Opinion
3:24-CV-1090 (DNH/ML)
11-07-2024
PRESIDENT THOMAS C. WILLIAMS. Director of Constituents, Plaintiff, v. FBI; and NY STATE TROOPERS, Defendants.
THOMAS C. WILLIAMS Pro Se Plaintiff.
THOMAS C. WILLIAMS Pro Se Plaintiff.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MIROSLAV LOVRIC, United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Thomas C. Williams (“Plaintiff”), who is proceeding Pro Se, has commenced this action against defendants FBI and NY State Troopers (collectively “Defendants”). (Dkt. No. 1.) Despite ample notice, Plaintiff has failed to pay the filing fee to commence the litigation and failed to comply with court orders. (Dkt. No. 9.) For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be dismissed.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
On September 10, 2024, Plaintiff commenced this action by the filing of a Complaint, accompanied by a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), a motion for permission to file electronically in ECF, and a motion to appoint counsel. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5.)
On September 16, 2024, the undersigned (1) denied Plaintiff's motion to appoint counsel, (2) denied as incomplete Plaintiff's IFP application, (3) directed Plaintiff to, within 30 days, either (a) pay the filing fee in full, or (b) submit a completed and signed IFP application, and (4) denied as moot Plaintiff's motion to file electronically in ECF. (Dkt. No. 6).
On September 20, 2024, the Court received as undeliverable the Pro Se Handbook (Dkt. No. 3) that was sent to Plaintiff via regular mail on September 10, 2024. (Dkt. No. 7.)
On October 17, 2024, the undersigned directed Plaintiff to show cause on or before October 31, 2024, why this matter should not be dismissed for, among other things, failure to comply with the Court's text order (Dkt. No. 6) and failure to pay the filing fee to commence the litigation. (Dkt. No. 9.) To date, Plaintiff has not responded to this order. (See generally docket sheet.)
B. Complaint
The Complaint is on a form complaint for a civil case and appears to seek “commission for security services” (Dkt. No. 1 at 3) from Defendants in the amount of $60 quadruple Billion Dollars.” (See generally Dkt. No. 1; Dkt. No. 1 at 7 [also seeking “$20 quadruple Billion Dollars . . . from NY State Troopers . . . [and] $80 quadruple Billion Dollars . . . [and] $40 quadruple Billion Dollars . . . from the FBI.”].)
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Standard Governing Dismissal for Failure to Comply With a Court Order
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court may, in its discretion, order dismissal of an action based on a plaintiff's failure to prosecute or comply with an order of the court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b); Baptiste v. Sommers, 768 F.3d 212, 216 (2d Cir. 2014); Rodriguez v. Goord, 04-CV-0358, 2007 WL 4246443, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007) (Scullin, J. adopting report and recommendation by Lowe, M.J.). That discretion should be exercised when necessary to “achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962). In addition, it should be exercised with caution and restraint because dismissal is a particularly harsh remedy, especially when invoked against a Pro Se plaintiff. Baptiste, 768 F.3d at 216-17.
Although Rule 41(b) grants a defendant leave to move for dismissal based on a plaintiff's failure to prosecute or comply with a court order (rather than grant the court explicit authority to dismiss sua sponte), “courts retain the ‘inherent power' to sua sponte ‘clear their calendars of cases that have remained dormant because of the inaction or dilatoriness of the parties seeking relief.'” Rodriguez v. Goord, 04-CV-0358, 2007 WL 4246443, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007) (Scullin, J.) (quoting link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962)). Indeed, the local rules of this Court recognize this authority and mandate that the Court exercise it under certain circumstances. See, e.g., N.D.N.Y. L.R. 41.2(a).
A determination of whether to dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 41(b) is informed by consideration of the following five specific factors: (1) the duration of the plaintiff's failure to comply with court orders; (2) whether the plaintiff was on notice that failure to comply would result in dismissal; (3) whether the defendant is likely to be prejudiced by further delay in the proceedings; (4) a balancing of the court's interest in managing its docket with the plaintiff's interest in a fair chance to be heard; and (5) whether the imposition of sanctions less drastic than dismissal is appropriate. Lucas v. Miles, 84 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Jackson v. City of New York, 22 F.3d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 1994); Alvarez v. Simmons Mkt. Research Bureau, Inc., 839 F.2d 930, 932 (2d Cir. 1988)); see also Shannon v. Gen. Elec.Co.,186 F.3d 186, 193-94 (2d Cir. 1999).
B. Standard Governing Review of the Complaint
Although the court has a duty to show liberality toward Pro Se litigants, and must use extreme caution in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a Pro Se complaint before the adverse party or parties have been served and have had an opportunity to respond, the court still has a responsibility to determine that a claim is not frivolous before permitting a plaintiff to proceed, notwithstanding payment of the filing fee. Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (a district court “may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee[.]”); see also Pflaum v. Town of Stuyvesant, Columbia Cnty., N.Y., 11-CV-0335, 2016 WL 865296, at *1, n.2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2016) (Suddaby, C.J.) (finding that the Court had the power to address and dismiss additional theories of the plaintiff's retaliation claim sua sponte because those theories were so lacking in arguable merit as to be frivolous). In determining whether an action is frivolous, the court must consider whether the complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Dismissal of frivolous actions is appropriate to prevent abuses of court process as well as to discourage the waste of judicial resources. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Harkins v. Eldridge, 505 F.2d 802, 804 (8th Cir. 1974).
III. ANALYSIS
Based upon careful consideration of the foregoing relevant factors related to dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b), I conclude that dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint at this juncture is warranted. Plaintiff's failure to proceed in this action has a substantial injurious effect on the litigation, and there is no end to Plaintiff's inaction in sight. Given Plaintiff's manifest disinterest in pursuing his claims in this action, I find that the need to alleviate congestion on the Court's docket and Defendants' interest in defending against the claims asserted by Plaintiff, outweigh his right to receive a further opportunity to be heard in this matter. As required, I have considered less-drastic sanctions, but reject them as ineffective. For example, I am persuaded that issuing an order reprimanding Plaintiff for his conduct would be futile, given that Plaintiff has ignored the Court's orders on two prior occasions. (Dkt. Nos. 6, 9.)
In addition, the undersigned notes that Plaintiff has failed to properly commence this action by either paying the filing fee or submitting a completed IFP application that reflects his current financial status. (See generally docket sheet); see, e.g., Walker v. Vill. Ct., 17-CV-0390, 2017 WL 4220415, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2017) (Peebles, M.J.) (citing Waters v. Camacho, 288 F.R.D. 70, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)) (recommending dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint where he failed to either pay the required filing fee or demonstrate that he qualifies for leave to proceed without prepayment of fees), report and recommendation adopted by, 2017 WL 4221069 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2017) (Hurd, J.).
As a result, I recommend that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be dismissed.
In the alternative, I recommend that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed as frivolous. As the Complaint is currently drafted, the Court is unable to meaningfully analyze, whether, and to what extent, Plaintiff has pleaded any colorable claim against Defendants. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff's Complaint places an unjustified burden on the Court and, ultimately, on Defendants “‘to select the relevant material from a mass of verbiage.'” Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1281, at 365 (1969)).
ACCORDINGLY, it is respectfully
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED in its entirety, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b), based on his failure to comply with this Court's orders and local rules of practice; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall file a copy of this Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit's decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72; Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)).
If you are proceeding Pro Se and served with this report, recommendation, and order by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date that the report, recommendation, and order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C).