Opinion
No. 5:17-CT-03113-D
02-07-2019
Marlow Williams, Plaintiff, v. Erik A. Hooks and Robert Evans, Defendants.
Memorandum & Recommendation
Plaintiff Marlow Williams, a state inmate proceeding pro se , filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (D.E. 1). This matter is currently before the court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment (D.E. 26, 30). After reviewing the parties' submissions, the undersigned recommends that the district court allow the defendants' motion, deny Williams's motion, and dismiss Williams's complaint.
The court appointed North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services, Inc. for the limited purpose of conducting discovery on Williams's behalf. (D.E. 22).
I. Background
Williams was convicted of first degree murder and robbery with a dangerous weapon in July 1993. Compl. at 5, D.E. 1. During a single sentencing proceeding, the state court sentenced Williams to consecutive terms of life imprisonment and 40 years incarceration, respectively. See Am. Compl. at 5, D.E. 3; Pl. Ex. at 10, D.E. 3-2. As of January 2013, Williams served the statutory minimum twenty-year term on his life sentence. Am. Compl. at 6, D.E. 3; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1371(a) (establishing statutory minimums for parole eligibility).
Having served the minimum term on his life sentence, Williams sought commencement of his robbery sentence. The North Carolina Post Release and Parole Commission ("Commission") notified Williams "that his second sentence will not commence as it runs after your life sentence, which has no expiration date. Unless you are sooner paroled by the . . . Commission, you will spend your natural life in prison on your sentence number 1." Pl. Ex. at 9, D.E. 3-2. Williams filed a civil complaint in North Carolina state court challenging this determination. Am. Compl. at 4-5, D.E. 3.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals ("NCCOA") described Williams's civil complaint as seeking:
(1) a declaratory judgment that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1355(a) is valid and mandates that his forty-year robbery sentence begin to run upon completion of the twenty-year minimum term on his life sentence, (2) an injunction compelling the Department and the Parole Commission to treat his forty-year robbery sentence as having commenced upon completion of the twenty-year minimum term on his life sentence, (3) a declaratory judgment that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1371(a) is valid and renders Williams eligible for parole upon completion of the twenty-year minimum term on his life sentence, (4) a declaratory judgment that his United States and North Carolina rights of due process and equal protection are being violated by Defendants' application of the sentencing and parole statutes, and (5) an injunction to enforce Williams's constitutional rights.Williams v. Perry, 794 S.E.2d 557, 558, 2016 WL 7100600 at * 1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016) (unpublished table opinion). The Rowan County Superior Court dismissed Williams's claims on summary judgment, and the NCCOA affirmed. Id. at * 1, 5.
First, the NCCOA rejected Williams's interpretation of § 1355(a). Section 1355(a) controls the commencement of sentences, stating that a consecutive sentence "commences to run when the State has custody of the defendant following completion of the prior sentence." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1355(a). Based on a plain reading of the statute, the NCCOA held that the "Commission correctly stated in its letter to Williams that his forty-year robbery sentence will not begin to run until completion of his prior life sentence." Williams, 2016 WL 7100600 at * 3.
Similarly, the NCCOA rejected Williams's argument that § 1371(a) entitled him to immediate parole eligibility. Section § 1371 states that a prisoner sentenced under the North Carolina Fair Sentencing Act for specific felonies, as Williams was, is eligible for parole after 20 years. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1371(a). In rejecting Williams's argument, the NCCOA found that § 1371(a) must be read alongside North Carolina General Statute § 15A-1354(b), which states:
In determining the effect of consecutive sentences . . . [the North Carolina Department of Public Safety ("DPS")] must treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a single term with the following incidents . . . The maximum prison sentence consists of the total of the maximum terms of the consecutive sentences . . . The minimum term consists of the total of the minimum terms of the consecutive sentences.N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1354(b). Accordingly the NCCOA held that § 1354(b) requires DPS "to treat Williams as being committed for a single term with a maximum prison sentence of life plus forty years, and a minimum term of twenty-seven years." Williams, 2016 WL 7100600 at * 4. Therefore, it concluded, "[t]o allow Williams parole after only twenty years would be to ignore the required minimum term for his robbery sentence in contravention of section 15A-1354(b)." Id.
Finally, the NCCOA rejected Williams's federal constitutional claims, finding that DPS and the Commission correctly applied the law and did not deprive Williams of any liberty interest. Id. at 5.
Williams filed a notice of appeal and sought review of the NCCOA's decision from the North Carolina Supreme Court. The North Carolina Supreme Court dismissed Williams's notice of appeal, and denied his petition for discretionary review. Williams v. Perry, 369 N.C. 522, 797 S.E.2d 296, 297 (2017).
