However, where an error is "so glaring" it naturally flows under our appellate review, we will not ignore it. W.H.J. v. J.N.W., 669 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Ky. App. 2023); see also Barker v. Commonwealth, 341 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Ky. 2011). When an obvious error encountered in our review does prompt us to address an issue not raised by the parties

W.H.J. v. J.N.W., 669 S.W.3d 52, 53 (Ky. App. 2023) (footnote omitted)

"[W]e cannot let indistinguishable cases yield distinguishable results in the interests of expediency." W.H.J. v. J.N.W., 669 S.W.3d 52, 57 (Ky. App. 2023).

Burton v. Commonwealth, 300 S.W.3d 126, 148 (Ky. 2009) (Minton, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also W.H.J. v. J.N.W., 669 S.W.3d 52, 57 (Ky. App. 2023) ("But we cannot let indistinguishable cases yield distinguishable results in the interests of expediency."). Thus, the judgment at hand cannot stand.

Because it is ultimately dispositive, we begin with Biological Parents' third argument that the family court's findings of fact and conclusions of law cannot stand where the family court failed to explicitly make its findings under the clear and convincing evidence standard. In W.H.J. v. J.N.W., 669 S.W.3d 52, 57 (Ky. App. 2023), we held that "an adoption decision which does not explicitly rely upon the clear and convincing evidence standard cannot stand." Importantly, in W.H.J. we vacated the adoption even though the appellant did not "directly raise that omission in his brief" explaining that the failure was such a fundamental one that we could not ignore it.

Our review of a case on appeal necessitates scrutiny of the trial court's findings in determining strength and validity of arguments before us. See, e.g., W.H.J. v. J.N.W., 669 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Ky. App. 2023) (addressing trial court's failure to make findings by clear and convincing evidence despite appellant's failure to raise that issue in his brief "since it is necessary to scrutinize the court's findings to assess Father's arguments, and it is obvious from reviewing those findings that the court did not use the correct standard.").

In contravention of KRS 199.502(3), at, no time did the circuit court inquire as to whether Mother was indigent, nor did it inform her of her right to appointment of counsel. This Court recently rendered W.H.J. v. J.N.W., 669 S.W.3d 52 (Ky. App. 2023), also a stepparent adoption, in which the circuit court did not inform natural father of his right to counsel and did not inquire whether he was indigent at any time, including the final hearing. At one point, the circuit court asked natural father if he planned to hire an attorney and mentioned an affidavit of indigency but did not explain it to him or make any inquiries as to whether he was indigent.

(citing Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Servs. of Durham Cnty., N.C. , 452 U.S. 18, 31-32, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2162, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981)). See also KRS 31.120(1)(b); W.H.J. v. J.N.W., 669 S.W.3d 52, 59 (Ky. App. 2023).