Opinion
21-CV-01083 (PGG) (KHP)
07-29-2021
ALEXANDER WILLIAMS, JR., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants.
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
KATHARINE H. PARKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
TO: THE HONORABLE PAUL G. GARDEPHE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Pro se Plaintiff Alexander Williams, Jr. brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 against 66 named Defendants (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging that Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights while he was housed at the George R. Vierno Center (“G.R.V.C.”) at Rikers Island as a pre-trial detainee. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendants infringed upon his constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, conspired to interfere with his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and neglected to prevent those infractions in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986.
On April 30, 2021, Defendant City of New York requested that the Court review Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 36 (“SAC”)) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B). Given the number of named Defendants and the extensive allegations asserted in the operative complaint, the Court stayed proceedings in this case pending that review.
Having carefully reviewed Plaintiff's SAC, I respectfully recommend that the following 16 named Defendants be dismissed from this action:
• New York City Health & Hospital;
• Doctor Bryan Burns;
• Doctor K;
• Doctor Saidu Jimoh (also referred to as Shidul Jimoh);
• Mrs. V;
• Shawn Fishler;
• Mr. Roman;
• ADW Lacroix;
• Captain Ferber;
• Captain Ballah;
• CO Simms;
• CO Adamchez (also referred to as Adamchex);
• CO Edmunds;
• CO Figurioa;
• CO Pierce; and
• Unknown ESU Officer.
Furthermore, I also respectfully recommend that the case proceed against all of the other named Defendants.
BACKGROUND
On November 3, 2020, Plaintiff was transferred from the Manhattan Detention Complex to the G.R.V.C. at Rikers Island for pre-trial detention. Plaintiff alleges that, from the time he arrived at G.R.V.C. to the filing of his initial Complaint in this action, he was subjected to inhumane living conditions and was deprived of various constitutional rights. The majority of Plaintiff's complaints stem from the facility's implementation of Command Level Order (“CLO”) 370.20. (SAC, Ex. 3.) Plaintiff alleges that, through enforcement of this CLO, Defendants created detainment conditions that violated the express conditions set forth in Plaintiff's Lockdown Order. (See SAC, Ex. 19.) He further contends that G.R.V.C. directly contravened explicit directives from the New York City Board of Corrections by implementing CLO 370.20. (SAC, Ex. 14.)
Plaintiff's SAC alleges various violations of Plaintiff's First, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as retaliation, conspiracy, and failure to prevent violations and harms against him. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that 50 named Defendants infringed on these constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; that four named Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985; and that 45 named Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1986.
For the avoidance of doubt, Plaintiff generally asserts Section 1983 claims against all of the named Defendants. However, liberally construing the SAC and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, Plaintiff's allegations can only conceivably substantiate claims under Section 1983 against the 50 named Defendants alluded to above.
LEGAL STANDARDS
I. Section 1915(e)(2)(B) Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court shall dismiss an action if it “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” The court must liberally construe a pro se plaintiff's complaint to determine if the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a plausible claim. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads enough facts to allow the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
II. Sections 1983 Claims
42 U.S.C. § 1983 establishes a cause of action for “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. In order to sufficiently allege a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show “a tangible connection between the acts of a defendant and the injuries suffered.” Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986). Indeed, defendants can only be held accountable for their own actions under Section 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 683 (stating that defendants could not be held liable unless they themselves acted against the plaintiff). That said, when individuals are sued in their supervisory capacity, those defendants can be found liable if they “created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed such a policy or custom to continue . . . [or] if [they were] grossly negligent in managing subordinates who caused the unlawful condition or event.” Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323-24 (2d Cir. 1986).
III. Section 1985 Claims
42 U.S.C. § 1985 prohibits “two or more persons from conspiring for the purpose of depriving any person of the equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.” Harte v. City of New York, No. 19-cv-1029 (WFK), 2019 WL 1492912, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2019). To sufficiently allege a Section 1985 claim, the plaintiff must show: “(1) a conspiracy (2) for the purpose of depriving a person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or the equal privileges and immunities under the laws; (3) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to the plaintiff's person or property, or a deprivation of a right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 146 (2d Cir. 1999). Additionally, the Second Circuit has held that the conspiracy must be motivated by class-based discriminatory animus and that the plaintiff must be a member of a protected class. Mira v. Kingston, 715 Fed.Appx. 28, 30 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order); Saunders v. Vinton, 554 Fed.Appx. 36, 38-39 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order).
DISCUSSION
I. Dismissal of Defendants for Lack of Allegations
As a preliminary matter, the following Defendants should be dismissed from this action because, while they are listed as Defendants, there is no mention of them in the SAC and no allegations are lodged against them: (1) New York City Health & Hospital; (2) Doctor K; (3) Captain Ferber; (4) CO Simms; and (5) Unknown ESU Officer.
As explained in further detail below, the Court also recommends that all New York City Health & Hospital employees be dismissed from the case. Thus, there is no need for Plaintiff to maintain his claims against the agency for purposes of establishing vicarious liability.
II. Section 1983 Claims
Having carefully evaluated the SAC, Plaintiff essentially asserts that 50 of the Defendants violated his constitutional rights and improperly deprived him of services from November 3, 2020, through April 11, 2021, while Plaintiff was housed at G.R.V.C, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff contends that his First, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when G.R.V.C. personnel refused to provide Plaintiff with Kosher meals in accordance with his religious beliefs, prohibited Plaintiff from contacting his attorney over the phone or in person, retaliated against Plaintiff for filing complaints and this lawsuit, and more.
Construing the pro se Plaintiff's SAC liberally, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims survive scrutiny under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B). To be clear, the Court offers no opinion on the likelihood of success or the merits of these claims at this juncture.
III. Section 1985 and 1986 Claims
In the SAC, Plaintiff alleges that numerous Defendants conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights by creating and implementing CLO 370.20 in violation of 42 U.S.C § 1985. (See SAC, Ex. 3.) Plaintiff further alleges that these and other Defendants neglected to prevent the aforementioned constitutional violations when they refused to intervene and stop the other Defendants while they were unlawfully enforcing CLO 370.20. Thus, Plaintiff asserts that these latter Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1986.
42 U.S.C. § 1986 provides, in part, that: “[e]very person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in [42 U.S.C. § 1985], are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented.”
As noted above, there are four elements that Plaintiff must allege in order to establish a Section 1985 claim. Thomas, 165 F.3d at 146. One of the elements Plaintiff must establish is that he is a member of a protected class and that Defendants' conduct was motivated by a class-based animus. Saunders, 554 Fed.Appx. at 38. However, Plaintiff does not allege that any of the Defendants' actions were motivated by Plaintiff's race or any other protected characteristic. Rather, if anything, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants were motivated by Plaintiff's complaints and lawsuit. (See, e.g., SAC ¶¶ 97, 184, 203.)
Second Circuit case law indicates that prisoners are not a protected class for the purposes of establishing a colorable claim under Section 1985. Saunders, 554 Fed.Appx. at 38; cf. Delee v. Hannigan, 729 Fed.Appx. 25, 32 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (finding that inmate's Section 1985 claims were properly dismissed for failure to establish membership in a protected class); Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290, 296 (2d Cir. 2015) (same). Consistent with this precedent, Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to establish a claim under Section 1985. Accordingly, those claims should be dismissed.
As for Plaintiff's Section 1986 claims, the Second Circuit has held that plaintiffs cannot state a claim under Section 1986 without first successfully stating a claim under Section 1985. Dacey v. Dorsey, 568 F.2d 275, 277 (2d Cir. 1978); Komatsu v. City of New York, No. 20-cv-6510 (LLS), 2020 WL 8641274, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2020). Given the Court's recommendation that Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Section 1985 should be dismissed, the Court also recommends dismissing Plaintiff's Section 1986 claims.
As stated above, Plaintiff alleges violations under Sections 1985 and 1986 against 49 total Defendants. However, for 11 of those 49 Defendants, the only claims asserted stem from purported Section 1985 and Section 1986 violations. Because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to support those claims, those 11 Defendants should be dismissed from this action, as there are no surviving claims asserted against them. These 11 Defendants include: Doctor Bryan Burns, Doctor Saidu Jimoh, Mrs. V, Shawn Fishler, Mr. Roman, ADW Lacroix, Captain Ballah, CO Adamchez, CO Edmunds, CO Figurioa, and CO Pierce.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully recommend that the following 16 Defendants be dismissed from this action: (1) New York City Health & Hospital, (2) Doctor Bryan Burns, (3) Doctor K, (4) Doctor Shidul Jimoh, (5) Mrs. V, (6) Shawn Fishler, (7) Mr. Roman, (8) ADW Lacroix, (9) Captain Ferber, (10) Captain Ballah, (11) CO Simms, (12) CO Adamchez, (13) CO Edmunds, (14) CO Figurioa, (15) CO Pierce, and (16) Unknown ESU Officer. I also recommend that the claims under Sections 1985 and 1986 be dismissed with respect to the remaining Defendants. Finally, I recommend that the case proceed with respect to the remaining 50 Defendants as to the alleged Section 1983 violations.
The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this Report and Recommendation to Plaintiff .
NOTICE
Plaintiff shall have seventeen days, and Defendants shall have fourteen days, from service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d) (adding three additional days only when service is made under Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b)(2)(C) (mail), (D) (leaving with the clerk), or (F) (other means consented to by the parties)). A party may respond to another party's objections after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2).
Plaintiff shall have seventeen days to serve and file any response. Defendants shall have fourteen days to serve and file any response. Any objections and any responses to such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court, with courtesy copies delivered to the chambers of the Honorable Paul G. Gardephe at the United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, New York, New York 10007, and served on the other parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72(b). Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be addressed to Judge Gardephe. The failure to file timely objections shall result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).