Opinion
2:21-cv-11631
03-19-2022
MOSES KEON WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. CHARLES JAMSEN, SIRENA LANDFAIR, and NATALIA STOKELY, Defendants.
Sean F. Cox District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANT SIRENA LANDFAIR'S MOTION TO DISMISS/MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF No. 22)
Upon review of the parties' papers, the Court deems this matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b); E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2).
KIMBERLY G. ALTMAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Introduction
This is a civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff Moses Keon Williams, proceeding pro se, is suing three defendants, Dr. Charles Jamsen, Sirena Landfair, a Heath Unit Manager, and Natlia Sokely, a nurse, challenging the adequacy of the medical care he received while incarcerated. See ECF No. 1. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), all pretrial matters were referred to the undersigned. (ECF No. 14). Before the Court is Landfair's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment on the basis of exhaustion. (ECF No. 22). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Landfair's motion to dismiss be GRANTED on the grounds that Williams has failed to state a viable claim against her.
II. Background
The following facts are gleaned from the complaint and focus on the facts that concern Landfair.
On or about July 5, 2018, Williams was transported from G. Robert Cotton Correction Facility (JCF) to Henry Ford Allegiance Hospital in Jackson, Michigan in order to undergo exploratory surgery to remove a possibly cancerous cyst from his right testicle. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4). During the surgery, Dr. Pinson discovered that there was in fact no cyst and Williams' testicle was merely enlarged. (Id., PageID.4-5). He then ended the surgery. (Id.). During the postsurgery, recovery phase, medical staff instructed Williams to take all medications prescribed by Dr. Pinson “to combat the pain and prohibit bacteria.” (Id., PageID.5). Despite this instruction, Williams was not provided any medications at JCF during the period beginning July 5, 2018 and ending August 16, 2018. (Id.).
During this period, Williams was under the direct care of Dr. Jamsen and Nurse Stokely while Landfair acted in her capacity as Health Unit Manager. (Id.). Williams kited Landfair on July 26, 2018, and informed her about his concerns regarding the lack of care he was receiving from Dr. Jamsen and Nurse Stokely. (Id., PageID.6). On August 2, 2018, William kited Landfair again. (Id., PageID.7). He received no response. (Id.). Williams then filed a grievance “regarding the deliberate indifference to his post surgery medical need.” (Id.). Eventually, Williams was transferred to a new correctional facility where his medical needs were met. (Id., PageID.7-8).
III. Analysis
In her motion, Landfair requests both dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim and summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 for failure to exhaust. Landfair's motion for summary judgment will be addressed first.
A. Motion for Summary Judgment
1. Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The court “views the evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Pure Tech Sys., Inc. v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 95 Fed.Appx. 132, 135 (6th Cir. 2004).
“The moving party has the initial burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists....” Stansberry v. Air Wis. Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2) (providing that if a party “fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact,” the court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion”). “Once the moving party satisfies its burden, ‘the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue.' ” Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
The fact that Williams is pro se does not reduce his obligations under Rule 56. Rather, “liberal treatment of pro se pleadings does not require lenient treatment of substantive law.” Durante v. Fairlane Town Ctr., 201 Fed.Appx. 338, 344 (6th Cir. 2006). In addition, “[o]nce a case has progressed to the summary judgment stage, . . . ‘the liberal pleading standards under Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-13 (2002)] and [the Federal Rules] are inapplicable.' ” Tucker v. Union of Needletrades, Indus., & Textile Employees, 407 F.3d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004)).
2. Application
Landfair argues that Williams did not exhaust his administrative remedies as to her. She says that Williams failed to name her in either of the two grievances he filed concerning the lack of medical care he received while incarcerated at JCF. Williams responds that he named the “HUM” in one of his grievances (JCF-18-08-1824-28c) and that “HUM” is a known acronym for “Health Unit Manager,” which is the title of Landfair's position at JCF. Landfair replies that the supplement to the grievance submitted by William wherein he named the “HUM” was not submitted at Step III and was, thus, not properly exhausted. She further suggests that the supplemental pages may have been fabricated.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires prisoners to “properly” exhaust all “available” administrative remedies prior to filing a lawsuit challenging prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88-90, 93 (2006). Proper exhaustion of administrative remedies “means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 91 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted and emphasis in original). Requiring exhaustion allows prison officials an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of their responsibilities before being haled into court and produces a useful administrative record. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007). The PLRA does not detail what “proper exhaustion” entails because “it is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Id. at 218.
“Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, which the defendant has the burden to plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence.” Lee v. Willey, 789 F.3d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 2015). But a prisoner countering a motion alleging failure to exhaust “must offer competent and specific evidence showing that he indeed exhausted his remedies, or was otherwise excused from doing so.” Sango v. Johnson, No. 13-12808, 2014 WL 8186701, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 1245969 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 18, 2015). Granting summary judgment because of a failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not on the merits and thus requires dismissal without prejudice. Adams v. Smith, 166 Fed.Appx. 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2006).
The Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) has established a three-step process to review and resolve prisoner grievances. “Under the [Michigan] Department of Corrections' procedural rules, inmates must include the ‘[d]ates, times, places and names of all those involved in the issue being grieved' in their initial grievance.” Reed-Bey v. Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322, 324 (6th Cir. 2010). As noted by the Court in Woodford, one of the purposes of requiring proper exhaustion is to “provide[ ] prisons with a fair opportunity to correct their own errors.” Woodford, 548 U.S. at 94. To be sufficient, a grievance need not “allege a specific legal theory or facts that correspond to all the required elements of a particular legal theory.” Burton v. Jones, 321 F.3d 569, 575 (6th Cir. 2003). Nonetheless, the grievance must give “fair notice of the alleged mistreatment or misconduct that forms the basis of the constitutional or statutory claim made against a defendant in a prisoner's complaint.” Id.
