Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-4067.
October 14, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Clinton O'Dell Whitehead filed this action pro se against Defendant Stewart Charles Paintin, a Public Defender. Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(5), 12(b)(6), 12(b)(7), and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
Because the Court finds that this motion can be resolved based solely on Rule 12(b)(6), the Court will not discuss the Defendant's other grounds for dismissal.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initiated this suit on July 10, 2003 and asserted numerous claims against Defendant arising from Defendant's court appointed representation of Plaintiff in 1996. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts seven counts against Defendant including breach of duty, conspiracy, forgery, falsifying court records, tampering with a public record of information, tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, and obstructing the administration of law or other governmental function. Defendant now moves, pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6), to dismiss the entire case against him.II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a court may dismiss a complaint "for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1993). When considering a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them. See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249-50 (1989); see also Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 313 (3d Cir. 2001). Claims by pro se litigants may be dismissed only "if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). Furthermore, when a complaint if filed pro se, a court must "apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name." Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999).
III. DISCUSSION
To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a Plaintiff must "demonstrate a violation of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States [and] that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995); see Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
In examining Plaintiff's complaint, there is no specific mention of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; however, Plaintiff's first count, entitled "Breach of Duty (Action in Trespass)," states that Defendant "failed to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge in his representation of his client, directly resulting in numerous Constitutional Violations." Pl.'s Comp. at 1. Although the complaint alone does not specify what Constitutional rights Plaintiff claims were violated, his response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss argues "first, sixth, and fourteenth U.S. Constitutional violations." Pl.'s Objections to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 2. Counts Three through Seven describe specific instances where Plaintiff alleges that Defendant forged Plaintiff's signature and made fraudulent misrepresentations to the court. See Pl.'s Comp. at 2-6. In liberally construing Plaintiff's pleadings, the Court finds counts one and three through seven constitute a § 1983 claim.
Since the parties are not diverse, and Plaintiff has cited no other federal law, the Court would have no subject matter jurisdiction over the matter if it was not a § 1983 action.
Defendant moves to dismiss the claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff's claim is time-barred. The appropriate statute of limitations in a § 1983 action is the state's statue of limitations for a personal injury claim. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985); see also Sameric Corp. of Delaware v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998). In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for a personal injury claim, and therefore a § 1983 claim, is two years. See Herbert v. Reinstein, 976 F. Supp. 331, 336 (E.D. Pa. 1997). The statute of limitations on a § 1983 action accrues on the date when the plaintiff "knew or should have known his or her rights had been violated." Herbert, 976 F. Supp. at 336 (quoting Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1991)). Here, the basis for counts one and three through seven in Plaintiff's complaint are allegations that Defendant forged Plaintiff's signature on guilty pleas on October 27, 1997. See Pl.'s Comp. at 2. Plaintiff admits that he learned of these alleged forgeries on June 11, 1998. See Pl.'s Comp. at 2. Plaintiff did not file this complaint until July 10, 2003, a full five years after learning of the alleged forgeries.
Plaintiff also argues Defendant forged his signature on four continuances, but as all of these alleged forgeries occurred before October 27, 1997, the Court will only focus on the most recent forgery when evaluating the statute of limitations defense.
Accordingly, since Plaintiff failed to file his § 1983 claim within the specified statute of limitations, Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against Defendant is dismissed. B. 42 U.S.C. § 1985
Plaintiff's Second Count alleges that Defendant conspired with Assistant District Attorney Norman Pine, the Honorable Paula F. Ott, and Court Reporter Susan Shirley to "deny Plaintiff adequate access to the courts, right to adequately petition the courts, and the right to effective assistance of counsel." Pl.'s Comp. at 3. Reading the amended complaint liberally, the Court construes Plaintiff's second count to be a conspiracy claim under § 1985(3).
To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), Plaintiff must allege (1) a conspiracy; (2) motivated by a racial animus designed to deprive, directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons to the equal protection of the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to person or property or the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. See Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1997). Section 1985(3) by itself does not create substantive rights but rather "serves as a vehicle for vindicating federal rights and privileges which have been defined elsewhere." Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 805 (3d Cir. 2001). As Plaintiff has not alleged any racial or class-based discrimination behind the alleged conspiracy, his allegations do not state a claim under § 1985. See Stouch v. Williamson Hospitality Corp., 22 F. Supp. 2d 431, 434-35 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Accordingly, Plaintiff's § 1985 claim is dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant's motion is granted and the case is dismissed in its entirety.
An appropriate Order follows.