We note, however, that even under the current loose construction approach, the term "shall" is generally construed as creating a mandatory duty, and that it has only been in rare cases involving matters of time or form that the word "shall" has been construed as creating only a discretionary or directory duty. See Commonwealth v.Filius, 346 Pa. Super. 434, 499 A.2d 1078 (1985); Wilkes-BarreArea Vocational School v. Greater Nanticoke Area SchoolDistrict, 115 Pa. Commw. 73, 539 A.2d 902 (1988); see alsoZimmerman v. O'Bannon, 497 Pa. 551, 442 A.2d 674 (1982); JamesF. Oakley, Inc. v. School District of Philadelphia, 464 Pa. 330, 346 A.2d 765 (1975); Francis v. Corleto, 418 Pa. 417, 211 A.2d 503 (1965); Division 85, Amalgamated Transit Union v. PortAuthority, 417 Pa. 299, 208 A.2d 271 (1965); Commonwealth v.Pryor, 347 Pa. Super. 239, 500 A.2d 811 (1985); Commonwealth v.Kowell, 209 Pa. Super. 386, 228 A.2d 50 (1967); Board ofPensions Retirement v. Hodge, 72 Pa. Commw. 59, 455 A.2d 1270 (1983); Matter of Columbia Borough, 24 Pa. Commw. 190, 354 A.2d 277 (1976). B. LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Section 1847, however, details the requirements for the establishment and operation of area vocational-technical schools. See Wilkes-Barre Area Vocational School v. Greater Nanticoke Area School District , 115 Pa.Cmwlth. 73, 539 A.2d 902, 905 n.3 (1988). Pursuant to the provisions of subarticle (c), school districts may elect to participate in the establishment and operation of an area vocational-technical school or technical institute to provide technical and vocational classes to the students and citizens in their attendance area. 24 P.S. § 18-1844.
24 P. S. § 21-2124. The word "shall" in a statute is generally considered mandatory or imperative, not permissive. Wilkes-Barre Area Vocational School v. Greater Nanticoke Area School District, 115 Pa. Commw. 73, 539 A.2d 902 (1988). With respect to the school district's reliance on the language of section 2121, as pointed out by the trial court, the General Assembly is simply imposing the same requirements on the board of public education through slightly different language.
We also note that the use of the word "shall" in a statute is generally considered imperative. Wilkes-Barre Area Vocational School v. Greater Nanticoke Area School District, 115 Pa. Commw. 73, 539 A.2d 902 (1988). A statute is mandatory if the thing directed to be done reflects the essence of a statute's purpose.
As a second basis for this argument, Petitioner contends that the PLCB had only intended to suspend him until its overzealous lawyers got involved and "discovered" Section 210. As noted above, subsection (m)(1) provides that "[a]ny person who violates the provisions of this section shall have his employment . . . immediately terminated. . . ." The use of the word "shall" in a statute is generally considered to be imperative. See, e.g., Wilkes-Barre Area Vocational School v. Greater Nanticoke Area School District, 115 Pa. Commw. 73, 539 A.2d 902 (1988). While we recognize that the sanction in this case is harsh, it is quite apparent from the statutory language that the legislature intended to divest the PLCB of discretion in meting out discipline for the offenses enumerated in Section 210. Any arguments regarding the severity of the punishment are properly addressed to the legislature, not this Court.
Furthermore, when a litigant lacks a necessary stake in the outcome, or when the court or agency is not able to grant effective relief, a case will be dismissed as moot. Al Hamilton Contracting Co. v. Department of Environmental Resources, 90 Pa. Commw. 228, 494 A.2d 516 (1985). Although a case is apparently moot, dismissal is not an absolute. If the issue raised is of a recurring nature, is of important public interest, or is capable of repeatedly avoiding review, the case will not be dismissed. Wilkes Barre Area Vocational School v. Greater Nanticoke Area School District, 115 Pa. Commw. 73, 539 A.2d 902 (1988). Because Metro has acquired third-party liability insurance coverage during pendency of this appeal, the PUC would have us dismiss this case as moot without considering the merits.