Opinion
CV 23-00630-PHX-JAT (ESW)
05-10-2023
Timothy Huntley Williams, Plaintiff, v. Roger Hartsell, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
JAMES A. TELIBORG, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff Timothy Huntley Williams, who is confined in a Maricopa County Jail, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). The Court will dismiss the Complaint with leave to amend.
I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee
The Court will grant Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $6.00. The remainder of the fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month's income credited to Plaintiff's trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula.
II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff's specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant's conduct. Id. at 681.
But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)).
If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff's Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, but because it may possibly be amended to state a claim, the Court will dismiss it with leave to amend.
III. Complaint
Plaintiff names the following Defendants in his eight-count Complaint: Maricopa County Court Commissioner Roger Hartsell, Public Defender Jay Rock, Mesa Police Officer Spires, the Maricopa County Superior Court, the Mesa Police Department, Maricopa County, and the “Adult Probation Department.” Plaintiff seeks money damages.
In Count One, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Hartsell violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights when he “intentionally filed paperwork wrong, in order to hide wrongdoing, 11-08-22 CR 2020-107383.”
In Count Two, Plaintiff claims Defendant Rock violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights when he “intentionally had paperwork[] filed using [Plaintiff's] signature without authorization on probation paperwork.”
In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Spires violated his Fourth Amendment rights when, on October 31, 2022, he searched Plaintiff without probable cause. In Count Four, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Spires arrested him without probable cause, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Count Five, Plaintiff alleges his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the Maricopa County Superior Court failed to provide him due process by “intentionally filing paperwork with [Plaintiff's] signature, without [his] authorization.”
In Count Six, Plaintiff alleges his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when “Mesa Police searched and arrested [him] without probable cause.”
In Count Seven, Plaintiff claims his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when he was held in the Maricopa County Jail from October 31 to November 8, 2022, “for no reason.”
IV. Failure to State a Claim
A. Defendant Hartsell
Judges are absolutely immune from § 1983 suits for damages for their judicial acts except when they are taken ‘in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-357 (1978); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). An act is ‘judicial” when it is a function normally performed by a judge and the parties dealt with the judge in his or her judicial capacity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362; Crooks v. Maynard, 913 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir. 1990). This immunity attaches even if the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly, Peirson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967), or of making grave errors of law or procedure, Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988). Regardless of the judge's status in the judicial hierarchy, a judge has absolute immunity for acts performed in the judge's official capacity. See Tanner v. Heise, 879 F.2d 572, 577-78 (9th Cir. 1989) (magistrate); Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387, 396 (11th Cir. 1982) (justice of the peace); O'Neill v. City of Lake Oswego, 642 F.2d 367 (9th Cir. 1981) (pro tem municipal judge).
Plaintiff sues Defendant Hartsell for his actions in conducting Plaintiff's criminal proceedings. Defendant Hartsell is absolutely immune from suit for those acts. Therefore, the Court will dismiss him.
B. Defendant Rock
A prerequisite for any relief under § 1983 is a showing that the defendant has acted under the color of state law. Whether an attorney representing a criminal defendant is a public defender or court-appointed counsel, he or she does not act under color of state law. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1981). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Rock cannot be brought under § 1983, and the Court will dismiss Defendant Rock.
C. Defendant Spires
Plaintiff alleges Defendants Spires searched and arrested him without probable cause. As explained below, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant Spires, and the Court will dismiss without prejudice Defendant Spires.
1. Search
“The Fourth Amendment prohibits ‘unreasonable searches and seizures' by the Government, and its protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). In such cases, the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the officer's action is supported by reasonable suspicion, not probable cause. Id. “While reasonable suspicion requires ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,' an officer must be able to articulate facts creating grounds to suspect that criminal activity ‘may be afoot.'” Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1020 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).
Plaintiff provides no details about the alleged illegal search or the circumstances surrounding the search that would show the search was unreasonable. He therefore fails to state a Fourth Amendment claim for an illegal search.
2. Arrest
To state a § 1983 claim for false arrest, Plaintiff must show that Defendant made the arrest without probable cause or other justification. Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013). “‘Probable cause exists if the arresting officers ‘had knowledge and reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe that [the arrestee] had committed or was committing a crime.'” Id. at 1097-98 (quoting Maxwell v. County of San Diego, 697 F.3d 941, 951 (9th Cir. 2012)); see also Edgerly v. City & County of S.F., 599 F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2010) (“To determine whether the Officers had probable cause at the time of the arrest, we consider ‘whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within [the Officers'] knowledge . . . were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense.'” (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964))). “[P]robable cause supports an arrest so long as the arresting officers had probable cause to arrest the suspect for any criminal offense, regardless of their stated reason for the arrest.” Edgerly, 599 F.3d at 954 (emphasis added). “If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
Plaintiff provides no details about his allegedly illegal arrest such as the crime for which he was arrested or the circumstances surrounding his arrest, nor does he allege facts showing why Defendant Spires lacked probable cause to arrest him. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim for false arrest.
D. Maricopa County Superior Court
The proper name of the “Maricopa County Superior” is the “Superior Court of the State of Arizona in and for the County of Maricopa,” and it is a state court. See Massengill v. Super. Ct. in and for Maricopa County, 416 P.2d 1009, 1012 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1966) (citing Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 1); see also Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 13 (the superior courts “constitute a single court”). Under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, a state or state agency may not be sued in federal court without its consent. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, “a state is not a ‘person' for purposes of section 1983. Likewise ‘arms of the State' . . . are not ‘persons' under section 1983.” Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1327 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). State superior courts are “arms of the State” for Eleventh Amendment purposes. See Lucas v. Ariz. Sup. Ct. Fiduciary Certification Program, 457 F App'x 689, 690 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The Arizona Supreme Court . . . is an ‘arm of the state' for Eleventh Amendment purposes.”); Greater L.A. Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[A] suit against the Superior Court is a suit against the State, barred by the eleventh amendment.”). Thus, the Court will dismiss Defendant Maricopa County Superior Court.
E. Mesa Police Department
Defendant Mesa Police Department is a subpart of the City of Mesa, not a separate entity for purposes of suit. Gotbaum v. City of Phx., 617 F.Supp.2d 878, 886 (D. Ariz. 2008); see Braillard v. Maricopa County, 232 P.3d 1263, 1269 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2010) (county sheriff's office is a nonjural entity); see also Vicente v. City of Prescott, 2012 WL 1438695, at *3 (D. Ariz. 2012) (city fire department is a nonjural entity); Wilson v. Yavapai County Sheriff's Office, 2012 WL 1067959, at *4 (D. Ariz. 2012) (county sheriffs office and county attorney's office are nonjural entities). Because Defendant Mesa Police Department is not a separate entity, it is not capable of being separately sued. Thus, the Court will dismiss Defendant Mesa Police Department.
Moreover, even if Plaintiff had sued the City of Mesa, his allegations do not support a claim. A municipality may not be sued solely because an injury was inflicted by its employees or agents. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). The actions of individuals may support municipal liability only if the employees were acting pursuant to an official policy or custom of the municipality. Botello v. Gammick, 413 F.3d 971, 978-79 (9th Cir. 2005). A § 1983 claim against a municipal defendant “cannot succeed as a matter of law” unless a plaintiff: (1) contends that the municipal defendant maintains a policy or custom pertinent to the plaintiff's alleged injury; and (2) explains how such policy or custom caused the plaintiff's injury. Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of a municipal defendant pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)). Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support that the City of Mesa maintained a specific policy or custom that resulted in a violation of Plaintiff's federal constitutional rights and has failed to explain how his injuries were caused by any municipal policy or custom.
F. Maricopa County and Adult Probation Office
Plaintiff does not allege Defendant Maricopa County maintained a policy or custom that resulted in injury to him or a violation of his constitutional rights. See Sadoski, 435 F.3d at 1080. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim against Defendant Maricopa County.
Moreover, the Maricopa County Adult Probation Office is not a proper defendant because it is simply an administrative division of Maricopa County and not a separate entity for purposes of suit. See Wilson, 2012 WL 1067959, at *4 (D. Ariz. 2012) (county sheriff's office and county attorney's office are nonjural entities). Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim against these Defendants.
V. Leave to Amend
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Within 30 days, Plaintiff may submit a first amended complaint to cure the deficiencies outlined above. The Clerk of Court will mail Plaintiff a court-approved form to use for filing a first amended complaint. If Plaintiff fails to use the court-approved form, the Court may strike the amended complaint and dismiss this action without further notice to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff must clearly designate on the face of the document that it is the “First Amended Complaint.” The first amended complaint must be retyped or rewritten in its entirety on the court-approved form and may not incorporate any part of the original Complaint by reference. Plaintiff may include only one claim per count.
If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, Plaintiff must write short, plain statements telling the Court: (1) the constitutional right Plaintiff believes was violated; (2) the name of the Defendant who violated the right; (3) exactly what that Defendant did or failed to do; (4) how the action or inaction of that Defendant is connected to the violation of Plaintiff's constitutional right; and (5) what specific injury Plaintiff suffered because of that Defendant's conduct. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976).
Plaintiff must repeat this process for each person he names as a Defendant. If Plaintiff fails to affirmatively link the conduct of each named Defendant with the specific injury suffered by Plaintiff, the allegations against that Defendant will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Conclusory allegations that a Defendant or group of Defendants has violated a constitutional right are not acceptable and will be dismissed.
A first amended complaint supersedes the original Complaint. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992); Hal Roach Studios v. RichardFeiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990). After amendment, the Court will treat the original Complaint as nonexistent. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. Any cause of action that was raised in the original Complaint and that was voluntarily dismissed or was dismissed without prejudice is waived if it is not alleged in a first amended complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
VI. Warnings
A. Release
If Plaintiff is released while this case remains pending, and the filing fee has not been paid in full, Plaintiff must, within 30 days of his release, either (1) notify the Court that he intends to pay the unpaid balance of his filing fee within 120 days of his release or (2) file a non-prisoner application to proceed in forma pauperis. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this action.
B. Address Changes
Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this action.
C. Possible “Strike”
Because the Complaint has been dismissed for failure to state a claim, if Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint correcting the deficiencies identified in this Order, the dismissal may count as a “strike” under the “3-strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Under the 3-strikes provision, a prisoner may not bring a civil action or appeal a civil judgment in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 “if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
D. Possible Dismissal
If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260-61 (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order of the Court).
IT IS ORDERED:
(1) Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is granted.
(2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government agency, Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $6.00.
(3) The Complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff has 30 days from the date this Order is filed to file a first amended complaint in compliance with this Order.
(4) If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within 30 days, the Clerk of Court must, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of this action with prejudice that states that the dismissal may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and deny any pending unrelated motions as moot.
(5) The Clerk of Court must mail Plaintiff a court-approved form for filing a civil rights complaint by a prisoner.