Opinion
3:24-CV-0267 (LEK/ML)
07-03-2024
THOMAS C. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. BINGHAMTON UHS, Defendant.
OF COUNSEL: APPEARANCES: THOMAS C. WILLIAMS Plaintiff, Pro Se
OF COUNSEL:
APPEARANCES:
THOMAS C. WILLIAMS
Plaintiff, Pro Se
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
MIROSLAV LOVRIC, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
The Clerk has sent a complaint in the above captioned action together with an amended application to proceed in forma pauperis, filed by Thomas C. Williams (“Plaintiff”) to the Court for review. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 9.) For the reasons discussed below, I (1) grant Plaintiff's amended in forma pauperis application (Dkt. No. 9), and (2) recommend that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be dismissed with leave to amend.
I. INTRODUCTION
Construed as liberally as possible, Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that his rights were violated by Defendant Binghamton UHS (“Defendant”). (See generally Dkt. No. 1.)
The court must interpret pro se complaints to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. Soto v. Walker, 44 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).
As best as the undersigned can decipher, the Complaint appears to allege that Defendant held Plaintiff without his consent and without a court order. (Dkt. No. 1 at 8.) The Complaint appears to allege that Plaintiff desired a transfer to Albany but that was not granted. (Id.) The Complaint is on form complaints alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as Amended. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.)
As relief, Plaintiff seeks $1,000,000,000 in damages “and proof of ownership of hospital.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 9.)
II. PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
When a civil action is commenced in a federal district court, the statutory filing fee, currently set at $405, must ordinarily be paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A court is authorized, however, to permit a litigant to proceed in forma pauperis status if a party “is unable to pay” the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). After reviewing Plaintiff's amended in forma pauperis application (Dkt. No. 9), the Court finds that Plaintiff meets this standard. Therefore, Plaintiff's amended application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
The language of that section is ambiguous because it suggests an intent to limit availability of in forma pauperis status to prison inmates. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (authorizing the commencement of an action without prepayment of fees “by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses”). The courts have construed that section, however, as making in forma pauperis status available to any litigant who can meet the governing financial criteria. Hayes v. United States, 71 Fed.Cl. 366, 367 (Fed. Cl. 2006); Fridman v. City of N.Y., 195 F.Supp.2d 534, 536 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Plaintiff is reminded that, although his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted, he is still required to pay fees that he may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.
III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR INITIAL REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT
“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
In determining whether an action is frivolous, the court must consider whether the complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Dismissal of frivolous actions is appropriate to prevent abuses of court process as well as to discourage the waste of judicial resources. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Harkins v. Eldridge, 505 F.2d 802, 804 (8th Cir. 1974); see Fitzgerald v. First East Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (a district court “may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee[.]”); see also Pflaum v. Town of Stuyvesant, Columbia Cnty., N.Y., 11-CV-0335, 2016 WL 865296, at *1, n.2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2016) (Suddaby, C.J.) (finding that the Court had the power to address and dismiss additional theories of the plaintiff's retaliation claim sua sponte because those theories were so lacking in arguable merit as to be frivolous).
Rule 8 of the Fed.R.Civ.P. requires a “short and plain statement” of a claim, showing that “the pleader is entitled to relief.” Whitfield v. Johnson, 763 Fed.Appx. 106, 107 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)). Each statement must be “simple, concise, and direct,' and must give ‘fair notice of the claims asserted.” Whitfield, 763 Fed.Appx. at 107 (quoting Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995)). A pleading must also contain “a demand for the relief sought[.]” Id. “A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 8 if it is ‘so confused, ambiguous, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.'” Id.
Moreover, Rule 10 of the Fed.R.Civ.P. provides that “[a] party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(b). Rule 10's purpose is to “provide an easy mode of identification for referring to a particular paragraph in a prior pleading[.]” Clervrain v. Robbins, 22-CV-1248, 2022 WL 17517312, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2022) (Stewart, M.J.) (citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3170384 (N.D.N.Y. May 1, 2023) (D'Agostino, J.). A complaint that does not comply with these Rules “presents far too heavy a burden in terms of defendants' duty to shape a comprehensive defense and provides no meaningful basis for the Court to assess the sufficiency of [the plaintiff's] claims,” and may properly be dismissed by the court. Gonzales v. Wing, 167 F.R.D. 352, 355 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (McAvoy, C.J.).
“In reviewing a complaint . . . the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Courts are “obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally.” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (reading the plaintiff's pro se complaint “broadly, as we must” and holding that the complaint sufficiently raised a cognizable claim). “[E]xtreme caution should be exercised in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and [the] parties . . . have had an opportunity to respond.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983).
IV. ANALYSIS
In addressing the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint, the court must construe his pleadings liberally. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Having reviewed Plaintiff's Complaint with this principle in mind, I recommend that it be dismissed for two reasons.
