Opinion
FSTCV155014842S
04-05-2016
Lisa " Lee" Whitnum v. Jane Emons et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (NO. 105)
Hon. Charles T. Lee, J.
Before the court is the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. On July 20, 2015, the self-represented plaintiff, Lee Whitnum, filed a six-count complaint against Connecticut Superior Court Judge Jane Emons, Supervisory Assistant State's Attorney John Whalen, the State's Long Term Care Ombudsman Nancy Shaffer, Regional Ombudsman Kimberly Massey, and Social Services Program Administration Manager for the State Department on Aging Margaret Gerundo-Murkette. On September 24, 2015, all five defendants jointly filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and submitted a memorandum of law in support. As exhibits, the defendants attached, among other things: (1) the plaintiff's request to the claims commissioner for permission to sue and notice of intent to sue the state; (2) a Woodbridge Police Department Case/Incident Report discussing the circumstances underlying the doorbell incident (as explained below) at Judge Emons' home; and (3) the arrest warrant application and signed affidavit concerning the plaintiff's arrest for calling Judge Emons' home (as explained below). On October 13, 2015, the plaintiff withdrew her causes of action against Whalen, Shaffer, Gerundo-Murkette, and Massey, in her professional capacity. On November 9, 2015, the plaintiff withdrew her remaining causes of action against Massey, in her individual capacity. On the same date, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendants' motion to dismiss. On December 7, 2015, the plaintiff withdrew her causes of action against Judge Emons, in her personal capacity. Therefore, as of this date, only Judge Emons, in her professional capacity, remained a defendant in this action. On March 9, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion to cite in Judge Emons in her personal capacity as a defendant in the case. Judge Emons, in her official capacity, objected to this motion. On March 18, 2016, in attempt to bring Judge Emons, in her personal capacity, back into the case, the plaintiff filed a motion to withdraw her previous withdrawal of Judge Emons as a defendant in her personal capacity.
For purposes of this memorandum, these five defendants will be referred to as " the original defendants."
As is more fully discussed below, the defendants' motion to dismiss is granted. Although, viewing the self-represented plaintiff's filings liberally, the plaintiff has named Judge Emons in her personal and professional capacities, the allegations against Judge Emons only implicate her in her official capacity. Therefore, as is more fully discussed below, sovereign immunity and judicial immunity bar suit. No exceptions apply.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a series of events leading up to the plaintiff's arrest in July of 2013. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts. In March of 2012, the plaintiff married James Baker. The court dissolved the marriage on September 10, 2013. The plaintiff claims that Judge Emons conspired with the other original defendants to destroy her marriage.
With respect to Judge Emons, the complaint alleges the following facts. While presiding over the plaintiff's divorce proceedings, Judge Emons issued various rulings, including quashing a subpoena, denying certain discovery requests, and denying the plaintiff's request for conciliation. In doing so, the plaintiff continues, Judge Emons abused the plaintiff's constitutional rights. In an attempt to have the plaintiff incarcerated, Judge Emons also falsely accused the plaintiff of ringing the Judge's doorbell at 2:00 a.m. and subsequently engaged in a smear campaign against the plaintiff. As against Judge Emons, the plaintiff alleges (1) dereliction of duty; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) defamation; (4) loss of consortium; (5) negligence; and (6) malicious prosecution. For all six claims, the plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, and any other damages that the court deems appropriate. In addition, the plaintiff " seeks § 1983 claim for monetary damages against some of the defendants . . ."
At various points, the plaintiff asserts that she is seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. In paragraph 28 of the complaint, the plaintiff states that she " seeks injunction at this court and the federal court for two reasons: #1. That the criminal charges against her are finally dropped and #2. to ensure that, if the appeals court throws out the divorce, the Bakers are finally able to see each other." It is unclear to which causes of action this request attaches. In paragraphs 42 of the complaint, the plaintiff states that she is " seeking injunctive and declaratory relieve and suing these individuals personally." It is unclear what injunctive relief, other than the relief stated in paragraph 28, the plaintiff is seeking. In paragraph 44 of the complaint, the plaintiff states, for the second time, that she " is asking in federal court that a judgment be issued that Judge Jane Emons be precluded from being a judge and/or collecting a salary as a judge . . ." Finally, in paragraphs 89 and 90 of the complaint, the plaintiff states that she seeks injunctive and declaratory relief against the other original defendants.
II. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
In her complaint, the plaintiff anticipates the defendants' claim of sovereign immunity and contends that Judge Emons is vulnerable to suit under at least two exceptions to sovereign immunity. First, because the plaintiff has alleged a violation of her constitutional rights, the second exception to sovereign immunity applies. Second, because the plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief on the basis of Judge Emons' promoting an illegal purpose in excess of her statutory authority, the third exception to sovereign immunity applies. Furthermore, the plaintiff avers that she is suing Judge Emons personally for her falsely accusing the plaintiff of criminal behavior. The plaintiff reasons that, on July 22, 2013, when Judge Emons called the police, she was not performing her duties as a judge; she had already stepped down from presiding over the plaintiff's divorce and was at home when she made the phone call.
In their motion to dismiss, the original defendants argue that, as to Judge Emons, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action because the action is barred by sovereign immunity. Specifically, in issuing rulings in the plaintiff's divorce proceeding, Judge Emons was clearly acting as a state official. In addition, although the plaintiff labels her suit as against Judge Emons personally, because Judge Emons' reporting the plaintiff to the police resulted from her role as the judge in the plaintiff's divorce proceeding, the plaintiff is only suing Judge Emons in her official capacity. Furthermore, if the court determines that sovereign immunity does not apply, all claims against Judge Emons are barred by the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity.
In her objection to the defendants' motion to dismiss, the plaintiff continues her argument regarding the suit against Judge Emons as a private citizen. According to the plaintiff, at the time of the doorbell incident (1) Judge Emons was not the presiding judge in any legal matter involving the plaintiff and (2) Judge Emons was acting on her own time, in the middle of the night. Therefore, Judge Emons was not acting within her official capacity. The plaintiff does not address the defendants' claim of judicial immunity.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
" A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 626, 79 A.3d 60 (2013). " A court deciding a motion to dismiss must determine not the merits of the claim or even its legal sufficiency, but rather, whether the claim is one that the court has jurisdiction to hear and decide." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hinde v. Specialized Education of Connecticut, Inc., 147 Conn.App. 730, 740-41, 84 A.3d 895 (2014).
" Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). " [O]nce raised . . . the question [of subject matter jurisdiction] must be answered before the court may decide the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kelly v. Albertsen, 114 Conn.App. 600, 605, 970 A.2d 787 (2009). " [L]ack of subject matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts . . . [I]f the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss . . . other types of undisputed evidence . . . and/or public records of which judicial notice may be taken . . . the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint . . . If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant's motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits . . . or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651-52, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).
" [T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003). " It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Financial Consulting, LLC v. Commissioner of Ins., 315 Conn. 196, 226, 105 A.3d 210 (2014). In addition, in regard to pro se petitioners, courts " should be solicitous . . . and construe their pleadings liberally in light of the limited legal knowledge they possess." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Markley v. Dep't of Pub. Util. Control, 301 Conn. 56, 74, 23 A.3d 668 (2011).
B. Sovereign Immunity
" [T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housatonic Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 301 Conn. 268, 274, 21 A.3d 759 (2011). Regarding the common-law exceptions to sovereign immunity, " [i]n the absence of a proper factual basis in the complaint to support the applicability of these exceptions, the granting of a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds is proper." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Markley v. Dep't of Pub. Util. Control, supra, 301 Conn. 66.
" The principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established under our case law . . . [T]he practical and logical basis of the doctrine [of sovereign immunity] is today recognized to rest . . . on the hazard that the subjection of the state and federal governments to private litigation might constitute a serious interference with the performance of their functions and with their control over their respective instrumentalities, funds, and property . . . Not only have we recognized the state's immunity as an entity, but [w]e have also recognized that because the state can act only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the state . . ." Columbia Air Servs. v. DOT, 293 Conn. 342, 349, 977 A.2d 636 (2009).
" If [a] plaintiff's complaint reasonably may be construed to bring claims against the defendants in their individual capacities, then sovereign immunity [does] not bar those claims." Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 307, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). " The determination of whether the plaintiff's complaint [alleges] claims against the [defendant] in [her] individual capacit[y] is governed by the test set forth in Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 568, 362 A.2d 871 (1975). In Spring . . . [t]he court agreed . . . that [t]he fact that the state is not named as a defendant does not conclusively establish that the action is not within the principle which prohibits actions against the sovereign without its consent . . . The vital test is to be found in the essential nature and effect of the proceeding . . . The court . . . set forth four criteria to determine whether an action is in effect, one against the state and cannot be maintained without its consent: (1) a state official has been sued; (2) the suit concerns some matter in which that official represents the state; (3) the state is the real party against whom relief is sought; and (4) the judgment, though nominally against the official, will operate to control the activities of the state or subject it to liability." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Egan, supra, 308.
As to the first Spring factor, courts look to " [t]he essential characteristics of a 'public office' [which] are [A] an authority conferred by law, [B] a fixed tenure of office, and [C] the power to exercise some portion of the sovereign functions of government . . . A key element of this test is that the 'officer' is carrying out a sovereign function." (Citations omitted.) Spring v. Constantino, supra, 168 Conn. 568. Regarding the third Spring factor, case law shows that, ordinarily, satisfaction of the second factor also satisfies the third. In other words, if a state official is being sued for actions conducted in carrying out official duties, ordinarily, the state is the real party in interest. See, e.g., Somers v. Hill, 143 Conn. 476, 123 A.2d 468 (1956) (state real party in interest where damages sought for injuries alleged to have been caused by the commissioner in carrying out specific acts for which the state employs him); Cimmino v. Marcoccia, 149 Conn.App. 350, 359-60, 89 A.3d 384 (2014) (concluding that state was real party in interest because damages sought were premised on injuries plaintiff alleged defendants caused during performance of acts that were part of official duties); Macellaio v. Newington Police Dep't, 142 Conn.App. 177, 181, 64 A.3d 348 (2013) (third Spring criterion met when damages sought for injuries allegedly caused by the defendant for performing acts that were part of his official duties). The fourth Spring factor is similarly conflated, although in a more conclusory manner. See, e.g., Cimmino v. Marcoccia, supra, 360 (" Any judgment against the defendants would impact the manner in which state officials conduct investigations"); Hultman v. Blumenthal, 67 Conn.App. 613, 621, 787 A.2d 666 (2002) (" The fourth criterion is met because any judgment against the defendant would operate to control the activities of the state"). Accordingly, if (1) a state official has been sued and (2) the suit concerns some matter in which that official represents the state, (3) the state is the real party against whom relief is sought; and (4) the judgment, though nominally against the official, will operate to control the activities of the state or subject it to liability.
As to the second Spring factor itself, there is scant law on how far the phrase in which that official represents the state" reaches. For purposes of absolute judicial immunity, the Sixth Circuit has explained that " in circumstances in which a judge reasonably perceives a threat to himself or herself arising out of the judge's adjudicatory conduct, the judge's response, be it a letter to a prosecutor or a call to the Marshall's office for security, is a judicial act . . ." Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 259 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1075, 118 S.Ct. 1517, 140 L.Ed.2d 670 (1998). The court explained that, " [a]s the [United States] Supreme Court has noted, the doctrine of judicial immunity exists to ensure that, in discharging their official responsibilities, judges will act without fear for their personal liability . . . If a disgruntled litigant is permitted to upset that equilibrium by threatening or harassing a judge and the judge must fear personal liability if he or she reports that harassment to authorities, the judge's ability to deal impartially and without fear will be seriously undermined. Even more to the point, the litigant, empowered to subject the judge to liability for reporting the conduct, can affect the judge's ability to sit on cases involving that litigant, thereby effectively creating a situation wherein the litigant will not have to answer to that judge or even appear before the judge. This enables the litigant to 'forum shop' by effecting the recusal of a judge through the litigant's own threatening or harassing conduct. If the judge were not free to address this conduct by complaining to law enforcement without fear of liability, the judge's freedom of action in insuring the integrity of his or her decision-making process, and, indeed, his or her decisions themselves, will be jeopardized. Any result which did not extend immunity to judges acting to protect the integrity of the judicial decision-making process would seriously undermine judicial independence, a cornerstone of a judge's capacity to sit and decide cases." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) Id., 260 (finding that a judge's instigating a criminal investigation against a disgruntled litigant who has harassed her is a judicial act).
In Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2005), the Second Circuit agreed with the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Barrett v. Harrington and stated that conduct which occurs outside of a courtroom can constitute a judicial act. The court found that a judge's actions were substantially judicial when " [t]here was a nexus between her actions--whether or not her actions were motivated by security and safety concerns--and [the plaintiff's] . . . case before her." Huminski v. Corsones, supra, 78. According to the Second Circuit, " the principles underlying judicial immunity suggest that [the judge's] actions should be protected. Exposing her to liability for her part in the . . . response to [the plaintiffs] activities, which were in response to her judicial decisions in a case before her, would be inconsistent with the protections of the independence of her decisionmaking. A judge cannot be expected regularly and dispassionately to make decisions adverse to overtly hostile parties if subsequent actions to protect herself . . . from . . . hostility may result in the rigors of defending against--and even the possibility of losing--lengthy and costly litigation." Id.
Sovereign immunity is not absolute; although exceptions to the doctrine exist, they " are few and [are] narrowly construed under our jurisprudence . . . Our Supreme Court has recognized three exceptions to sovereign immunity: (1) when the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waives the state's sovereign immunity . . . (2) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights . . . and (3) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote an illegal purpose in excess of the officer's statutory authority." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Traylor v. Gerratana, 148 Conn.App. 605, 609-10, 88 A.3d 552, cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 444, 190 L.Ed.2d 336 (2014).
As to the first exception, " [w]hen a plaintiff brings an action for money damages against the state, [s]he must proceed through the office of the claims commissioner pursuant to chapter 53 of the General Statutes, § § 4-141 through 4-165. Otherwise, the action must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the doctrine of sovereign immunity." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Schub v. Dept. of Social Services, 86 Conn.App. 748, 750, 862 A.2d 382, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 920, 871 A.2d 1029 (2005). Before a plaintiff is entitled to judicial review of a claim for monetary damages against the state, the plaintiff must " [exhaust] the administrative remedy . . . of presenting [the] claim . . . first to the claims commissioner . . ." Doe v. Heintz, 204 Conn. 17, 34, 526 A.2d 1318 (1987). The second and third exceptions to sovereign immunity do not apply to claims against the state for monetary damages. See Cox v. Aiken, 278 Conn. 204, 212, 897 A.2d 71(2006); see also Columbia Air Services, Inc. v. DOT, supra, 350-51.
C. Judicial Immunity
Neither the Connecticut Supreme Court nor the Appellate Court has expressly determined whether absolute judicial immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction. See Leseberg v. O'Grady, 115 Conn.App. 18, 21 n.3, 971 A.2d 86 (2009), cert. denied, 293 Conn. 913, 978 A.2d 1110 (2009); see also Carrubba v. Moskowitz, 274 Conn. 533, 537, 877 A.2d 773 (2005) (" It is unnecessary for us, however, in resolving the present case, to consider whether a motion to dismiss was the proper procedural vehicle by which to raise absolute immunity because that question is not presented in this appeal."). Relying on Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, 272 Conn. 776, 787, 865 A.2d 1163 (2005), some trial courts have concluded that absolute judicial immunity can be raised properly in a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Damato v. Thomas, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-09-5030385 (June 2, 2010, Peck, J.) .
