Opinion
C/A 23-670-JD-PJG
01-18-2024
Jonathan Williams, Plaintiff, v. Martin J. O'Malley, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration,[1] Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL FROM THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S DENIAL OF SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
Paige J. Gossett, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This social security matter is before the court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Civil Rule 83.VII.02 (D.S.C.). The plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the defendant, Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), denying the plaintiff's claims for social security benefits.
Part I-Plaintiff seeks:
[] Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”): Plaintiff's age at filing:
[x] Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”): Date last insured: December 31, 2025
[] Other:
Application Dated: August 23, 2021
Plaintiff's Year of Birth: 1981
Plaintiff's alleged onset Dated: January 21, 2019
Part II-Social Security Disability Generally
Under 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), (d)(5), and/or 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(H)(i), as well as pursuant to the regulations formulated by the Commissioner, the plaintiff has the burden of proving disability, which is defined as an “inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a) and/or § 416.905(a); see also Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1973). The regulations generally require the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) to consider five issues in sequence, as outlined below. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a)(4) and/or § 416.920(a)(4). If the ALJ can make a determination that a claimant is or is not disabled at any point in this process, review does not proceed to the next step. Id.
A claimant has the initial burden of showing that he/she is unable to return to past relevant work because of his/her impairments. Once the claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. To satisfy this burden, the Commissioner must establish that the claimant has the residual functional capacity, considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and impairments, to perform alternative jobs that exist in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) and/or § 1382c(a)(3)(A)-(B); see also McLain v. Schweiker, 715 F.2d 866, 868-69 (4th Cir. 1983); Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260, 264-65 (4th Cir. 1981); Wilson v. Califano, 617 F.2d 1050, 1053 (4th Cir. 1980). The Commissioner may carry this burden by obtaining testimony from a vocational expert. Grant v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 189, 192 (4th Cir. 1983).
Part III-Administrative Proceedings
Date of ALJ Decision: October 4, 2022
In applying the requisite five-step sequential process, the ALJ found:
Step 1: Plaintiff was engaged in substantial gainful activity from January 2019-March 2020:
[x] Yes [] No
However, there has been a continuous 12-month period(s) during which Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity. The remaining findings address the period(s) Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity.
Step 2: [x] Plaintiff has the following severe impairments:
[O]besity, lumbar degenerative disc disease, tinnitus/hearing loss, patella pain syndrome, obstructive sleep apnea, and posttraumatic stress disorder (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).
[] Plaintiff does not have a severe impairment.
Step 3: [x] Plaintiff's impairment(s) does/do not meet or medically equal a Listing. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
Step 4: Plaintiff's Residual Functional Capacity is as follows:
[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except he requires a sit/stand option defined as limiting standing and walking to 4 hours; he can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; he can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; he must avoid exposure to excessive noise, defined as moderate SCO level 3; he must avoid exposure to hazards such as heights and machinery; work is limited to simple routine, repetitive tasks with few, if any, workplace changes; and he can frequently interact with the public, coworkers, and supervisors.
[] Plaintiff could return to his/her past relevant work.
Step 5: [] Plaintiff could not return to his/her past relevant work, but using the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (“Grids”) as a framework supports a finding that Plaintiff is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App'x 2.
[x] Plaintiff could not return to his/her past relevant work, but there are jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, as follows:
[O]ffice helper (DOT Code 239.567-010) (unskilled SVP 2 in nature and light exertionally) with 37,360 such positions existing nationally; information clerk (DOT Code 237.367-018) (unskilled SVP 2 in nature and light exertionally) with 105,737 such positions existing nationally; and inspector/surgical instruments (DOT Code 712.684-050) (unskilled SVP 2 in nature and light exertionally) with 57,695 such positions existing nationally.
Date of Appeals Council decision: December 20, 2022
Part IV-Standard of Review
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court may review the Commissioner's denial of benefits. However, this review is limited to considering whether the Commissioner's findings “are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standard.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). Thus, the court may review only whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law was applied. See Brown v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 873 F.3d 251, 267 (4th Cir. 2017); Myers v. Califano, 611 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir. 1980). “Substantial evidence” means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589; see also Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019); Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204, 207 (4th Cir. 2015). “Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence' to support the agency's factual determinations.” Biestek, 139 S.Ct. at 1154 (citation omitted). In reviewing the evidence, the court may not “undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Craig, 76 F.3d at 589; see also Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, even if the court disagrees with the Commissioner's decision, the court must uphold it if it is supported by substantial evidence. Blalock, 483 F.2d at 775.
Part V-Issue for Judicial Review
Residual Functional Capacity. The RFC assessment must be a reasoned assessment of all of the relevant evidence. The ALJ here failed to include significant limitations resulting from Williams' impairments and failed to provide an adequate discussion rejecting those limitations. Can a decision based upon an incomplete and inaccurate assessment of a claimant's RFC be supported by substantial evidence?(Pl.'s Br., ECF No. 7.)
