Opinion
C/A No. 9:20-03690-HHM-MHC
06-15-2021
Omar Rick Williams, Sr., Plaintiff, v. Steve Duncan, Carol Scott, Ms. Macon, Ms. Gaylord, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This a civil action filed by a state prisoner. In the event a limitations issue arises, Plaintiff shall have the benefit of the holding in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988) (prisoner's pleading was filed at the moment of delivery to prison authorities for forwarding to the district court). Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge.
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint and Amended Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992), Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995), and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, and a court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016).
However, even when considered under this less stringent standard, for the reasons set forth below, this case is subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for "all civil actions").
I. BACKGROUND
In his initial Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated and he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment because "[a]ll defendants acted negligen[t] under color of state law [and] [t]hey had a duty to serve and protect." Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 4. Plaintiff alleged that he was forced to work in the Kirkland Correctional Institution kitchen after it was classified as a COVID-19 hotspot, he tested positive for COVID-19, and he did not receive any medical treatment. Id. at 5. In the section of the complaint form titled "Injuries" that specifically asked Plaintiff to describe any injuries, he merely wrote that "[t]he basis for this lawsuit is the lack of treatment after testing [positive] for this deadly disease." Id. at 6. Plaintiff requested $500,000 in actual and punitive damages. Id.
Plaintiff was given notice that his Complaint was subject to summary dismissal because he failed to state a claim against any of the named Defendants and failed to state a claim for medical deliberate indifference. Plaintiff was reminded that he could not amend his Complaint in a piecemeal fashion and that an amended complaint replaces the original complaint and should be complete in itself. See ECF No. 8. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on December 14, 2020. ECF No. 15.
II. AMENDED COMPLAINT
The Amended Complaint should be summarily dismissed because Plaintiff fails to request any relief; fails to state any claim against Defendant Ms. Gaylord; and fails to state a cognizable claim against Defendants Warden Steve Duncan (Duncan), Major Scott (Scott), and Ms. Minnie Macon (Macon).
A. Failure to State a Claim for Relief
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff fails to state any claim for relief. See ECF No. 15 at 1-4. Were this Court to find that Plaintiff's rights have been violated, but order no remedy, it would, in effect, be rendering an advisory opinion. Such an action is barred by Article III of the Constitution. Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975); see also Bowler v. Young, 55 F. App'x 187, 188 (4th Cir. 2003); Norvell v. Sangre de Cristo Dev. Co., 519 F.2d 370, 375 (10th Cir. 1975) (federal courts do not render advisory opinions).
B. Defendant Gaylord - Failure to State a Claim
Defendant Gaylord should be dismissed as a Defendant to this action. Plaintiff lists Defendant Gaylord in the caption of his Amended Complaint (ECF No. 15 at 1), but does not mention Gaylord anywhere else in the Complaint and his pleadings fail to provide any specific facts to support a claim that Defendant Gaylord violated his federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (requiring, in order to avoid dismissal, " 'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests'" (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2))). Although the "liberal pleading requirements" of Rule 8(a) only require a "short and plain" statement of the claim, a plaintiff must "offer more detail ... than the bald statement that he has a valid claim of some type against the defendant." Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted); see also White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723 (4th Cir. 1989) (district court did not abuse discretion by dismissing plaintiff's complaint which "failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support his bare assertion").
C. Defendant Duncan
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff writes:
My specific claim against Steve Duncan is the fact that I was (forced) to work at Kirkland Kitchen, which was clearly known as a hotspot for (COVID-19). I was told by Steve Duncan, if I refused to work in this hotspot, that I would be shipped to a prison that's already infected with (COVID-19). This action was clearly arbitrary and capricious. Warden Duncan had a duty to serve and protect all inmates in his custody, instead he placed me in a deadly enviro[n]ment which resulted in me testing [positive] for (COVID-19[).] Upon testing [positive], there [was] absolutely no medical treatment.ECF No. 15 at 1-2.
To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to assert an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, he fails to state a claim. To state a claim for deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must allege that he had a serious medical need and that the defendant(s) acted with deliberate indifference to that need. See Heyer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 209-210 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008)); see also King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 218-20 (4th Cir. 2016); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). A "serious medical need" is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Iko, 535 F.3d at 241 (internal quotation marks omitted). To constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, "the treatment [a prisoner receives] must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness." Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Unless medical needs were serious or life threatening, and the defendants were deliberately indifferent to those needs of which he was aware at the time, a plaintiff may not prevail. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837 Sosebee v. Murphy, 797 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1986). A claim of deliberate medical indifference requires more than a showing of mere negligence, Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06, and "more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
Here, there is no indication that any of the named Defendants are medical providers, and Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the Defendants, including Defendant Duncan, personally failed to provide needed medical treatment. Further, although Plaintiff states that he contracted COVID-19, he has not alleged that he suffered a serious or life-threatening injury to which any of the Defendants were deliberately indifferent. See, e.g., Hallinan v. Scarantino, 466 F. Supp. 3d 587, 606 n. 8 (E.D.N.C. 2020) (finding no evidence of deliberate indifference as to the inmate's testimony that he was not provided treatment for COVID-19 where there was no indication that he developed symptoms that required treatment).
To the extent Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Duncan's actions constitute negligence, such claims are subject to summary dismissal as they are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328-36 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 345-48 (1986); Ruefly v. Landon, 825 F.2d 792, 793-94 (4th Cir. 1987). Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff's claim concerning medical treatment is a disagreement as to the proper treatment to be received, such an allegation does not in and of itself state a constitutional violation. See Smart v. Villar, 547 F.2d 112 (10th Cir.1976); Lamb v. Maschner, 633 F. Supp. 351, 353 (D. Kan. 1986).
Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to assert a claim concerning his conditions of confinement such as allegedly being placed in a COVID-19 "hotspot," his claim fails as Plaintiff has not asserted that he suffered a serious or significant injury as a result of the alleged conditions. To state a claim that conditions of confinement violate constitutional requirements, "a plaintiff must show 'both (1) a serious deprivation of a basic human need; and (2) deliberate indifference to prison conditions on the part of prison officials.'" Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir. 1991)). A plaintiff asserting unconstitutional conditions of confinement must demonstrate that he suffered a serious or significant physical or mental injury because of the challenged condition. See Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1380-81.
D. Defendants Scott and Macon
Plaintiff alleges that his custody level was "minimum" and that Defendant Scott violated SCDC policy because she placed him in a "maximum" level prison to work. ECF No. 15 at 2-3. He appears to allege that Defendant Macon, the head of classification, violated SCDC policy because she failed to sign a specific SCDC form prior to assigning his job. Id. at 3.
Initially, it should be noted that Plaintiff has only alleged that that Defendants violated SCDC policies or rules. However, a violation of a policy or rule of the SCDC does not constitute a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights and is therefore not assertable in a § 1983 action. See Keeler v. Pea, 782 F. Supp. 42, 44 (D.S.C. 1992); cf. Johnson v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., No. 06-2062, 2007 WL 904826, at *12 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2007)(The plaintiff's allegation that defendants did not "follow their own policies or procedures, standing alone, does not amount to a constitutional violation.")(citing Riccio v. County of Fairfax, Virginia, 907 F.2d 1459, 1469 (4th Cir. 1990) (if state law grants more procedural rights than the Constitution requires, a state's failure to abide by that law is not a federal due process issue)).
Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff is complaining about his custody classification because he temporarily had to go to Kirkland Correctional Institution to work, he fails to identify a liberty interest that would invoke due process protections. Generally, to prevail on a claim that an inmate's security classification violates the Due Process Clause, the plaintiff must prove that he had a protected liberty interest in a certain classification and the interest was adversely affected by the defendant's actions without the protections of due process. Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590, 593 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (stating that a § 1983 claim for due process violations in prisons must invoke a "liberty interest" that "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life"). Prisoners generally have no liberty interest in a particular security classification or in being housed in a particular facility. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250-51 (1983) (inmates have no due process right to choose their specific place of confinement).
Courts have previously found that no South Carolina law or regulation creates a liberty interest in a particular security or custody classification. See Brown v. Evatt, 470 S.E.2d 848, 851 (S.C. 1996) ("Neither the state statutes which create and define the powers of the SCDC nor SCDC's operational classification regulations create the required liberty interest. Though they provide procedural safeguards and substantive criteria for making base-line classification decisions, these are made only as recommendations that are subject to discretionary review and rejection by higher-level prison officials."); see also Slezak, 21 F.3d at 595-97 (finding no state created liberty interest in particular classification decisions within SCDC from state statutes, a federal consent decree, or in the operational regulations within SCDC).
Nor has Plaintiff alleged a constitutional claim against any of the Defendants about his job assignment. "An inmate's expectation of keeping a certain prison job does not amount to a property or liberty interest entitled to protection under the due process clause." Gibson v. McEvers, 631 F.2d 95, 98 (7th Cir. 1980) (citing Altizer v. Paderick, 569 F.2d 812, 813 (4th Cir. 1978) (finding no denial of Due Process rights when prison administrators removed prisoner from job assignment without a hearing and explaining that classifications and work assignments of prisoners in penal institutions are matters of prison administration, within the discretion of the prison administrators, and do not require fact-finding hearings as a prerequisite for the exercise of such discretion)).
III. ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AS SUPPLEMENTED
As noted above, the Amended Complaint replaces the Complaint and thus this Court should consider the Amended Complaint and not the Complaint. However, even if the Amended Complaint is interpreted as a supplement to the original Complaint and the two documents are considered together, this case should be summarily dismissed. In the Complaint, Plaintiff requests monetary damages, such that dismissal for failure to state a claim for relief would not be warranted. However, for the reasons discussed above in section II, subsections B-D, this case should be dismissed even if the Complaint and Amended Complaint are considered together. Plaintiff fails to state any claim against Defendant Gaylord and he fails to state a cognizable claim against Defendants Duncan, Scott, and Macon.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that this case be dismissed without issuance and service of process.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the following page.
/s/_________
Molly H. Cherry
United States Magistrate Judge June 15, 2021
Charleston, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).