Opinion
8:21-cv-03491-DCC-JDA
11-08-2022
Davonta Williams, Plaintiff, v. Taia Carter, Lieutenant; Miles Perkins, Sergeant; Christian Riley, Officer, Defendants.[1]
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jacquelyn D. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants. [Doc. 24.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff, an inmate with the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) proceeding pro se, filed this action in this Court, alleging multiple federal constitutional claims against prison staff relating to events that allegedly occurred during his confinement. [Doc. 1.] On March 15, 2022, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 24.] By Order of this Court filed the next day, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), Plaintiff was advised of the summary judgment/dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately. [Doc. 25.] The Clerk docketed a response and a supplement to the response from Plaintiff on July 29 and August 25, 2022, respectively. [Docs. 37; 40.] The motion is now ripe for review.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights due to their deliberate indifference to his medical needs and/or his safety. [Id. at 4.] Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that, on July 28, 2021, at approximately 1:15 p.m., he was in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) at Lee Correctional Institution in the shower when he told Defendant Carter that he was having a mental health crisis and that he would not leave the shower until he spoke with someone from mental health. [ Id. at 4-5.] Plaintiff alleges that Carter then opened the shower door to let in Defendants Perkins and Riley, who started assaulting, punching, and choking Plaintiff. [Id. at 5.] According to Plaintiff, Defendants then lifted him into the air by his neck and one leg and carried him into a cell, where he was slammed onto the concrete bed slab and then handcuffed. [Id.] Plaintiff alleges that after he was handcuffed, Perkins repeatedly punched him in the head, causing his right eye to split open and bleed, and he placed both of his hands around his neck, choking him. [Id.] According to Plaintiff, Carter and another correctional officer watched Perkins and Riley attack and assault him and later wrote a false disciplinary report accusing Plaintiff of threatening an officer. [Id.] Plaintiff also contends all three Defendants and the other officer denied him medical care. [Id.]
For his injuries, Plaintiff contends that he has suffered neck pain, body pain, back pain, a gash in his head on his right eye, pain in his right eye, major headaches, and head pain. [Id. at 10.] Plaintiff asserts he was refused medical treatment for his injuries and has suffered the loss of his vision. [Id.] For his relief, Plaintiff seeks money damages in the amount of $250,000. [Id.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. The mandated liberal construction means only that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for her. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411,417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court “conjure up questions never squarely presented.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Requirements for a Cause of Action Under § 1983
This action is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1 983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements:
(1) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and (2) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The under-color-of-state-law element, which is equivalent to the “state action” requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment,
reflects judicial recognition of the fact that most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments. This fundamental limitation on the scope of constitutional guarantees preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.Id. (quoting Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual” may at times be treated “as if a State has caused it to be performed.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Specifically, “state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a ‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.'” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). State action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation “caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible” and that “the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). A determination of whether a private party's allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State requires the court to “begin[ ] by identifying ‘the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.'” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)).
Because there is no doctrine of respondeat superior in § 1983 claims, Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978), a defendant is liable in his individual capacity only for his personal wrongdoing or supervisory actions that violated constitutional norms, see Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (setting forth elements necessary to establish supervisory liability under § 1983). A plaintiff must establish three elements to prevail under § 1983 on a theory of supervisory liability:
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive
practices[]”; and (3) that there was an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.Id. (citations omitted and footnote added).
Stated differently,
“[A]bsent an allegation that a named defendant has personally subjected the plaintiff to a deprivation of his constitutional rights or has caused the conduct complained of or participated in some manner in the allegedly unlawful actions of his employee or subordinate officer, this Court has held a complaint insufficient to state a claim against such defendant under § 1983.”Thompson v. McCoy, 425 F.Supp. 407, 411 (D.S.C. 1976) (quoting Knipp v. Weikle, 405 F.Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio 1975)). A plaintiff's burden to establish a claim based on supervisory liability is a heavy one; in fact, the Supreme Court may have entirely abrogated supervisory liability in Bivens actions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 693 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Lest there be any mistake, . . . the majority is not narrowing the scope of supervisory liability; it is eliminating Bivens supervisory liability entirely. The nature of a supervisory liability theory is that the supervisor may be liable, under certain conditions, for the wrongdoing of his subordinates, and it is this very principle that the majority rejects.”). A Bivens action “is the ‘federal analog to suits brought against state officials under . . . § 1983.'” Id. at 675-76 (quoting Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 (2006)). Therefore, the Supreme Court's reasoning may extend to abrogate supervisory liability in § 1983 actions as well as Bivens actions. See Jones v. Corr. Care Solutions, No. 0:09-cv-269, 2010 WL 2639788, at *2 (D.S.C. June 7, 2010) (noting that, under Iqbal, supervisory liability may no longer be a viable § 1983 claim).
