Opinion
21-CV-8235 (PAE) (RWL)
03-03-2023
SEAN WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT and NYU LANGONE MEDICAL CENTER, Defendants.
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION TO HON. PAUL A. ENGELMAYER: RULE 11 SANCTIONS
ROBERT W. LEHRBURGER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
This is the third meritless lawsuit filed in this District by Plaintiff Sean Williams (“Plaintiff” or “Williams”) against his employer New York University Langone Health (“NYULH”) over garnishment of his wages due to failure to pay child support pursuant to a state court order. Courts previously rejected two virtually identical actions filed by Williams against NYULH, and the District Judge in this most recent iteration of Williams' claim dismissed it sua sponte as having no merit and barred by the doctrines of res judicata and claim preclusion - just as the Court in the second action did. NYULH has now moved for sanctions against Williams pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 (“Rule 11”) based on his meritless and vexatious filings. For the following reasons, I recommend that the motion be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
The Complaint incorrectly identifies NYULH as NYU Langone Medical Center.
Background
A. The Three Actions
Williams has proceeded pro se in each of the three actions. He first filed a lawsuit in this District against an NYU affiliate (NYU Hospital Center Finance & Payroll Support) on December 18, 2019. Williams v. NYU Hospital Center Finance & Payroll Support, No. 19-CV-11612 (S.D.N.Y.). In that case, Williams alleged that the defendant unlawfully garnished his wages in violation of his right to substantive due process. On April 14, 2020, the Court sua sponte dismissed the complaint on multiple grounds, including failure to state a claim; lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and because it was barred by the doctrine of domestic relations abstention. (Dkt. 14-1 at ECF 2-10.) Williams appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and, on September 23, 2020, the appeal was denied. Williams v. NYU Hospital Center Finance & Payroll Support, Case No. 20-1631.
Under the Second Circuit's domestic relations abstention doctrine, federal district courts are to abstain from exercising federal-question jurisdiction over claims involving domesticrelations issues, so long as those claims can be fully and fairly determined in the state courts. See Deem v. DiMella-Deem, 941 F.3d 618, 621 (2d Cir. 2019).
On May 21, 2020, Williams, filed a nearly identical lawsuit in this District against the Director of NYULH's Employee & Labor Relations, again challenging the garnishment of his wages to satisfy his child support obligations. Williams v. Cooper, No. 20-CV-4125 (S.D.N.Y.). On September 3, 2020, the Court sua sponte dismissed the complaint as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. (Dkt. 14-2 at ECF 54-59.)
On October 5, 2021, Williams filed the instant action, yet another nearly identical lawsuit against NYULH challenging the garnishment of his wages. (Dkt. 1, “Compl.”.) On June 29, 2022, NYULH appeared and filed a letter setting forth the history of the matter and suggesting that the Court consider sua sponte dismissal. (Dkt. 14.) On July 11, 2022, the District Judge did just that, sua sponte dismissing the Complaint with prejudice as having no merit and barred by the doctrines of res judicata and claim preclusion. (Dkt. 18.) The Court mailed a copy of the dismissal order to Williams at his home address. (See unnumbered ECF entry on July 13, 2022.)
B. Service Of The Summons And Complaint
As one ground for seeking sanctions, NYULH points to the fact that it received service of the identical Complaint from the instant action in November 2022 despite having been dismissed with prejudice in July 2022. (Dkt. 24 at 5.) Because NYULH appears to have assumed incorrectly that Williams personally was responsible for reserving the Complaint in November 2022, the Court sets forth the history of service of the summons and Complaint in this action.
Affidavits of service of the summons and Complaint first appeared on the docket in early April 2022. (Dkts. 8-9.) Those affidavits indicate service by mail and are attested to by a person named Delroy Jones. Service merely by mail, however, was not proper service. Accordingly, as Williams was unrepresented, on May 31, 2022, the Court sua sponte issued an order directing service to be made by the U.S. Marshal. (Dkt. 10.)