Although Plaintiff's table of contents lists two issues, the second issue appears to have been listed by mistake as he briefs only the first issue.
Oral Argument:
[] Held on.
[x] Not necessary for recommendation.
Summary of Reasons
A claimant's residual functional capacity is “the most [a claimant] can still do despite [his] limitations” and is determined by assessing all of the relevant evidence in the case record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). In assessing residual functional capacity, an ALJ should scrutinize “all of the relevant medical and other evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). Social Security Ruling 96-8p further requires an ALJ to reference the evidence supporting his conclusions with respect to a claimant's residual functional capacity. Further, “remand may be appropriate . . . where an ALJ fails to assess a claimant's capacity to perform relevant functions, despite contradictory evidence in the record, or where other inadequacies in the ALJ's analysis frustrate meaningful review.” Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013)) (alterations in original); see also Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 188 (4th Cir. 2016).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has repeatedly stated that “[a]n ALJ has the obligation to consider all relevant medical evidence and cannot simply cherrypick facts that support a finding of nondisability while ignoring evidence that points to a disability finding.” Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 869 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010)); see also Arakas v. Comm'r, 983 F.3d 83, 98 (4th Cir. 2020). Moreover, an ALJ continues to have an obligation to “include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each conclusion.” Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 190 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 636 (4th Cir. 2015)); see also SSR 96-8p. Similarly, remand may be appropriate when the courts are left to guess at how the ALJ arrived at the conclusions and meaningful review is frustrated. Mascio, 780 F.3d 636-37. The ALJ must “build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusions.” Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189.
Here, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to explain why, although he found the state agency reviewers' opinion to be persuasive, he failed to include their opinion limiting Plaintiff to “simple, one to two step tasks” in Plaintiff's RFC. Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff's need for an assistive device, pointing to evidence regarding Plaintiff's cane need and usage.
The state agency reviewers' opined that Plaintiff should be limited to simple, one-to-two step tasks. The ALJ acknowledged this part of their opinions and stated that he found their opinions persuasive; however, he failed to explain why he did not include this limitation in Plaintiff's RFC, and instead limited Plaintiff to “simple routine, repetitive tasks.” This difference in limitation matters because if Plaintiff were limited to “simple, one-to-two step tasks,” there may be an apparent conflict between the jobs identified by the vocational expert and the DOT. See, e.g., Henderson v. Colvin, 643 Fed.Appx. 273 (4th Cir. 2016) (remanding and holding an apparent conflict existed between a limitation to “simple one-to-two step tasks with low stress” and GED reasoning level two); Rounds v. Comm'r, 807 F.3d 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that reasoning code 2 requires additional reasoning and understanding above the ability to complete one-to-two step tasks); but see Lawrence v. Saul, 941 F.3d 140 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding no conflict between a limitation of “simple, routine, repetitive tasks” and jobs with a GED reasoning level two).
Although the Henderson Court ultimately stated “that there is an apparent conflict between an RFC that limits Henderson to one-to-two step instructions and GED Reasoning Code 2,” the opinion makes it clear that the court was considering Henderson's limitation to “simple one-to-two step tasks.” Henderson, 643 Fed.Appx. at 276-78.
Although an ALJ is not required to accept every limitation opined when he finds an opinion persuasive, the ALJ still “must ‘build an accurate and logical bridge' from the evidence to their conclusions.” Arakas, 983 F.3d at 95 (quoting Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189). Contrary to the Commissioner's argument and the cases cited, the ALJ's discussion here is not sufficient to permit meaningful review of the decision as it is not clear why the ALJ found Plaintiff was not limited to “simple, one-to-two step tasks.” See Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189-90; Mascio, 780 F.3d 636-37; see also Lewis, 858 F.3d at 869 (“An ALJ has the obligation to consider all relevant medical evidence and cannot simply cherrypick facts that support a finding of nondisability while ignoring evidence that points to a disability finding.”) (quoting Denton, 596 F.3d at 425). Accordingly, the court is constrained to recommend that this matter be remanded for further consideration and explanation of this issue.
In light of this recommendation, the court need not address Plaintiff's remaining argument, as it may be rendered moot on remand. See Boone v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 203, 211 n.19 (3d Cir. 2003) (remanding on other grounds and declining to address claimant's additional arguments). Moreover, if necessary, Plaintiff may present his remaining argument concerning the ALJ's alleged failure to properly consider his cane usage on remand.
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that this matter be
[] Affirmed. Plaintiff has failed to show that the Commissioner's decision was unsupported by substantial evidence or controlled by an error of law.
[x] Reversed and remanded pursuant to K Sentence Four [] Sentence Six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further consideration consistent with this Order.
[] Reversed and remanded for an award of benefits.
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).