First, as it currently stands, Plaintiff's Complaint wholly fails to provide fair notice of the claims he attempts to assert. By way of example, the Complaint states:
Support staffing of Registration continues a Deportation of Registrants of police id to concure with “police act,” and if I need help of medical can I choose your FBI trained please(Dkt. No. 1 at 2 [errors in original].)
The Complaint continues,
Free service from UHS Hospital employed for option and me to medical choose from a state of known services if I care to.(Dkt. No. 1 at 6.)
Given its lack of clarity, the undersigned recommends dismissal of the Complaint because it is not acceptable under Rules 8 and 10 of the Fed.R.Civ.P. and because Plaintiff's claim or claims against Defendant are entirely unclear.
Second, in the alternative, I recommend that the Complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
To the extent that the Complaint is construed as asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant, it fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Defendant is a state actor or that its actions are “fairly attributable to the state.” Roark v. New York, 23-CV-1237, 2023 WL 8827185, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2023) (Lovric, M.J.) (citing White v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 369 Fed.Appx. 225, 226 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[P]rivate actors and institutions, such as the hospitals . . . named as defendants in [plaintiff's] complaint, are generally not proper § 1983 defendants because they do not act under color of state law.”); Guillory v. Benedict, 21-CV-0073, 2021 WL 707076, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2021) (Baxter, M.J.) (recommending dismissal of the plaintiff's § 1983 claims against private medical institution St. Joseph's Hospital), report and recommendation adopted by, 2021 WL 706644 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2021) (Sharpe, J.); Guillory v. Crouse Hosp., 21-CV-1177, 2021 WL 5605260, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2021) (Baxter, M.J.) (“it remains well settled in this Circuit that a private hospital, and its employees, are not deemed state actors solely because the state has granted them authority to practice medicine within its borders.”), report and recommendation adopted by, 2021 WL 5585926 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2021) (Hurd, J.)) (recommending dismissal of the § 1983 claims against Samaritan Hospital, a private medical institution, because the complaint failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting how its actions are “fairly attributable to the state.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 125512 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2024) (Hurd, J.); see Campbell v. New York State Police, 23-CV-1337, 2024 WL 1702010, at *5 n.5 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2024) (Lovric, M.J.) (citing New York United Health Services, https://www.nyuhs.org/why-choose-us/leadership-performance (last visited July 3, 2024) (“UHS is a not-for-profit, community-benefit organization governed by a board of directors whose members are selected from the communities we serve.”)) (noting that “it appears that Defendant [Binghamton] UHS is a private medical institution.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 3063674 (N.D.N.Y. June 20, 2024).
To the extent that the Complaint is construed as asserting claims pursuant to the ADA against Defendant, it fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Plaintiff is an individual with a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (defining “disability” to mean “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of [an] individual . . . record of such impairment; or . . . being regarded as having such an impairment.”).
Moreover, Plaintiff could not proceed with a claim under Title I of the ADA, which addresses employment discrimination, because he has not alleged that he was employed by Defendant. 42 U.S.C. § 12117; see Mary Jo C. v. New York State and Local Retirement Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 169 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Title I of the ADA expressly deals with th[e] subject of employment discrimination ....”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Title II of the ADA proscribes discrimination against the disabled in access to public services.” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 73 (2d Cir. 2009). Private entities are not subject to the provisions of Title II even if they receive government funding. Brennan v. NCAComp Inc., 22-CV-012, 2022 WL 4290660, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2022) (Lovric, M.J.), report-recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 3097843 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2022) (Suddaby, C.J.) (citations omitted). Title III of the ADA prevents discrimination based on a disability in places of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182. Title III provides a private right of action for injunctive relief but no right of action for monetary relief. 42 U.S.C. § 12188; see Krist v. Kolombos Rest. Inc., 688 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that Title III of the ADA “authorizes private actions only for injunctive relief, not monetary damages.”). Additionally, even assuming that Defendant is a public accommodation, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7), and that Plaintiff is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA, the Complaint is devoid of factual allegations concerning “policies, practices, [or] procedures” by Defendant that deprived Plaintiff of the ability to access goods, services, or privileges available to those without Plaintiff's disabilities. Benyi v. New York, 20-CV-1463, 2021 WL 1406649, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2021) (Lovric, M.J.), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1404555 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2021) (Hurd, J.); see Heendeniya v. St. Joseph's Hosp. Health Ctr. (SJHHC), 15-CV-1238, 2017 WL 1013081, at *9 n.14 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2017) (Suddaby, C.J.) (dismissing Title III ADA claims against St. Joseph's Hospital Health Center for failure to state a claim where the plaintiff failed to allege that he was denied the “full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations” and that the defendants discriminated against him “based on [his] disability”). Further, Title IV of the ADA does not appear to be applicable to Plaintiff's claims because Title IV prohibits disability discrimination in telecommunications. See Genco v. Sargent & Collins LLP, No. 18-CV-0107, 2018 WL 3827742, at *3, n.5 (W.D.N.Y. June 4, 2018). Lastly, Title V of the ADA, sometimes referred to as the “retaliation provision,” also does not appear applicable because Plaintiff does not allege that he engaged in activity protected by the ADA, that Defendant was aware of that activity, or any causal connection between the allegedly adverse actions that Defendant took against him and the protected activity. See Chiesa v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 638 F.Supp.2d 316, 323 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (Hurd, J.).
To the extent that the Complaint is construed as asserting a claim pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended, it fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting an employee/employer relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant. See Jones v. Thomas, 20-CV-5581, 2020 WL 5077026, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2020) (dismissing for failure to state a claim, the plaintiff's claims pursuant to Title VII where the plaintiff did not allege that he is or was an employee of any of the defendants); Basora-Jacobs v. Palevsky, 20-CV-1675, 2020 WL 3868710, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 10, 2020) (dismissing the plaintiff's Title VII claims because “[t]he complaint does not list Plaintiff's employer as a defendant in the case caption.”). Moreover, the Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Plaintiff filed a timely charge with the EEOC and received an EEOC right-to-sue letter before commencing this action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), (f); see Legnani v. Alitalia v. Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 274 F.3d 683, 686 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Under . . . Title VII . . ., a claimant may bring suit in federal court only if she has filed a timely complaint with the EEOC and obtained a right-to-sue letter.”).
As a result, to the extent that the Complaint is construed as asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the ADA, and/or Title VII, I recommend that those claims be dismissed. See Walker v. Flynn, 22-CV-0400, 2022 WL 2304169, at *4-7 (N.D.N.Y. June 27, 2022) (Lovric, M.J.) (recommending dismissal of the plaintiff's Section 1983, ADA, and Title VII claims where the complaint failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting that (1) the defendant “was a ‘state actor' or was ‘collaborating' with state actors,” (2) the plaintiff “is or was employed by [the d]efendant,” (3) the plaintiff obtained a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, and (4) an ADA claim pursuant to Titles I-IV), report and recommendation adopted by, 2022 WL 2789355 (N.D.N.Y. July 15, 2022) (Sharpe, J.).
V. OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND
Generally, a court should not dismiss claims contained in a complaint filed by a pro se litigant without granting leave to amend at least once “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”). An opportunity to amend is not required, however, where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Cortec Indus. Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Of course, where a plaintiff is unable to allege any fact sufficient to support its claim, a complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.”). Stated differently, “[w]here it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive, . . . it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.” Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993); accord, Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.).
See also Carris v. First Student, Inc., 132 F.Supp.3d 321, 340-41 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (Suddaby, C.J.) (explaining that the standard set forth in Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999)-that the Court should grant leave to amend “unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would be successful in stating a claim”-is likely not an accurate recitation of the governing law after Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)), rev'd on other grounds, 682 Fed.Appx. 30.
Given that this is the Court's first review of Plaintiff's pleading and that Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, out of an abundance of caution, I recommend that he be permitted to replead the Complaint.
If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he should note that the law in this circuit clearly provides that “‘complaints relying on the civil rights statutes are insufficient unless they contain some specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of rights, instead of a litany of general conclusions that shock but have no meaning.'” Hunt v. Budd, 895 F.Supp. 35, 38 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (McAvoy, J.) (quoting Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 1987)); accord Pourzancvakil v. Humphry, 94-CV-1594, 1995 WL 316935, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. May 22, 1995) (Pooler, J.). Therefore, in any amended complaint, Plaintiff must clearly set forth facts that give rise to the claims, including the dates, times, and places of the alleged underlying acts, and each individual who committed each alleged wrongful act. In addition, the revised pleading should allege facts demonstrating the specific involvement of any of the named defendants in the constitutional deprivations alleged in sufficient detail to establish that they were tangibly connected to those deprivations. Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986). Finally, Plaintiff is informed that any such amended complaint will replace the existing Complaint, and must be a wholly integrated and complete pleading that does not rely upon or incorporate by reference any pleading or document previously filed with the Court. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is well established that an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.”).
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff's amended application to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 9) is GRANTED; and it is further respectfully
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD as frivolous (or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall file a copy of this order, report, and recommendation on the docket of this case and serve a copy upon the parties in accordance with the local rules.
The Clerk shall also provide Plaintiff with copies of all unreported decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72; Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)).
If you are proceeding pro se and served with this report, recommendation, and order by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date that the report, recommendation, and order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C).