Opinion
Civil Action 4:22-cv-4523-TMC-TER
11-30-2023
CORNELL WIGFALL, SR., #2022081307, a/k/a Cornell Jermaine Wigfall, Plaintiff, v. BRITTANY KEEFNER, SHIRLEY ANDERSON, CLARK ARD, CARTER WIEVER, and NEIL JOHNSON, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Thomas E. Rogers, III United States Magistrate Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging various violations of his constitutional rights. Presently before the court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 47). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he was advised pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), that a failure to respond to Defendants' motion could result in the motion being granted and his claims dismissed. Plaintiff timely filed a Response (ECF No. 51). All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), DSC. This report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.
II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Upon initial review of this case, the undersigned entered a Report and Recommendation recommending that Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim and his claims for denial of access to court, the presence of mold, inadequate visitation, and denial of property be dismissed, which was adopted by the District Judge. See Order (ECF No. 32). Service was authorized as to Plaintiff's claims for lack of clean drinking water, paint chips in his food, lack of religious services available to him, confinement to lock-down in isolation 20-24 hours a day, lack of medical attention or treatment for stomach pain and for carpal tunnel, and inability to exercise. See Am. Compl. pp. 6-9 (ECF No. 11); Order (ECF No. 15).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, the moving party bears the burden of showing that summary judgment is proper. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is proper if the non-moving party fails to establish an essential element of any cause of action upon which the non-moving party has the burden of proof. Id. Once the moving party has brought into question whether there is a genuine dispute for trial on a material element of the non-moving party's claims, the non-moving party bears the burden of coming forward with specific facts which show a genuine dispute for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The non-moving party must come forward with enough evidence, beyond a mere scintilla, upon which the fact finder could reasonably find for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4th Cir. 1991). However, the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Barber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 87475 (4th Cir. 1992). The evidence relied on must meet “the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits.” Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1993).
To show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the party must present evidence supporting his or her position by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A); see also Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Systems, Inc., 33 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 1994); Orsi v. Kickwood, 999 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1993); Local Rules 7.04, 7.05, D.S.C.
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)). A legal action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707, 119 S.Ct. 1624, 143 L.Ed.2d 882 (1999). To be successful on a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). The parties do not dispute that they were acting under color of state law in their individual capacities at all times relevant to this action.
Defendants argue that summary judgment is appropriate in part because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires that a prisoner exhaust the available administrative remedies before filing a 1983 action concerning conditions of his confinement. 42 U.S.C.1997e(a). In enacting the PLRA, Congress carved out an exception to the general rule that exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to filing a civil rights suit. The PLRA amended section 1997e so that it now provides, “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Id. § 1997e(a). Accordingly, before Plaintiff may proceed with his claims in this Court, he must first exhaust his administrative remedies. The United States Supreme Court has held that “Congress has mandated exhaustion clearly enough, regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001); see Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002); Jones v. Smith, 266 F.3d 399 (6th Cir.2001) (exhaustion required even though Plaintiff claimed futility); Larkin v. Galloway, 266 F.3 d 718 (7th Cir.2001) (exhaustion required even though Plaintiff claimed he was afraid); see also Claybrooks v. Newsome, 2001 WL 1089548 (4th Cir., September 18, 2001) (unpublished opinion) (applying Booth v. Churner to affirm district court's denial of relief to Plaintiff). A failure to exhaust all levels of administrative review is not “proper exhaustion” and will bar actions filed by inmates under any federal law, including § 1983. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2386, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006).
The Georgetown County Detention Center (GCDC), where Plaintiff was confined at the times relevant to this action, provides a grievance procedure, Grievance Policy No. 701.0, which is set forth in GCDC's Inmate Handbook. The grievance system is accessed through the commissary kiosks. An incident must be grieved within three days of its occurrence. A grievance form is reviewed by a lieutenant for investigation/response. Within five working days, the lieutenant provides responses through the kiosk system. If the inmate/detainee is not satisfied with the response, he or she may appeal the response to the captain. The inmate/detainee has two working days to submit the appeal, and the captain will respond within five working days. An inmate/detainee not satisfied with the captain's response has two working days from receipt to submit a written appeal to the Detention Center Director, who will respond within seven working days. A decision from the Detention Center Director is final and exhausts the administrative process regarding inmate/detainee grievances. See Inmate Handbook pp. 10-11 (ECF No. 47-6); Policy No. 701.0 (ECF No. 47-6).
Plaintiff filed a number of grievances and requests via the kiosk from the time he entered the GCDC on August 19, 2022, through the date he filed this action on December 15, 2022. See Georgetown County Booking Report (ECF No. 47-7 p. 32); Pl. Grievance Records (ECF No. 47-7 pp. 1-30). He submitted many requests for treatment for stomach pain and at least one request for treatment for pain in his arm, both of which he raises in this action. See Pl. Grievance Records, pp. 10, 12-13, 20, 22, 24-26, 28. Only one of those requests was labeled a “grievance.” See Pl. Grievance Records p. 24. However, there is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff ever filed an appeal of the responses he received to the Captain or the Detention Center Director. Therefore, Plaintiff failed to fully exhaust his claims regarding the alleged inadequate medical treatment he received for his stomach or his carpal tunnel issues.
Further, there are no grievances in the record addressing Plaintiff's complaints about lack of clean drinking water, paint chips in his food, lack of religious services available to him, confinement to lock-down in isolation 20-24 hours a day, and inability to exercise. Thus, Plaintiff also failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to these claims as well.
The PLRA provides only one exception to the exhaustion requirement-that inmates need not exhaust “unavailable” remedies. Ross v. Blake, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1858 (2016). An exhaustion remedy is unavailable when, inter alia, prison administrators “thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at 1860. There is no evidence in the record that the grievance process was ever unavailable to Plaintiff. The PLRA's exhaustion requirement is a robust one. See Ross, 136 S.Ct. at 1856-58. Prisoners must therefore diligently and properly follow the administrative procedures that are available. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. Because Plaintiff failed to do so with respect to the issues raised herein, dismissal of this action is appropriate.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 47) be granted and this case be dismissed in its entirety.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 2317 Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).