Opinion
C. A. 9:22-3000-BHH-MHC
10-31-2023
Larry A. White, Plaintiff, v. Bryan Stirling, Agency Director; Amy Enloe, Registered Nurse; Charles Williams, Perry Correctional Warden; South Carolina Department of Corrections; and Cynthia Baldwin, Dentist, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff filed this action pro se, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of his constitutional rights. ECF No. 13. Before the Court are a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Cynthia Baldwin, ECF No. 68, and a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Bryan Stirling, Amy Enloe, Charles Williams and South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC Defendants”), ECF No. 74. As Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court entered Roseboro Orders, which were mailed to Plaintiff, advising him of the importance of a dispositive motion and of the need to file an adequate response. ECF Nos. 69, 70, 75, 76. Plaintiff was specifically advised that if he failed to file a properly supported response, Defendants' Motions may be granted, thereby ending his case. ECF Nos. 69, 75. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendant Baldwin's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 71, and Defendant Baldwin filed a Reply, ECF No. 72. Plaintiff did not file a Response in Opposition to the SCDC Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and the time for doing so has passed. ECF No. 75. The Motions are ripe for review.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.). Because the Motions are dispositive, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends granting the Motions.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is an inmate incarcerated within the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”). He was housed at Perry Correctional Institution (“PCI”) at the time he filed this action.ECF No. 13 at 2. He brings this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants violated his constitutional rights by denying him dental care.
Plaintiff is currently housed at Lee Correctional Institution. ECF No. 73.
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that beginning around April 18, 2022, and ongoing, he has been denied medical attention for his tooth. Id. at 6-7. He alleges that he has a chipped tooth, has asked to have the tooth pulled, needs a dental filling, and has been waiting to get x-rays and an exam since April. Id. Plaintiff further alleges it hurts every time he eats and brushes his teeth. Id.
As to Defendants, Plaintiff's allegations in his Amended Complaint are:
Defendants Warden Charles Williams and Nurse Practitioner Amy Enloe will not respond to an informal resolution. Nurse Harris was notified on 6-14-22 about the medical need and pain that I have been enduring.... Cynthia Baldwin has been written also but does not respond.Id. Defendant Baldwin is a dentist who provides dental care services to inmates at PCI. Id. at 3.
Plaintiff also alleges:
Defendant Bryan Stirling is the Agency Director of the State Department of Corrections and is legally responsible for the overall operations of the department of each institution under its jurisdiction and all inmates confined therein. I (Plaintiff) have had my family coninuacely [sic] call head quarters to speak with Bryan Stirling but have not been able to reach him directly neither has he returned their calls. Thus is the reason he is named as an defendant. Defendant S.C.D.C. is a Government Entity and shall provide for my health and wellbeing. Defendant Charleston Williams is the warden over Perry Correctional and is responsible for who is confined at that institution and are aware that not just I The Plaintiff but other inmates as well have dental needs that need to be looked at and has been written requests to staff but has not responded to them.
ECF No. 13 at 5.
Plaintiff attached a sworn statement to his original Complaint, providing the following:
I've completed two sick calls for Dental in April of 2022. The last sick call for Dental . . . was April 27, 2022.... In May, I'd written an Request to Staff to Nurse Enloe about my pains and asking when would I be seen. I have never received an response to that request. . . . After not receiving an response I've filed another request to staff member, trying to resort to an informal resolution. I have attempted to file an step one of the grievance procedure.
ECF No. 1-1 at 1.
According to a Sick Call and Dental Requests Form dated April 27, 2022, which is also attached to and incorporated in the original Complaint, Plaintiff submitted a request to be seen on medical sick call or in the dental clinic, stating: “I need a tooth pulled that has been broken and also I need a fill in. When I get food in my tooth it hurts.” ECF No. 1-1 at 2. On April 28, 2022, a medical staff member responded: “We will get you on the schedule for an exam and x-ray.” Id.
According to an Inmate Grievance Form Step 1 dated August 25, 2022, which Plaintiff attached to and incorporated in the original Complaint, Plaintiff filed a grievance, stating:
I've put in two sick call forms in April for the Dentist and was told that I would be put on the list for an x-ray and exam but have not been seen yet.... It hurts every time I eat and brush my teeth[.]
