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Wilder v. DMR Consulting Group, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Sep 15, 2009
345 F. App'x 735 (3d Cir. 2009)

Opinion

No. 09-2451.

Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 August 6, 2009.

Opinion filed: September 15, 2009.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil No. 99-05667), District Judge: Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh.

Lawrence Verline Wilder, Sr., Cantonsville, MD, for Appellant.

Christopher J. Moran, Esq., Dara P. Newman, Esq., Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak Stewart, Philadelphia, PA, Robin H. Rome, Esq., Stanton, Hughes, Diana, Cerra, Cerra, Mariani Margello, Morristown, NJ, James D. Cutlip, Esq., Cutlip Associates, Glen Ridge, NJ, Gina M. Sarracino, Esq., Lowenstein Sandler, Roseland, NJ, for Appellee.

Before: MCKEE, FISHER and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges.


OPINION


Lawrence Wilder appeals from an order of the District Court denying his "motion to reopen" pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), and denying his motion for appointment of counsel as moot.

Wilder filed the Rule 60(b) motion on March 5, 2009, seeking reconsideration of a June 11, 2002 order dismissing his civil rights complaint with prejudice. According to Wilder, he has "new evidence to [sic] the defendants' guilt." We agree with the District Court that Wilder's motion is untimely because it was filed almost seven years after the challenged order was entered. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1) ("A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time — and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding"); Moolenaar v. Gov't of V.I., 822 F.2d 1342, 1348 (3d Cir. 1987) (two years not a "reasonable time" for 60(b) purposes); Martinez-McBean v. Gov't of V.I., 562 F.2d 908, 913 n. 7 (3d Cir. 1977) (expressing "serious doubts" that two and one half year delay in filing Rule 60(b) motion would comply with "reasonable time" requirement).

Even if Wilder's motion were timely, he would be unable to bear the "heavy burden" for demonstrating entitlement to Rule 60(b) relief. Bohus v. Beloff, 950 F.2d 919, 930 (3d Cir. 1991). Specifically, the alleged "newly discovered evidence" (an EEOC press release describing a settlement in an unrelated matter) is not "material" to Wilder's case. Id. Nor would it "probably have changed the outcome of the trial." Id.

There being no substantial question presented by Wilder's appeal, we will summarily affirm the District Court's order denying both his Rule 60(b) motion and his motion for appointment of counsel. See LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.


Summaries of

Wilder v. DMR Consulting Group, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Sep 15, 2009
345 F. App'x 735 (3d Cir. 2009)
Case details for

Wilder v. DMR Consulting Group, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:Lawrence Verline WILDER, Sr., Appellant v. DMR CONSULTING GROUP, INC.; AT…

Court:United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. Submitted for Possible Summary Action

Date published: Sep 15, 2009

Citations

345 F. App'x 735 (3d Cir. 2009)

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