Williams filed this complaint in April 2017 (D.E. 1), and sought leave to amend in claims in July 2017 (D.E. 3). In his complaint, as amended, Williams reiterates the same arguments he raised in state court. See Compl. at 5-8, D.E. 1; Am. Compl. at 7-13, D.E. 3-1. Specifically, he asserts that defendants incorrectly applied §§ 1354(b) and 1355(a). Compl. at 5, D.E. 1; Am. Compl. at 6-7, D.E.3-1. The crux of his claims, as at the state level, is that defendants "have made the decision to disregard the commencement of [his] second sentence and because of this [his] parole eligibility date is miscalculated." Pl. Mem. at 5, D.E. 20. As relief, Williams seeks a declaratory judgment that defendants are incorrectly applying state law in determining the commencement date of his robbery sentence, as well as various other forms of injunctive relief. Am. Compl. at 9-11, D.E. 3-1. At frivolity review, the court liberally construed these pleadings to argue that defendants denied Williams due process in calculating his parole eligibility date, and continued management of his claims (D.E. 9).
Williams filed a summary judgment motion in March 2018 (D.E. 19), which he later amended (D.E. 30). Defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment in April 2018 (D.E. 26). In addition to his own summary judgment motion, Williams also responded to defendants' cross-motion (D.E. 31, 32, 33). Defendants replied (D.E. 37).
In this posture, the court denied Williams's original summary judgment motion as moot (D.E. 43).
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when an examination of the pleadings, affidavits, and other proper discovery materials before the court shows that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact," thus entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656-57 (2014). In making this determination, "the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor." News & Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)); accord Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1866.
The movant carries the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or non-existence might affect the outcome of the litigation. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). And a factual dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. The movant discharges this burden by identifying "an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. In response, the non-movant must identify specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 323. In so doing, the non-movant may rely on a verified complaint when allegations in the document are based on personal knowledge. Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991). Conclusory allegations and speculation do not suffice. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). If the non-movant fails to introduce evidence contradicting a fact supported by the movant's evidence, the court may "consider the fact undisputed for summary judgment purposes." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). If the non-movant fails to meet his burden, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. "When cross-motions for summary judgment are before a court, the court examines each motion separately, employing the familiar standard under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, L.L.C., 630 F.3d 351, 354 (4th Cir. 2011).
B. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
Defendants assert the doctrine of res judicata as an affirmative defense. "Res judicata or claim preclusion bars a party from suing on a claim that has already been 'litigated to a final judgment by that party or such party's privies and precludes the assertion by such parties of any legal theory, cause of action, or defense which could have been asserted in that action.'" Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 210 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting 18 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore's Fed. Practice § 131.10(1)(a) (3d ed. 2008)). Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, "a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action." Pueschel v. United States, 369 F.3d 345, 354 (4th Cir. 2004) (quotation and alteration omitted). Similarly, "[u]nder collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case." Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). As the Fourth Circuit has explained:
[T]he preclusive [e]ffect of a prior judgment extends beyond claims or defenses actually presented in previous litigation, for not only does res judicata bar claims that were raised and fully litigated, it prevents litigation of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously available to the parties, regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding.Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Beverley, 404 F.3d 243, 248 (4th Cir. 2005) (quotation and alteration omitted). The doctrine encourages reliance on judicial decisions, bars vexatious litigation, and frees the courts to resolve other disputes. See, e.g., Pueschel, 369 F.3d at 354-56. In order to find that a case is barred, the court must find: "(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit, (2) an identity of the cause of action in both the earlier and the later suit, and (3) an identity of parties or their privies in the two suits." Beverley, 404 F.3d at 248 (quotations omitted). "The determination of whether two suits arise out of the same cause of action . . . does not turn on whether the claims asserted are identical. Rather, it turns on whether the suits and the claims asserted therein arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions or the same core of operative facts." Pueschel, 369 F.3d at 355 (quotation omitted); see also SAS Inst., Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., 874 F.3d 370, 378-79 (4th Cir. 2017) ("The conceptual framework we operate under is a transactional one, as we ask whether the claim presented in the new litigation arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the claim resolved by the prior judgment and whether the claims could have been brought in the earlier action.") (quotations omitted)), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 67 (2018).
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to § 1983 actions, and federal courts must afford preclusive effect to issues which have been decided by state courts when the courts of that state would do so. Allen, 449 at 95-96 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738); see also Davenport v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 3 F.3d 89, 92 (4th Cir. 1993) ("federal courts . . . in a § 1983 action . . . are bound under the Full Faith and Credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, to apply the law of the rendering state to determine whether and to what extent the state court judgment should have preclusive effect in the federal action"). To that end, the Fourth Circuit has held:
In order to assert collateral estoppel under North Carolina law, a party must show that the issue in question was identical to an issue actually litigated and necessary to the judgment, that the prior action resulted in a final judgment on the merits, and that the present parties are the same as, or in privity with, the parties to the earlier action. North Carolina courts have abandoned the final requirement of "mutuality of estoppel" for the defensive use of collateral estoppel, so long as the party seeking to reopen the issue "had a full and fair opportunity to litigate" the matter in the previous action.Sartin v. Macik, 535 F.3d 284, 287-88 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Thomas M. McInnis & Assocs., Inc. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421, 349 S.E. 2d 552,557, 560 (1986)).