" It is a long-standing doctrine that a judge may not be civilly sued for judicial acts he undertakes in his capacity as a judge." Traylor v. Gerratana, supra, 148 Conn.App. 613. " This role of judicial immunity serves to promote principled and fearless decision-making by removing a judge's fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption." Gross v. Rell, 304 Conn. 234, 246-47, 40 A.3d 240 (2012). " [I]ssuing incorrect legal rulings and orders . .., applying unconstitutional laws, intimidating [a] plaintiff during hearings, [and] engaging in ex parte communications [are] . . . undeniably . . . actions taken in [a judge's] official judicial capacity. Thus . . . claims against [a judge based on these actions] are barred by absolute judicial immunity." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Traylor v. Gerratana, supra, 148 Conn.App. 613-14. As is stated in the preceding section, " [i]n circumstances in which a judge reasonably perceives a threat to himself or herself arising out of the judge's adjudicatory conduct, the judge's response, be it a letter to a prosecutor or a call to the Marshall's office for security, is a judicial act within the scope of judicial immunity." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Huminski v. Corsones, supra, 396 F.3d 78 (agreeing with Barrett v. Harrington, supra, 130 F.3d 246).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Sovereign Immunity
The defendants filed their motion to dismiss on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action before the plaintiff filed her motion to cite in Judge Emons personally. In addition, lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time; Waterbury v. Washington, 260 Conn. 506, 527, 800 A.2d 1102 (2002); and may be raised by the court sua sponte. Webster Bank v. Zak, 259 Conn. 766, 774, 792 A.2d 66 (2002). Notwithstanding these points, in light of the fact that the plaintiff is self-represented, the court treats the plaintiff's filings as attempting to include Judge Emons, both officially and personally, as a defendant.
" The interpretation of pleadings is always a question of law for the court . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Boone v. William W. Backus Hospital, 272 Conn. 551, 559, 864 A.2d 1 (2005).
The plaintiff states that she is suing Judge Emons in her official capacity for issuing certain rulings in the plaintiff's divorce proceeding. The claims arising from these actions clearly satisfy the first two Spring factors. First, it is undisputed that a judge of the Superior Court carries out a sovereign function and is a state official. With respect to the second prong of the Spring test, in quashing a subpoena, denying certain discovery requests, denying the plaintiff's request for conciliation, and issuing other orders, Judge Emons performed essential judicial acts and therefore represented the state. Accordingly, the state is the real party in interest because the plaintiff seeks damages for injuries alleged to have been caused by Judge Emons in carrying out specific acts for which the state employs her. Finally, because judgment against Judge Emons would impact the manner in which judges issue rulings, the fourth criterion is satisfied. For these reasons, the causes of action arising from Judge Emons' rulings are, as the plaintiff contends, against Judge Emons in her official capacity.
The plaintiff also alleges that she is suing Judge Emons in her personal capacity. The defendants disagree. To resolve this dispute, the court looks to the complaint and the undisputed facts, established by undisputed evidence, in the record. In her complaint, the plaintiff states that she is seeking monetary damages from " Judge Jane Emons for her unlawful behavior . . ." and " Private citizen Jane Emons both an exception to Sovereign Immunity for three reasons: 1. The violation of this plaintiff's Constitutional Rights and 2. For her role in two alleged criminal activities . . ." The court interprets these statements as the plaintiff's attempt to sue Judge Emons in her personal capacity and to assert that at least two of the exceptions to sovereign immunity apply.
