Whether a party has waived its right to arbitration is a question of law, which we review de novo. In re Fleetwood Homes, 257 S.W.3d at 694; Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 591-93 (Tex. 2008); Williams Indus., Inc. v. Earth Dev. Sys. Corp., 110 S.W.3d 131, 135 n. 4 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (explaining waiver under Texas General Arbitration Act, but explaining that "standard for determining waiver of the right to arbitration is the same under both the Texas General Arbitration Act and the Federal Arbitration Act."). There exists a strong presumption against waiver in the law and "[a]ny doubts regarding waiver are resolved in favor of arbitration."
"A party seeking to compel arbitration has the initial burden to establish the arbitration agreement's existence and to show that the claims asserted against it fall within the arbitration agreement's scope." Williams Indus., Inc. v. Earth Dev. Sys. Corp., 110 S.W.3d 131, 134 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (citing Mohamed v. Auto Nation USA Corp., 89 S.W.3d 830, 835 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.)). If the party seeking to compel arbitration carries its initial burden, the party resisting arbitration must then present evidence on any defenses to the arbitration agreement. Id.
If a party seeking arbitration carries its initial burden, the burden shifts to the party resisting arbitration to present evidence on its defenses to the arbitration agreement. Williams Indus., Inc. v. Earth Dev. Sys. Corp., 110 S.W.3d 131, 134 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). The Landwehrs' sole defense to arbitration is that Southwind waived its right to arbitrate their claims.
Whether waiver occurs depends on the individual facts and circumstances of each case. Jones, 235 S.W.3d at 340; Southwind Group, Inc., 188 S.W.3d at 735; Williams Indus., Inc. v. Earth Dev. Sys. Corp., 110 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). A party does not waive arbitration merely by delay; instead, the party urging waiver must establish that any delay resulted in prejudice.
Because the Teachers carried their initial burden, the burden then shifted to USAE to prove any defenses to the enforcement of the Agreement. Williams Indus. v. Earth Dev. Sys. Corp., 110 S.W.3d 131, 134-35 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). In issue two, the Teachers contend that USAE failed to prove its asserted defense of waiver.
A party seeking to compel arbitration has the initial burden to establish the arbitration agreement's existence and to show that the claims asserted against it fall within the arbitration agreement's scope. Williams Indus., Inc. v. Earth Dev. Sys. Corp., 110 S.W.3d 131, 134 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (citing Mohamed v. Auto Nation USA Corp., 89 S.W.3d 830, 835 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.)). If the party seeking to compel arbitration carries its initial burden, the party resisting arbitration must then present evidence on any defenses to the arbitration agreement. Id.
Because Bulldog carried its initial burden, the burden shifted to Castro to present evidence on his waiver defense to the arbitration agreement. Southwind Group, 188 S.W.3d at 735; Williams Indus., Inc. v. Earth Dev. Sys. Corp., 110 S.W.3d 131, 134 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). The standard for determining waiver of the right to arbitration is the same under both the FAA and the TAA.Southwind Group, 188 S.W.3d at 735; Brown v. Anderson, 102 S.W.3d 245, 250 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2003, pet. denied); Sedillo v. Campbell, 5 S.W.3d 824, 826 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
Whether waiver has occurred depends on the individual facts and circumstances of each case. Southwind Group, Inc., 188 S.W.3d at 735; Williams Indus., Inc. v. Earth Dev. Sys. Corp., 110 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.); Sedillo v. Campbell, 5 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). Waiver occurs only where "a party has acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate and such actions prejudiced the other party."
A party opposing arbitration must also show it was prejudiced by the other party's substantial invocation of the judicial process. See G.T. Leach Builders, 458 S.W.3d at 511-12; Kennedy Hodges, L.L.P. v. Gobellan, 433 S.W.3d 542, 543 (Tex. 2014); William Indus., Inc. v. Earth Dev. Sys. Corp., 110 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). Showing prejudice is generally an evidentiary burden.
If implied from a party's conduct, that conduct must be "unequivocal." Id.; see Williams Indus., Inc. v. Earth Dev. Sys. Corp., 110 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.); Haddock v. Quinn, 287 S.W.3d 158, 177 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied). "Whether waiver occurs depends on the individual facts and circumstances of each case."