On July 8, 2022, an affidavit of service was filed by a process server attesting to service having been made personally on NYULH on June 24, 2022. (Dkt. 16.) As noted above, NYULH then appeared in the action on June 29, 2022 (Dkt. 13), and the Court dismissed the case on July 11, 2022 (Dkt. 18). Then, on November 9, 2022, a Process Receipt and Return was filed, attesting to service of the identical summons and Complaint on NYULH on November 8, 2022, almost four months after the case had been dismissed. (Dkt. 19.) NYULH attributes the November 2022 service to Williams. But an examination of the process receipt reveals on its face that Williams likely was not responsible for the November service. The receipt is a United States Marshal form (Form USM-285). Prior to service, the form was filled out by S. Harrold, the “Authorized USMS Deputy or Clerk,” on June 1, 2022. June 1, 2022 was the day immediately following May 31, 2022, when the Court issued the order for service to be made by the U.S. Marshals Service. (Dkt. 10.) The form was then completed under signature of the “US. Marshal or Deputy” attesting to service on November 8, 2022. (Dkt. 19.)
In short, service on November 8, 2022, seems to have been nothing more than belated execution by the U.S. Marshal of the service order issued on May 31, 2022. NYULH has not provided any contrary evidence suggesting that Williams prompted the November 2022 service.
C. NYULH's Motion For Sanctions
On November 29, 2022, NYULH filed a letter with the Court recounting the history of the case, including the November 2022 service of the same Complaint that had been dismissed on July 11, 2022, and requesting a conference to discuss NYULH's desire to file a motion for Rule 11 sanctions. (Dkt. 20.) The Court denied the request for a conference but set a briefing schedule in the event that NYULH proceeded with filing the motion. (Dkt. 21.) In doing so, the Court recited in particular the fact that the “identical complaint was served on [NYULH]” on November 9, 2022, even after the Complaint already had been dismissed with prejudice. (Id.)
NYULH filed its motion for sanctions on December 9, 2022. (Dkt. 23.) As grounds for sanctions, NYULH relies on both (1) Williams' repeated filing of the virtually identical claim despite previous dismissals with prejudice, and (2) service of the Complaint in November 2022 in the instant action after the Court already had dismissed it in July 2022. (Dkt. 24 at 3-5.) NYULH asks that the Court require Williams to pay NYULH double the attorneys' fees it incurred in defending this third action. NYULH also asks that the Court impose a filing injunction, requiring Williams to obtain authority from the Court before filing any additional actions against NYULH. (Dkt. 24 at 5-6.)
NYULH filed proof of service of its motion papers on Williams on December 12, 2022, by overnight delivery. (Dkt. 26.) Williams did not file any response by the December 23, 2022 deadline for doing so. (See Dkt. 21.) Accordingly, on December 29, 2022, the Court issued an order sua sponte extending Williams' response deadline to allow for a late filing. The Court's order warned that “If no response from Plaintiff is received by January 2, 2023, the motion may be granted for that reason alone, and the Court will decide the motion on the existing record.” (Dkt. 28.) A copy of the order was sent to Plaintiff. (See unnumbered docket entry dated January 3, 2023.) Plaintiff still did not file a response and has not done so at any time since.
On January 6, 2023, the Clerk of Court received as returned and undeliverable the Court's December 12, 2022 order that referred the matter to me for report and recommendation. (See unnumbered docket entry dated January 6, 2023.) No such return was received, however, in connection with service of either the Court's order setting forth the briefing schedule for the sanctions motion (Dkt. 21), or the Court's order sua sponte extending the response deadline (Dkt. 28).
The matter has been referred to me for report and recommendation. (Dkt. 25.)
Legal Standards For Rule 11 Sanctions
Under Rule 11(b), whenever a pleading or “other paper” is filed, an attorney or litigant certifies that “to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances”:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Accordingly, sanctions may be imposed “when court filings are used for an ‘improper purpose,' or when claims are not supported by existing law, lack evidentiary support, or are otherwise frivolous.” Ipcon Collections LLC v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 698 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 2012); accord Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 131 (2d Cir. 2002) (a submission violates Rule 11 “either when it has been interposed for any improper purpose, or where, after reasonable inquiry, a competent attorney could not form a reasonable belief that the pleading is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law”) (internal quotation marks and original emphasis omitted). “[T]he standard for triggering the award of fees under Rule 11 is objective unreasonableness.” Margo v. Weiss, 213 F.3d 55, 65 (2d Cir. 2000).
Rule 11 is “aimed at curbing abuses of the judicial system,” Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 542, 111 S.Ct. 922, 928 (1991), and to “guard[] against frivolous, vexatious, or scurrilous lawsuits.” Murawski v. Pataki, 514 F.Supp.2d 577, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). The rule applies to pro se litigants as well as attorneys and their clients. Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b) (imposing requirement on both attorneys and “unrepresented part[ies]); Ferguson v. Commissioner of Tax and Finance, 739 Fed.Appx. 19, 22 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Although courts may afford them greater leniency, pro se litigants are not immune from Rule 11 sanctions”); Mantis Transportation v. Kenner, 45 F.Supp.3d 229, 253 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[i]t is well-settled that Rule 11 applies to pro se litigants”).
