Opinion
Civil Action 22-154
01-08-2024
ALFRED WHITEFIELD, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL ZAKEN, JOHN DOE, CRYSTAL GREENWALT, ANKRON, STRECHLY, MINDY ANDREETTI, HARN, KUTEC, REHONIC, TRAUX, JOHN, and JORDAN, Defendants.
Honorable Marilyn J. Horan United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE: ECF NO. 81
MAUREEN P. KELLYUNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Alfred Whitefield (“Plaintiff'), an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Greene (“SCI-Greene”), brings this pro se action arising out of allegations that prison officials wrongly placed him in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) and confiscated his legal materials. ECF No. 71.
Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Michael Zaken (“Zaken”), Crystal Greenawalt (“Greenawalt”), Mindy Andreetti (“Andreetti”), Jared Ankrom(“Ankrom”), Justin Strechly (“Strechly”), Ham, Kutec, Rehonic, Traux, John, and Jordan (collectively, “Defendants”). ECF No. 81. For the reasons below, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss be granted in part and denied in part. Further, Plaintiffs remaining claims should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Plaintiff spells this individual's last name “Greenwait,” but the correct spelling appears to be “Greenawalt.” ECF No. 30; ECF No. 71-8 at 2.
Plaintiff spells this individual's last name “Ankron,” but the correct spelling appears to be “Ankrom.” ECF No. 30; ECF No. 71-7 at 2.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Habeas Case
Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Whitefield v. Wetzel, No. 2:21-cv-00340 (E.D. Pa.) (the “Habeas Case”) on January 26, 2021. Plaintiff's Habeas Case arose out of convictions in two state court criminal cases for first-degree murder and related charges in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff was represented by counsel, Zak Goldstein, who argued on Plaintiffs behalf that a new trial should be granted based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at ECF No. 1.
On February 12, 2022, United States Magistrate Judge Richard A. Lloret issued a report and recommendation relative to the petition for writ of habeas corpus. Based on a thorough examination of the record and applicable law, Judge Lloret recommended that the petition be denied because Plaintiff did not suffer any violation of his Fifth, Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendment rights as a result of actions taken by his defense counsel. Id. at ECF No. 12. On September 29, 2022, United States District Judge Edward G. Smith adopted the report and recommendation and denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id. at ECF No. 18. Plaintiff did not appeal.
2. Factual Allegations
a. Administrative confinement
On August 31, 2021, Plaintiff was placed in the RHU at SCI-Greene. Prison officials informed Plaintiff that he was under investigation for a violation of facility rules, and he was placed in administrative confinement under DC-ADM 802, Section l.B.l.f. This provision allows for administrative confinement when “there is need for increased control” while an investigation is ongoing. ECF No. 71 ¶ 27; ECF No. 71-1 at 2.
On September 9, 2021, Plaintiff had a custody hearing with the Program Review Committee (“PRC”). Although PRC decided to release Plaintiff back to general population, he received notice on the same date that he would continue to be housed in administrative custody because “[t]he inmate has completed a Disciplinary Custody (DC) sanction and the facility has an operational need, appropriate bed space, to temporarily place the inmate under Administrative Custody (AC) status.” ECF No. 71 ¶ 31; ECF No. 71-6 at 2.
Plaintiff later was released to general population on September 17, 2021. ECF No. 71 ¶ 32.
b. Confiscation of legal materials
On September 3,2021, Defendants Traux and Rehonic inventoried Plaintiff s property. Id. ¶ 28. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Strechly ordered that Plaintiffs legal property be confiscated with a threat to destroy it. Id.
Plaintiff was given a confiscated items receipt for his legal materials and paperwork, and he was advised that he needed a legal exemption to retain those materials. ECF No. 71-9 at 2. He requested an exemption on September 20, 2021. In his request, he incorrectly referred to the state court caption, docket numbers, and county for his now-closed criminal proceedings instead of his active federal Habeas Case. Because those state court criminal proceedings were both closed, Greenawalt and/or Ankrom denied his request on October 4, 2021. ECF No. 71 ¶¶ 33-34; ECF No. 71-8 at 2; ECF No. 71-9 at 2.
Plaintiff did, however, identify his case as a “federal” case and listed the presiding federal district court judge, Judge Smith, in his form.
Plaintiff filed a grievance about his missing legal materials on October 9, 2021. ECF No. 71-9 at 2. He explained that he was advised to request a legal exemption on September 4, 2021, but his request was improperly denied because his cases were, in fact, still active. Plaintiff attached exhibits to his grievance showing that he had an active case pending in federal court. ECF No. 71 ¶ 35. Defendant Andreetti denied Plaintiffs grievance as untimely, saying that it was filed more than 15 working days after the relevant incident. ECF No. 71-10 at 2.
Plaintiff appealed this decision, explaining that his grievance was timely because he filed it within 15 days of his legal exemption being rejected. ECF No. 71-11 at 2. Defendant Zaken upheld the rejection as untimely on appeal, however, on the grounds that Plaintiff included a separate event that occurred more than 15 working days earlier (the September 4,2021, instruction to obtain a legal exemption) in his grievance. ECF No. 71-12 at 2.
On November 17, 2021, Plaintiff submitted his grievance to final appeal with the Secretary's Office of Grievance and Appeals (“SOIGA”). ECF No. 71 ¶ 45. Although Plaintiff says he never received a response from SOIGA, he includes as an exhibit a letter from SOIGA informing Plaintiff that he needed to a cure a deficiency with his appeal (failure to attach the initial grievance response) before it could be considered. Id. ¶¶ 46-47; ECF No. 71-14 at 3.
Plaintiff also continued his efforts to obtain his legal materials outside the grievance system. He complained about his missing legal materials to various prison officials, who said they would “look into it” or make inquiries, to no avail. ECF No. 71 ¶¶ 40, 41, 42 and 44.
On October 25 and November 2, 2021, Plaintiff wrote inmate requests to staff to Captain Kennedy. Plaintiff explained that his legal materials were not returned to him, and his request for legal materials was improperly denied. While his state court cases were closed because he had exhausted his state court remedies, he was still pursuing a federal habeas petition arising out of those proceedings. Kennedy responded that Plaintiff had a box of legal materials stored in disputed property due to his “over compliance,” and that Plaintiff needed to contact the legal department. ECF No. 71-3 at 2; ECF No. 71-16 at 2.
On November 9, 2021, Plaintiff sent another inmate request to staff directed to the “legal department,” reiterating that he was seeking legal materials for use in his ongoing Habeas Case. Andreetti responded that Plaintiff needed to ask his unit team for a legal exemption form, fill it out, and return it to his unit team. ECF No. 71-4 at 2.
On April 19,2022, Plaintiff finally received a legal property exemption. However, he was only given an empty record box instead of his legal materials. ECF No. 71 ¶ 47.
3. Legal Claims
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff brings five claims: Count I: violation of First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances; Count II: denial of right to procedural due process by unlawfully placing Plaintiff in the RHU and destroying Plaintiff s legal property; Count III: denial of access to courts; Count IV: false imprisonment/unlawful confinement; and Count V: violation of Eighth Amendment rights based on confinement in the RHU.
4. Procedural History
Plaintiff began this lawsuit on January 26, 2022, by filing a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Motion”), together with a proposed Complaint. ECF No. 1. After Plaintiff cured certain deficiencies, the Court granted the IFP Motion on May 5, 2022, and his original Complaint was filed on the same date. ECF Nos. 9 and 11.
Defendants filed two prior motions to dismiss, but Plaintiff subsequently filed amended pleadings that rendered each of those motions moot. ECF Nos. 33,40, 43, 44, 52, 57, 71, and 72. Plaintiff filed the operative Third Amended Complaint on April 5, 2023. ECF No. 71.
Former defendant, County of Greene, also separately filed a Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 33. Plaintiff did not include this party as a defendant in his later pleadings.
This is the fourth complaint that Plaintiff has submitted. ECF Nos. 11, 43, 57, and 71. However, the Court entered an order striking a complaint that Plaintiff tried to file on October 17, 2022, because it was not signed or dated. ECF Nos. 57 and 58.
Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss and Brief on June 2, 2023. ECF Nos. 81 and 82. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on August 25, 2023. ECF No. 86.
The Motion to Dismiss is now ripe for consideration.
B. LEGAL STANDARD
In assessing the sufficiency of a complaint pursuant to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and all reasonable factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202,205 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court, however, need not accept bald assertions or inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. See Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys, v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Bell Atl. Corp, v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,286 (1986)). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that a complaint is properly dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) where it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Id. at 570, or where the factual content does not allow the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v, Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,231 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that, under Twombly, “labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” do not suffice but, rather, the complaint “must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct” and that are sufficient “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s] of his claim”).
