Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-2815 SECTION "K"
December 19, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Petitioner's Motion and Incorporated Memorandum for Remand to State Court (Doc. 2) filed by Anne E. Williams ("Williams"). Having reviewed the pleadings, memoranda and the relevant law, the Court finds the motion to have merit.
Williams is an African-American female who is over the age of 40 and is a cancer survivor. She claims that she is the victim of race, gender, age and disability discrimination. Her petition, filed in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, states that on June 4, 2001, she filed a written administrative claim of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Louisiana Commission on Human Rights due to non-promotion based on race and disability. (Petition ¶ II). The investigation proceeded on the basis of race, gender, age and disability. The parties were not able to resolve petitioner's charges of discrimination. Petitioner was issued a "Dismissal and Notice of Rights" dated June 12, 2002. (Petition ¶ III). She filed suit under the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law "as the filing and investigation of a discrimination complaint with the EEOC and the Louisiana Commission of Human Rights constitutes proper notice under La. R. S. 23:303(C)." (Petition ¶ IV). There is no other mention, reference, or reliance on any federal statute extent in the petition.
Because plaintiff in paragraph VI of the petition stated that the "non-exclusive actions of defendants have violated petitioner's rights under the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Act and other yet to be named statutes and acts . . . .", defendant Pan American Life Insurance Company ("Pan American") removed this matter to this Court claiming that plaintiff must be referring to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act ( 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.).
A defendant may remove from state court any civil action of which the federal district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). "Any ambiguities are construed against removal because the removal statute should be strictly construed in favor of remand." Manzella v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 2002 WL 31040170 at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 10, 2002), citing Manguno v. Prudential Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002). "The [well-pleaded complaint] rule makes the plaintiff master of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law." Caterpillar v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429 (1987).
The Court recognizes that this right is trumped where the area of law is preempted by federal legislation, Asunto v. Shoup, 132 F. Supp.2d 445 (5th Cir. 2000), but such is not the case in the area of employment discrimination.
As stated in Manzella:
"under the well-pleaded complaint rule, "federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of plaintiffs properly pleaded complaint.'" Terrebonne Homecare, Inc. v. SMA Health Plan, Inc. 271 F.3d 186, 188 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S.C. § 386, 392 (1987). "When a plaintiff has a choice between federal and state law claims, she may proceed in state court on the exclusive basis of state law, thus defeating the defendant's opportunity to remove." Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., 238 F.3d 674, 680 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted).Id., at *3. Such is the case in the matter before the Court. The only mention of any federal statute was the filing of a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"); however, that does not preclude a finding that she was pursuing her rights under state, rather than federal law. Id., at *4
As noted in Manguno, the "case law is replete" with instances where federal courts have remanded state-based discrimination claims: "based on findings that the plaintiff elected to assert only state law claims, even when the complaints stated facts that would support a Title VII claim, contained more substantial references to Title VII than in the instant case and pled exhaustion of the administrative remedies necessary to bring a Title VII claim." Id at *3 and cases cited therein.
Defendant incorrectly relies on Cook v. Unitrin, Inc., 2002 WL 1359748 (E.D. La. June 4, 2002) for the proposition that "the removal court should inspect the complaint carefully to determine whether a federal claim is necessarily presented, even if the plaintiff has couched his pleading exclusively in terms of state law," citing Sheet Meal Workers Int'l Assoc. v. Carter, 450 U.S. 949 (1981). In Cook, the court found that the Mississippi plaintiffs claims for race discrimination must arise under federal law because the Mississippi law has no cause of action for race discrimination. Here, Louisiana law provides a cause of action as stated in the complaint. This case does not implicate the artful pleading doctrine. Furthermore, defendant's bootstrap argument concerning "complete preemption" under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 ("ERISA") is likewise without merit. A fair reading of the petition does not demonstrate to the Court that plaintiff is seeking benefits since in the same paragraph cited plaintiff admits that she was paid her benefits. There is simply no basis for the removal of this matter to federal court.
Plaintiff seeks costs and attorney's fees incurred by the filing of the Motion to Remand; however, the Court is its discretion denies such relief. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) that the Motion to Remand (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED and this matter is REMANDED to the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans.