Opinion
No. 1-674 / 00-2099.
Filed January 28, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mahaska County, RICHARD J. VOGEL, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from the district court's grant of defendant's motion for a directed verdict. AFFIRMED.
William D. Olson of Brierly Charnetski L.L.P., Grinnell, for appellant.
Mark C. Feldman of Beving, Swanson Forrest, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by VOGEL, P.J., and MILLER and EISENHAUER, JJ.
The plaintiff appeals a district court ruling granting the defendant's motion for directed verdict on plaintiff's action against the defendant for unpaid employment benefits. Plaintiff argues the district court erred in concluding that his claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations provided in Iowa Code section 614.1(8) (1999) and that he could not raise the defense of equitable estoppel. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings . Duane White was employed by Taintor Cooperative Company (Taintor) from February 1990 to November 1997. From 1990 to 1992, White received employee benefits, including paid vacation and medical benefits. However, in 1993, White began working only part-time for Taintor after obtaining part-time work as a Federal post office employee. In 1997, White and Taintor became involved in a dispute over medical benefits and holiday pay allegedly owed to White for July 1993 through June 1996. In June 1998, Dennis Hunwardsen, general manager of Taintor, sent White a letter requesting that he compile an itemization of what he believed he was owed. White submitted an itemization and it was submitted to Taintor's board of directors. On October 28, 1998, the board of directors sent White a letter stating that his claims were barred pursuant to Iowa Code section 614.1(8)
On September 15, 1999, White filed a petition claiming unpaid benefits totaling $14,278.41. On September 22, 1999, Taintor filed a motion to dismiss White's petition, which the district court denied. Following trial, Taintor filed a motion for directed verdict. On November 29, 2000, the district court granted the motion, concluding that White's claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in section 614.1(8). The order also stated: ". . . the doctrine of equitable estoppel would apply in that the plaintiff's Petition at Law filed September 15, 1999, was some ten and a half months after being notified as shown by Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 and denial of his claim." II. Scope of Review . Our scope of review is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 4. Where no substantial evidence exists to support each element of a plaintiff's claim, the court may sustain a motion for directed verdict. Godar v. Edwards, 588 N.W.2d 701, 705 (Iowa 1999). Evidence is considered substantial when a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach a conclusion. Id. We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was directed. Id. Iowa R. App. P. 14(f)(2).
While the order states that equitable estoppel "would" apply, it is possible this is scrivener's error. During the course of pre-trial proceedings White defended against Taintor's motion to dismiss on the basis of the statute of limitations by relying on the doctrine of equitable estoppel. It is probable the court meant to rule that equitable estoppel did not apply due to White's delay in filing the petition.
III. Motion for Directed Verdict . White argues the district court erred in concluding that he was time barred from raising his claims and Taintor was not estopped from raising the statute of limitations. He argues that his delay was justified because his prior contacts with Taintor's general managers had misled him into believing a resolution could be reached. We disagree.
Iowa Code section 614.1(8) (1999) provides that actions for failure to pay wages must be filed within two years of the date they accrue. White's claims for holiday pay and medical benefits are considered wages pursuant to section 91A.2(7)(b). The last year White claimed he was not paid benefits and wages was 1996, and under section 614.1(8), he therefore he had two years from that calendar year in which to file his claims against Taintor. However, White did not file an action until September 15, 1999, well beyond the two-year statute of limitations. White's claims were therefore barred under section 614.1(8).
White, however, raises an equitable estoppel defense to the statute of limitations, arguing that his communications with Taintor officials led him to believe that they could reach a resolution regarding his claims without resorting to legal action. We find no merit to this argument.
Equitable estoppel is a recognized defense to the application of a statute of limitations. Beeck v. Aquaslide `N' Dive Corp., 350 N.W.2d 149, 157 (Iowa 1984). Equitable estoppel is triggered when false representations induce a plaintiff into inaction to his or her detriment under the statute of limitations. Meier v. Alfa-Laval, Inc., 454 N.W.2d 576, 579 (Iowa 1990). The party seeking an exception to the expiration of the limitations period has the burden of proving it by clear and convincing evidence. Beeck, 350 N.W.2d at 157. Before equitable estoppel may be successfully invoked to defeat a statute of limitations, a plaintiff must prove (1) false representations, or concealment of material facts, (2) lack of knowledge of the true facts on the part of the actor, (3) intention to be acted upon, and (4) reliance by the party to whom made to his prejudice or injury. Bowles v. Schilling, 581 N.W.2d 192, 194 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). The person raising the defense of equitable estoppel has a duty to exercise reasonable care and diligence in asserting his claim. DeWall v. Prentice, 224 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Iowa 1974).
In the present case, White was informed in October 1998 that the board had rejected his claim for wages and benefits. He did not file his petition until September 1999, nearly eleven months later. While there is evidence that White and Taintor's general managers discussed the issue of whether he was owed back wages and that they sent White a letter requesting him to submit an itemization of his claims to the board, we find no specific evidence in the record suggesting that Taintor provided White with false information or concealed material facts. White called no other witnesses to testify on his behalf at trial. Although White argues there is inferential evidence in the file the district court overlooked, White does not specify what that evidence is. We agree with the district court that White failed to act with reasonable diligence in bringing his action and that he failed to establish equitable estoppel as a defense to the two-year statute of limitations set forth in section 614.1(8). We therefore affirm the district court's judgment.
AFFIRMED.