Pro se pleadings and filings, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or the litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); U.S, ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (A “petition prepared by a prisoner ... may be inartfully drawn and should ... be read ‘with a measure of tolerance'”); Freeman v. Dep't of Corr., 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997) (overruled on other grounds)-, see also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Ne. Land Co., 906 F.2d 100,103 (3d Cir. 1990) (same).
However, there are limits to the court's procedural flexibility: “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim ... they cannot flout procedural rules - they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). Accordingly, because Plaintiff is a Pro se litigant, this Court will consider the facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.
C. DISCUSSION
1. Claims for Denial of Legal Materials
Plaintiff brings claims arising out of his missing legal materials in Counts I, II, and III.For the reasons below, the Court should grant the Motion to Dismiss as to these claims.
Plaintiff also brings an Eighth Amendment in Count V about his placement in the RHU, in which he refers to not having his legal materials. That claim is separately addressed below.
a. Denial of access to courts claims (Counts I and III)
The Court construes Plaintiffs claims in Counts I and III as First Amendment claims for denial of his access to courts under the First Amendment. In support of the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for denial of his access to courts. Because Plaintiff had legal counsel in the Habeas Case and did not miss any filing deadlines or lose any substantive rights, Defendants argue, he suffered no actual injury. ECF No. 82 at 15-17.
Plaintiff expressly identifies Count III as a denial of access to courts claim. While Plaintiff calls Count I a claim for denial of his First Amendment right to petition for a redress of grievances, the Court also construes this as a claim for denial of access to courts. See Ramos v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., No. 4:CV-06-1444, 2006 WL 2129148, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 2006) (“While prisoners do have a constitutional right to seek redress of their grievances from the government, that right is the right of access to the courts . i .”). Indeed, Plaintiff describes the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances as a type of access to courts claim in his pleadings. ECF No. 71 ¶ 49.
In response, Plaintiff argues that Defendants have continued to withhold his legal materials without justification, and his injury is ongoing. Although he was counseled in the Habeas Case, Plaintiff argues, he could not refer to the record and assist his counsel with those proceedings. Plaintiff also asserts that he has since filed a second Pro se PCRA petition in state court, and the fact that he is still missing legal materials frustrates his ability to represent himself in that case. ECF No. 86 at 5.
Courts have recognized that “confiscation or destruction of a prisoner's legal papers may violate a prisoner's right of access to the courts.” Heller v. Keenhold, No. 3:12-cv-446, 2013 WL 4604441, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2013) (collecting cases). To establish a cognizable denial-of-access claim, a prisoner must show that he has suffered an actual injury to his ability to present a nonfrivolous, arguable claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-53 (1996); see also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002); Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that the complainant “must describe the underlying arguable claim well enough to show that it is ‘more than mere hope'”). An “actual injury” does not occur without a showing that a claim has been lost or rejected, or that the presentation of such a claim is being prevented. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354-56. In addition, a prisoner must demonstrate that no other remedy will potentially compensate for the lost claim. Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205.
In this case, Plaintiff does not plead facts suggesting that he lost or was unable to present any nonfrivolous or arguable legal claim because he did not have access to his legal materials. As Defendants point out, although Plaintiffs Habeas Case was pending, he was counseled in that case. See Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1042 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[T]he provision of lawyers is one means by which a state may provide prisoners with meaningful access to courts”). By the time Plaintiff was denied access to his legal materials, his counsel had already filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus articulating the grounds for his requested relief. In support, Plaintiff s counsel relied on the publicly available record from Plaintiffs criminal proceedings, to which he had continued access throughout the proceedings. The district court ultimately denied Plaintiff s petition for writ of habeas corpus in a thorough and well-reasoned analysis. No appeal followed. Absent any plausible allegations suggesting that Plaintiffs claim was frustrated, lost, or rejected because of Defendants' actions, Plaintiff does not state a denial of access to courts claim relative to his Habeas Case.