Upon finding that a party has violated Rule 11, the Court may, but is not required, to impose sanctions. Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c) (“[i]f, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation”) (emphasis added). Whether to impose sanctions “is within the Court's broad discretion.” Landmark Ventures, Inc. v. Cohen, No. 13-CV-9044, 2014 WL 6784397, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2014) (citing Rule 11(c)(1) and Knipe v. Skinner, 19 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Discussion
A. The Criteria For Rule 11 Sanctions Has Been Met
In filing his Complaint in the instant action, Williams violated both subsections (1) (improper purpose) and (2) (legal frivolousness) of Rule 11(b).
The same or virtually identical claim had been dismissed twice, with prejudice. In the first action, the Court dismissed Williams' complaint sua sponte, determining that the claim had no merit and that, in any event, it did not belong in federal court. In the second action, the Court again determined, sua sponte, that the claim had no merit and was barred by the doctrines of res judicata and claim preclusion. With full knowledge of those rulings, Williams nevertheless filed the instant third action asserting the same claims. It was objectively unreasonable for him to do so; he did not provide, and the Court is not aware of, any basis that would support reasserting his claim against NYULH under existing law or any non-frivolous extension or modification of the law. Williams' filing of the instant third action alleging the same claim thus violated Rule 11. See, e.g., Edwards v. Barclays Services Corp., No. 19-CV-9326, 2020 WL 3446870, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2020) (determining that “Plaintiff was fully aware that the current case was frivolous ... considering his robust prior experience with the doctrine of res judicata in prior actions”) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Mu-Hammad, No. 17-MC-6008, 2017 WL 2799298, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. June 27, 2017) (finding that plaintiff's “continuing propensity for filing multiple frivolous, baseless and repetitive cases in this Court and his obvious intent to continue to file frivolous, baseless and repetitive cases in this Court,” made it “unquestionably necessary and warranted for the Court to impose an appropriate sanction pursuant to Rule 11”).
In addition to having no legal basis for his claim, it can be reasonably inferred that Williams intended to file this third action for the improper purpose of harassing NYULH. There is no other reasonable inference that can be drawn from Williams having now filed the same claim against NYULH (or its affiliates) for a third time, despite the two previous sua sponte dismissals. See Knipe, 19 F.3d at 77 (holding that the lack of merit of a second-filed action following dismissal of first action supported district court's conclusion that plaintiff was “pursuing a personal agenda against the [defendants]”); Edwards, 2020 WL 3446870, at *5 (concluding that plaintiff's case was not only frivolous but also “vexatious” given prior history of dismissal including for res judicata).
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Court recommends imposition of Rule 11 sanctions. A deterrent is needed to forestall further frivolous lawsuits against NYULH in this Court and to forestall the wasteful expenditure of both NYULH and the Court's resources in dealing with Williams' vexatious filings.
B. The Appropriate Sanction
Courts consider a number of factors in determining an appropriate sanction, including:
(1) whether the improper conduct was willful, or negligent; (2) whether it was part of a pattern o[f] activity, or an isolated event; (3) whether it infected the entire pleading, or only one particular count or defense; (4) whether the person has engaged in similar conduct in other litigation; (5) what effect it had on the litigation process in time or expense; (6) whether the responsible person is trained in the law; (7) what amount, given the financial resources of the responsible person, is needed to deter that person from repetition in the same case.Bobcar Media, LLC v. Aardvark Event Logistics, Inc., No. 16-CV-885, 2019 WL 422613, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2019) (citing Continental Casualty Co. v. Marshall Granger & Co., No. 11-CV-3979, 2017 WL 1901969, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2017)) (internal alteration and additional citation omitted). When fashioning a sanction, “courts must remain mindful that the point of Rule 11 sanctions is not to compensate or reimburse the defendants for the totality of their losses, but rather to punish and to deter future similar conduct.” Tantaros v. Fox News Network LLC, No. 17-CV-2958, 2018 WL 1662779, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. March 16, 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under Rule 11, sanctions must be “limited to what [is sufficient] to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(4).