North Carolina courts would apply res judicata and collateral estoppel in this case. Williams raises the same issues in his federal complaint as he did in state court. Simply put, in both actions Williams seeks declaratory judgment and various forms of injunctive relief, premised upon defendants' alleged improper application of numerous North Carolina parole eligibility statutes. He received a final judgment on the merits at state court and the parties are in privity with one another. Finally, the state courts provided Williams a full and fair opportunity to litigate every issue raised in his state action. Accordingly, Williams's action is barred.
C. Rooker-Feldman Abstention
Similarly, Williams essentially asks this court to overrule the NCCOA's December 2016 opinion. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, "lower federal courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments." Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006) (per curiam); see Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). This abstention doctrine applies to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting [federal] court review and rejection of those judgments." Thana v. Bd. of License Comm'rs for Charles Cty., Md., 827 F.3d 314, 319 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). Moreover, a party may not escape the jurisdictional bar of Rooker-Feldman by merely refashioning its attack on the state court judgments as a § 1983 claim." Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Virginia, 122 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir. 1997). For these reasons, the doctrine of abstention provides an alternate basis for dismissing Williams's claims.
Of course, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to federal habeas corpus actions. See Jordahl, 122 F.3d at 199. Again, however, this is not a habeas action. Williams does not challenge the fact or length of his confinement. He proceeds under § 1983, challenging defendant's procedural application of North Carolina's parole statutes.
D. Procedural Due Process
Alternatively, Williams's claims fail on the merits. Williams essentially argues that defendants are incorrectly calculating his parole eligibility. A challenge to the procedures used to determine an inmate's eligibility for parole is correctly brought pursuant to § 1983. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005) (ruling a challenge to state procedures denying parole could be brought under § 1983, because plaintiff would be entitled, at most, to a new parole hearing, not a reduced sentence); see also Brown v. Johnson, 169 F. App'x. 155, 157 (4th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (noting that prisoner challenges to parole guidelines should proceed under § 1983); Overman v. Beck, 186 F. App'x. 337, 338 (4th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (Section 1983 is the appropriate cause of action for inmate challenges to "policies and procedures applicable to their parole reviews, [but] not the denial of parole itself"); Tibbs v. Meehan, No. CV JKB-15-3214, 2016 WL 2770517, at *1 (D. Md. May 12, 2016). But "[b]ecause parole consideration and parole itself typically hinge on the discretionary decisions of parole authorities, inmates generally possess no entitlement, but only a desire, that a parole board will decide in their favor." Vann v. Angelone, 73 F.3d 519, 522 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Greenholtz v. Inmate of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) ("There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence."); Bowling v. Dir., VDOC, No. 7:17CV00142, 2018 WL 521592, at *2 (W.D. Va. Jan. 23, 2018).
To the extent Williams challenges the proper application of North Carolina state law, the NCCOA properly applied the relevant statutes. Cf. Langley v. Bulter, No. 5:15-CT-3274-FL, 2017 WL 6043261, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 6, 2017) (discussing the interplay of various North Carolina parole eligibility statutes); King v. Baker, No. 5:01-CT-825-BR, 2004 WL 3331899, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 2, 2004) (same), aff'd, 104 F. App'x 360 (4th Cir. 2004).
With regard to Williams's federal due process claim, although due process principles apply in the parole review context, the process due is minimal. Vann v. Angelone, 73 F.3d 519, 522 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Even where this court has found that a parole statute establishes a liberty interest, we have held that inmates are entitled to no more than minimal procedure") (interior citations omitted)); Bradford v. Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728, 733 (4th Cir. 1974). Likewise, "[a] federal court must not involve itself in the merits of either the state's parole statute or its individual parole decisions." Spaulding v. North Carolina Parole Comm'n, No. 5:15-HC-2307-FL, 2017 WL 979022, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 13, 2017) (quotation omitted). In the parole context, a statement of reasons provided to the prisoner satisfies procedural due process. Vann, 73 F.3d at 522. The state court proceedings and the written NCCOA decision summarized above rendered Williams sufficient procedural due process in the parole context. Accordingly, his claims are without merit.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the court recommends allowing defendants' summary judgment motion (D.E. 26), denying Williams's summary judgment motion (D.E. 30), and dismissing Williams' s complaint.
The Clerk of Court must serve a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation ("M&R") on each party who has appeared in this action. Any party may file a written objection to the M&R within 14 days from the date the Clerk serves it on them. The objection must specifically note the portion of the M&R that the party objects to and the reasons for their objection. Any other party may respond to the objection within 14 days from the date the objecting party serves it on them. The district judge will review the objection and make their own determination about the matter that is the subject of the objection. If a party does not file a timely written objection, the party will have forfeited their ability to have the M&R (or a later decision based on the M&R) reviewed by the Court of Appeals. Dated: February 7, 2019
/s/_________
Robert T. Numbers, II
United States Magistrate Judge