These competing sworn statements present an issue of fact as to whether there was probable cause to arrest Rance. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied on Count I, against Ken Jenn as Sheriff, for false arrest under Florida law. Williams v. The Miami Dade Police Dep't, 08-10800, 2008 WL 4726101 (11th Cir. Oct. 29, 2008). The allegations in this complaint were sworn under penalty of perjury on December 6, 2007.

"[A]n officer may conduct a brief, warrantless, investigatory stop of an individual when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, without violating the Fourth Amendment." Williams v. Miami-Dade Police Dept., 297 Fed. Appx. 941, 944 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Hunter, 291 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2002)). The officer conducting such a stop must have "a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." Id.

Thus, even assuming that Robbins' identification of Plaintiff was false, it cannot serve as the basis of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim against Lieutenant McBride. See Williams v. Miami-Dade Police Dep't, 297 Fed.Appx. 941, 948 (11th Cir. 2008) (“McIntosh and Carey are entitled to qualified immunity for claims arising out of Williams' possession of a kilogram of cocaine and claims arising out of Williams' alleged drug purchase. There is no evidence that either McIntosh or Carey had reason to doubt the validity of Baaske's representations . . . .”)

The elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution are: (1) an original proceeding against the present plaintiff was commenced; (2) the present defendant was the legal cause of the original proceeding; (3) the disposition of the original proceeding was a bona fide termination in plaintiff's favor; (4) there was an absence of probable cause for the original proceeding; (5) the present defendant acted with malice; and (6) the present plaintiff suffered damages. Williams v. Miami-Dade Police Dep't, 297 F. App'x 941, 946 (11th Cir. 2008).

Plaintiff may not sue the MBPD because “[u]nder Florida law, police departments are not legal entities amenable to suit.” Williams v. Miami-Dade Police Dep't, 297 Fed.Appx. 941, 945 (11th Cir. 2008). Therefore, the Court addresses only Plaintiff's claims against the City of Miami Beach.

See Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992) (agreeing with the district court that the sheriff's department was not a legal entity and, thus not subject to suit or liability under § 1983); Spry v. Turner, No. 8:11-CV-531-T-33TGW, 2011 WL 940343, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2011) (finding that Polk County Sherriff's Department was not a suable entity since “no provision is made constitutionally or statutorily for a ‘Sheriff's Department' as a separate legal entity, as an agency of the county, or as a corporate entity, nor is a Sheriff's Department given authority to be sued in such a name”) (citations omitted); Williams v. Miami-Dade Police Dep't, 297 Fed.Appx. 941, 945 (11th Cir. 2008) (determining that “police departments are not legal entities amenable to suit” under Florida law); Papa v. City of N. Miami Beach, No. 06-61833-C.V., 2007 WL 9701041, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2007) (explaining that when fulfilling policing functions, police departments “do[] not have the capacity to be sued and dismissal with prejudice is the appropriate result”).

Next, Plaintiff's claims against Citrus County Sheriff's Department are improper because it is not a legal entity subject to suit. See Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992) (agreeing with the district court that the sheriff's department was not a legal entity and, thus not subject to suit or liability under § 1983); Spry v. Turner, No. 8:11-CV-531-T-33TGW, 2011 WL 940343, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2011) (finding that Polk County Sherriff's Department was not a suable entity since “no provision is made constitutionally or statutorily for a ‘Sheriff's Department' as a separate legal entity, as an agency of the county, or as a corporate entity, nor is a Sheriff's Department given authority to be sued in such a name”) (citations omitted); Williams v. Miami-Dade Police Dep't, 297 Fed.Appx. 941, 945 (11th Cir. 2008) (determining that “police departments are not legal entities amenable to suit” under Florida law); Papa v. City of N. Miami Beach, No. 06-61833-C.V., 2007 WL 9701041, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2007) (explaining that when fulfilling policing functions, police departments “do[] not have the capacity to be sued and dismissal with prejudice is the appropriate result”).

“A traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Williams v. Miami-Dade Police Dep't, 297 Fed. App'x 941, 944 (11th Cir. 2008) (unpublished opinion) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). A claim for false arrest falls within the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable seizure and is cognizable under Section 1983.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees that all individuals “will be secure in their person . . . against unreasonable seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Williams v. Miami-Dade Police Dep't, 297 Fed. App'x 941, 944 (11th Cir. 2008) (unpublished opinion) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). To state a claim for a Fourth Amendment violation based on an unconstitutional seizure, Plaintiff “must demonstrate that a seizure occurred and that it was unreasonable.” Hinds v. Glatthorn, No. 6:18-cv-1415, 2018 WL 5817278, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2018) (quoting Evans v. Hightower, 117 F.3d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir. 1997)).

Police officers are not the legal cause of a prosecution “where there was no evidence that they had anything to do with the decision to prosecute or that they had ‘improperly influenced' that decision.” Williams v. Miami-Dade Police Dep't, 297 Fed.Appx. 941, 947 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Eubanks v. Gerwen, 40 F.3d 1157, 1160-61 (11th Cir.1994)). “The intervening acts of the prosecutor, grand jury, judge and jury . . . each break the chain of causation unless plaintiff can show that these intervening acts were the result of deception or undue pressure by the defendant policemen.”