Opinion
Case No. C2-01-004
July 15, 2003
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Casey Williams ("Williams"), brought this case under Title IX of the Education Amendments, 20 U.S.C. § 1681-88 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Williams essentially claimed that the Paint Valley Local School District ("school district") was deliberately indifferent to his physical and emotional integrity by permitting a teacher, Harold Arnold ("Arnold"), to remain in the classroom after receiving notice of previous complaints that he had improperly fondled other students. Williams further alleged that Arnold fondled him in an inappropriate sexual manner.
Specifically, Williams alleged that his fourth grade teacher, Harry Arnold, inappropriately touched him over a two-week period. Plaintiff claimed that Arnold directed Williams to sit close to him, then put his arm around him, placed his other hand on the boy's leg and rubbed up and down the inside of his thigh, sometimes coming into contact with Williams' genital area. Plaintiff alleged that Paint Valley knew that Arnold had a predisposition to sexually molest male elementary school students because of previous complaints made by four students in 1976 and one student in 1990. All of the previous complaints of inappropriate touching were similar to Casey Williams' description and came from elementary school-aged boys in Arnold's special education classes. Plaintiff claimed that Paint Valley, by its actions or inactions in response to these previous complaints, was deliberately indifferent to the risk that Arnold would molest another male student, thereby leading to Plaintiff's injury.
This case was tried by a jury from December 9, 2002 through December 20, 2002. Following a presentation of all of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant, Paint Valley Local Schools, on both the Title IX and Section 1983 claims. The Court entered judgment on December 27, 2002 consistent with the verdict. This matter is now before the Court on Plaintiff Casey Williams' Motion for New Trial, or Alternatively, Judgment as a Matter of Law. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's Motion is denied.
I.
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants contended that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's Title IX claim under Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274, 304 (1998) and Davis v. Monroe County Board of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). Paint Valley argued that the school district did not have actual notice of, and was not deliberately indifferent to, the teacher's misconduct against Casey Williams. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that he need not show that the school district was aware of and had actual notice of the alleged specific instances of misconduct as it related to him. Plaintiff argued he could satisfy his burden of proof by demonstrating that Paint Valley was aware of the danger and knew of underlying facts indicating a sufficiently substantial danger to students.
These cases provide that, under Title DC, a school district may be liable for harassment of a student only if the plaintiff demonstrates: (1) a school district official with authority to institute corrective measures. (2) has action notice of; and (3) is deliberately indifferent to the student's harassment. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 304; Davis, 526 U.S. at 642.
In addition to the arguments raised in his memorandum in opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff also argued for a relaxed standard of "actual notice" in his proposed jury instructions. See Plaintiff's proposed jury instructions on "deliberate indifference" and "actual notice." (Parties' Joint Submission of Jury Instructions and Stipulations, at pp. 22-23 (Doc. #97).)
Following a discussion of the dispute in the circuits regarding the contours of "actual notice" in the context of Title IX, this Court agreed with Plaintiff, denied Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and held as follows:
The Court concludes that Gebser does not require that the offending teacher actually committed previous acts of sexual abuse before the school district may be liable for the teacher's misconduct under Title IX. Nor does Gebser require that the appropriate official have actual knowledge of current abuse. Rather, the actual notice standard is met when an appropriate official has actual knowledge of a substantial risk of abuse to children in the school based on prior complaint[s] of other students. While the complaints may be unsubstantiated by corroborating evidence and denied by the allegedly offending teacher, whether such complaints put the school district on notice of a substantial risk to students posed by a teacher is usually question for the jury. This is particularly true in the case at [bar] in which four students and an eyewitness in 1976 and one in 1990 made similar complaints to those made by the Plaintiff.
The evidence of record is at least in dispute as to whether the School District knew that Arnold posed a risk and whether, in light of that risk, they failed to act to protect the students in his classroom. . . .
(Opinion and Order, November 15, 2002, at p. 13, 14.)
II.
Plaintiff now moves for a new trial in this case. Rule 59(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:
A new trial may be granted to al or any of the parties and on all or any part of the issues (1) in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the course of the United States;
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a)(1). A new trial is warranted under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a) when a jury has reached a seriously erroneous result as evidenced by (1) the verdict being against the weight of the evidence; (2) the damages being excessive; or (3) the trial being unfair to the moving party, i.e., the proceedings being influenced by prejudice or bias. Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1045-46 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing, inter alia, Montgomery Ward Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 (1940)).
Plaintiff moves alternatively for judgment as a matter of law. The standard applied to a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 differs from the standard for a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50. Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against the party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue.
In considering a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the Court should review all of the evidence in the record, but, in doing so, must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
III.
Plaintiff makes several arguments in support of his Motion for New Trial including the Court's purported ban on his ability to present closing argument on a key legal standard in the case; defense counsel's alleged misconduct during closing arguments; and claims relating to the weight of the evidence. The Court addresses these arguments below.
A. Jury Instruction on Deliberate Indifference
A primary basis of Plaintiffs Motion relates to the scope and proper definition of the term "deliberate indifference" in the context of Title IX. It is clear that a school district is not vicariously liable under Title IX or Section 1983 for the acts of a teacher. As the Supreme Court determined:
[A] damages remedy will not lie under Title IX [against a school district] unless an official who at a minimum has authority to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the recipient's behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination in the recipient's programs and fails adequately to respond. . . . [T]he response must amount to deliberate indifference to discrimination. . . . The premise, in other words, is an official decision by the recipient not to remedy the violation.Gebser, 524 U.S. at 289.
To that end, the Court gave the following jury instruction on the concept of deliberate indifference as it relates to this Title IX case:
In order for the School District to be liable for acting with deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the School District had actual knowledge of prior facts to which it responded unreasonably. Plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that its response to the abuse, or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of known circumstances. No one particular response is required. A school district's duty to respond may be sparked once it is alerted to the possibility of a sexual abuse. If the school district takes timely measures to end a substantial risk of abuse, it is not deliberately indifferent if such measures are not clearly unreasonable.
Where a school district has knowledge that its remedial action is inadequate and ineffective, it is required to take reasonable action in light of those circumstances to eliminate the behavior. Where a school district has actual knowledge that its efforts to remediate are ineffective, and it continues to use those same methods to no avail, such district has failed to act reasonably in light of the known circumstances.
(Final Instructions to the Jury, "Deliberate Indifference," p. 21.)
Plaintiff argues for a new trial because, inter alia, he contends that this jury instruction was legally incorrect. Because Plaintiff asserts that the definition of deliberate indifference was the central legal concept underlying his case, Plaintiff claims that the instruction was plain error. Plaintiff contends that the error was compounded by defense counsel's repeated reference to the instruction in his closing argument. Plaintiff maintains that the singular or cumulative effect of these factors caused the jury to be confused, biased and mistaken in rendering its verdict.
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff waived his objection to the Court's instruction because he did not object to it. "stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds for the objection" before the jury retired to deliberate, as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 51. A review of the transcript from the charge conference, however, bears out a different conclusion. The parties and the Court discussed and debated the "deliberate indifference" instruction for the majority of the entire conference — for over eleven of the thirty-page transcript. During this discussion of the deliberate indifference standard, both parties raised clear objections relating to the language of the instruction. Plaintiff in particular raised objections to the "clearly unreasonable" aspect of the deliberate indifference instruction. The parties further preserved objections as to the instruction as it related to the Court's previous Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Finally, the parties each agreed that their objections would be preserved for the record.
Less clear, however, is whether Plaintiff objected to the "substantial risk" language of the deliberate indifference instruction as it related to the actual knowledge component of the prima facie case under Title IX. In fact, Plaintiff argued for the substantial risk analysis, as opposed to actual knowledge of the current instance of abuse, both in his Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and in his proposed jury instructions. The Court is not inclined, however, based on the extensive debate over the deliberate indifference standard during the charge conference to make a determination that Plaintiff waived his objection to this or any other provision in the instruction. Accordingly, the Court determines that Fed.R.Civ.P. 51 does not apply in this instance.
Jury instructions are not erroneous if "they adequately inform the jury of the relevant considerations and provide a basis in law for aiding the jury in reaching its determination." Kitchen v. Chippewa Valley Schools, 825 F.2d 1004, 1012 (6th Cir. 1987). "A judgment can be reversed if the instructions, viewed as a whole, were confusing, misleading and prejudicial." Id. at 1011; see also Vance v. Spencer County Public Schools, 231 F.3d 253, 263 (6th Cir. 2000) (describing standard of review for jury instructions).
Plaintiff contends that the Court's jury instruction on deliberate indifference imposed a higher standard than required to establish a school district's liability for the acts of a teacher. In particular, Plaintiff takes exception to that portion of the jury instruction which required a showing that the school district's conduct be "clearly unreasonable." Plaintiff argues that the Supreme Court formulated this more stringent version of the deliberate indifference standard within the framework of student-on-student, peer harassment, but never referred to or intended that it be used in cases of teacher-on-student abuse. The use of the "clearly unreasonable" language in the jury instruction, coupled with defense counsel's use of the term in his closing argument, according to Plaintiff, imposed an elevated standard for evaluation of a school system's remedial action than the standard imposed under Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274 (1989) and further confused the jury on this issue.
In Gebser, the Supreme Court rejected the use of agency principles to impute liability. Instead, the Court held that a school district may be liable under Title IX for monetary damages for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student only if the school district has actual notice of the abuse. 524 U.S. at 283. Moreover, the Court held that a school district may be liable for its failure to react to teacher-student harassment only where the district itself intentionally acted in violation of Title IX by remaining deliberately indifferent. 524 U.S. at 290-91. In Gebser, however, the Court did not elaborate on the standard of deliberate indifference other than to note as follows:
The administrative enforcement scheme presupposes that an official who is advised of a Title IX violation refuses to take action to bring the recipient into compliance. The premise, in other words, is an official decision by the recipient not to remedy the violation. That framework finds a rough parallel in the standard of deliberate indifference. Under a lower standard, there would be a risk that the recipient would be liable in damages not for its own official decision but instead for its employees' independent actions. Comparable considerations led to our adoption of a deliberate indifference standard for claims under § 1983 alleging that a municipality's actions in failing to prevent a deprivation of federal rights was the cause of the violation.
Id. (citations omitted).
A year later, the Supreme Court took up the issue of whether "a private damages action may lie against the school board in cases of student-on-student harassment . . . [and concluded] that it may, but only where the funding recipient acts with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment in its programs or activities." Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 643 (1999). The Court there held that a school district is deemed deliberately indifferent to acts of student-on-student harassment only where its "response to the harassment or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances." Id. at 648.
The Court declines Plaintiff's invitation to draw a distinction between the standard of deliberate indifference in the context of teacher-on-student versus student-on-student abuse. In both Gebser and Davis, the Supreme Court articulated the deliberate indifference standard as requiring proof of more than mere negligence but less than purposeful intent to harm. Later, in Davis, the Supreme Court clarified the concept of deliberate indifference as first set forth in Gebser rather than divining a completely new and separate standard for student-on-student abuse.
Further, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has not differentiated the standard in the two contexts. For instance, in Vance v. Spencer County Public Schools, 231 F.3d 253, 261-263 (6th Cir. 2000), the court set forth various examples of conduct that satisfied the deliberate indifference standard and referred interchangeably to cases involving teacher-on-student and student-on-student abuse. This Court in fact drew much of its instruction on the deliberate indifference standard from the Vance case. (Trans. of Jury Charge Cont, at p. 18-20.) Consequently, the jury instruction in this regard was neither confusing, misleading nor prejudicial.
Plaintiff also maintains that the jury instruction on deliberate indifference incorrectly imposed an Eighth Amendment standard — knowledge of a "substantial risk" of the danger — which Plaintiff contends was plain error. As described above, the Court instructed the jury that Paint Valley had to be aware of a substantial risk that Arnold would inappropriately touch Plaintiff in order to arrive at the conclusion that Paint Valley was deliberately indifferent.
The Court adopted the substantial risk analysis for all of the reasons stated in its Opinion and Order denying in part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and will not repeat the bases here. Suffice to say that, in its Opinion and Order, the Court rejected Defendants' arguments relating to actual notice under Title IX and instead adopted Plaintiff's position that the standard is met when an appropriate official has actual knowledge of a substantial risk of abuse to children in the school based on prior complaints of other students. Plaintiffs argument now that the substantial risk provision in the deliberate indifference instruction was legally incorrect lacks merit.
Contrary to what Plaintiff argues in his Motion for New Trial, the Court did not adopt an Eighth Amendment analysis.
A new trial is not warranted based on the deliberate indifference jury instruction. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion is denied in this respect.
B. Defense Counsel's Remarks and Plaintiff's Presentation During Closing Argument
Plaintiff contends that the Court should order a new trial based on the alleged prejudicial misconduct of counsel during closing argument. Plaintiff maintains that defense counsel improperly instructed the jury on the law in violation of the Court's directives not to do so. Moreover, Plaintiff argues that the Court prohibited his counsel from introducing the full instruction of deliberate indifference in a visual presentation to the jury.
A court may set aside a jury verdict based upon improper conduct of defense counsel during closing argument only when a reasonable probability exists that the jury has been influenced by such prejudicial conduct. Strickland v. Owens Corning, 142 F.3d 353, 358 (6th Cir. 1998) (citations and quotations omitted). Before closing arguments, the Court cautioned both counsel not to read an entire instruction to the jury. The Court noted that reading an entire instruction impinges on the Court's role in instructing the jury as to the applicable law and could potentially diminish juror attentiveness to the actual charge. (Trans. of Closing Arg., at p. 2-3.) The Court specifically advised counsel that they could certainly reference the key standard of deliberate indifference in their closing arguments and cull out particular phrases, but could not read entire pages or paragraphs to the jury. (Trans. of Closing Arg., at p. 3.)
Counsel for Plaintiff initially intended to use a slide containing an entire and lengthy paragraph of the Court's jury instruction relating to the term deliberate indifference for use with her closing argument. Following the Court's ruling that she would not be permitted to place the entire paragraph of the instruction before the jury, she revised her electronic over-head projection slides to bullet-point key phrases. Plaintiff now asserts that the Court prohibited her from conveying the full concept of deliberate indifference and that she "at the direction of the Court . . . did not further discuss or explain the deliberate indifference standard in her closing argument." (Mot. for New Trial, at p. 3.) The Court did not, in any sense, prohibit counsel from discussing or explicating the concept of deliberate indifference. Further, counsel for Defendant did not act in contravention of the Court's instruction prohibiting the attorneys from instructing the jury. Plaintiff maintains that Defendant incorrectly defined deliberate indifference by repeatedly referencing the clearly unreasonable aspect of the Court's instruction. Plaintiff faults defense counsel for using only a portion, or bullet-points of the terms in the instruction.
At the same time, Plaintiff asserts in a somewhat contradictory fashion, that defense counsel disobeyed the Court's directive not to read the entire instruction to the jury. At no point did Plaintiff object to defense counsel's closing arguments. Not surprising, defense counsel's closing argument reviewed the facts and strenuously asserted that the school district did not act or fail to act with deliberate indifference. Reference was made to portions of the jury instructions, although no large blocks of the instructions were read or shown to the jury. Defense counsel also told the jury to follow the Court's instructions if they perceived any discrepancy between what he was saying and what the judge said. (Trans. Closing Args., at p. 24.) The Court finds no misconduct as to the Defendant's closing argument. See Igo v. Coachmen Indus., Inc., 938 F.2d 650, 659 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting standard for granting new trial based on attorney misconduct).
Because Plaintiff also not object to defense counsel's closing argument, "failure to object at trial to closing arguments does raise the degree of prejudice which must be demonstrated in order to get a new trial. . . . Strickland, 142 F.3d at 358 (citing Reese v. Mercury Marine Div. of Brunswick Corp., 793 F.2d 1416, 1429 (5th Cir. 1986)).
Plaintiff also argues that defense counsel engaged in misconduct in his closing argument by tangentially referring to concepts of negligence. He argues that defense counsel's reference to negligence, which he contends is a complicated legal concept, misled and confused the jury as to the legal meaning of deliberate indifference.
Defense counsel stated "Even is you think they were negligent, that's not enough. Deliberate indifference is different than all those. It is a much higher standard. . . ." (Trans. Closing Args., at p. 31.)
Even assuming that a passing reference to the term negligence was prejudicial, "improper comments during closing arguments rarely rise to the level of reversible error." Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1377 (7th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Plaintiff did not object to the statement at the time it was made. Further, Plaintiff had an opportunity to address such issues during rebuttal, but did not. Moreover, the Court specifically instructed the jury to adhere to its instructions and that the Court's instructions, not counsel's comments, controlled their deliberations. (See Final Instructions to Jury, at p. 7.)
When opposing counsel fails to object, the verdict will not be overturned unless defense counsel's conduct was outrageous or egregious and Plaintiff demonstrates some degree of prejudice. Strickland, 142 F.3d at 359. Defense counsel's reference to negligence during closing argument was not egregious or prejudicial to an extent sufficient to warrant a new trial.
C. Defense Counsel's Alleged Prejudicial Misconduct
Plaintiff asserts that defense counsel engaged in prejudicial misconduct by mischaracterizing witnesses' testimony and by referencing evidence that the Court had excluded pursuant to a motion in limine. Further, Plaintiff contends that defense counsel interposed his own personal opinion and vouched for the credibility of defense witnesses during his closing argument. Plaintiff also claims that defense counsel misrepresented his indecision as to calling Harry Arnold as a witness as well as Arnold's availability, which, Plaintiff asserts, prejudiced the presentation of his case.
Plaintiff claims first that during closing argument defense counsel mischaracterized the testimony of Dean Jollay and William Mason. In particular, Plaintiff claims that Jollay testified that he told Paint Valley what its options were for terminating Arnold. Plaintiff asserts that in closing argument, defense counsel told the jury that Jollay gave the school district blanket advice that it did not have to take any remedial action at all because "you don't have enough to go on here." (Trans. Closing Args., p. 39.) Plaintiff was free to clarify any of these alleged discrepancies during his rebuttal. Further, while the comments describing Jolly's testimony were not verbatim recollections, the statements were not at variance with Jolly's own recollection and testimony.
Similarly, Plaintiff argues that defense counsel micharacterized the testimony of William Mason, Plaintiff's expert. Specifically, he contends defense counsel told the jury that even Mason agreed that at some point, he would have stopped watching Arnold in the classroom. Plaintiff argues that, during his trial testimony, Mason clarified his deposition testimony upon which defense counsel relied in making such assertion. Plaintiff claims that defense counsel's description of Mason's testimony left the jury with the impression that Plaintiffs own expert condoned Paint Valley's conduct. At not point did Plaintiff object; he had the opportunity to address these claims in rebuttal. Further, the jury heard Mason's testimony and could evaluate his conclusions. A new trial is warranted only when the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result and cannot, as here, be supported by Plaintiffs bare assertion that defense counsel's allegedly false representation in closing argument improperly influenced the jury.
Plaintiff further asserts the defense counsel improperly remarked about the credibility of Plaintiffs mother, Sara Hart. Referring to the testimony of Plaintiffs expert, Jolie Brains, defense counsel said "Hart did not have a good touch with perception, and I think she (Brains) even used the word `delusional.'" (Closing Args., at p. 57.). The Court had previously ruled by granting in part Plaintiff's motion in limine that Mrs. Hart's emotional or mental difficulties were not relevant in this case except to the extent that her mental state affected her son, Casey Williams. Plaintiff asserts that defense counsel's remarks about Hart were improper because he did not link them to Casey Williams' reactions to the alleged sexual misconduct by his teacher. Defense counsel was commenting on Sara Hart's credibility and did not involve or reference to personal issues and relationships of Hart which the Court excluded. Nor does the comment standing alone provide any basis for concluding that the jury was distracted from the issues before them in favor of focusing on Plaintiffs mother and her difficulties.
Plaintiff contends that defense counsel improperly interjected his opinion during closing argument regarding what evidence and testimony he believed to be true. As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, "personal opinion of counsel has no place at trial." United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749, 754 (6th Cir. 1979). Counsel said among other remarks that "I think Dr. Smandon [the defense expert] has a better opinion on this . . ."; and "I don't see how you can find they were deliberately indifferent. . . ." While these statements may in a literal sense convey counsel's personal beliefs, they are not tantamount to improper vouching. Counsel did not give a personal endorsement or otherwise offer a personal opinion as to the credibility of the witnesses. Moreover, Plaintiff did not object to the comments or request a cautionary instruction from the Court. See Bess, 593 F.2d at 754-88 (refusing to adopt per se rule that all statements of personal belief by counsel constitute reversible error and examining factors courts should consider in assessing complained-of conduct). The Court will not order a new trial based on these comments.
Plaintiff also argues that defense counsel deliberately misled him to believe that the defense would call Harry Arnold as a witness. Plaintiff maintains that his attorney had the impression that defense counsel was in daily contact with Arnold who was supposedly on stand-by to testify, while in reality, defense counsel had no intention of calling Arnold as a witness. At the time of trial, Arnold was out of town and defense counsel had no way of communicating with him. When Plaintiff attempted to subpoena Arnold on December 19th to testify as a rebuttal witness on the last day of a two-week trial, she could not locate him. Consequently, Arnold did not testify at the trial.
While the Court does not condone any type of misleading trial tactics, defense counsel's conduct in this regard does not amount to making a materially false representation. Plaintiff failed to subpoena Arnold and was gambling on Defendant calling him as a witness. Defendant was under no obligation to call any particular witness and was not obliged to present its case in a manner that assists the Plaintiff. No claim is made that defense counsel actually said that he would call Arnold as a witness. The fault for Plaintiffs failure to secure Arnold's attendance at the trial does not lie with defense counsel. Plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial based on defense counsel's alleged prejudicial misconduct is accordingly denied.
D. The Holidays
Plaintiff maintains that scheduling concerns over the holiday season and the prospect of returning to deliberate during the week of Christmas caused jurors to reach an improper compromise or reach a rushed verdict. Plaintiff argues that the jurors may have had personal or outside influences rushing their deliberations such that they instead chose to compromise in order to reach a unanimous verdict.
A verdict that is the result of compromise or similar improper motive may be grounds for a new trial. E.g., Devine v. Patterson, 242 F.2d 828, 832-34 (6th Cir. 1957); Carter v. Moore, 165 F.3d 1071, 1077-78 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting relevant factors in determining whether verdict is result of impermissible compromise include grossly inadequate damages award, close question of liability and odd chronology of jury deliberations). Here, other than Plaintiffs speculation, nothing in the record demonstrates or suggests a compromise character in the verdict. Plaintiff argues that the jury did not take enough time to consider all of the evidence. That the jury took over four hours to deliberate may just as likely indicate the jurors' focus on the central controversy in the case.
Nothing in the case suggests that the jurors rushed or reached an inappropriate compromise in order to arrive at a verdict before the Holiday break. The Court and counsel questioned all of the potential jurors extensively during voir dire regarding their availability during the season. Further, the Court regularly consulted with the jury in open court to address any scheduling concerns. Plaintiff's Motion is denied as to this argument.
E. Jury Verdict Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence
Plaintiff argues that a reasonable jury could not have concluded either that Arnold did not molest Plaintiff or that Paint Valley did not act with deliberate indifference. In considering a motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence:
[T]he trial court must compare the opposing proofs, weigh the evidence, and set aside the verdict if it is of the opinion that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence. . . . It should deny the motion if the verdict is one which could reasonably have been reached, and the verdict should not be considered unreasonable simply because different inferences and conclusions could have been drawn or because other results are more reasonable.J.C. Wyckoff Assocs., Inc. v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 936 F.2d 1474, 1481 (6th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff argues that the evidence regarding whether Arnold inappropriately touched Plaintiff was uncontroverted at trial and thus reasonable jurors could only have concluded that it occurred. Even if the jurors concluded that Arnold did inappropriately touch Plaintiff and therefore violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights, this finding is merely a prerequisite to holding Paint Valley liable, not a categorical determination of liability on the part of the school district. Plaintiff also bore the duty of proving that Paint Valley was deliberately indifferent. On that score, sufficient credible evidence supports the jury's verdict that Paint Valley was not deliberately indifferent. The jury considered evidence that Paint Valley investigated the allegations made against Harry Arnold and took remedial action in response to the claims both in 1976 and 1990. Several years intervened between the previous students' allegations against Arnold and the time of the alleged incidents involving Plaintiff Casey Williams. These factors and this evidence are sufficient to support a reasonable verdict in favor of Paint Valley on the deliberate indifference element of Plaintiff's claims under Title IX and Section 1983. While it is also true that sufficient evidence existed for the jury to find for Plaintiff, it is not the role of this Court to second guess a verdict, so long as the evidence construed in favor of the prevailing party will support a verdict returned to such party.
Viewing and weighing the evidence as a whole, the Court concludes that the jury verdict is not against the clear weight of the evidence. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion is denied.
F. Judgment as a Matter of Law
A court must grant judgment as a matter of law if there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party under controlling law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. The standard applicable to a motion for judgment as a matter of law is substantially the same as a pretrial motion for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ. p. 56. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).
Plaintiff maintains that the evidence demonstrated that Paint Valley failed to take greater remedial action after the 1990 complaint than it did after the 1976 complaints. Because the 1990 complaints to some extent corroborated the 1976 charges, Plaintiff contends that the absence of a stronger response in 1990 than that of 1976 constituted deliberate indifference.
The Sixth Circuit has noted that "[t]he standard announced by the Supreme Court is a `clearly unreasonable response in light of the known circumstances'" Vance v. Spencer County Public School, 231 F.3d 253, 260 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 648). Further, the court held that a school district cannot be required to eradicate all possible harassment, but it can be responsible for a minimalist response:
Thus, where a school district has knowledge that its remedial action is inadequate and ineffective, it is required to take reasonable action in light of those circumstances to eliminate the behavior. Where a school district has actual knowledge that its efforts to remediate are ineffective, and it continues to use those same methods to no avail, such district has failed to act reasonably in light of the known circumstances.
Id. at 261. The court recognized that no particular response is required and indicated that a school district should take immediate and appropriate steps to investigate and to end any harassment or abuse. Id. The court did not, as Plaintiff suggests, determine that a school district would be liable, as a matter of law, if it took the same or similar steps in response to subsequent allegations of sexual misconduct in its schools, even if the allegations involved the same teacher who was the subject of previous complaints.
The jury received this language from the Vance case as part of the deliberate indifference instruction.
Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law is denied. There is a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for Paint Valley under the facts presented in this case. Several witnesses testified with respect to the school district's response to the allegations against Harry Arnold in 1976 and 1990. The evidence in this case was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The Motion for Judgment as a matter of law is therefore denied.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Casey Williams' Motion for New Trial, or Alternatively, Judgment as a Matter of Law is DENIED.