The first five factors all point toward the need for effective sanctions. Williams acted willfully, which is the only conclusion that can be drawn from his repeated filing of the same claim despite previous dismissal. His current Complaint is part of a continuing pattern of filing the same frivolous claim in successive litigations. The defect at issue is the entirety of his claim in federal court, not merely one cause of action or argument among other non-frivolous ones. And by filing the instant action, Williams has caused NYULH to incur legal fees and expenses, and the Court to incur substantial time in disposing of the case, that otherwise could have been devoted to litigants with non-frivolous claims.
The last two factors, however, weigh in favor of moderating the sanctions imposed. It is apparent from his filings that Williams is not a lawyer or otherwise formally trained in the law. That is only of limited significance, however, given that Williams knew, or should have known, from two previous suits that his claim lacked merit and was barred by the previous actions. Indeed, in the order dismissing the second action, the Court made clear that Williams' claim could not be saved by making changes or additions: “Because the defects in Plaintiff's complaint cannot be cured with an amendment, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint.” (Dkt. 14-2 at ECF at 59).
Finally, although proceeding pro se, Williams did not apply to proceed in forma pauperis, instead paying the $402 filing fee. (See unnumbered docket entry dated November 16, 2021.) The Court has no information about Williams' financial resources other than knowledge that he has been employed by NYULH in a job and that during 2019, he earned a base amount of approximately $44,000 before overtime. (See Compl. at ECF at 12.) The Court reasonably infers from this limited information that Williams is of modest means.
NYULH contends that “[t]he only deterrents sufficient to prevent Plaintiff from filing yet another baseless complaint against NYULH are the award to NYULH of double attorneys' fees expended in defense of the frivolous Complaint and an order precluding Plaintiff from further filings against NYULH without leave of the Court.” (Dkt. 24 at 67.) Based on the factors assessed above, the Court finds that a financial sanction is not appropriate at this time. First, although Williams acted willfully in filing the instant Complaint, he is not a lawyer and likely knew nothing about Rule 11 until NYULH filed this motion.
Second, Williams received no warning. Rule 11 generally requires that before filing a Rule 11 motion, the aggrieved party provide the offending party with notice and an opportunity to withdraw the pleading. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(2). Nothing on the docket shows that NYULH formally adhered to that procedure, and NYULH has made no representation in its motion that it did so. And in its letter to the Court suggesting the Court consider sua sponte dismissal, NYULH did not mention Rule 11 or sanctions. Had it done so, Williams at least would have had warning that if he did not withdraw the Complaint he could be subject to Rule 11 sanctions. But that is not what happened. See Murawski, 514 F.Supp.2d at 590 (in considering sanctions, courts may consider “whether the litigant has been warned of the possible imposition of sanctions”) (citations omitted).
Third, NYULH only indicated its intent to seek sanctions after it received service of the identical Complaint in November 2022 following dismissal in July 2022. (Dkt. 20.) In its letter requesting a conference, NYULH asserted that Williams had “disregarded” the Court's July dismissal order by re-serving the Complaint on November 8, 2022. (Dkt. 20 at 2.) And in authorizing NYULH to proceed with its sanctions motion, the Court relied on that representation. As set forth above, however, the evidence before the Court suggests that the November 2022 service was not made by Williams, but instead by the U.S. Marshal, belatedly executing the Court's service order issued on May 31, 2022.
Fourth, given what appear to be modest financial resources, awarding attorneys' fees, let alone double attorneys' fees, strikes the Court as excessive. See Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Association v. County of Albany, 369 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (“Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting mechanism and does not create an entitlement to attorney's fees”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). All the cases cited by NYULH in support of awarding attorneys' fees as a sanction are distinguishable as none involve the combination of countervailing factors just described.
See Manwani v. Brunelle, 99 F.3d 400, 1995 WL 732686 (Table), at *2 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming sanctions against pro se plaintiff “addicted to vexatious litigation” concerning tax treatment of his securities transactions and accounts); Caisse Nationale De Credit Agricole-CNCA, New York Branch v. Valcorp, Inc., 28 F.3d 259, 265 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming sanctions against attorneys signing “preposterous” pleadings); Fox v. Boucher, 794 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1986) (awarding double attorneys' fees against pro se attorney who filed meritless case out of “spite”); Johnson ex rel. Wilson v. Dowd, 345 F. App'x. 26 (5th Cir. 2009) (sanctions against attorney following Rule 11 notice procedure); Lee v. Lending Tree, 473 F.Supp.2d 435, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (dismissing pleading but granting pro se plaintiff leave to amend and only warning that “if he fails to comply with Rule 11's requirements by filing frivolous or unsubstantiated claims, he is subject to monetary and non-monetary sanctions”).