ECF No. 1-1 at 4. Plaintiff's grievance was processed and returned on August 29, 2022, with the inmate grievance coordinator stating:
You have exceeded the established time frame for filing a grievance on this issue. Pursuant to SCDC Policy GA-01.12 Inmate Grievance System, you have eight (8) days from date of incident/RTSM to file a Grievance. You stated this happened in April 2022 per your grievance. Your grievance was not received until 08/29/22. Therefore, your grievance is being Processed & Returned to you. This grievance is closed.Id.
SCDC Defendants submitted the affidavit of Dr. Floyd Nicholson, the Dental Director for SCDC, with Plaintiff's dental records attached. ECF No. 74-2. The dental records show dental treatment received by Plaintiff between 2018 and 2023. ECF No. 74-3. The first in 2022 is Plaintiff's request dated August 24, 2022, stating that his tooth was hurting. ECF No. 74-3 at 1. Plaintiff was prescribed acetaminophen by Defendant, Dr. Cynthia Baldwin. Id. Plaintiff was then scheduled to be seen on November 3, 2022, but had to be rescheduled because there was another patient who had an emergency. Id. Plaintiff was then supposed to be seen on November 15, but could not be seen for security reasons. Id. Plaintiff was seen on November 17, 2022, where Dr. Baldwin indicated that two of Plaintiff's teeth would likely need to be extracted because of extensive decay. Id. Plaintiff was again prescribed acetaminophen and an antibiotic, Cephalexin. Id. Plaintiff was then seen on December 15, and teeth numbers 3 and 4 were extracted by Dr. Adam Jenkins. Id. Dr. Baldwin assisted Dr. Jenkins in the procedure. Id. Plaintiff continued to receive dental care throughout 2023. Id.
LEGAL STANDARD
A. Rule 12(b)(6)
“The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of a complaint.” Williams v. Preiss-Wal Pat III, LLC, 17 F.Supp.3d 528, 531 (D.S.C. 2014) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)); see Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of [affirmative] defenses.”). Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), such that the defendant will have “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he facts alleged ‘must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level' and must provide ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Robinson v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 551 F.3d 218, 222 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This plausibility standard is not analogous to a “probability requirement,” rather “it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
B. Rule 56
Summary judgment is appropriate if a party “shows there is no genuine dispute as to any issue of material fact” and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under the framework established in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), the party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324.
Under this standard, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, although the Court views all the underlying facts and inferences in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the non-moving “party nonetheless must offer some ‘concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor.'” Williams v. Genex Servs., LLC, 809 F.3d 103, 109 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256). That is to say, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory or speculative allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. To survive summary judgment, the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action on which he will bear the burden of proving at a trial on the merits. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
Additionally, pro se filings are to be “liberally construed” and a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This “[l]iberal construction of the pleadings is particularly appropriate where, as here, there is a pro se complaint raising civil rights issues.” Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 173 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting “we are obliged to construe [a complaint's] allegations liberally and with the intent of doing justice”). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact when none exists. See United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012); Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The ‘special judicial solicitude' with which a district court should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.”).
In this case, Plaintiff has not responded to SCDC Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. This failure to respond, however, does not fulfill the burdens imposed on moving parties by Rule 56. Custer v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 416 (4th Cir. 1993). Rule 56 requires that the moving party establish, in addition to the absence of a dispute over any material fact, that it is “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Although the failure of a party to respond to a summary judgment motion may leave uncontroverted those facts established by the motion, the moving party must still show that the uncontroverted facts entitle the party to “a judgment as a matter of law.” The failure to respond to the motion does not automatically accomplish this. Thus, the court, in considering a motion for summary judgment, must review the motion, even if unopposed, and determine from what it has before it whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) (“If a party . . . fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-including the facts considered undisputed-show that the movant is entitled to it[.]”).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff claims Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by denying him dental care. ECF No. 13 at 6-7. Deliberate indifference by prison personnel to a prisoner's medical needs is actionable under § 1983 pursuant to the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). To establish a claim under the Eighth Amendment, an inmate must establish two requirements: (1) a sufficiently serious deprivation occurred, resulting “in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,” and (2) the prison official had a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
In other words, to sustain his constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must make (1) an objective showing that of a serious medical need and (2) a subjective showing that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need. Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting a “plaintiff must demonstrate that the officers acted with ‘deliberate indifference' (subjective) to the inmate's ‘serious medical needs' (objective)”); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (to state an Eighth Amendment claim, “a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence [1] deliberate indifference to [2] serious medical needs”).
