Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:00-CV-3238-TWT
January 14, 2002
ORDER
This is an employment discrimination action brought pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621et seq. It is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 23]. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the Defendant' s motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant Cascade United Methodist Church ("Cascade") is a religious institution engaged in Christian ministry and the conduct of worship and related Church services and activities, missions and outreach. Plaintiff Williams has been a member of Cascade since 1983. During his membership, Plaintiff has been actively involved in many ministries such as chairing the Mission Outreach Ministry and serving on the Usher Board. Plaintiff has also served as a member of the Methodist Men's Club. Cascade hired Plaintiff Williams as its Maintenance and Security Coordinator in October, 1986. This job required Plaintiff to perform and oversee custodial duties, including maintenance services.
On July 8, 1996, Plaintiff injured his right shoulder and neck while performing lawn maintenance with a rotor tiller on church grounds. The Church secretary referred Plaintiff to Dr. Williams Osborne. Dr. Osborne referred Plaintiff to Dr. Christopher Edwards for treatment of his neck injury, and to Dr. William Armstrong for treatment of his right shoulder injury. On January 23, 1997, Plaintiff was placed on medical leave from Cascade. After undergoing surgery and treatment, in November, 1997, Dr. Edwards gave Plaintiff Williams a 12% permanent partial disability rating because of his neck injury. On December 10, 1999, Dr. Armstrong gave Plaintiff a 6% disability rating to the body as a whole. At this time, Plaintiff s doctors released Plaintiff to return to work without restriction. On January 20, 2000, however, Cascade received a letter from Plaintiff's attorney in which he stated:
[Plaintiff] is permanently injured and, from all indications and medical evidence known to us, will have lifelong needs for workers [sic] compensation treatment and benefits resulting from his shoulder and neck injuries. . . Because of his neck and shoulder injuries while working for Cascade United Methodist Church, [Plaintiff] will never be able to return to work at Cascade and perform the activities he did prior to his injuries. . . [Plaintiff] cannot perform his pre-injuries [sic] duties without restrictions.
In early February, 2000, Plaintiff approached Valerie Earvin, Director of Administration for Cascade at the time, about returning to work. Plaintiff alleges that he and Ms. Earvin talked about a custodial position that was available at the time. Ms. Earvin allegedly expressed concern about whether Plaintiff Williams could perform the physical requirements of the job. When Plaintiff informed Ms. Earvin that he was in fact capable, she told Plaintiff that she would get back to him with salary and benefits. Defendant Cascade contends that at this time, Ms. Earvin offered Plaintiff the job subject to Plaintiff providing documentation clarifying his ability to return to frill-duty work without restriction. Defendant Cascade insists this documentation was necessary because of the conflicting information regarding Plaintiff s condition. It is Plaintiff s position, however, that Ms. Earvin did not offer him the job or ask Plaintiff to provide any documentation.
Ms. Earvin wrote to Plaintiff on two occasions in February. Plaintiff states these letters again did not ask Plaintiff to obtain any written documentation from his doctors; Cascade contends that these letters reiterated Ms. Earvin' s request for documentation from Plaintiff. The second letter, sent on February 18, 2000, informed Plaintiff that Cascade's workers' compensation attorneys had advised Ms. Earvin that Cascade should be cautious about returning Plaintiff to work in light of conflicting information from his treating physicians and his attorney. Accordingly, Ms. Earvin allegedly advised Plaintiff not to report on February 21, 2000, until Earvin received the documentation she had requested.
Pursuant to the Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church, the Staff Pastor Parish Relation Committee ("SPRC") of the local church is vested with authority to make ultimate employment decisions with respect to non-episcopally appointed employees. Earvin, as Director of Administration, had the authority to recommend employment actions to the SPRC, which is made up of nine voting members in addition to the senior pastor, who is a non-voting member of the committee. On February 22, 2000, Earvin made two recommendations to the Cascade SPRC with respect to Plaintiff's employment in light of his alleged failure to provide clarification of his ability to return to full-duty employment without restrictions:
(1) To ask for Plaintiff's resignation with severance pay with week of salary per year worked at the salary rate of $25,000 per year; or
(2) To terminate Plaintiff's employment as at-will employee by the Georgia law for employment and termination.
The SPRC took Earvin' s recommendations under advisement. Following deliberation, the committee unanimously voted to terminate Plaintiff's employment without severance, effective February 22, 2000. All nine of the SPRC voting members were present at the February 22, 2000, meeting. The SPRC's reason for terminating Plaintiff's employment included consideration of the following three factors:
(1) Plaintiff's attorney's January 20, 2000 letter in which he stated Plaintiff could not perform his pre-injury duties;
(2) Documents from Plaintiff's treating physicians claiming Plaintiff could return to work without restriction; and
(3) Advice from the Church's workers' compensation attorneys to be "very careful in bringing Plaintiff back to work" in light, of his conflicting information regarding Plaintiff's ability to return to work.
On February 23, 2000, Earvin wrote Plaintiff and notified him that his employment had been terminated by the SPRC, effective February 22, 2000, based upon the SPRC's assessment of the documentation it had available. Plaintiff was given the option to resign by February 25, 2000. Plaintiff; however, elected not to resign his employment with Cascade.
The custodian position remained open and Cascade solicited applications for the position through advertisements in its weekly newsletter, The Messenger, which is distributed to congregants of the Church at the conclusion of the Sunday morning worship services. The position was advertised in the April 2, and April 9, 2001 issues of The Messenger. The advertisement read as follows:
Cascade is currently seeking a full-time custodian. Must be able to lift and clean. Workdays are from Monday-Friday, pay $18,000.00. Please apply with the Director of Administration by April 15.
Plaintiff did not apply for the custodian position. Joseph Frazier, a temporary employee hired by Cascade in 1999, applied for the custodian position in response to the advertisements. Frazier was hired to fill the custodian position on June 7, 2000, about three months after Plaintiff's termination. On April 18, 2000, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The EEOC issued Plaintiff a notice of right to sue letter on September 11, 2000. The instant action was filed on December 7, 2000.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits submitted by the parties show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The court should view the evidence and any inferences that may be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Adickes v. S.H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-159 (1970). The party seeking summary judgment must first identify grounds that show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant, who must go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact does exist.Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
III. DISCUSSION
A. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Cascade discriminated against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12102 et seq. The ADA prohibits covered entities, including private employers, from discriminating against "a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a).
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination pursuant to the ADA, "a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he has a disability; (2) he is a qualified individual; and (3) he was subjected to unlawful discrimination as a result of his disability." Gordon v. E.L. Hamm Assoc., Inc. 100 F.3d 907, 910 (11th Cir. 1996). A plaintiff must also show that the employer had either actual or constructive knowledge of the disability or considered the employee to be disabled. Gordon, 100 F.3d at 910-11. If a plaintiff establishes these three elements, the ADA imposes on employers a duty to provide reasonable accommodation for known disabilities unless doing so would result in undue hardship to the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1526 (11th Cir. 1997). It is the employee's burden to identify a reasonable accommodation that would allow the employee to perform his job. Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 284-85 (11th Cir. 1997). Establishing undue hardship is an affirmative defense to be pled and proven by the employer. Willis, 108 F.3d at. 286.
"In order to state a claim for wrongful termination under the ADA, a plaintiff must first prove that he has a disability, as defined by the Act." Standard v. A.B.E.L. Services. Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1327 (11th Cir. 1997). Disability is defined in three ways as "(1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (2) a record of such impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2). "Merely proving the existence of a physical or mental impairment, without addressing any limitation on major life activities, is not sufficient to prove disability under the Act." Standard, 161 F.3d at 1327. The phrase "major life activities" includes functions such as "caring for oneself; performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (i). In determining whether an impairment is substantially limiting, the court should consider the nature and severity of the impairment, its expected duration, and its long-term impact. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2).
Plaintiff does not claim that he is substantially limited in a major life activity. Instead, Plaintiff asserts that Cascade regarded Plaintiff as having a substantially limiting impairment. To be "regarded as" an individual with a disability pursuant to the ADA, one must either (1) have an impairment that does not substantially limit a major life activity, but be treated by the employer as constituting such limitation; (2) have a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or (3) have no impairment, but be treated by an employer as having a substantially limiting impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1). Plaintiff asserts that he had no impairment, and could perform the functions of the job, yet was treated by Cascade as unable to discharge the duties of custodian.
Cascade claims Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of the ADA. Specifically, Cascade challenges Plaintiff's assertion that it regarded Plaintiff has having a disability. Defendant concedes that Plaintiff indicated that he wished to return to work. (Deposition of Joseph Williams, p. 32). Moreover, Cascade admits that Plaintiff was released to return to work by both of his treating physicians. (Deposition of Joseph Williams, pp. 35-36, Exhibit 3; Exhibit 4). Due to the letter containing conflicting information Defendant Cascade received from Plaintiff's attorney stating that Plaintiff was permanently disabled, Defendant Cascade would not allow Plaintiff to return to work until proper documentation was submitted. Defendant Cascade asserts that the responsibility of procuring this documentation lay with Plaintiff; and Plaintiff's failure to do so justified his termination.
Defendant compares this case to that of Wilson v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 4 F. Supp.2d 1164, (N.D. Ga. 1998). In that case, the plaintiff was diagnosed with a permanent heart condition characterized by abnormal thickening of the walls of the heart. Id. at 1166. The plaintiff s doctor placed severe work restrictions on the type of work plaintiff could perform. When plaintiff sought to return to his job as Electrical and Instrument Mechanic, the defendant employer put him on disability leave. Indeed, plaintiff's doctor, after reviewing a list of job requirements for an E I Mechanic, prohibited plaintiff from returning to such a position. Later, when a light duty position was proposed which plaintiff's doctor approved, the employer did not offer it to plaintiff and the litigation ensued. In granting summary judgment to the employer on plaintiff s argument that the employer "regarded" him as possessing an impairment, Judge Carnes of this Court stated:
In this case, however, there was nothing faulty or inaccurate about [the employer's] perception that plaintiff had a condition that prevented him from performing many of the duties of the position . . . [because] it was the plaintiff; himself; who informed [the employer] that he suffered from a serious heart condition and could no longer perform many of his duties.Id. at 1171. The Court noted that the case would be different had plaintiff and his doctor insisted to plaintiff's employer that he could still perform his regular duties, yet his employer refused to allow him as a result of his diagnosis. Id.
Defendant contends that because Plaintiff refused to submit the proper documentation that he could perform his regular duties, the outcome of this case should be similar to that in Wilson. Unfortunately for Defendant, the Court views the facts of this case to be unlike the actual case in Wilson and more like Judge Carnes' hypothetical. There is no dispute that Cascade had been informed through both Plaintiff and his doctors that Plaintiff was capable of returning to work with no restrictions. (Defendant Cascade's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts as to which There is no Genuine Issue to be Tried, No. 16, 17). Although Defendant Cascade insists that Ms. Earvin requested documentation from Plaintiff regarding his ability to perform the job, the letters written to Plaintiff are, at least, ambiguous as to whether it was in fact Plaintiff's responsibility to procure the appropriate documentation. The February 9th letter sent by Ms. Earvin states: "I will proceed to seek clarification of `return to work' documentation, workman's comp status and Cascade's position relative to position and salary." (Exhibit 7 to Deposition of Joseph Williams). The February 18th letter states:
The letter dated February 9, 2000 indicated that I would seek to clarify the disposition regarding your return to work on Monday, February 21, 2000. I have had a conversation with the attorney, however, I am waiting to receive written documentation. There continues to be a need for clarity regarding your ability to return to work.
(Exhibit 8 to Deposition of Joseph Williams).
A jury could interpret these ambiguous statements to mean that Ms. Earvin would acquire the relevant documentation from Plaintiff's physicians and attorney. Therefore, this is the case posed by the Court in Wilson where both the plaintiff and his doctors affirmed his ability to return to work, but the defendant refused to allow him to do so. Unfortunately, after Ms. Earvin made these statements and before the ensuing litigation, Ms. Earvin was killed in a car accident. Therefore, the Court does not have the benefit of any testimony she may have offered to shed light on the situation. On the basis of the evidence before the Court, however, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff's termination was motivated by the perception of Defendant Cascade that he was unable to perform the duties of the job. Summary judgment as to Plaintiff's ADA claim is denied.
B. AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT
Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant discriminated against him in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). It is undisputed that the Plaintiff has no direct evidence of age discrimination. Therefore, he must establish the elements of a prima facie case based upon circumstantial evidence as set forth in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and restated in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADEA, a plaintiff must demonstrate "(1) that he was a member of the protected group of persons between the ages of 40 and 70; (2) that he was subject to an adverse employment action; (3) that a substantially younger person filled the position that he sought or from which he was discharged; and (4) that he was qualified to do the job for which he was rejected." Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., 196 F.3d 1354, 1359 (11th Cir. 1999).
Defendant concedes that Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of age discrimination. Cascade submits, however, that it has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff's termination, namely Plaintiff's refusal to acquire documentation outlining his medical release to return to work. The Court has already concluded, however, that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant imposed this duty on Plaintiff in the first place. If it is, as Plaintiff suggests, that Defendant Cascade never asked Plaintiff to submit further documentation, then a jury could conclude that Defendant's subsequent termination of Plaintiff was motivated by something other than Plaintiff's failure to submit the requisite documents or, by inference, age discrimination. Plaintiff has succeeded in coming forward at this stage with barely enough evidence that Defendant's legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action is pretextual. Plaintiff's claim for age discrimination also survives summary judgment.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Cascade's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 23] is DENIED. A consolidated pre-trial order shall be submitted within 30 days from the docketing of this Order. This case will be placed on the Court's March, 2002, trial calendar.
SO ORDERED, this 14th day of January, 2002.