Opinion
4:99CV3110
July 20, 2000
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON THE DEFENDANT KLAUMANN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This case comes before me now on the motion for summary judgment by the defendant Doug Klaumann. In particular, the defendant contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity on the claims that he violated the plaintiff's civil rights. He also argues that there is no evidence to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. For the following reasons, I find that the motion should be granted.
Standard of Review
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted when, viewing the facts and reasonable inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d 844, 846 (8th Cir. 1983). A genuine issue of material fact exists when there is sufficient evidence favoring the party opposing the motion for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the evidence is to be taken in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S. H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). If the moving party meets the initial burden of establishing the nonexistence of a genuine issue, then the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce evidence of the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). The opposing party "may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial," and "must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57 (citations omitted). The plaintiff, for whatever reason, has failed to submit any opposition brief or evidence on the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Background
The relevant facts for the resolution of this motion for summary judgment are found in the affidavit of the defendant that he filed in support of this motion. See filing 17. I shall not restate them here.
Analysis
Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of [her] federal rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to prevail in a § 1983 action for civil damages from a government official performing discretionary functions, the defense of qualified immunity that our cases have recognized requires that the official be shown to have violated "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Thus a court must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all, and if so, proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232-233, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991); see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841, n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998).Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999).
Count I of the Second Amended Complaint
In count I, the plaintiff claims that the mistaken arrest and subsequent detainment by the defendant and his fellow officers violated her constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure generally translates into a warrant requirement. See Brayman v. United States, 96 F.3d 1061, 1065 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Hatten, 68 F.3d 257, 260 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1150 (1996)). As incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, "the Fourth Amendment requires the State to provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979). The Fourteenth Amendment protects "against deprivations of liberty without due process of law." Id. at 145. However, "the Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested." Id.
I believe that these claims, as they relate to the facts of this case, are foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979). Similar to this case, Baker involved the "matched" arrest, over vigorous protest, of a victim of mistaken identities pursuant to what was, on its face, a valid arrest warrant. The sheriff's office detained McCollan for several days, releasing him only after comparing his visage to a photograph of the wanted man (McCollan's brother, who, as matters turned out, had used McCollan's identification when originally apprehended). See id. at 140-41. McCollan subsequently sued the sheriff under § 1983, seeking damages for the deprivation of his liberty. See id. at 141. The district court directed a verdict in the sheriff's favor, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. See McCollan v. Tate, 575 F.2d 509, 511 (5th Cir. 1978). The Supreme Court then granted the sheriff's certiorari petition. See Baker v. McCollan, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979).
Although McCollan had framed his suit in terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court began by considering whether the arrest itself had violated the Fourth Amendment. See Baker, 443 U.S. at 142-43 (noting that the Fourth Amendment has been incorporated into the Fourteenth). The Court concluded that because the warrant naming McCollan was valid on its face, probable cause existed for the arrest and, hence, the Fourth Amendment was not implicated. See id. at 143-44; see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (observing that, even if the wrong person is arrested, there is no Fourth Amendment violation as long as the arrest is based on probable cause) (citing cases).
Once the Fourth Amendment had dropped out of the equation, the Court considered whether McCollan had been deprived of any of the specific subset of procedural guarantees, incorporated into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, that come into play after completion of an arrest (e.g., the prohibition against excessive bail, the guarantee of a speedy trial, and the like). See Baker, 443 U.S. at 144-46 n. 3. Because McCollan had not been deprived of any such rights, the Court concluded that the complainant had failed to prove a constitutional wrong. See id. at 145-47. While conceding that a lengthy detainment in the face of repeated claims of innocence might in extreme circumstances furnish the basis for a constitutional violation, the Court was "quite certain that a detention of three days over a New Year's weekend does not and could not amount to such a deprivation." Id. at 145. In the bargain, the Court also rejected, at least implicitly, any claim that the detainment constituted a substantive due process violation. See id. at 147-49 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
In this case, the plaintiff concedes the defendant was armed with an arrest warrant, that she was named in the arrest warrant, and that the arrest warrant was at least facially valid. Thus, I find that the plaintiff's arrest, even though she was the wrong person, was based on probable cause and, as a result, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the defendant, even though the warrant under which he arrested and detained the plaintiff met the standards of the Fourth Amendment, took reasonable steps to gather information in the face of repeated protests of mistake and innocence. Therefore, the plaintiff — who was targeted in a facially valid arrest warrant issued by a judicial officer upon probable cause — has no Fourteenth Amendment claim in respect to the detention that followed her arrest.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff tries to establish a constitutional violation by alleging that the defendant was reckless in his actions. To support her allegation, the plaintiff has asked that I grant more time for discovery. She contends that further discovery is necessary so that she may ascertain whether the defendant had prior knowledge of the person for whom the warrant was sought. The fact is, however, that the defendant admits that at the time of execution he had knowledge of another person who's names also matched some of names in the caption of the warrant. Therefore, I see no reason to hold up the resolution of this motion as the information that the plaintiff seeks is already before me.