The defendants have submitted undisputed evidence into the record. This evidence, in the form of a Woodbridge Police Department Case/Incident Report, establishes the following facts. At around 1:30 in the morning on June 22, 2013, police officers were called to Judge Emons' home. According to Judge Emons, who summoned the police, someone rang her doorbell in a way that caused the doorbell to stick and continuously ring. Officer Scott, who completed the report, wrote the following: " This incident is concerning to [Judge Emons] because she is a Federal Judge who is hearing divorce case involving a Lisa Whitnum-Baker. That approximately a month ago, Baker had contacted [Judge Emons] at her home and harassed/threaten her." On a different page, the report states that " this [warrant for the plaintiff's arrest] was issued subsequent to . . . [an] investigation of harassing telephone calls made to Judge Emons' home during the early morning hours of May 15, 2013 by Whitnum-Baker . . . [T]he nature of these calls was court related . . . The complaint and the undisputed evidence in the record show that this situation is similar to the situation in the Sixth Circuit case Barrett v. Harrington . Although factually similar, in Barrett, the Sixth Circuit analyzed whether judicial immunity barred suit; in the present case, the question is whether sovereign immunity bars suit. Based on the rationales underlying both types of immunity, this distinction is immaterial. The purpose of judicial immunity is to allow a judge to deal impartially and without fear, avoid affecting a judge's ability to sit on cases involving a litigant and undermining judicial independence, insure a judge's freedom of action and the integrity of the decision-making process, and make sure that decisions are not jeopardized. These functions are all cornerstones of a judge's capacity to sit and decide cases. The purpose behind sovereign immunity is to prevent serious interference with the ability of state officials to perform their functions. Again, the cornerstone of a judge's function is to sit and decide cases. Because, as to judges, each immunity doctrine is premised on the same rationale, it is reasonable to conclude that what constitutes a 'judicial act" for the purposes of judicial immunity also constitutes an " official act" for the purposes of sovereign immunity. See Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, supra, 272 Conn. 787 (" Put simply, absolute immunity furthers the public policy of encouraging participation and candor in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. This objective would be thwarted if those persons whom the common-law doctrine was intended to protect nevertheless faced the threat of suit. In this regard, the purpose of the absolute immunity afforded participants in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings is the same as the purpose of the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the state.").
Like the judges' actions in both cited federal cases, Judge Emons' actions on the night of the doorbell incident arose out of her adjudicatory conduct, specifically her role in the plaintiff's divorce proceedings. In other words, there was a nexus between her actions--which were motivated by security and safety concerns--and the plaintiff's case before her; Judge Emons summoned the police in response to what she thought were the plaintiff's activities, which were in response to the judge's judicial decisions in the plaintiff's divorce proceedings. By instigating a criminal investigation against the plaintiff, a disgruntled litigant, who she feared was harassing her, Judge Emons engaged in an official judicial act and, therefore satisfies the second Spring factor. For the same reasons articulated in the preceding paragraph, the other three Spring factors are also satisfied. Accordingly, the plaintiff is attempting to sue Judge Emons in her official capacity.
Because the plaintiff is suing Judge Emons only in her official capacity, unless one of the three exceptions to sovereign immunity applies, the claims against Judge Emons are barred. Although the plaintiff included unspecified equitable relief in her complaint, it is clear that, as against Judge Emons, her claims are for money damages only. See Miller v. Egan, supra, 265 Conn. 304 n.5. Under Miller v. Egan, only the first exception to sovereign immunity, which requires a waiver, can apply to remove sovereign immunity in a case for monetary damages. Here, the file shows that the plaintiff has submitted a " Request for Permission to Sue & Notice of Intent to Sue the State" to the claims commissioner. There is no evidence that the legislature waived the state's sovereign immunity. Accordingly, because the plaintiff has not exhausted her administrative remedies, and because she does not allege that the waiver exception applies, the plaintiff cannot maintain a suit for damages against the state.
B. Judicial Immunity
Although the court has determined that the plaintiff's suit is barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, to the extent that the complaint can be construed as asserting causes of action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, state sovereign immunity law does not apply. See Sullins v. Rodriguez, 281 Conn. 128, 133, 913 A.2d 415 (2007) (" [W]hen sovereign immunity is claimed as a defense to a cause of action pursuant to § 1983, federal sovereign immunity jurisprudence preempts analysis under state law."). Therefore, the court will discuss the alternative argument, namely, whether absolute judicial immunity bars suit. Section 1983 authorizes actions against state officers for damages arising from official acts, if sued in their individual capacities. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 23, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991). " [The United States Supreme Court] has refused to extend absolute immunity beyond a very limited class of officials . . ." However, that limited class includes 'judges carrying out their judicial functions, whose special functions or constitutional status requires complete protection from suit." Id., 29. In the present case, Judge Emons is absolutely immune from suit for her actions alleged in the complaint because she is a state official and, based on Huminski v. Corsones, supra, 396 F.3d 78, and Barrett v. Harrington, supra, 130 F.3d 246, was acting within her official capacity as a judge.
V. CONCLUSION
By reason of the foregoing, the defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED.