Opinion
CV 23-00695-PHX-JAT (ESW)
05-10-2023
Timothy Huntley Williams, Plaintiff, v. State of Arizona, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
JAMES A. TELIBORG, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff Timothy Huntley Williams, who is confined in a Maricopa County Jail, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). The Court will dismiss the Complaint with leave to amend.
I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee
The Court will grant Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $6.00. The remainder of the fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month's income credited to Plaintiff's trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula.
II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff's specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant's conduct. Id. at 681.
But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)).
If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
Plaintiff's Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, but because it may possibly be amended to state a claim, the Court will dismiss it with leave to amend.
III. Complaint
Plaintiff names the following Defendants in his three-count Complaint: the State of Arizona Prosecutor, Tempe Police Officer Daniel Reynolds, and the Tempe Police Department. Plaintiff seeks money damages.
In Count One, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Reynolds violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff claims Defendant Reynolds “had no right” to search him and “how could [he] be trespassing at a fire station, for checking on [his] friend? That's a safe place.” Plaintiff alleges “they filed charges without finding probable cause” and searched him without probable cause.
In Count Two, Plaintiff contends Defendant Reynolds violated his Fifth Amendment rights when he told Plaintiff that Plaintiff was required by law to identify himself. Plaintiff asserts this is “opposite of my Miranda right.”
In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff claims he was denied “substantial procedure rights” because “two years have passed” and “they wanted to wait until I was in a worse position, they brought this charge up because of the incident 10-31-22 to 11-08-22 from case CA-2020-107383.” Plaintiff claims he was not indicted by a grand jury, “nor did they find probable cause before a warrant was issued.”
On November 1, 2022, a Petition to Revoke Probation was filed in Plaintiff's criminal case, CR 2020-107383. See http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/docket /CriminalCourtCases/caseInfo.asp?caseNumber=CR2020-107383 (last accessed May 4, 2023).
IV. Failure to State a Claim
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled. Id.
A. Count One
Plaintiff alleges Defendants Reynolds searched and arrested him without probable cause. As explained below, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant Reynolds, and the Court will dismiss without prejudice Count One.
1. Search
“The Fourth Amendment prohibits ‘unreasonable searches and seizures' by the Government, and its protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). In such cases, the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the officer's action is supported by reasonable suspicion, not probable cause. Id. “While reasonable suspicion requires ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,' an officer must be able to articulate facts creating grounds to suspect that criminal activity ‘may be afoot.'” Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1020 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).
Plaintiff provides no details about the alleged illegal search or the circumstances surrounding the search that would show the search was unreasonable. He therefore fails to state a Fourth Amendment claim for an illegal search.
2. Arrest
To state a § 1983 claim for false arrest, Plaintiff must show that Defendant made the arrest without probable cause or other justification. Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013). “‘Probable cause exists if the arresting officers ‘had knowledge and reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe that [the arrestee] had committed or was committing a crime.'” Id. at 1097-98 (quoting Maxwell v. County of San Diego, 697 F.3d 941, 951 (9th Cir. 2012)); see also Edgerly v. City & County of S.F., 599 F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2010) (“To determine whether the Officers had probable cause at the time of the arrest, we consider ‘whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within [the Officers'] knowledge . . . were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense.'” (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964))). “[P]robable cause supports an arrest so long as the arresting officers had probable cause to arrest the suspect for any criminal offense, regardless of their stated reason for the arrest.” Edgerly, 599 F.3d at 954 (emphasis added). “If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
Plaintiff provides no details about his allegedly illegal arrest such as the crime for which he was arrested or the circumstances surrounding his arrest, nor does he allege facts showing why Defendant Reynolds lacked probable cause to arrest him. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim for false arrest.
B. Count Two
In Count Two, Plaintiff claims Defendant Reynolds violated his Fifth Amendment rights by telling Plaintiff he was required by law to identify himself.
Plaintiff appears to be challenging the constitutionality of an investigatory stop. “The Fourth Amendment prohibits ‘unreasonable searches and seizures' by the Government, and its protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). “[I]n such cases, the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the officer's action is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity ‘may be afoot.'” Id. (citation omitted). The reasonable suspicion standard “is not a particularly high threshold.” United States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). “Although a . . . mere hunch is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Id. (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274). When conducting an investigatory stop, a police officer is entitled to conduct a limited investigation to determine the person's identity and “to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions.” United States v. Davis, 530 F.3d 1069, 1081 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarthy, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984).
Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to show that Defendant Reynolds lacked reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim in Count Two.
C. Count Three
In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges he has been denied due process during his criminal proceedings. It appears the criminal proceedings are ongoing.
The abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), prevents a federal court in most circumstances from directly interfering with ongoing criminal proceedings in state court and applies while the case works its way through the state appellate process. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 369 (1989) (“[f]or Younger purposes, the State's trial-and-appeals process is treated as a unitary system”); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975) (“Virtually all of the evils at which Younger is directed would inhere in federal intervention prior to completion of state appellate proceedings, just as surely as they would if such intervention occurred at or before trial.”). “[O]nly in the most unusual circumstances is a defendant entitled to have federal interposition by way of injunction or habeas corpus until after the jury comes in, judgment has been appealed from and the case concluded in the state courts.” Drury v. Cox, 457 F.2d 764, 764-65 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). Special circumstances occur “[o]nly in cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction and perhaps in other extraordinary circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown.” Carden v. Montana, 626 F.2d 82, 84 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 85 (1971)).
Plaintiff has failed to show special or extraordinary circumstances indicating that he will suffer irreparable harm if this Court abstains from hearing his claims until after he has a chance to present them to the state courts. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 45-46; Carden, 626 F.2d at 83-84. Thus, the Court will abstain from interfering in Plaintiff's ongoing statecourt criminal proceedings. These are issues that should be raised in his criminal case, not here. See, e.g., Mann v. Jett, 781 F.2d 1448, 1449 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (abstention appropriate in § 1983 action for denial of Sixth Amendment right to counsel; plaintiff can adequately litigate his claim in ongoing state criminal proceedings and the potential for federal-state friction is obvious).
V. Leave to Amend
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Within 30 days, Plaintiff may submit a first amended complaint to cure the deficiencies outlined above. The Clerk of Court will mail Plaintiff a court-approved form to use for filing a first amended complaint. If Plaintiff fails to use the court-approved form, the Court may strike the amended complaint and dismiss this action without further notice to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff must clearly designate on the face of the document that it is the “First Amended Complaint.” The first amended complaint must be retyped or rewritten in its entirety on the court-approved form and may not incorporate any part of the original Complaint by reference. Plaintiff may include only one claim per count.
In each count, Plaintiff must write short, plain statements telling the Court: (1) the constitutional right Plaintiff believes was violated; (2) the name of the Defendant who violated the right; (3) exactly what that Defendant did or failed to do; (4) how the action or inaction of that Defendant is connected to the violation of Plaintiff's constitutional right; and (5) what specific injury Plaintiff suffered because of that Defendant's conduct. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976).
Plaintiff must repeat this process for each person he names as a Defendant. If Plaintiff fails to affirmatively link the conduct of each named Defendant with the specific injury suffered by Plaintiff, the allegations against that Defendant will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Conclusory allegations that a Defendant or group of Defendants has violated a constitutional right are not acceptable and will be dismissed.
A first amended complaint supersedes the original Complaint. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992); Hal Roach Studios v. RichardFeiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990). After amendment, the Court will treat the original Complaint as nonexistent. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262. Any cause of action that was raised in the original Complaint and that was voluntarily dismissed or was dismissed without prejudice is waived if it is not alleged in a first amended complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
VI. Warnings
A. Release
If Plaintiff is released while this case remains pending, and the filing fee has not been paid in full, Plaintiff must, within 30 days of his release, either (1) notify the Court that he intends to pay the unpaid balance of his filing fee within 120 days of his release or (2) file a non-prisoner application to proceed in forma pauperis. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this action.
B. Address Changes
Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this action.
C. Possible “Strike”
Because the Complaint has been dismissed for failure to state a claim, if Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint correcting the deficiencies identified in this Order, the dismissal may count as a “strike” under the “3-strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Under the 3-strikes provision, a prisoner may not bring a civil action or appeal a civil judgment in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 “if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
D. Possible Dismissal
If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260-61 (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order of the Court).
IT IS ORDERED:
(1) Plaintiff's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is granted.
(2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government agency, Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $6.00.
(3) The Complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff has 30 days from the date this Order is filed to file a first amended complaint in compliance with this Order.
(4) If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within 30 days, the Clerk of Court must, without further notice, enter a judgment of dismissal of this action with prejudice that states that the dismissal may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and deny any pending unrelated motions as moot.
(5) The Clerk of Court must mail Plaintiff a court-approved form for filing a civil rights complaint by a prisoner.