Specifically, under MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130, prisoners must provide the following information at Step I of the grievance process: “The issues should be stated briefly but concisely. Information provided is to be limited to the facts involving the issue being grieved (i.e., who, what, when, where, why, how). Dates, times, places, and names of all those involved in the issue being grieved are to be included.” MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130(R) (underscoring omitted).
Here, Williams alleges that he submitted a several page supplement to grievance JCF-18-08-1824-28c wherein he names the “HUM.” (ECF No. 29, PageID.160-164). Landfair, in turn, argues that the supplemental pages were not submitted through Step III and that they may have been fabricated. (ECF No. 34, PageID.221-222).
This case is analogous to Durden v. Price, No. 21-11035, 2022 WL 1311701 (E.D. Mich. March 24, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 1308812 (E.D. Mich. May 2, 2022). In that case, the prisoner-plaintiff was accused of failing to submit his Step I grievance with his Step III appeal and the prisoner-plaintiff argued in response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment on exhaustion grounds “that he did in fact include with his Step III appeal a copy of his Step I grievance and response.” Id. at *4. The Magistrate Judge ultimately concluded that this statement created a genuine issue of fact regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies, which precluded summary judgment. Id. In so deciding, the Magistrate Judge relied on Miles v. Rink, No. 2:19-cv-167, 2021 WL 2019765 (W.D. Mich. April 15, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 2018315 (W.D. Mich. May 20, 2021). In Miles, the Magistrate Judge stated that “[t]he case law suggests that when a prisoner submits some evidence that he submitted his Step III grievance appeal, he has satisfied his burden of responding to a motion seeking dismissal for failure to exhaust his Step III grievance appeal. Ultimately, it is Defendants' burden to establish a lack of genuine issue of fact regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies.” Id. at *6.
Here, like in Durden and Miles, there is an issue of genuine fact regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies making summary judgment on this ground inappropriate. This is because Williams claims he grieved the HUM in the supplement to his grievance and he has supported this claim by submitting the alleged supplement to this Court for consideration. Landfair's challenge to the legitimacy of the supplement is not properly resolved at the summary judgment stage. Thus, Landfair's motion for summary judgment on exhaustion grounds should be denied.
B. Motion to Dismiss
1. Standard
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff and accept all allegations as true.” Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation omitted); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (concluding that a plausible claim need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . .”). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the defendant's conduct.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P'Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).
Furthermore, the Court holds pro se complaints to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, even in pleadings drafted by pro se parties, “ ‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.' ” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 Fed.Appx. 975, 976-77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)). Moreover, “courts may not rewrite a complaint to include claims that were never presented . . . nor may courts construct the Plaintiff's legal arguments for him.... [N]either may the Court ‘conjure up unpled allegations[.]' ” Rogers v. Detroit Police Dept., 595 F.Supp.2d 757, 766 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (Ludington, J., adopting report and recommendation of Binder, M.J.).
2. Application
Williams attempts to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Landfair because she “completely ignored” his kites complaining of the care he was receiving from Dr. Jamsen and Nurse Stokely. (ECF No. 1, PageID.8-9). Landfair, however, argues that this claim should be dismissed because it fails to assert how Landfair personally violated Williams' rights and because there is no supervisory liability in a § 1983 claim.
Under the Eighth Amendment, prisoners have a constitutional right to medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). Prison officials may not act with deliberate indifference to the medical needs of their prisoners. Id. at 104. An Eighth Amendment claim has two components, one objective and the other subjective. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2002). Under the objective component, “the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is ‘sufficiently serious.' ” Id. In Farmer, the Court held that the objective test requires that “the inmate show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 834; see also Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004). Under the subjective component, “the plaintiff must allege facts which, if true, would show that the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk.” Comstock, 273 F.3d at 702.
Furthermore, as for any claim under § 1983, Williams' “allegations must demonstrate that each defendant [ ], through his or her own individual actions, personally violated [his] rights.” Johnson v. Moseley, 790 F.3d 649, 653 (6th Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676). “It is well-settled that [g]overnment officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior.” Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 241 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, as Landfair correctly argues, she cannot not be held liable simply because she is the supervisor of Dr. Jamsen and Nurse Stokely. This is true even if Dr. Jamsen and Nurse Stokely did violate Williams' rights.
The undersigned also believes that Williams' claim against Landfair could be read as one for failure to intervene in his medical treatment, or lack of medical treatment as the case may be. “However, the Sixth Circuit has never extended the failure to intervene to medical treatment....” Dittmer v. Corizon Health, Inc., No. 20-CV-12147, 2020 WL 6544784, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 6, 2020). Accordingly, even if Dr. Jamsen and Nurse Stokely were deliberately indifferent to Williams' medical needs, Landfair cannot be held liable for failing to intervene in their alleged inadequate care. Thus, the claims against Landfair should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS Landfair's motion to dismiss be GRANTED on the grounds that Williams has failed to state a viable claim against her. The case would then continue at this time against Dr. Jamsen and Nurse Stokely
NOTICE TO PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS
The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and Recommendation. Any objections must be filed within 14 days of service, as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Local Rule 72.1(d). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 144 (1985); Howard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 508 (6th Cir. 1991). Filing objections that raise some issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers, Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). Under Local Rule 72.1(d)(2), any objections must be served on this Magistrate Judge.
Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” and “Objection No. 2,” etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the objections in length and complexity. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, in the same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to Objection No. 2,” etc. If the court determines that any objections are without merit, it may rule without awaiting the response.