Opinion
C. A. 8:20-cv-03004-TLW-JDA
08-25-2020
Chadriquez Williams, Petitioner, v. Warden Dobbs, FCI Williamsburg, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge
Chadriquez Williams (“Petitioner”) is a prisoner in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and is currently incarcerated in South Carolina at the Williamsburg Federal Correctional Institution. [Doc. 1 at 1.] Proceeding pro se, Petitioner brings this habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review such petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. For the reasons below, the Petition is subject to summary dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner's Conviction, Sentence, and Appeal
On August 4, 2010, Petitioner was convicted by a jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia to Counts 1, 2, and 3 of an Indictment at case number 4:09-cr-00039-MFU, charging him with possession with intent to distribute marijuana at Count 1 and use and possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense at Counts 2 and 3. [Doc. 1 at 1]; United States v. Williams, No. 4:09-cr-00039-MFU (W.D.Va. Aug. 4, 2010), Docs. 3; 64 (“Williams”). On October 22, 2010, the Honorable Samuel G. Wilson sentenced Petitioner to a total term of imprisonment of 438 months, consisting of 18 months at Count 1, 120 months at Count 2, and 300 months at Count 3, all to be served consecutively. Williams, Docs. 73; 75.
The Court takes judicial notice of the records in Petitioner's criminal case and his appeals filed in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
On July 1, 2011, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated Petitioner's sentence and remanded the case to the sentencing court for the limited purpose of resentencing. Williams, Doc. 95. On remand, the sentencing court dismissed Count 3 of the Indictment and resentenced Petitioner on October 18, 2011, to a total term of imprisonment of 380 months, consisting of 18 months at Count 1, and 342 months at Count 2 to be served consecutively to Count 1. [Doc. 1 at 1]; Williams, Docs. 105; 106; 108. Petitioner again appealed his conviction and sentencing, but the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the sentencing court's amended judgment. Williams, Docs. 119; 120; 121.
As noted by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in ruling on Petitioner's direct appeal from the amended judgment,
[Petitioner] was originally convicted on two § 924(c) counts, for which he was sentenced to 120 months on one and 300 months on the other. After [Petitioner] appealed to [the Fourth Circuit], the Government moved to dismiss the latter § 924(c) count, and [the Fourth Circuit] vacated [Petitioner's] sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing. On remand, the district court increased [Petitioner's] sentence on the remaining § 924(c) count from 120 months to 342 months in prison.United States v. Williams, 481 Fed.Appx. 851, 852, n.1 (4th Cir. 2012).
Petitioner's § 2255 Motions
On March 25, 2013, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the sentencing court. [Doc. 1 at 4]; Williams, Doc. 126. Petitioner argued, among other things, that his sentence should be vacated because the sentencing court erroneously sentenced him as a career offender under § 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”). Williams, Doc. 126 at 19-20. However, the sentencing court denied his motion on June 13, 2014. Williams, Doc. 163. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the sentencing court's opinion and order on March 16, 2015. Williams; Docs. 171; 172; 175.
Petitioner then filed a second motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the sentencing court on July 17, 2018. Williams, Doc. 201. However, the sentencing court denied his motion on August 9, 2018, as a successive petition. Williams, Doc. 202; 203. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the sentencing court's opinion and order on November 20, 2018. Williams; Docs. 207; 208; 209.
Petitioner's Present Action
Petitioner now seeks habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in this Court, claiming that his sentence is unconstitutional because he is not a career offender under § 4B1.1 of the Guidelines because he is actually innocent of the predicate offense. [Doc. 1-1 at 3. Petitioner contends that he meets the savings clause test announced in United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2018). [Id.] For his relief, Petitioner requests that the Court vacate his sentence. [Doc. 1 at 8.]
Petitioner filed a supporting brief with his Petition. [Doc. 1-1.] The Court has carefully reviewed both the Petition and the supporting brief, as well as the documents from Petitioner's underlying criminal action, in its consideration of Petitioner's claims.
APPLICABLE LAW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se pleadings pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction, 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). The Petitioner is a pro se litigant, and thus his pleadings are accorded liberal construction. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). Even under this less stringent standard, however, the Petition is subject to summary dismissal.
Furthermore, this Court is charged with screening Petitioner's lawsuit to determine if “it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4 of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; see also Rule 1(b) Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the U.S. District Courts (2012) (a district court may apply these rules to a habeas corpus petition not filed pursuant to § 2254).
DISCUSSION
Savings Clause Test
Unlike a § 2255 motion, which is filed in the sentencing court, a § 2241 petition is filed in the district where the petitioner is incarcerated. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a); In re: Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 332 (4th Cir. 2000). Ordinarily, “defendants convicted in federal court are obliged to seek habeas relief from their convictions and sentences through § 2255.” Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 (4th Cir. 1997)). This is so because a § 2241 petition generally “attacks the execution of a sentence rather than its validity,” whereas a § 2255 motion “attacks the legality of detention.” Rice v. Lamanna, 451 F.Supp.2d 755, 758 (D.S.C. 2006) (quoting Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996)); see also United States v. Miller, 871 F.2d 488, 489-90 (4th Cir. 1989) (distinguishing between attacks to the “computation and execution of the sentence rather than the sentence itself”). However, § 2255 includes a savings clause, which permits a district court to consider a § 2241 petition challenging the validity of the prisoner's conviction or sentence when § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of . . . detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); Jones, 226 F.3d at 333. Accordingly, Petitioner cannot challenge his federal sentence under § 2241, unless he can satisfy the requirements of the § 2255 savings clause, which states:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). In other words, as applied here, Petitioner's § 2241 action is barred unless he can demonstrate that the relief available to him under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective. Here, Petitioner has already filed a motion under § 2255 in the sentencing court seeking relief from his conviction and sentence but was unsuccessful. Nevertheless, “the remedy afforded by § 2255 is not rendered inadequate or ineffective merely because an individual has been unable to obtain relief under that provision, or because an individual is procedurally barred from filing a § 2255 motion.” See In re Vial, 115 F.3d at 1194 n.5 (citations omitted).