The question, of course, is whether the defendant's actions in this case were reckless in light of his knowledge. The evidence before me shows that the defendant in fact recognized some of the names contained in the caption of the warrant. He then questioned whether the person he knew was in fact the subject of the warrant. In search of an answer, he confronted the defendant Young. He was told, he states, that the person he knew and the person sought in the warrant were not the same. On this basis, along with the fact that the plaintiff's name was the only name contained in the body of the warrant, I feel that it can be said, as a matter of law, that the defendant, who was not involved in the initial investigation that gave rise to probable cause and the issuance of the arrest warrant, in other words, who was merely involved in the execution a facially valid arrest warrant, was not reckless in his conduct.
"For conduct to be `reckless' it must be such as to evince disregard of, or indifference to, consequences, under circumstances involving danger to life or safety to others, although no harm was intended." Black's Law Dictionary p. 1142 (5th ed. 1979).
Also in count I, the plaintiff claims that the defendant violated her right to be free from unreasonable searches in her home. The defendant, however, argues that no unreasonable search occurred. He bases this contention on the fact that the plaintiff consented to the entry and subsequent search of her home. See filing 17, ex. 1b (permission for search and seizure signed by the plaintiff). The plaintiff does not dispute her consent. Therefore, it seems as though the defendant did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Since the plaintiff has set forth no evidence that the entry and search of her home was done in an unreasonable manner, I find that this claim must fail against this defendant.
Lastly, in count I, the plaintiff claims that the defendant violated her right to timely and effective assistance of counsel. There is no evidence before me that supports a claim. Therefore, without hesitation, I find that this claim also fails.
Count II of the Second Amended Complaint
In count II, of the second amended complaint, the plaintiff claims that the defendant violated her right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution as a result of the mistaken service of an arrest warrant at her residence. In general, a person's right to privacy is protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court, in its decision of Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977), determined that the Fourteenth Amendment protects two kinds of individual privacy interests from unwarranted governmental intrusion. First, it acts as a safeguard to a person's "independence in making certain kinds of important decisions," such as marriage, procreation, and child rearing. Id. And second, it protects a person's interest "in avoiding disclosure of [highly] personal matters." Id. In either case, the individual asserting the right must have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Eagle v. Morgan, 88 F.3d 620, 625 (8th Cir. 1996). I do not find, and the plaintiff has not set forth, even though she has had ample opportunity to do so, such an expectation.
The plaintiff has also brought this claim under the Fifth Amendment. However, the Fifth Amendment does not provide "a general protection of privacy but [deals] with the more specific issue of compelled self-incrimination," Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400 (1976), which is not at issue here. Therefore, I fail to see how the rights and privacies of the Fifth Amendment apply in this case.
There is also a right to privacy claim under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment, as applied to the states by way of the Fourteenth, see Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963), protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches . . ." U.S. Const. amend. 4; it is one of the core protections against "governmental invasions `of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life'" which "`affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security.'" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 484 n. * (1965). The plaintiff's claim here may very well be for an alleged violation of her fundamental right of privacy in her home, and her right to be free from unlawful arrest or restraint under the Fourth Amendment. If so, then this claim is simply a derivative of the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims set forth above. For the same reasons then that I set forth above, I find that the plaintiff's § 1983 claim for violation of her Fourth Amendment right to privacy is due to be dismissed.
Count III of the Second Amended Complaint
In count III, the plaintiff's claim is based on the tort of outrage. In particular, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant acted intentionally and recklessly, and that his conduct was extreme and outrageous in the mistaken service of a valid arrest warrant at her residence. The tort of outrage, otherwise referred to as "intentional infliction of emotional distress," requires emotional distress so that a reasonable person cannot be expected to endure it. See Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 464 N.W.2d 769 (1991). I do not find that this was such a case.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant Klaumann's motion for summary judgment, filing 22, is granted.
IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for an extension of time to respond to the defendant Klaumann's motion for summary judgment, filing 43, is denied.