Although monetary sanctions are not warranted at this juncture, non-monetary sanctions are. Specifically, the Court agrees with NYULH that a narrow filing injunction should issue that prohibits Williams from filing any new case in the Southern District of New York against NYULH without first obtaining leave of the Court. “If a litigant has a history of filing vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits, courts may impose sanctions, including restrictions on future access to the judicial system.” Hong Mai Sa v. Doe, 406 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Edwards, 2020 WL 3446870, at *5 (“An injunction against future lawsuits is an available remedy in appropriate circumstances and has been applied where litigants file repeated lawsuits relating to the same case”) (cleaned up). The Court derives the authority to impose such an injunction from multiple sources, including “both the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), see Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 23-25 (2d Cir. 1986), as well as its inherent authority, see Lacy v. Principi, 317 F.Supp.2d 444, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).” Edwards, 2020 WL 3446870, at *5. The Court “also maintains the ‘constitutional obligation to protect [its] jurisdiction from conduct which impairs [its] ability to carry out Article III functions.'” Id. (quoting In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1261 (2d Cir. 1984)).
In determining whether an injunction against further litigation is appropriate, the Court must consider: “(1) the litigant's history of litigation and in particular whether it entailed vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the litigant's motive in pursuing the litigation, e.g., does the litigant have an objective good faith expectation of prevailing?; (3) whether the litigant is represented by counsel; (4) whether the litigant has caused needless expense to other parties or has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts and their personnel; and (5) whether other sanctions would be adequate to protect the courts and other parties.” Id. (quoting Safir, 792 F.2d at 24).
Consideration of those factors weighs strongly in favor of a filing injunction, albeit a narrow one. Williams' frivolous Complaint in the instant action was preceded by his two earlier suits asserting essentially the same claim that was twice dismissed with prejudice. As explained above, Williams' motivation to harass can be inferred from his repeated filings. Williams' repeated filings have imposed needless legal costs on NYULH and occupied the Court with having to manage and issue opinions and orders in multiple frivolous cases. Although Williams is not represented by counsel, filing injunctions are a well-recognized sanction imposed on pro se litigants who repeatedly file meritless lawsuits. See, e.g., Edwards, 2020 WL 3446870, at *6 (enjoining pro se plaintiff “from filing any new action in connection with any credit card issued to Plaintiff by Defendant, or related to the facts or claims in his prior lawsuits against Defendant,” as well as requiring plaintiff to attach to future complaints regardless of subject matter both the injunction order and an attestation that the complaint does not violate the order); Satterfeld v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 04-CV-3782, 2005 WL 1765708, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2005) (enjoining pro se plaintiff “from instituting any new action, in state or federal court, based on the acts complained of in this litigation” due to repeated attempts to litigate); Lacy, 317 F.Supp.2d at 449-50 (enjoining pro se plaintiff who repeatedly filed suits barred by res judicata from filing suit in any court related to same nucleus of facts).
Finally, the Court can think of no lesser sanction that would be a deterrent to further vexatious filings against NYULH. A filing injunction is appropriate in such circumstances. The scope of that injunction, however, should be limited to the subject matter of the repetitive, frivolous actions - i.e., garnishment of Williams' wages. In the event that Williams were to file a frivolous case involving different subject matter, the Court could at that time consider whether a broader filing injunction is warranted. For now, however, the only subject matter at issue has been garnishment. The injunction should be tailored accordingly.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend GRANTING NYULH's motion in part and DENYING it in part. Specifically, I recommend that the Court not impose monetary sanctions but instead issue an order that (1) imposes a limited filing injunction against Williams prohibiting him from filing any future lawsuits against NYULH concerning garnishment of his wages without first seeking leave of court, and (2) warning Williams that if he files future frivolous actions against NYULH, he may be subject to additional sanctions, including monetary payment.
Service
Defendants shall serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff by any means previously approved by the Court.
Right To Object And Preserve Appellate Review
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b), the parties shall have fourteen (14) days to file written objections to this recommendation. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court, with extra copies delivered to the Chambers of the Honorable Paul A. Engelmayer, 40 Foley Square, New York, New York 10007, and to the Chambers of the undersigned, 500 Pearl Street, New York, New York 10007. Failure to file timely objections will preclude the right to object and also will preclude appellate review.