Recently, the Fourth Circuit established a test for evaluating whether a petitioner meets the savings clause under § 2255 when he contests his sentence:
[Section] 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a sentence when: (1) at the time of sentencing, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the sentence; (2) subsequent to the prisoner's direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the aforementioned settled substantive law changed and was deemed to apply retroactively on collateral review; (3) the prisoner is unable to meet the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255(h)(2) for second or successive motions; and (4) due to this retroactive change, the sentence now presents an error sufficiently grave to be deemed a fundamental defect.Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 429. This savings clause test is a jurisdictional requirement that must be met before the Court can entertain a petition filed pursuant to § 2241. Id. at 426 (explaining, “the savings clause requirements are jurisdictional”). The Court may sua sponte raise subject matter jurisdiction, and the Fourth Circuit has held that, if a petitioner cannot meet the savings clause requirements, then the § 2241 petition “must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” Rice, 617 F.3d at 807. While at first blush, this issue may seem complex for initial review under § 1915, consideration of it is required because the § 2 255 savings clause is a jurisdictional requirement, and an analysis of whether Petitioner meets the new four-part savings clause test created in Wheeler is therefore required at this stage.
Petitioner appears to meet the first requirement of Wheeler that his sentence was legal at the time of sentencing. However, Petitioner cannot meet the second element because he cannot show that, subsequent to his first § 2255 motion, the settled substantive law under which he was sentenced changed and was deemed to apply retroactively on collateral review.
Analysis
Petitioner argues that his sentence should be vacated and appears to allege that he meets the four-part savings clause test announced in Wheeler. [Docs. 1 at 8; Doc. 1-1 at 1, 3.] Specifically, Petitioner contends that he is actually innocent of the required predicate offense to trigger the career offender enhancement under § 4B1.1 of the Guidelines. [Doc. 1-1 at 4.] Petitioner contends that his two prior convictions for distribution of marijuana are not valid predicate offenses for the career offender enhancement. [Id. at 5.]
However, Petitioner cannot meet the second element of the Wheeler savings clause test, which requires that “subsequent to the prisoner's direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the aforementioned settled substantive law changed and was deemed to apply retroactively on collateral review.” Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 429. Here, Petitioner points to no substantive law change subsequent to his first § 2255 motion that has been applied retroactively on collateral review. To support his argument, Petitioner cites Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016). However, the Fourth Circuit has concluded that “Mathis did not announce a substantive change to the law” but instead “reiterated and clarified when to apply the categorical approach or the modified categorical approach.” Muhammad v. Wilson, 715 Fed.Appx. 251, 252 (4th Cir. 2017). Likewise, the Fourth Circuit has held that Mathis “has not been held retroactively applicable on collateral review.” Walker v. Kassell, 726 Fed.Appx. 191, 192 (4th Cir. 2018); see also Brooks v. Bragg, 735 Fed.Appx. 108, 109 (4th Cir. 2018) (“Mathis did not announce a retroactively applicable substantive change in the law.”). Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to satisfy the elements of the Fourth Circuit's Wheeler test to invoke the savings clause to challenge his sentence in this § 2241, and his Petition is therefore subject to summary dismissal.
The undersigned also notes that Petitioner raised the same argument that he raises here in his first § 2255 motion. The sentencing court denied Petitioner's motion and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that decision, rejecting Petitioner's
assertion that he should not have been classified as a career offender. Under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a) (2010), a defendant qualifies as a career offender if: (1) the defendant is older than eighteen years of age at the time of the instant offense; (2) the instant offense is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two felony convictions for either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. [Petitioner] concedes his situation satisfies all of the requirements for career offender status. Despite his concession, [Petitioner] summarily asks the court to find, “under the unique facts of this case,” that the district court erred by counting his prior convictions as proper career offender predicate convictions. Because [Petitioner] concedes his situation satisfies the career offender requirements, and since he assigns no error to the district court's decision to classify him as a career offender, we reject [Petitioner's] request to have his sentenced vacated on this ground.Williams, Doc. 119 at 4-5.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner cannot meet the savings clause test announced in Wheeler. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the Petition. Accordingly, it is recommended that the § 2241 Petition be dismissed without prejudice and without requiring the Respondent to file an answer or return.
See Platts v. O'Brien, 691 Fed.Appx. 774 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner's Ass'n v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir. 2013) (“A dismissal for . . . [a] defect in subject matter jurisdiction[ ] must be one without prejudice, because a court that lacks jurisdiction has no power to adjudicate and dispose of a claim on the merits.”).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Petitioner's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).