Opinion
16-P-641
04-04-2017
Donna M. WHITMAN v. TOWN OF EAST LONGMEADOW.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
On appeal from a judgment on jury verdict, the defendant, town of East Longmeadow (town), argues error in the judge's denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and motion for a new trial or remittitur. We affirm.
1. Judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The town claims that the judge erred in denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the plaintiff, Donna M. Whitman, did not prove that the town breached the parties agreement. "A motion for judgment n.o.v. presents ‘a pure question of law, specifically, whether anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any combination of circumstances could be found from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the plaintiff.’ " Wodinsky v. Kettenbach, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 825, 833 (2015), quoting from Quinn v. Mar-Lees Seafood, LLC, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 688, 702 (2007). We review the evidence "in the light most favorable to [Whitman], ‘without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence.’ " Ibid., quoting from Haddad v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 455 Mass. 91, 94 n.5 (2009).
The town and Whitman entered into a contract where the town agreed to purge Whitman's personnel record of documents relating to a complaint alleging that Whitman endangered one of her students by exposing the child to an allergen in exchange for Whitman accepting a short unpaid suspension. Three years after the agreement, at the child's father's request, the town produced the investigative report that accused Whitman of recklessly endangering the child by exposing her to an allergen. In turn, the father took the investigative report to the police and a clerk magistrate issued a criminal complaint for child endangerment.
The district attorney dismissed the complaint prior to Whitman's arraignment.
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The town contends that they did not agree to eradicate any and all records pertaining to the incident. However, the contract between the parties states in part: "[T]he ‘[n]otice of [i]ntent to [s]uspend,’ together with any and all related documents and materials, will be removed from Ms. Whitman's personnel record. There will be no record of the unpaid suspension retained in Ms. Whitman's personnel record."
Pursuant to G. L. c. 149, § 52C, "personnel record" is defined as "a record kept by an employer that identifies an employee, to the extent that the record is used or has been used, or may affect or be used relative to that employee's qualifications for employment ... or disciplinary action." The jury could have reasonably found that the investigative report was a document that falls within the definition of a personnel record and thus, the town's production of it was in breach of the contract. We conclude that the judge correctly determined that the evidence, construed in favor of Whitman, justified the jury verdict. See Passatempo v. McMenimen, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 742, 745 (2014).
2. Motion for a new trial or remittitur. The town also claims that the judge erred in denying its motion for a new trial or remittitur because Whitman failed to prove causally related damages as a result of the town's breach of contract. A judge deciding a motion for new trial focuses on whether the verdict "is so greatly against the weight of the evidence as to induce in his mind the strong belief that it was not due to a careful consideration of the evidence, but that it was the product of bias, misapprehension or prejudice." Turnpike Motors. Inc. v. Newbury Group. Inc., 413 Mass. 119, 127 (1992), quoting from Scannell v. Boston Elevated Ry., 208 Mass. 513, 514 (1911). Ruling on a motion for a new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and the denial of a new trial will be reversed only for clear abuse of discretion. See Intl. Totalizing Sys., Inc. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 29 Mass. App. Ct. 424, 438 (1990)
Here, the town's release of the investigative report to the child's father led directly to the issuance of a criminal complaint against Whitman. The criminal complaint caused her to suffer from depression and posttraumatic stress disorder. See St. Charles v. Kender, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 155, 159 (1995) (where a "breach of contract is of a nature particularly likely to cause emotional distress," then damages may be awarded). Furthermore, the criminal complaint caused Whitman to leave her teaching position for which her annual salary exceeded $70,000. In light of the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the town's motion for a new trial or remittitur.
Judgment affirmed.
Orders denying motions for judgment n.o.v., and remittitur or new trial affirmed.