Summary
permitting the EEOC to intervene before discovery started and before a class had been certified
Summary of this case from Coburn v. DaimlerChrysler Services North America, L.L.C.Opinion
No. 00-CV-0680-DRH
May 11, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Now before the Court is the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's motion for leave to intervene (Doc. 44). Rent-A-Center objects the motion. Pursuant to FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 24(b), the Court grants the motion.
In August 2000, Plaintiffs brought this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq . (Doc. 1). The Plaintiffs are residents of various states and allegedly have all been employed or have applied for employment with Defendant Rent-A-Center, Inc. ("Rent-A-Center"). On October 18, 2000, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding additional Plaintiffs (Doc. 15). Rent-A-Center, a corporation with its headquarters in Plano, Texas, operates rent-to-own stores in various locations throughout the United States. Plaintiffs seek to be certified as representatives of a class, alleging that Rent-A-Center has maintained a pattern and practice of sex discrimination against women employees and women applicants for employment.
On February 6, 2001, the Court denied Rent-A-Center's motion to transfer (Doc. 24). Now before the Court is the EEOC's motion for leave to intervene. The EEOC argues that because this is a case of general importance it should be allowed to intervene to advance the same Title VII claims of discrimination as well as a claim that Rent-A-Center has failed to preserve records it was required to preserve under Title VII. Rent-A-Center responds that the motion should be denied because the intervention will unduly delay the adjudication of the issues, prejudice Rent-A-Center and expand the scope of the original lawsuit. Based on the reasons stated herein, the Court grants the motion to intervene.
As of this date, Plaintiffs have not objected to the EEOC's motion for leave to intervene. In fact the EEOC asserts that Plaintiffs have consented to the motion (Doc. 45, p. 3).
II. Permissive Intervention
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 24(b) states in pertinent part:
Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. . . . In exercising its discretion, the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
It is well established that district courts have broad discretion to grant or deny motions to intervene under Rule 24(b)(2). See Sokuogon Chippewa Community v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 941, 949 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 860 (7th Cir. 1985). In deciding whether to grant permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(2), the court must consider three requirements: (1) whether the petition was timely; (2) whether a common question of law or fact exists; and (3) whether granting the petition to intervene will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Schipporeit, 69 F.3d 1377, 1381 (7th Cir. 1995) Southmark Corp. v. Cagan, 950 F.2d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 1991)
III. Analysis
A. TimelinessThe Court must consider the "totality of the circumstances" to determine whether a petition is timely. United States v. City of Chicago, 908 F.2d 197, 199 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 1067 (1991). In particular, four factors must be considered: (1) the length of time the intervenor knew or should have known of his or her interest in this case, (2) the prejudice to the original parties caused by the delay, (3) the resulting prejudice to intervenor if the motion is denied, and (4) any unusual circumstances. Shea v. Angulo, 19 F.3d at 346; Ragsdale v. Turnock, 941 F.2d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 502 U.S. 1035 (1992). The test establishes a reasonableness standard: "potential intervenors need to be reasonably diligent in learning of a suit that might affect their rights, and upon so learning they need to act reasonably promptly." Nissei Sangyo Am., Ltd. v. United States, 31 F.3d 435, 438 (7th Cir. 1994). The most important consideration in this regard is whether the delay will prejudice the original parties to the case. Id . (citing Wright Miller, Federal Practice Procedure: Civil 2d § 1916 (1986)). Whether a petition is timely presented is within the district court's discretion. City of Chicago, 908 F.2d at 199 .
Here, the EEOC moved to intervene five months after Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint. Discovery on the merits of this case has been stayed until ruling on Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The only discovery which has been permitted has been on the class certification issues. Further, the EEOC filed its motion prior to Plaintiffs filing their motion for class certification. The Court does not find the five month gap between the filing of the amended complaint and the filing of the motion to intervene to be prejudicial to Rent-A-Center. Under the totality of the circumstances, the motion to intervene is timely.
Pursuant to the Scheduling and Discovery Order entered on November 9, 2000, Plaintiffs have up to and including October 1, 2001, to file their motion for class certification (Doc. 17). As of this date, Plaintiffs have not filed their motion for class certification.
B. Common Questions of Law and Fact
The questions of law and fact to be raised by the EEOC are virtually identical to Plaintiffs' claims with the exception of the EEOC's claim that the Rent-A-Center violated § 709(c) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) and 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 by failing to preserve employment records. The Court finds that the additional claim asserted by the EEOC relates to the allegations in the amended complaint. Thus, the EEOC has satisfactorily established that its claims and Plaintiffs' claims involve common questions of facts.
C. Prejudice or Delay of Adjudication
The original parties have not yet initiated discovery on the merits of Plaintiffs' claims. This process will not begin until after the Court rules on the motion for class certification. The motion for class certification will not be ripe for disposition until after December 3, 2001 (the date Rent-A-Center's response the class certification motion is due). Permitting the EEOC to join the case at this juncture will not delay the progression of this case through pre-trial discovery or trial preparation. Moreover, the EEOC has intervened many times in other similar litigations and are thus well-versed in the subject matter of the issues to be tried before the Court. Accordingly, the Court concludes that intervention will not prejudice or delay adjudication of this case.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the EEOC's motion to intervene (Doc. 44). The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to docket and file stamp the Intervenor's Complaint instanter.
IT IS SO ORDERED.