Opinion
Case No. CV415-240
11-30-2015
QUADRAMEL TRELLION WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. THE STATE OF GEORGIA, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Quadramel Williams has filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for injunctive relief against the State of Georgia, which is currently prosecuting him for "poss. w/intent." Doc. 1 at 5; see also attached state court docket showing that his prosecution for sale of a controlled substance remains pending. He claims that he "was false arrested" after the police arrived at his wife's house seeking two men who ran through the "house with guns," did not see a judge for the first time until seven months after that arrest, has court-appointed counsel that rates "poor = 3" on a scale of "1 to 10," and that "CNT made a false report of a[n] investigator that never [happened]." Id. at 5. He seeks no damages but wants all pending charges dismissed. Id. at 6.
As Williams is proceeding in forma pauperis ("IFP"), docs. 2 & 3, his action is subject to immediate dismissal if the Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (requiring the dismissal of IFP actions "any time" they raise non-cognizable claims); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring early screening of all prisoner/detainee complaints against governmental entities or officials and the dismissal of non-cognizable claims).
Williams' choice of remedy is fatal to his complaint. State defendants may not employ § 1983 as a vehicle for seeking the dismissal of the state criminal proceedings, for "a prisoner in state custody cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement. . . . He must seek federal habeas corpus relief (or appropriate state relief) instead." Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (quotes and cites omitted); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) ("[H]abeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983."); Cooks v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 599 F. App'x 940, 941 (11th Cir. 2015) (district courts must "'ensure that state prisoners use only habeas corpus (or similar state) remedies when they seek to invalidate the duration of their confinement -- either directly through an injunction compelling speedier release or indirectly through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State's custody.'") (quoting Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81); Harris v. Purvis, 2015 WL 3439857 at * 1 (S.D. Ga. May 27, 2015). Because Williams seeks to have his state charges "dropped" (doc. 1 at 6), which would require his immediate release from custody, he must pursue habeas relief.
Before Williams can bring a federal habeas action, he must first exhaust his available state remedies through either a direct appeal or a petition for collateral relief. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 79 (federal "habeas corpus actions require a petitioner fully to exhaust state remedies, which § 1983 does not"); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). If he wishes to proceed via habeas corpus, he must submit a separate petition in compliance with the applicable rules. Such a petition, however, would be subject to immediate dismissal for lack of exhaustion of his available state remedies.
Given the impossibility that Williams' complaint could ever state a § 1983 claim, it must be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and a re-pleading option is not warranted. Dysart v. BankTrust, 516 F. App'x 861, 865 (11th Cir. 2013) ("[D]istrict court did not err in denying Dysart's request to amend her complaint because an amendment would have been futile."); Langlois v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 401 F. App'x 425, 426-27 (11th Cir. 2010); Simmons v. Edmondson, 225 F. App'x 787, 788-89 (11th Cir. 2007) (district court did not err in dismissing complaint with prejudice without first giving plaintiff leave to amend because no amendment could have overcome the defendants' immunity). Also because of its failure to state a claim, this case should be recorded as a "strike" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Meanwhile, it is time for Williams to pay his filing fee. His furnished PLRA paperwork reflects $162.97 in average monthly deposits and a $18.43 average monthly balance over the six month period prior to the date of his Prison Account Statement. Doc. 5. He therefore owes an initial partial filing fee of $32.60. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (requiring an initial fee assessment "when funds exist," under a specific 20 percent formula). Plaintiff's custodian shall set aside 20 percent of all future deposits to his account, then forward those funds to the Clerk each time the set aside amount reaches $10.00, until the balance of the Court's $350.00 filing fee has been paid in full.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") requires the incremental collection of the filing fee from detainees who are allowed to proceed IFP. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), (h). --------
Also, the Clerk is DIRECTED to send this R&R to plaintiff's account custodian immediately, as this payment directive is nondispositive within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), so no Rule 72(b) adoption is required. In the event plaintiff is transferred to another institution, his present custodian shall forward a copy of this Order and all financial information concerning payment of the filing fee and costs in this case to plaintiff's new custodian. The balance due from the plaintiff shall be collected by the custodian at his next institution in accordance with the terms of this Order.
SO ORDERED, this 30th day of November, 2015.
/s/_________
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
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