Although Plaintiff now argues that his ability to pursue a second PCRA petition has since been impeded by his missing legal materials, that allegation does not appear in the operative Third Amended Complaint. Accordingly, the Court should grant the Motion to Dismiss relative to Plaintiffs denial of access to courts claims in Counts I and III.
b. Procedural due process claim (Count II)
Plaintiff brings a procedural due process claim in Count II relative to his confinement in the RHU and his missing legal materials. Defendants move to dismiss the portion of this claim that pertains to his Plaintiff s legal materials based on Plaintiff s failure to state a claim. In support, Defendants argue that confiscating an inmate's property does not violate his right to due process if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is provided, and that access to the usual prison grievance procedure is such a remedy. Because Plaintiff was counseled in his Habeas Case, Defendants also argue he suffered no injury. ECF No. 82 at 15-17.
In response, Plaintiff argues he was injured because Defendants confiscated his legal materials and never returned them. There was no valid reason to confiscate those materials, he argues, because he had an open case. ECF No. 86 at 4-5.
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized, “[a] denial of access to legal documents may, in some cases, constitute a violation of due process.” Zilich v. Lucht, 981 F.2d 694, 695 (3d Cir. 1992). When, as here, however, a plaintiff lacks proof of retaliation or denial of access to courts, “an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property does not violate the Due Process Clause ‘if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.'” Monroe, 536 F.3d at 210 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)); Rogers v. Mrs. Brown, No. Civ. A. 95-7867, 1996 WL 608473, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 1996) (“Lacking proof of retaliation or denial of access, plaintiff must demonstrate that the loss of materials itself amounted to a violation of procedural due process under the standard set forth in Hudson.. .”).
Because Plaintiff had a meaningful post-deprivation remedy, he fails to state a claim for violation of his procedural due process rights. As Defendants point out, Plaintiff had access to the grievance process. Plaintiff could also bring a lawsuit under state law. Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss should be granted as to Count II, to the extent this claim arises out of Plaintiff s missing legal materials.
2. Claims Arising out of Placement in RHU (Counts II, IV and V)
Plaintiff also brings multiple claims arising out of his confinement in the RHU. In Count II, he alleges that Defendants violated his right to due process, in part, by unlawfully placing him in the RHU. He also asserts a false imprisonment/unlawful confinement claim in Count IV and an Eighth Amendment claim in Count V based on his confinement in the RHU.
As discussed, Count II is also based on Plaintiff's missing legal materials.
In support of the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiff s claims arising out of his placement in the RHU should be dismissed because he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Defendants assert that none of the grievances that Plaintiff attaches to his Complaint complain about his placement in the RHU. ECF No. 82 at 7-10.
In response, Plaintiff correctly notes he does not bear the burden to show he exhausted his administrative remedies in his pleadings. Still, he argues, he did affirmatively plead that he exhausted his administrative remedies relative to his claims. ECF No. 86 at 1-2.
a. Exhaustion of administrative remedies
Upon review, the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs RHU claims should be denied based on failure to exhaust. Because failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, inmates are not required to plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Plaintiffs claims should not be dismissed based on his failure to attach grievances about his placement in the RHU.
b. Lack of personal involvement/failure to state a claim
That said, the Court still should dismiss Plaintiffs RHU claims based on Plaintiffs failure to state a claim against the individual defendants. In a civil rights claim, as here, individual government defendants must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing and “may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), rev'd on other grounds, Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct. 2042 (2015) (quoting Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366 (3d Cir. 2012)); see also Millbrook v. United States, 8 F.Supp.3d 601, 613 (M.D. Pa. 2014). “Rather, state actors are liable only for their own unconstitutional conduct.” Barkes, 766 F.3d at 316.
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs claims based on lack of personal involvement as to Defendants Kutec, John, Jordan, Greenawalt, Zaken, Andreetti, and Ankrom. ECF No. 82 at 1015. Upon review, the Court should grant the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff s RHU claims as to those individual defendants, and any remaining RHU claims should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Defendants move to dismiss all claims against Kutec, John, Jordan, Greenawalt, Zaken, Andreetti, and Ankrom based on their lack of personal involvement. Because the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs claims arising out of his missing legal materials for the reasons discussed, it is not necessary to address this argument relative to those claims.
While Plaintiff broadly asserts his claims against all Defendants, he does not specifically allege any defendant's personal involvement relative to his RHU claims. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff includes no specific factual allegations as to Defendants Ham, Kutec, John, Jordan, and John Doe. He only includes allegations relative to his legal materials for all other Defendants, Zaken, Greenawalt, Ankrom, Strechly, Andreetti, Rehonic, and Traux. As a result, there is no viable pending claim related to Plaintiff's placement in the RHU against any individual defendant.