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Ross v. Commc'ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record,
including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.
DISCUSSION
Excessive Force Claim
The use of excessive force upon an inmate by correctional officers violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992). To state an excessive force claim, an inmate must show (1) that the correctional officers acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind and (2) that the harm inflicted on the inmate was sufficiently serious. Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). The subjective component requires the inmate to demonstrate the officer applied force not “in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,” but rather applied force “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because Plaintiff was a convicted prisoner at the time of the events in question, the Eighth Amendment governs his claim, whereas the Fourteenth Amendment would govern had Plaintiff been a pretrial detainee. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400-01 (2015).
Officers employ force in good faith “not only when they confront immediate risks to physical safety, but also when they attempt to preserve internal order by compelling compliance with prison rules and procedures.” Brooks v. Johnson, 924 F.3d 104, 113 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast, officers employ force “‘maliciously' and for the ‘very purpose of causing harm,' . . . when they inflict pain not to induce compliance, but to punish an inmate for intransigence or to retaliate for insubordination.” Id. Given the difficulty in obtaining direct evidence of motive, in Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986), the Supreme Court set out factors from which such a malicious motive may be inferred. See Brooks, 924 F.3d at 116. The Fourth Circuit has identified those factors as:
(1) “the need for the application of force”; (2) “the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used”; (3) the extent of any reasonably perceived threat that the application of force was intended to quell; and (4) “any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.”Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 239 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting that this list of factors is nonexclusive); see Brooks, 924 F.3d at 116.
In contrast to the subjective component, the objective component of an excessive force claim is not nearly as demanding to establish because “[w]hen prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated . . . whether or not significant injury is evident.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010). Nevertheless,
not every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force,
provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind. An inmate who complains of a push or shove that causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim.Id. at 37-38 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Still, it is not the case “that the ‘absence of serious injury' is irrelevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry.” Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may suggest whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary in a particular situation” and “may also provide some indication of the amount of force applied.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not forecasted evidence that creates a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether any Defendant violated his Eighth Amendment rights with a use of force. The Court agrees, concluding that Plaintiff has not forecasted evidence that creates a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether any Defendant acted with a culpable state of mind.
Regarding the first Whitley factor, Defendants forecasted evidence that Plaintiff refused to follow directives to exit the shower [Docs. 24-4 ¶ 5; 24-5 ¶¶ 3, 4; 24-6 ¶¶ 2, 3], and Plaintiff has forecasted no contrary evidence. As to the second and third factors, although Defendants did not forecast evidence that they perceived that Plaintiff presented a particular threat, Plaintiff has forecasted no admissible evidence that any Defendant used anything more than the minimum amount of force necessary to move Plaintiff from the shower to his cell. And regarding the fourth factor, Defendants forecasted evidence that they made significant efforts to avoid having to move Plaintiff by force, including Riley leaving his post to speak with Mrs. Fox and obtain her agreement to speak with Plaintiff in the holding cell and leaving the shower area for a time to allow Plaintiff to “cool off”; and Carter, Welch, and Perkins speaking to Plaintiff and issuing him several directives to leave the showers and return to his cell. [Docs. 24-4 ¶¶ 3-5; 24-5 ¶¶ 3, 4; 24-6 ¶¶ 2, 3.] Based on the forecasted evidence, no reasonable factfinder could have found that Defendants acted out of malicious motive rather than out of a good-faith attempt to compel compliance with prison rules and procedures.
In his memorandum opposing summary judgment, Plaintiff asserts that Riley and Perkins entered the shower and attacked him by punching him in the head and midsection, then removed him from the shower by his neck and leg, took him into his cell, slammed him on the concrete slab, and placed him in restraints. [Doc. 37 at 1-2.] Plaintiff contends that after he was placed in restraints, Perkins punched him in the head several times, splitting open Plaintiff's eye and causing it to leak an excessive amount of blood. [Id. at 2.] Plaintiff asserts that Perkins then started choking him. [Id.] Plaintiff asserts that no mental heath counselor was contacted or present during the cell extraction. [Id. at 2-3.] Plaintiff also maintains that neither Perkins or Riley contacted medical to inform them that Plaintiff had been injured. [Id.] Even to the extent that some of Plaintiff's allegations are present in his Complaint, the Court notes that the Complaint was not made “under penalty of perjury,” and therefore does not qualify as a verified complaint. See Workman v. Bodiford, No. 6:18-355-RBH-KFM, 2018 WL 6933427, at *3 n.3 (D.S.C. Oct. 9, 2018), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 6829015 (D.S.C. Dec. 28, 2018), aff'd, 766 Fed.Appx. 1 (4th Cir. 2019). Nor has Plaintiff submitted an affidavit supporting his version of events. “As such, in considering Defendants' entitlement to summary judgment, the Court is left to accept the correctness of Defendants' affidavits, reports, and records, and reject the unsupported contrary allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint and Plaintiff's various legal memoranda.” Perry v. Lovelace, No. 6:20-cv-00733-TMC-JDA, 2020 WL 8483786, at *2 n.4 (D.S.C. Nov. 2, 2020), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 492490 (D.S.C. Feb. 10, 2021). The record contains video taken from a camera outside the shower area [Doc. 27], but a review of the video yields nothing that the Court concludes a jury could reasonably view as conflicting with Defendants' account of the events.
Carter also stated in her affidavit that when Plaintiff “began to refuse his removal physically, mechanical restraints were applied to gain control of the situation and avoid injuries to both Plaintiff and officers” and “Plaintiff was secured in his cell with no further incident.” [Doc. 24-6 ¶ 4.]
Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendants' summary judgment motion be granted as to Plaintiff's excessive force claim.
Deliberate Indifference Claim
Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment and states a cause of action under § 1983 because deliberate indifference constitutes “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05 (internal quotation marks omitted). Deliberate indifference exists when prison officials know of a substantial risk to a prisoner's health or safety and consciously disregard that risk. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994). Within the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, “the treatment must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness” to violate a prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights. Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, the prisoner must demonstrate (1) his medical condition was a sufficiently serious one and (2) subjectively, the prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind, which is satisfied by showing deliberate indifference by the prison officials. Goodman v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 096996, 2011 WL 1594915, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 28, 2011). As the United States Supreme Court has explained,
Since, we said, only the “‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain'” implicates the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner advancing such a claim must, at a minimum, allege “deliberate indifference” to his “serious” medical needs. “It is only such indifference” that can violate the Eighth Amendment; allegations of “inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care,” or of a “negligent . . . diagnos[is],” simply fail to establish the requisite culpable state of mind.Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (emphasis and alteration in original) (citations omitted). Further, in the context of prisoner medical care, the Constitution requires only that prisoners receive adequate medical care; a prisoner is not guaranteed his choice of treatment. De'lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 526 (4th Cir. 2013). The fact that a prisoner believed he had a more serious injury or that he required better treatment does not establish a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1975).
Here, Riley and Carter both stated in affidavits that Plaintiff had no visible injuries when he was returned to his cell. [Docs. 24-4 ¶ 7; 24-6 ¶ 5.] Plaintiff points to a note from a nurse from 3:56 a.m. on July 29, 2021, describing the following “[c]omment[]/[r]equest[]” from Plaintiff:
[Inmate complains of] gash to forehead that is bleeding, is requesting sickcall visit. Given 2x2 g[au]ze to hold pressure, antibiotic ointment and large bandaid. [Inmate] is requesting sick call visit today. Given through door. [Due to] behavior unable to open flap per rounding [commanding officer].[Doc. 24-2 at 32.] Assuming that the note would be admissible evidence that Plaintiff actually had a bleeding gash on his forehead approximately 14 hours after Defendants removed him from the shower, Plaintiff has not forecasted any admissible evidence that the injury occurred before Defendants left his cell, let alone that they noticed the injury at the time they were with him.
As noted, Plaintiff has not submitted a verified complaint or an affidavit supporting his version of events. See Perry, 2020 WL 8483786, at *2 n.4; Workman, 2018 WL 6933427, at *3 n.3. The record does include a voluntary statement that Plaintiff apparently provided as part of SCDC's investigation into Plaintiff's allegations of excessive force; however, the statement is unsworn. [Doc. 24-2 at 14.]
Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendants' summary judgment motion be granted as to his claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.
Because Plaintiff has failed to forecast evidence creating a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether his Eighth Amendment rights were violated, Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity to the extent they are sued in their individual capacities, as Defendants argue [Doc. 24-1 at 10-14]. The Court also agrees with Defendants' argument that they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims to the extent Defendants were sued in their official capacities [Id. at 14-15].
State Law Claims
To the extent that Plaintiff intends to asserts some form of negligence claim, Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on that claim as well on the basis of immunity under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (“SCTCA”).
Plaintiff's state-law claims, to the extent he asserts any, can be heard by this Court through the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, which allows federal courts to hear and decide state-law claims along with federal law claims. Federal courts are permitted to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” In deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, courts look at “convenience and fairness to the parties, the existence of any underlying issues of federal policy, comity, and considerations of judicial economy.” Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995). Applying these factors, the Court concludes that the factors counsel in favor of the Court retaining jurisdiction to the extent Plaintiff alleges any state-law claims. Plaintiff brought this case in federal court and resolution of the state-law claims, to the extent Plaintiff alleges any, involves only the straight-forward application of established state-law principles, such that judicial economy strongly favors retaining jurisdiction.
The SCTCA grants immunity to governmental employees acting within the scope of their employment unless the conduct constitutes actual fraud, actual malice, intent to harm, or a crime involving moral turpitude. S.C. Code § 15-78-70(a), (b); see Smith v. Ozmint, 394 F.Supp.2d 787, 792 (D.S.C. 2005) (holding “a state employee can, in these limited circumstances, be held personally liable by a federal court for some intentional torts committed within the scope of his employment”); Roberts v. City of Forest Acres, 902 F.Supp. 662, 671 (D.S.C. 1995) (noting that an employee of a government entity is personally liable for a tort, only when the employee's conduct falls within the exceptions listed in § 15-78-70(b)); Antley v. Shepherd, 532 S.E.2d 294, 299 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a governmental manager was not personally liable for discharge in violation of public policy when he was acting within the scope of his duties). “The provisions of [the SCTCA] establishing limitations on and exemptions to the liability of the State, its political subdivisions, and employees, while acting within the scope of official duty, must be liberally construed in favor of limiting the liability of the State.” S.C. Code § 15-78-20(f).
When a plaintiff alleges that a state governmental employee has committed a tort while he was acting within the scope of his official duty, SC Code § 15-78-70(c) states that a plaintiff can name as a defendant only the governmental entity for which the employee was acting. Additionally, § 15-78-60 states that:
[t]he governmental entity is not liable for a loss resulting from: . . . (5) the exercise of discretion or judgment by the governmental entity or employee or the performance or failure to perform any act or service which is in the discretion or judgment of the governmental entity or employee; . . . (25) responsibility or duty including but not limited to supervision, protection, control, confinement, or custody of any student, patient, prisoner, inmate, or client of any governmental entity except when the responsibility or duty is exercised in a grossly negligent manner.S.C. Code §§ 15-78-60(5), (25).
Here, Plaintiff has not forecasted any evidence creating a genuine dispute of material fact concerning whether any action on the part of any Defendant fell outside the SCTCA's provisions. Rather, the evidence in the summary judgment record demonstrates that Defendants acted within their discretion and judgment. See S.C. Code § 15-78-60(5). And Plaintiff has not forecasted any evidence tending to show that any Defendant was grossly negligent. See S.C. Code § 15-78-60(25).
Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendants' summary judgment motion be granted to the extent Plaintiff alleges any state law negligence claims.
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that Defendants' summary judgment motion [Doc. 24] be GRANTED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.