Opinion
Case No. 2:05-CV-280.
September 13, 2006
OPINION AND ORDER
This is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") brought by plaintiff Norman V. Whiteside ("plaintiff"), an inmate of the State of Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction ("ODRC"). With the consent of the parties, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), this matter is before the Court on plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction (" Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction"), Doc. No. 31. For the reasons that follow, plaintiff's motion is DENIED.
I.
On March 24, 2005, plaintiff filed this action alleging retaliation, discrimination and denial of access to courts. Complaint ¶ 1. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that as a result of filing lawsuits against employees of the Madison Correctional Institution ("MaCI"), its staff "launched a wave of retaliatory attacks against" him and illegally confiscated his property. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff also alleges that he was not allowed to keep certain legal material and as a result he could not use the materials in a deposition, present it to the parole board or use it in a medical malpractice case. Id. ¶ 24. Finally, plaintiff alleges that defendants ignored institutional rules, policies and procedures in order to advance a retaliatory and discriminatory agenda against him. Id. ¶ 26.Plaintiff currently is involved in four lawsuits, which each require certain filing fees to be paid to the courts in which they are pending. Affidavit of Diana Mathews (" Mathews Aff.") ¶ 5 attached to Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction (" Defendants' Memorandum Contra"). ODRC is responsible for debiting prisoners' accounts to pay the courts in which a prisoner initiates a lawsuit. Doc. No. 1, Application and Affidavit by Incarcerated Person to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees.
Ms. Mathews is the Account Clerk Supervisor at MaCI. Affidavit of Diana Mathews ¶¶ 2, 3.
On July 25, 2006, plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Doc. No. 15, arguing that defendants have purposely improperly debited his prison account and requesting that the Court issue an order requiring defendants to reimburse his prison account and to order defendants not to make improper deductions from his account in the future. On August 4, 2006, defendants filed Defendants' Memorandum Contra, Doc. No. 36, and, on August 17, 2006, plaintiff filed his reply in support of his motion (" Plaintiff's Reply"), Doc. No. 40.
II.
A. Standard
Plaintiff moves under Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a) and (b), which permit a party to seek injunctive relief if he believes he will suffer irreparable harm or injury. A temporary restraining order relates only to restraints sought without written or oral notice to the adverse party or his attorney, whereas the application is properly treated as one for a preliminary injunction where the adverse party was given notice. First Tech. Safety Sys., Inc. v. Depinet, 11 F.3d 641, 650 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 581 F.2d 570, 573 (6th Cir. 1978)); Fed.R.Civ.P. 64(a), (b). In this action, defendants were noticed of plaintiff's intent to seek injunctive relief, and indeed, responded in opposition to the request. Thus, the Court will address plaintiff's motion as one for a preliminary injunction.
The decision whether or not to issue a preliminary injunction falls within sound discretion of the district court. Friendship Materials, Inc. v. Michigan Brick, Inc., 679 F.2d 100, 102 (6th Cir. 1982). A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that should be granted only after the Court has carefully considered the following four factors:
(1) whether the movant has a "strong" likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would otherwise suffer irreparable injury; (3) whether issuance of a preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by issuance of a preliminary injunction.Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing McPherson v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453, 459 (6th Cir. 1997) ( en banc), quoting Sandison v. Michigan High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir. 1995)). These four considerations are not required elements of a conjunctive test but are rather factors to be balanced. In re Delorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d at 1229; Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. Engler, 257 F.3d 587, 592 (6th Cir. 2001); Monongahela Power Co. v. Schriber, 322 F. Supp.2d 902, 918 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (J. Sargus).
B. Discussion
Turning to the first factor of the four-part test, the Court, upon review, concludes that plaintiff has failed to establish the likelihood of success on the merits of his claim because plaintiff's request for reimbursement is moot and because it is highly unlikely that the account will be improperly debited in the future.
There is no dispute related to the legal requirements relating to debits made to an inmate's prison account. Plaintiff's application, in accordance with the law of this circuit, was completed using the standardized form adopted by this Court. Doc. No. 1, Application and Affidavit by Incarcerated Person to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees. The application states that the Court will assess and collect a partial payment of the filing fee and that, "[n]o matter how little money is in the prisoner's account, prison officials must forward payments to the Court until the initial partial filing fee is paid." Id. (citing In Re Prison Litigation Reform Act, Administrative Order No. 97-01, Part II (c), 105 F.3d 1131, 1133 (6th Cir. 1997). Furthermore, this Court's March 24, 2005, Order approving plaintiff's request to proceed without prepayment of filing fees requires that,
After full payment of the initial partial filing fee, the custodian shall submit 20% of the inmate's preceding monthly income credited to the account, but only when the amount in the account exceeds $10.00 until the full fees of $250.00 have been paid to the Clerk of this Court.
Doc. 2, Order (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997)).
Plaintiff argues that the custodian of his prison account improperly debited his account leaving it with only fifteen cents, in violation of the above-stated law and in an effort to "humiliate" him. Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1, 3; Plaintiff's Reply at 10. Defendants admit that, on one occasion, they mistakenly deducted an amount that left plaintiff's account with less than ten dollars. Defendants' Memorandum Contra at 4-5. Defendants, however, convincingly explain how the mistake was made and why the mistake will not recur:
In the event that there are multiple federal and state filing fee obligations, like Inmate Whiteside [has], the deductions occur and the fees are paid based upon a prioritizing of the cases until all cases are paid in full.
In April 2006, the institution switched the computer system that was used for tracking and debiting inmate accounts. . . . [resulting in change to] this prioritizing . . . and now filing fee obligations can be paid regardless of priority. . . . The system was supposed to automatically calculate 20 percent of [plaintiff's] prior month's income and distribute it accordingly among his federal cases and continue deductions for his state cases until $10.00 remained in the account. The system failed to do this and instead deducted his entire balance except the $.15 (cents). . . .
[This] error was the first time the new system calculated and deducted money from Inmate Whiteside's account. . . .Mathews Aff. ¶¶ 9, 13-15 attached to Defendants' Memorandum Contra. Once defendants realized the mistake made with respect to plaintiff's account, they corrected it. Id. ¶¶ 14-19. Plaintiff does not dispute these representations. See Plaintiff's Reply. Consequently, plaintiff's request that his account be corrected is now, in the view of this Court, moot.
Moreover, defendants have reviewed the new system with regard to its accuracy in debiting all inmates' accounts and attest that the payment of filing fees will "occur pursuant to state and federal requirements." Id. and at ¶ 24. Defendants' explanation strongly indicates that the type of mistake at issue here will not be made in the future, making plaintiff's request for an order directing defendants to properly debit his account in the future of little use. Indeed, the issue is certainly not appropriate for the extraordinary relief plaintiff requests.
Accordingly, because plaintiff has no chance of success on the merits of his claim that defendants purposely wrongfully debited his prison account, injunctive relief will not be granted. As this Court has stated:
Although, as mentioned above, the four factors are to be balanced in determining whether a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction should issue, courts have often recognized that the first factor is traditionally of greater importance than the remaining three. See Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527, 537 (6th Cir. 1978)). In fact, the Sixth Circuit has held that when the proponent of the injunctive relief has no chance of success on the merits of the claim, the Court may dismiss the motion without considering the other three factors. See Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir. 1997). Failure to do so is reversible error. See id.; Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1037 (6th Cir. 1995).Stanley v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. Corr., Case No. C2-02-178, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21996, *8-9 (S.D. Ohio August 12, 2002) (J. Sargus) (denying motion for injunctive relief after evaluation only of chance of success on the merits factor).
Similarly, in this action, plaintiff has no chance of proving that defendants purposefully improperly debited his prison account and that they will continue do so in the future. Under these circumstances, plaintiff is simply not entitled to injunctive relief
WHEREUPON, in light of the foregoing, Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Doc. No. 31, is DENIED.