., ¶ 75.
• An Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs claim against Morgan and Poborsky for denying him breakfast after he told them “he is a diabetic and hypertensive inmate who needs to eat food, specifically with his diabetic medication.” A/.,¶44.
• An Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs claim against S. Jones for “deliberately fail[ing] to inform the medication nurse of [Williams'] serious need for diabetic monitoring and medications.” Id., ¶ 23.
• First Amendment access to courts and retaliation claims against S. Jones, Morgan, Reifer, J. Jones, Poborsky, Young, and Neyman for “moving [him] into unsanitary housing, frustrating and impeding [his] litigation, denying [him] recreation; showers; meals; and issuing [him] false misconduct reports because of [his] protected exercise of filing complaints and grievances,” id., ¶ 76, and a related supervisory liability claim against supervisors J. Jones and Defelice for “contribut[ing] to and proximately causfing]” Defendants' First Amendment violations. Id., ¶ 78.
• Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims against Reifer and Nunuz for “not preserving] and/or intentionally destroy[ing]” “relevant HD unit video footage,” id, ¶ 71, and Rudzienski and Nunez for “refusing to review relevant video footage, refusing to call relevant witnesses requested, providing false and inadequate written disposition(s) of the disciplinary hearing findings, and finding [Williams] guilty of unauthorized group activity with no evidence to support the charge.” Id., ¶ 79.
• Pennsylvania state tort law claims of “harassment, intimidation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id., p. 1.
D. Discussion
Defendants' motion presents six arguments: (1) all claims against the Defendants in their official capacities fail as a matter of law to the extent Williams seeks money damages; (2) all claims against Defendants Reifer, Rudzienski, and Nunez fail because Williams has not alleged facts to support their personal involvement in actionable conduct; (3) the Complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against any Defendant; (4) the Complaint fails to state an “access to courts” claim against any Defendant; (5) the Complaint fails to state a “failure to discipline”/supervisory liability claim against Defendants Defelice and J. Jones; and (6) Williams' state law claims are barred by sovereign immunity. As discussed below, each of Defendants' arguments has merit.
1. All official capacity claims for monetary relief are barred by sovereign immunity.
Williams asserts constitutional claims for money damages against the Defendants in both their individual and official capacities. The latter are barred by the immunity afforded to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment proscribes actions for money damages in the federal courts against states, their agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities. Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23 (3d Cir. 1981) (Pennsylvania); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (state agencies); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (state employees acting in their official, capacity). “Pennsylvania has not waived its immunity from suit in federal court.” Toth v. California Univ, of Pennsylvania, 844 F.Supp.2d 611, 648 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8521(b)). Nor did Congress intend by the general language of § 1983 to override the traditional sovereign immunity afforded to the states. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342-45 (1979); see also Toth, 844 F.Supp.2d at 648. The DOC, as an agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and its agents and employees in their official capacities, are therefore entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for money damages. See Brown v. Smith, 2019 WL 2411749 (W.D. Pa. June 7, 2019).
That said, Eleventh Amendment immunity does not extend to claims for money damages asserted against agents and employees of state agencies acting in their individual capacities. See e.g, Helfrich v. Com. of Pa., Dep't of Mil. Affs., 660 F.2d 88, 90 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)). The Eleventh Amendment also does not provide immunity for claims for injunctive or declaratory relief. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 n. 18 (1985)). Thus, Eleventh Amendment immunity does not provide a basis to dismiss a § 1983 claim for money damages when it is asserted against a state actor in their individual capacity or for injunctive or declaratory relief when it is asserted against a state actor in their official capacity. See id. (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). Accordingly, Williams' First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims for money damages against the Defendants in their official capacities should be dismissed with prejudice, but his claims for money damages against them in their individual capacities and his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against them in their official capacities are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. As discussed below, however, each of these claims, except Williams' unchallenged First Amendment retaliation claim against certain Defendants, fail for other reasons.
Williams seeks an injunction ordering “Nunez or his agents to”: (1) “[e]xpunge the disciplinary convictions” discussed in the Complaint from Williams' record; and (2) provide Williams with “any and all reprimands, sanctions, or penalties imposed on the defendants.” ECF No. 15, p. 16. At this stage of the proceedings, the Court takes no position regarding the availability of such relief. As discussed below, the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim upon which Williams bases this claim fails based on Williams' lack of a protected liberty interest.
2. Eighth Amendment Claims
The Court construes the Complaint to assert an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against S. Jones, Neyman, and Defelice based on the conditions of Cell 17 and a deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim against Morgan, Poborsky, and S. Jones. The Defendants argue that Williams' “allegations, albeit unpleasant, fall short of the ‘sufficiently serious' threshold so as to bring his allegations within the realm of the Eighth Amendment.” ECF No. 30, p. 7 (citing See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)); Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 225 (2017); Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367-68 (3d Cir. 2012)). The Court agrees.
a. The Complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against S. Jones, Neyman, and DeFelice based on the conditions of Cell 17.
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment imposes constitutional limitations on a prisoner's conditions of confinement. See Rhondes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); Wilson V. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). “[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met.” Giblom v. Gillipsie, 435 Fed.Appx. 165, 168 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). First, the plaintiff must allege a deprivation that is “objectively, sufficiently serious.” Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 125 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The objective component is narrowly defined: only “extreme deprivations” suffice to make out an Eighth Amendment claim. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). A prisoner must show that the condition, either alone or in combination with other conditions, deprived him of “the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,” or at least a “single, identifiable human need.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). These needs include “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety.” Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 1997). “[A] totality of the circumstances test must be applied to determine whether the conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment.” Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418, 427 (3d Cir. 1990).
Second, the plaintiff must show that the prison official “subjectively acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind, i.e., deliberate indifference.” Tillman v. Lebanon County Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 418 (3d Cir. 2000). “This subjective component is also narrowly construed.” Henry v. Overmyer, 2013 WL 3177746, at *2 (W.D. Pa. June 24, 2013). A prison official's conduct violates the Eighth Amendment “only if he knows that the inmate[ ] face[s] a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847) (alterations in original).
Williams contends that the conditions of his confinement in Cell 17 amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. He avers that S. Jones and Defelice “refused to provide [him] with a winter blanket for the freezing winter cell conditions.” ECF No. 15, ¶ 13 (emphasis supplied). He asserts that Cell 17 was filthy and theorizes that the cell was potentially “contaminated” with the “Corona virus” because of the previous occupant's positive COVID-19 diagnosis. Id. He also alleges that unit workers did not disinfect or clean the cell before he arrived, although he concedes that he received a mop, bucket, and window cleaner (but no disinfectant chemicals) the day he moved into the cell. See id.
Whether viewed separately or in combination, these conditions do not support that Williams was deprived of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities or even a single, identifiable human need. The cold temperature in his cell and absence of a “winter blanket” are not alleged to have existed for a period sufficient to implicate the Eighth Amendment. His single allegation regarding temperature conditions of his cell presents little substance. He alleges only that S. Jones denied him a “winter blanket” and that the cell was “freezing” when he arrived. The Complaint does not allege that Williams lacked other bedding, including a standard blanket, or warm clothes. A cold cell and the absence of a “winter blanket,” without more, do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. See Freeman v. Miller, 615 Fed. Appx., 72, 79 (3d Cir. 2015) (no reasonable factfinder could conclude that permitting Plaintiff “to wear only underwear and a suicide smock for” about seven days despite the “allegedly low cell temperature” exposed him “to cold conditions of sufficient severity and duration to objectively amount to an ‘extreme deprivation.'”). C.f, Sampson v. Berks Cnty. Prison, 171 Fed.Appx. 382, 385 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that inmate's complaint stated an Eighth Amendment claim where it alleged that “all end cells suffer from inadequate heating in the winter,” that “prison officials are aware of this condition,” and that plaintiff repeatedly complained of extreme cold in his end cell, including one occasion when “it was so cold in his cell that he was able to see his breath”). Williams also has not alleged facts to support an inference that he suffered any harm because of his cold cell. See Wilson v. Ellett, 2016 WL 613824, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2016) (quoting Benson v. Godinez, 919 F.Supp. 285, 289 (N.D. Ill. 1996)) (“[W]hile the Eighth Amendment does not require plaintiff to become deathly ill before a constitutional violation will be found, ‘the absence of any ailment other than colds or sore throats militates against characterizing the conditions in [plaintiffs] cell as objectively serious.'”). As in Wilson, Williams has not alleged “facts that would tend to show that the temperature in his cell was so cold as to pose a serious risk of physical or psychological harm.” Wilson, 2016 WL 613824, at *3 (Plaintiffs assertion that from October to March, he was “continuously subjected for a prolonged period of time to the bitter cold of winter weather and subfreezing temperatures in [his] cell” “due to the open window” was not “an extreme deprivation” violative of the Eighth Amendment).