The Court notes that Plaintiff does, however, include an exhibit showing that Ham signed Plaintiff s DC -141, Part 1 form explaining his initial placement in the RHU. ECF No. 71-1 at 2.
As discussed below, these claims also fail on the merits.
(1) Procedural due process claim (Count II)
In Count II, Plaintiff brings a claim for violation of his procedural due process rights relative to his placement in the RHU. “The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). “In analyzing a procedural due process claim, the first step is to determine whether the nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the ‘liberty or property' language of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Shoats v. Hom, 213 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2000). A protected liberty interest arises only where a restraint “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Williams v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 559 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708 (3d Cir. 1997); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). If the asserted interest falls within the protections of the Due Process Clause, the second step is to determine whether Plaintiff was afforded “all of the process he was due.” Shoats, 213 F.3d at 143.
Plaintiffs claim fails at the first step. “Confinement in administrative or punitive segregation will rarely be sufficient, without more, to establish the type of ‘atypical' deprivation of prison life necessary to implicate a liberty interest.” Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486). Courts have routinely held that periods of disciplinary confinement of up to fifteen months do not implicate due process concerns. Powell v. McKeown, No. 1:20-cv-348, 2021 WL 2400773, at *7 (M.D. Pa. June 11, 2021) (citing Nifas v. Beard, 374 Fed.Appx. 241, 244 (3d Cir. 2010); Smith, 293 F.3d at 653; Griffin, 112 F.3d at 708). In this case, Plaintiff only was placed in the RHU for about 18 days. Because this does not implicate any protected liberty interest, he cannot show any violation of his right to due process. Accordingly, Count II should be dismissed based on Plaintiffs failure to state a claim.
(2) False imprisonment/unlawful confinement claim (Count IV)
Plaintiff also claims false imprisonment/unlawful confinement. To state a claim for false imprisonment under Pennsylvania law, Plaintiff must show that (1) he was detained; and (2) the detention was unlawful. Komegey v. City of Phila., 299 F.Supp.3d 675, 682 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
There is no apparent authority for an inmate who is lawfully incarcerated to bring a false imprisonment claim under Pennsylvania law based on the conditions of his confinement. Id. Nevertheless, any such claim “would require, at the very least, the deprivation of a cognizable liberty interest without due process,” id., and Plaintiffs allegations do not satisfy that burden for the reasons discussed. Thus, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs false imprisonment/unlawful confinement claim in Count IV.
(3) Eighth Amendment claim (Count V)
Finally, Plaintiff brings an Eighth Amendment claim in Count V relative to his placement in the RHU and the corresponding confiscation/destruction of his legal materials. The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to provide “humane conditions of confinement.” Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). “For an alleged deprivation to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, it must result from the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). “Courts have widely held that conditions in the RHU do not satisfy this standard.” Mowery v. Overmyer, No. 1:22-cv-00180,2023 WL 3800016, at *9 (W.D. Pa. June 2, 2023) (citing Williams v. Armstrong, 566 Fed.Appx. 106, 109 (3d Cir. 2014) (inmate's 112-day stay in the RHU where he was not denied any of life's necessities did not violate the Eighth Amendment); Gibson v. Lynch, 652 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1981) (incarceration in solitary confinement for 90 days did not violate the Eighth Amendment); Griffin, 112 F.3d at 709 (placement in administrative custody for 15 months did not violate the Eighth Amendment)).
Thus, Plaintiffs approximately 18 days in the RHU, without more, does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Allegations that Plaintiff was deprived of legal materials also do not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Powell v. Wetzel, No. 1:12-cv-01684, 2014 WL 2864686, at *5 (M.D. Pa. June 24,2014). Accordingly, the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claim in Count V.
D. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Court should grant in part and deny in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 81. The Court should grant the Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiffs claims in Count I and Count III, and Count II, in part, as it relates to Plaintiffs legal materials. The Motion to Dismiss should also be granted as to Plaintiffs RHU claims (Count II, in part, and Counts IV and V) against Defendants Kutec, John, Jordan, Greenawalt, Zaken, Andreetti, and Ankrom. Further, Plaintiffs remaining claims should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
“If a complaint is vulnerable to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236. Accordingly, the Court should grant leave to amend to the extent Plaintiff can cure the deficiencies above.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187,193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.