Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-9626.
April 11, 2007.
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Philip R. Volland, Judge, Trial Court No. 3AN-03-778 Cr.
John Bernitz, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Sharon L. Marshall, Assistant District Attorney, Leonard M. Linton Jr., District Attorney, Anchorage, and Talis J. Colberg, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Stewart, Judges.
William E. Willett was convicted, based upon his plea of no contest, of murder in the first degree, an unclassified felony with a maximum term of imprisonment of 99 years. Superior Court Judge Philip R. Volland sentenced Willett to serve a term of imprisonment of 88 years. Willett appeals, arguing that the sentence is excessive. We uphold the sentence.
AS 11.41.100(a)(1)(A), (b); AS 12.55.125(a).
Willett killed his domestic partner, Lorene Boehly, by striking her repeatedly with a cast iron skillet. Judge Volland found that the offense was "most definitely an intentional homicide" which was committed with "extreme violence." Judge Volland found that the circumstances suggested that Willett had killed Boehly to "avoid prosecution for an additional offense." At the time of the homicide, Boehly was scheduled to talk to the police about a fraudulent check that Willett had deposited. Judge Volland noted that Willett had four prior felony convictions. Willett's prior convictions did not show any pattern of violence, but rather showed a pattern of theft and fraud.
Judge Volland concluded that, based upon Willett's prior record and his present offense, it was necessary to isolate Willett from society for a substantial period of time. He concluded that Willett's prior record showed that he had "a high risk of reoffending." Although Willett's prior record did not show a history of past violence or assaults, Judge Volland concluded that, even if he were released at an advanced age, Willett would commit the kinds of theft and fraud crimes that he had committed in the past. And Judge Volland concluded there was a considerable risk that Willett's commission of these crimes could lead to a tragedy such as what occurred in the present case.
Judge Volland concluded that the facts of Willett's present case would support a sentence of 99 years of imprisonment. But he concluded that he should reduce the sentence to some degree because Willett took responsibility for the offense and spared the victim's family additional emotional trauma by entering his no contest plea.
In arguing that his sentence is excessive, Willett recognizes that this court has allowed judges wide discretion in imposing sentences for murder in the first degree. But Willett argues that his crime was not a typical first-degree murder. He argues that his act was impulsive and that he did not intend to kill Boehly.
See Riley v. State, 720 P.2d 951, 952 (Alaska App. 1986).
Willett's argument simply has no merit. In the first place, when Willett entered his no contest plea to murder in the first degree, he established, for purposes of sentencing, all the elements of the crime. Therefore, in entering his plea, Willett conceded, for purposes of sentencing, that he intentionally killed Boehly. Second, Judge Volland independently concluded that the record, as presented in the presentence report, established that Willett intentionally killed Boehly. The record supports Judge Volland's conclusion.
See Scott v. State, 928 P.2d 1234, 1236-38 (Alaska App. 1996).
Willett also contends that the facts of the crime and Willett's conduct after the crime established grounds for Judge Volland to impose a mitigated sentence. But Judge Volland found that Willett's crime was a particularly brutal and senseless murder. He also examined Willett's prior record and concluded that, based upon that prior record, Willett had poor prospects for rehabilitation. All of these findings are supported by the record and support the sentence that Judge Volland imposed. We conclude that the sentence was not clearly mistaken.
McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974).
The sentence is AFFIRMED.