Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4638-12T3
09-12-2014
RONALD WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
Ronald Williams, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Andrew J. Sarrol, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Hayden and Leone. On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections. Ronald Williams, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Andrew J. Sarrol, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Inmate Ronald Williams, while incarcerated at New Jersey State Prison, was found guilty of disciplinary infractions for committing the following prohibited acts in violation of N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a): *.002, assaulting any person; *.154, tampering with or blocking any locking device; and *.306, conduct which disrupts or interferes with the security or orderly running of the correctional facility. He appeals the final decision and sanctions imposed by the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC). Having thoroughly considered the record before us, we affirm.
The record reveals that on March 15, 2013, at approximately 7:50 a.m., Senior Corrections Officer Taylor allowed Williams out of his cell to utilize the shower. After observing a panel indicator light activate showing that the shower door was securely locked, Taylor allowed another inmate, Shaheed Williams, to exit his cell to use the telephone. At that point Senior Corrections Officer Payne, who was also in the area, observed Williams push open the shower door and assault Shaheed. As a result, Payne called a "Code 33," requiring staff from all areas of the prison to respond and cease all movements in that part of the prison. Taylor then inspected the shower finding that the light fixture was not properly secured and a 3/4 inch piece of magnet was stuck to the side panel of the shower door, which appeared to prevent the door from fully closing. As a result of this incident, Williams was issued disciplinary charges for assault, tampering with or blocking a locking device, and disrupting the security or orderly running of the prison. The next day, Sergeant Gilmartin conducted an investigation, determined the charges had merit, and referred the case to a hearing officer.
As this inmate shares a common last name with appellant, we will refer to him using his first name, meaning no disrespect.
At the initial disciplinary hearing on March 18, 2013, Williams pled not guilty and requested, and was granted, a counsel substitute. The hearing was then adjourned to allow for the preparation of confrontation questions. At the subsequent hearing on March 22, 2013, both Williams and his counsel substitute declined to make an oral statement. Williams did not call any witnesses or present any questions for confrontation. Williams' only submission was a written statement in which he claimed that he was unable to mount a defense because he was placed in "a dry and empty cell" where he was unable to turn the lights on or off, did not have access to his documentary evidence including his legal reading and writing materials, and was unable to properly consult with his counsel substitute. Williams requested that his charges be dismissed because he was "denied the right to collect or gather evidence and adequately present his case and present documentary evidence, and the ability to cross-examine adverse witnesses."
The hearing officer found Williams guilty on all three charges based on the prison staff's reports that Williams utilized a magnet to break out of the unit shower and assault a fellow inmate, which resulted in the halting of prison activity for a period of time. The hearing officer noted that Williams presented no evidence to contradict these facts beyond his claim that he had been placed in a "dry cell." For the *.002 charge, the hearing officer imposed 15 days' detention with credit for time served, 30 days' loss of recreation privileges, 300 days' administrative segregation, 300 days' loss of commutation time, and 300 days' loss of telephone privileges. For the *.154 charge, the hearing officer imposed 300 days' administrative segregation, 300 days' loss of commutation time, and 300 days' loss of television privileges. For the *.306 charge, the hearing officer imposed 15 days' detention with credit for time served, 300 days' administrative segregation, 300 days' loss of commutation time, and 300 days' loss of radio privileges.
On March 25, 2013, Williams administratively appealed his charges. He claimed that, because he was placed in an "empty dry specially designed cell" without access to his personal property, he was denied his rights to adequate and effective representation, to present documentary evidence, to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and to his fundamental procedural safeguards. On April 1, 2013, the Administrator denied Williams' appeal and upheld the hearing officer's decision. The Administrator upheld the decision and sanctions finding that "there was compliance with the New Jersey Administrative Code on inmate discipline, which prescribes procedural safeguards." This appeal followed.
On appeal, Williams raises the following contention:
POINT I: APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS PERSONAL ITEMS (PROPERTY), CONTRARY TO N.J.A.C. 10A:4-10.6, AS A RESULT PREVENTED HIM AND COUNSEL SUBSTITUTE FROM ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION AT THE DISCIPLINARY HEARING, IN THIS REGARD THE RULING OF THE HEARING OFFICER SHOULD BE VACATED.
Our role in reviewing an agency decision is limited. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579 (1980)). Our function is to determine whether the administrative action was "'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or [ ] is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" Ramirez v. Dep't of Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 18, 23 (App. Div. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Henry, supra, 81 N.J. at 579-80). "The burden of demonstrating that the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable rests upon the [party] challenging the administrative action." In re Arenas, 385 N.J. Super. 440, 443-44 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 188 N.J. 219 (2006).
The DOC has "broad discretionary powers" to promulgate regulations aimed at maintaining security and order inside correctional facilities. Jenkins v. Fauver, 108 N.J. 239, 252 (1987). Furthermore, as we have previously noted, "[p]risons are dangerous places, and the courts must afford appropriate deference and flexibility to administrators trying to manage this volatile environment." Russo v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 324 N.J. Super. 576, 584 (App. Div. 1999).
Prison disciplinary hearings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full spectrum of rights due to a criminal defendant does not apply. See Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 522 (1975). Nonetheless, prisoners are entitled to certain limited due process protections. Id. at 525. These protections include written notice of the charges at least twenty-four hours prior to the hearing; an impartial tribunal, which may consist of personnel from the central office staff; a limited right to call witnesses; the assistance of counsel substitute; and a right to a written statement of evidence relied upon and the reasons for the sanctions imposed. Id. at 525-33; see also McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 193-96 (1995).
"A finding of guilt at a disciplinary hearing shall be based upon substantial evidence that the inmate has committed a prohibited act." N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a). Substantial evidence means "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 376 (1961) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
We have carefully considered Williams' contention in light of the applicable law and find it lacks sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in this written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only the following comments.
We are satisfied that the record contains sufficient and substantial evidence that amply supported the agency's finding of guilt, and that Williams was afforded the limited due process rights to which he was entitled. See Avant, supra, 67 N.J. at 522-33. Williams had twenty-four hours' notice of the charges prior to the initial hearing; he was granted counsel substitute; the hearing took place before a member of the DOC's central office staff, which constitutes an impartial tribunal; Williams and his counsel substitute were provided an opportunity to make a statement on Williams' behalf; and Williams was afforded the opportunity to present witnesses and evidence on his own behalf. Importantly, Williams and his counsel substitute declined to make any statements, they did not present any witnesses, and, despite being granted an adjournment to prepare confrontation questions, they did not submit any questions. Indeed, Williams has never, even in his appeal papers to us, denied culpability for the disciplinary violations charged.
In sum, because we find there are no perceivable violations of Williams' due process rights, and the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings of the DOC, we must defer. See Henry, supra, 81 N.J. at 579-80. We find no reason in the record to disturb the DOC's final decision upholding Williams' guilt and sanctions.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION