Whitehead v. Stevens

7 Citing cases

  1. Eudaly v. Superior Oil Co.

    270 P.2d 335 (Okla. 1954)   Cited 5 times

    Nevertheless the court held that the party making the tender was bound thereby and awarded the money to the person for whom the tender was made. See also, Warner v. Wickizer, 146 Okla. 232, 294 P. 130; Whitehead v. Stevens, 54 Okla. 337, 152 P. 445; Nellis v. Minton, 91 Okla. 75, 216 P. 147; First Nat. Bank of Ada v. Elam, 126 Okla. 93, 258 P. 892; Columbia River Co. v. Smith, 83 Or. 137, 162 P. 831, 163 P. 309; Fox v. Williams, 92 Wis. 320, 66 N.W. 357. We conclude and hold that, upon the rendition of the judgment in the Federal Court quieting title in Superior to its leasehold interest, the money deposited in court became the property of Bradshaw; that Superior was then a purchaser in good faith of the lease, was thereupon entitled to the protection of the provisions of Title 12 O.S. 1951 § 176[ 12-176], and its title to the oil and gas lease and the leasehold estate thus acquired was unaffected and it was not divested thereof by the subsequent vacation of the Bradshaw judgments.

  2. Cochran v. Norris

    51 P.2d 736 (Okla. 1935)   Cited 7 times

    In the case of Galloway v. Loffland, no minors or incompetents were involved. The maxim urged by defendant is general rule applied to persons competent to contract. See Buzard v. Houston, 119 U.S. 347, 7 S.Ct. Rep. 249; McIndoo v. Brown et al., 125 Okla. 88, 256 P. 743; Whitehead v. Stephens, 51 Okla. 337, 152 P. 445; Power Irrigation Co. of Clearlake v. Capay Ditch Co., 226 F. 634; Levy V. Inman, 103 Okla. 90, 229 P. 436; Sioux City v. Trust Company, 82 F. 134. This equitable requirement has been applied to an infant who fraudulently represented that he was over the age of 21 years and therefore competent to contract.

  3. Warner v. Wickizer

    294 P. 130 (Okla. 1930)   Cited 9 times

    In view of the fact that the defendants asked affirmative equitable relief in the cancellation of the deed, it was the duty of the trial court, as we view it, to require the defendants to pay the amount of such mortgage under the equitable rule that "He who seeks equity must do equity." See the authorities and application of the rule as announced in the cases of Whitehead v. Stevens, 54 Okla. 337, 152 P. 445; Nellis v. Minton, 91 Okla. 75, 216 P. 147, and First Nat. Bank of Ada v. Elam, 126 Okla. 93, 258 P. 892, wherein parties sought relief somewhat similar to that asked by defendants in the present action. The judgment of the trial court is modified to the extent that the defendants are required, as a condition to having their title quieted as against the mortgage of the plaintiff, to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $25, with interest thereon at 6 per cent. from December 27, 1904, which sum is adjudged a lien against the land involved.

  4. First Nat. Bank of Ada v. Elam

    126 Okla. 93 (Okla. 1927)   Cited 18 times
    In First National Bank of Ada v. Elam, 126 Okla. 93, 258 P. 892, 900 (1927), it is made clear that the "good faith" defense applies to a mortgagee's refusal to accept a tendered payment in full.

    "Where a tender is made for the purpose of basing a demand for affirmative relief on it, the rule stated in the preceding paragraph does not apply, but a different rule founded on the principle that he who seeks equity must do equity is called into action, and requires the tender to be kept good. Tuthill v. Morris, 81 N.Y. 94; Werner v. Tech, 127 N.Y. 217, 27 N.E. 845, 24 A. S. R. 443; Knudson v. Fenimore, 69 Okla. 3, 169 P. 478." The Supreme Court of this state has affirmed the above rule in the case of Whitehead v. Stevens, 54 Okla. 337, 152 P. 445, and we quote from the syllabus of that case as follows: "He who seeks equity must do equity.

  5. McIndoo v. Brown

    256 P. 743 (Okla. 1927)   Cited 2 times

    Hurley v. Anicker, 51 Okla. 97, 151 P. 593; Carter v. Fox (Cal.) 103 P. 910; Frink v. Thomas (Ore.) 25 P. 717. The intervener further invoked the principle that he who seeks equity must do equity, and that the relief prayed by the defendant as against it would not be granted without the money advanced for the defendant's benefit being paid. Nellis et al. v. Menton, 91 Okla. 75, 216 P. 147; Gibson v. Johnson. 73 Kan. 261, 84 P. 982; Walters v. Chance, 73 Kan. 680; Whitehead v. Stevens, 54 Okla. 337, 152 P. 445; Power Irrigation Co. v. Capay Ditch Co., 226 Fed. 634; 10 R. C. L. 394; Henry et al. v. Henry (Neb.) 107 N.W. 789. In this last case, we think the facts are in effect all but the same as in the case at bar.

  6. Folsom v. Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co.

    94 Okla. 181 (Okla. 1923)   Cited 19 times
    In Folsom v. Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co., 94 Okla. 181, 221 P. 480, Conditt v. McKinley, 94 Okla. 265, 221 P. 1007, Martin v. Hostetter, 59 Okla. 246, 158 p. 1174, and Richmond v. Robertson, 50 Okla. 635, 151 P. 203, the order of sale did not run in the name of the state of Oklahoma.

    " To the contention of defendants in error that the plaintiffs in error should offer to redeem the property or pay what is due under the mortgages we cannot agree, under the alleged facts and under the state of the record in this case, and we do not think the case of Whitehead v. Stevens, 54 Okla. 337, 152 P. 445, has any application to a void sale, as the decision in that case of based upon an entirely different state of facts. While we do not base our decision upon the fact that the defendants in error, since the filing of this appeal, have secured new orders of sale and proceeded to resell the property, this fact is very persuasive on this court that, they are not very strongly convinced that the sale complained of here, consummated under the conditions, was valid.

  7. Nellis v. Minton

    91 Okla. 75 (Okla. 1923)   Cited 19 times

    "The law does not permit a mortgagor to quite title against the holder of his mortgage on the naked ground that the right to foreclose the mortgage has become barred by the statute of limitations." Capell v. Dill et al., 82 Kan. 652, 109 P. 286; Walter v. Chance, 73 Kan. 680, 685, 85 P. 779, 780; Whitehead v. Stevens, 54 Okla. 337, 152 P. 445. "The mortgagor will be required to pay the mortgage debt as a condition of redeeming, though the lien is extinguished because equity requires every one seeking equity to to equity."