Williams' allegations of unsanitary cell conditions fare no better. As the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit have explained, “the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.” Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 139 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981)). For example, “even though administrative confinement in a dry cell is unpleasant and often unsanitary, so long as the conditions of that confinement are not foul or inhuman, and are supported by some penological justification, they will not violate the Eighth Amendment.” Id. The prior presence of a COVID-positive inmate in Cell 17, the cell's foul smell, urine-stained toilet, and trash strewn sink and floor, while unpleasant, do not constitute a substantial risk of harm to Williams' health and safety. See Gilblom v. Gillipsie, 435 Fed.Appx. 165, 169 (3d Cir. 2011) (denying conditions of confinement claim when inmate spent approximately thirty-six (36) hours in dry cell with his own excrement); Burkholder v. Newton, 116 Fed.Appx. 358 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that Eighth Amendment claims have been rejected when much harsher conditions than a cold and unsanitary cell have been alleged). Further, Williams' receipt of cleaning materials the day he arrived indicates that his confinement in an unsanitary cell lasted several daytime hours, at most. Unsanitary cell conditions for such a short duration do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. See Manson v. Vogt, 2023 WL 8281687, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2023) (one day “in a cell with fecal matter and without any clothes or a smock” did not violate the Eighth Amendment); Freeman v. Miller, 615 Fed.Appx. 72, 77 (3d Cir. 2015) (denial of clothing and mattress for seven (7) days did not violate Eighth Amendment). C.f. Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 7 (2020) (“The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit properly held” that [Plaintiff s] confinement to a “pair of shockingly unsanitary cells” for six full days constituted cruel and unusual punishment.”). Moreover, Williams does not allege that he suffered any harm because of the unpleasant cell conditions. See Lindsey v. Shaffer, 411 Fed.Appx. 466, 468 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“The critical issue for Eighth Amendment purposes is not the number of prisoners who share facilities; rather, it is whether the alleged overcrowding has somehow harmed the prisoner.”). Whether examined separately or collectively, the allegations of the Complaint fail to support a finding that the conditions of Williams' confinement in Cell 17 amounted to an objectively “extreme deprivation.” Accordingly, the Complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against S. Jones, Neyman, and Defelice.
The insufficiency of Williams' allegations to support a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights based on the conditions of Cell 17 also disposes of his “deliberate indifference” claim against Defendants S. Jones, Neyman, and Defelice. Williams asserts that these Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a risk to his health and safety when they allowed him to be housed in an unsanitary cell without cleaning supplies and a winter blanket. This claim is little more than a repackaged version of his “conditions of confinement” claim and fails for similar reasons. To state a viable Eighth Amendment claim in this context, an inmate must allege facts to support that: (1) he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984); (2) prison official knew of and disregarded “an excessive risk to inmate health and safety,” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir. 2001); and (3) the prison official's deliberate indifference caused the inmate to suffer harm, see Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012). Because the conditions of Cell 17 did not pose a substantial risk of serious harm to Williams, he cannot properly base a “deliberate indifference” claim upon these conditions. See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650-51 (3d Cir. 2002) (“An officer's failure to stop an ongoing constitutional violation violates the Eighth Amendment when he ‘had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and simply refused to do so.'”) (emphasis supplied). See also Nifas v. Beard, 374 Fed.Appx. 241, 135-36 (3d Cir. 2010). Accordingly, the Eighth Amendment claims against S. Jones, Neyman, and Defelice should be dismissed. )
b. The Complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to Williams' serious medical needs claim.
The Court also construes the Complaint as asserting an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to Williams' serious medical needs claim against S. Jones, Morgan, and Poborsky. Prisons have a duty to provide prisoners with adequate medical care, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), and “[t]he Eighth Amendment proscribes deliberate indifference to prisoners' serious medical needs.” Spruill v. Gillis, 312 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004); Natale v. Camden County Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). To state a claim for violation of his or her Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care, an inmate must allege facts to “show (i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicated deliberate indifference to that need.” Id. N serious medical need is a need diagnosed by a physician, that the physician believes to require medical treatment, or a need that is “so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987). To support a finding that a prison official was deliberately indifferent requires a showing that the official “knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to [the] inmate['s] health.” Natale v. Camden County Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d at 582 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). A plaintiff must allege facts sufficient “to support the inference that the defendants knowingly and unreasonably disregarded an objectively intolerable risk of harm.” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 132 (3d. Cir. 2001) (emphasis supplied) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 846).
Here, Williams alleges that he suffers from diabetes and hypertension and that, on January 28, 2021, S. Jones failed to inform a nurse who was conducting medication rounds that Williams wished to have her check his glucose levels and dispense his diabetes and psychiatric medication. Williams does not allege that he was experiencing a medical emergency or explain why a corrections officer would be responsible for this aspect of his care rather than medical personnel. In any event, Williams' allegations acknowledge that he was under the care of medical personnel who, unlike corrections officers, are responsible for the timing of medical monitoring and dispensing of medication. “If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts ... a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Jones v. Falor, 135 Fed.Appx. 554, 556 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Spruill, 312 F.3d at 236). “[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official... will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference.” Id. (quoting Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236). While Williams may have expressed to S. Jones his desire for glucose testing and dispensing of his medications at that particular time, such determinations are for medical personnel, not corrections officers, absent indications of urgent or emergency medical need, none of which is alleged here. Williams also does not allege that he experienced any adverse health effects due to S. Jones' failure to comply with his direction to contact the nurse.
The Complaint also fails to state a deliberate indifference to medical needs or any other constitutional claim against Morgan and Poborsky based on their refusal to provide him with food to eat with his medication. Williams alleges that, on February 28, 2021, he advised Morgan and Poborsky that he was “diabetic and hypertensive” and needed to take his diabetes medication with food, but they nevertheless refused to give him breakfast. ECF No. 15, ¶ 44. In fact, Poborsky allegedly responded to Williams' statement by laughing and commenting, “I guess you will do us all a favor and die.” Id. Williams further alleges that taking his medication without food caused him “stomach pains, cramps, nausea, and possible damage to [his] gastrointestinal lining.” Id., ¶ 44. There is no doubt that these allegations, particularly the comment Williams attributes to Poborsky, support an inference that Poborsky and Morgan disregarded Williams' medical need to accompany his medication with food. The closer question is whether the allegations support that they disregarded a “serious medical need.” Put differently, the question is whether a single instance of denying Williams a meal to accompany his medication represented disregard for “an excessive risk to inmate health or safety...” Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 262 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). This question should be answered in the negative.
Williams does not allege that any Defendant denied him his diabetes medication or that the failure to provide him breakfast prevented him from taking his medication. Indeed, his allegation that his medication upset his stomach confirms that he took it. It is common knowledge that many medications are recommended to be taken with food to avoid stomach upset, but the consequences of failing to do so is not generally associated with a significant risk to health or safety. Williams alleges that he experienced stomach pains, cramps, and nausea as a result of not receiving breakfast with his medication. While these symptoms are certainly unpleasant, the law does not regard them as sufficiently serious to implicate the Eighth Amendment unless they are protracted or accompanied by other symptoms indicative of a serious condition. See Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 621 (7th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that “[v]omiting, in and of itself, is not an uncommon result of being mildly ill, and, absent other circumstances (e.g., vomiting continuously for a long period of time, having blood in one's vomit, or the like), does not amount to an objectively serious medical condition”); Quintana v. Santa Fe Cty. Bd. of Comm 'rs, 973 F.3d 1022, 1030 (10th Cir. 2020) (concluding that frequent vomiting, without the presence of blood, did not constitute a serious medical need); Drouin v. Skallet, 2017 WL 2591281, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2017) (collecting cases suggesting that “nausea and vomiting generally do not constitute a serious medical need”); Maier v. Lehman, 2014 WL 7182116, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2014) (citing cases to conclude that vomiting does not rise to the level of a serious medical need). Williams also alleges that he sustained “possible damage to [his] gastrointestinal lining.” On its face, this allegation is nothing more than Williams' hyperbolic speculation on a medical matter concerning which he has no apparent expertise. As such, it does not support a plausible inference of serious harm or a serious threat to Williams' health. While the denial of a meal to accompany medication on a single occasion, resulting in an inmate's stomach upset, may constitute grounds for disciplining the offending correction officers, these facts do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
3. The Complaint fails to state a First Amendment “access to courts” claim.
Williams also asserts that the acts and omissions of S. Jones, Morgan, Reifer, Poborsky, Young, Neyman, Defelice, and J. Jones violate his First Amendment right of access to the courts. See Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, prisoners retain a right of access to the courts.”). “Where prisoners assert that defendants' actions have inhibited their opportunity to present a past legal claim, they must show (1) that they suffered an ‘actual injury'-that they lost a chance to pursue a ‘nonffivolous' or ‘arguable' underlying claim; and (2) that they have no other ‘remedy that may be awarded as recompense' for the lost claim other than in the present denial of access suit.” Id. (quoting Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)). “[T]he underlying cause of action,... is an element that must be described in the complaint.” Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415.
Williams alleges that the Defendants have interfered with his prosecution of this action. But Williams is actively pursuing this action. Accordingly, he cannot plausibly allege that Defendants' conduct has prevented him from initiating this lawsuit or otherwise caused him to lose a nonfrivolous claim. The Complaint also does not allege facts to support that Defendants conduct prevented him from prosecuting his 2020 civil suit (No. 1:20-cv-00208-SPB-RAL) or caused Williams to lose a nonfrivolous claim in that case. Because Williams has failed to allege an actual injury caused by the Defendants' conduct, his First Amendment access-to-courts claim should be dismissed.
4. The Complaint fails to allege facts to support a supervisory liability claim against J. Jones and Defelice.
Williams alleges that J. Jones's conduct and Defelice's failure to discipline S. Jones, Neyman, Young, and Morgan “constitute[d] deliberate indifference to [his] health & safety” and “contributed to and proximately caused” various other violations of his constitutional rights. See ECF No. 15, ¶ 78. The Defendants argue that these claims must be dismissed because Williams “has not alleged that Defendant Jones (Jeremy) or Defendant Defelice was involved, other than by virtue of their supervisory roles, in any constitutional violations.” ECF No. 30, p. 9. The Defendants are correct.
A plaintiff pursuing a § 1983 claim “must show that each and every defendant was ‘personal[ly] involve[d]' in depriving him of his rights.” Kirkv. Roan, 2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (quoting Evancho v. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2006)). Generally, “a supervising public official has [no] affirmative constitutional duty to supervise and discipline so as to prevent violations of constitutional rights by his or her subordinates.” Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 1986); Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1120 (3d Cir. 1990). But courts have identified two circumstances where the conduct of a supervisor or policymaker may constitute personal involvement in a constitutional violation sufficient to support his or her individual liability. First, supervisory liability may attach if the supervisor personally “participated in violating the plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced” in a subordinate's unconstitutional conduct. A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995)). However, “[a] negations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence... must be made with appropriate particularity.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1988). Second, liability may attach if the supervisor, “with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” Id. (quoting Stonekingv. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725 (3d Cir. 1989)).
In this case, Williams premises Defelice and J. Jones's liability upon their supervisory positions as Unit Manager and COIV/Captain, respectively. See ECF No. 15, ¶¶ 6, 7, 78. Williams' First Amendment access-to-courts claim and Eighth Amendment claims against Defelice and J. Jones based on their supervisory responsibilities fail as a threshold matter because, as discussed above, the Complaint does not allege facts to support a First Amendment access-to-courts claim or Eighth Amendment violation. Furthermore, as a general matter, Defelice and J. Jones cannot be liable under § 1983 based on a theory of respondeat superior. See e.g, Davis v. Williams, 354 Fed.Appx. 603, 604, 606, 607 (3d Cir. 2009). To the extent Williams asserts a supervisory claim against Defelice and J. Jones based on other Defendants alleged harassing comments and racist remarks, this claim also fails as a threshold matter because verbal harassment, without more, does not rise to a constitutional harm. See e.g., Gannaway v. Berks Cnty. Prison, 439 Fed.Appx. 86,91 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting DeWaltv. Carter, 224 F.3d 607,612 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (“it is well settled that ‘[t]the use of racially derogatory language, while unprofessional and deplorable, does not violate the Constitution,” as “[s]tanding alone, simple verbal harassment does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, deprive a prisoner of a protected liberty interest or deny a prisoner equal protection of the laws.”). With respect to the retaliation claim, the Complaint does not specify how DeFelice and J. Jones caused the retaliatory conduct alleged in the Complaint. His allegation that DeFelice and J. Jones contributed to and proximately caused the other Defendants' alleged unconstitutional conduct is unsupported by factual allegations and purely conclusory. As such it provides no basis for a claim against Defelice or J. Jones. All claims against Defelice and J. Jones are therefore based solely on their supervisory roles and unsupported by any allegations of fact to support that they participated in any actionable conduct. Accordingly, all claims against Defelice and J. Jones should be dismissed.
5. The Complaint fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.
Williams asserts a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim against Reifer, Nunez, and Rudzienski based on the disposition of misconducts D492968, D093927, and D508252, and his resulting placement in the RHU. “To state a claim under § 1983 for deprivation of procedural due process rights, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of ‘life, liberty, or property,' and (2) the procedures available to him did not provide ‘due process of law.'” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Alvin v. Suzuki, 221 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir.2000)). Williams' procedural due process claims fail because his 30-day confinement in the RHU was too short to implicate a liberty interest. See Nifas, 374 Fed.Appx. at 244 (“confinement in AC for 178 days and a 90-day placement on the RRL does not amount to an ‘atypical and significant hardship' when compared to the ordinary incidents of prison life”). See also Mensinger, 293 F.3d at 654 (seven months in disciplinary confinement did not implicate a liberty interest); Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 151-52 (3d Cir. 2002) (disciplinary detention for fifteen days and administrative segregation for 120 days did not implicate a protected liberty interest); Sanchez v. Walton, 2019 WL 249537, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2019) (“ninety (90) day confinement in segregation is insufficient to establish that [inmate] was deprived of a liberty interest”). The absence of allegations to trigger due process protections requires the Court to dismiss the procedural due process claims with prejudice.
The Complaint appears to advance a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against J. Jones as well for “directing] and authoriz[ing]” Reifer and Nunez' alleged failure to preserve “HD unit video footage” relevant to Williams' misconduct defense. ECF No. 15, ¶ 72. Like the due process claim against the other Defendants, any due process claim against J. Jones fails because Williams has not alleged facts to support a protected liberty interest.
6. The First Amendment retaliation claim against Reifer should be dismissed for lack of personal involvement.
Defendants argue that the Complaint does not allege facts to support Reifer's personal involvement in the conduct upon which Williams bases his First Amendment access to courts and retaliation claims. As discussed, the Complaint fails to state a viable access-to-courts claim against any Defendant. To prevail on any claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995); Est. of Smith v. Marasco, 430 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2005). From these elements, it follows that a defendant faces liability under § 1983 only if he had “personal involvement” in the deprivation of the plaintiffs constitutional right. See Gould v. Wetzel, 2013 WL 5697866, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 21, 2013). Each defendant must have played an “affirmative part” in the complained-of misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“In a § 1983 suit... [a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”); Oliver v. Beard, 358 Fed.Appx. 297, 300 (3d Cir. 2009).
Williams' sole allegation against Reifer is that she told Young, Morgan, and Poborsky about the grievance he submitted against them immediately after he handed it to her. Given that Young, Morgan, and Poborsky would have learned of the grievance in the ordinary course, it is difficult to conceive how this allegation possibly supports any claim against Reifer. But, in any case, Reifer's role in the grievance process is not personal involvement for purposes of §1983. Indeed, courts have routinely dismissed civil rights claims against prison officials whose only involvement in the alleged violation was their participation in the grievance process. Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 782 (W.D. Pa. 2013). See also Mincy v. Chmielsewski, 508 Fed.Appx. 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[A]n officer's review of, or failure to investigate, an inmate's grievances generally does not satisfy the requisite personal involvement.”); Stevens v. Winger, 2021 WL 2075585, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 24, 2021) (dismissing claims against prison health care administrator whose only awareness of the alleged misconduct was based on receipt of a grievance). Such should be the fate of Williams' First Amendment retaliation claim against Reifer.
7. Defendants are immune from the Pennsylvania state tort law claims.
Lastly, the Defendants contend that they are immune from Williams' state law intentional infliction of emotional distress (‘TIED”) claim. ECF No. 15, p. 1. The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides state officials with broad immunity from state law tort claims, “except as the General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity.” 1 Pa. C.S. § 2310. Although the Pennsylvania General Assembly “has waived sovereign immunity for claims of negligence against Commonwealth employees in a very limited and express set of circumstances,” it has not done so for intentional torts. Id. (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)). Kull v. Guisse, 81 A.3d 148, 157 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 2013) (“[S]tate employees do not lose their immunity for intentional torts, provided they are acting within the scope of their employment.”) (citations omitted, emphasis added). Consequently, sovereign immunity “shields Commonwealth employees from liability when their actions: (1) cannot fit into one of the nine statutory exceptions in § 8522; (2) are not negligent; and (3) occurred when acting within the scope of his or her employment.” Tibbens v. Snyder, 2020 WL 5372097, at *5 (M.D. Pa. June 24, 2020) (citing Kintzel v. Kleeman, 965 F.Supp.2d 601, 606 (M.D. Pa. 2013)).
Williams claims of “harassment, intimidation” are encompassed within his IIED claim.
Specifically, the General Assembly has waived immunity in cases of: (1) vehicle liability; (2) medical-professional liability; (3) care, custody or control of personal property; (4) Commonwealth real estate, highways and sidewalks; (5) potholes and other dangerous conditions; (6) care, custody or control of animals; (7) liquor store sales; (8) National Guard activities; and (9) toxoids and vaccines. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8522.
IIED is an intentional tort, see e.g., Sabo v. UPMC Altoona, 386 F.Supp.3d 530, 556 (W.D. Pa. 2019), and, as such, falls outside the statutory exceptions enumerated in § 8522, see, e.g, Brown v. Smith, 2019 WL 2411749, at *4 (W.D. Pa. June 7, 2019) (noting that assault and battery do not fall within the § 8522 exceptions). And no plausible basis exists for inferring that any Defendant was acting outside the scope of his or her employment. Accordingly, Williams' state law tort claim against the Defendants is barred by sovereign immunity and should be dismissed with prejudice.
E. Leave to Amend
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Court should permit a curative amendment unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). The Court may deny leave to amend where there is “undue delay, bad faith[,] or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). And though “the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court,” it may not “outright refus[e] to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial.” Id. These instructions are equally applicable to pro se litigants and those represented by counsel. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). In this case, it would be futile to allow Williams to amend his constitutional claims asserted against the Defendants in their official capacities for monetary relief, his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim based on 30 days in the RHU, his First Amendment claim based on Reifer's involvement in the grievance process, and his state law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. However, Williams may be able to allege additional facts to cure some or all of the deficiencies in his remaining constitutional claims.
Accordingly, all claims for money damages against the Defendants in their official capacities, Williams' Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, his First Amendment access-to-courts claim, his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, and all claims against Defelice, J. Jones, and Reifer should be dismissed with prejudice. Williams' remaining challenged constitutional claims (i.e., his Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement and deliberate indifference to medical needs claims) should be dismissed without prejudice. It is also recommended that Williams be granted leave to file an amended complaint as to the claims dismissed without prejudice within twenty days. If Williams fails to file an amended complaint within this time, the Court should enter an order dismissing those claims against all Defendants with prejudice.
Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint must be complete in all respects and takes the place of the original complaint. As such, the amended complaint must again identify each party and allege the “claims in short, concise, and plain statements.” Fed R. Civ. P. 8. Further, Plaintiff must re-assert in the amended complaint every cause of action from the complaint deemed adequately pled or dismissed without prejudiced. Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 220 (3d Cir. 2017) (“an amended pleading ... supersedes the earlier pleading and renders the original pleading a nullity”).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' partial motion to dismiss the Complaint (ECF No. 29) be GRANTED and that the Court dismiss:
• all constitutional claims for money damages asserted against Defendants in their official capacities;
• the First Amendment access-to-courts claim against S. Jones, Morgan, Reifer, J. Jones, Poborsky, Young, and Neyman;
• the Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims against Rudzienski, Nunez, and Reifer;
• the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim against S. Jones, Neyman, Defelice, and J. Jones;
• all other claims against Defelice and J. Jones;
• the First Amendment retaliation claim against Reifer; and
• the Pennsylvania state tort law claims.
It is further recommended that all of the foregoing claims be dismissed with prejudice, except Williams' Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement and deliberate indifference to medical needs claims.
To aid the Court and parties in future proceedings, the undersigned notes that Williams' First Amendment retaliation claim against S. Jones, Morgan, Poborsky, Young, and Neyman in their individual capacities remains pending and unaffected by this Report and Recommendation. Because the only claim against Defendants Rudzienski and Nunez is Williams' due process claim, concerning which the undersigned recommends dismissal with prejudice, it is further recommended that these Defendants be terminated as parties to the case. Similarly, because the claim or claims against Defendant Reifer are based on conduct that is clearly not actionable under federal law, it is also recommended that she be terminated as a party.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).