As to the objective prong, a “serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Heyer v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d 202, 210 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Iko, 535 F.3d at 241).
The subjective prong of deliberate indifference is a “very high standard” and merely negligent behaviors do not meet the subjective mens rea requirement. See Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575-76 (4th Cir. 2001). The Fourth Circuit has recognized two different aspects of an official's state of mind that must be shown to satisfy the subjective prong in this context: “First, actual knowledge of the risk of harm to the inmate is required” and, second, “the officer must also have recognized that his actions were insufficient to mitigate the risk of harm to the inmate arising from his medical needs.” Iko, 535 F.3d at 241 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (“[A] prison official cannot be found liable . . . for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”).
In other words, a plaintiff must allege deliberate indifference “by either actual intent or reckless disregard” and the defendant's actions must be so “grossly incompetent, inadequate or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Aten v. Richland Cnty., C/A No. 5:16-cv-03614-PMD-KDW, 2018 WL 4560572, at *6 (D.S.C. July 3, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 4109608 (D.S.C. Aug. 29, 2018), aff'd sub nom. Aten v. Wiggins, 839 Fed.Appx. 798 (4th Cir. 2021). Furthermore, “so long as the official who knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety ‘responded reasonably to the risk,' they cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment, ‘even if the harm ultimately was not averted.'” Pfaller v. Amonette, 55 F.4th 436, 445 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844).
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity: SCDC and Official Capacity Claims
Defendants are being sued in their official and individual capacities. See ECF No. 13 at 23. The Eleventh Amendment bars suit against SCDC and the individual Defendants in their official capacities.
Under the Eleventh Amendment, federal courts are barred from hearing claims against a state or its agents, instrumentalities, and employees, unless the state has consented to the suit. Fauconier v. Clarke, 966 F.3d 265, 279 (4th Cir. 2020); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) (“It has long been settled that [the Eleventh Amendment's] reference to ‘actions against one of the United States' encompasses not only actions in which a State is actually named as the defendant, but also certain actions against state agents and state instrumentalities.”). Unless a state has consented to suit or Congress has waived a state's immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, a state (and its agencies) may not be sued in federal or state court. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Congress has not abrogated the states' sovereign immunity under § 1983, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343 (1979), and South Carolina has not consented to suit in federal district court. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e).
Here, Defendant SCDC is an agency and an alter ego of the state of South Carolina. See S.C. Code Ann. § 24-1-30. As a result, the Eleventh Amendment bars the action against Defendant SCDC. See Will, 491 U.S. at 66.
The individual Defendants are employees of SCDC. ECF Nos. 74-4 at ¶ 1; 74-5 at ¶ 1; 74 6 at ¶ 1. Consequently, they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in their official capacities. See Simpson v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 2:19-CV-2245-RMG, 2020 WL 582321, at *2 n.1 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2020) (noting SCDC employees are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in suits brought against them in their official capacities). Moreover, for purposes of § 1983 liability, neither Defendant SCDC nor the individual Defendants are considered “persons” in their official capacities and, thus, not subject to suit. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (“Neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under § 1983.”); see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26-27 (1991).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Baldwin's employer is the South Carolina Department of Corrections. ECF No. 13 at 3. There is no other information before the Court regarding Defendant Baldwin's employer. Regardless, even if Defendant Baldwin were employed by an outside entity, individual employees of medical companies providing contract medical care have been found to be “public officials” for purposes of § 1983 lawsuits. See, e.g., Womble v. Williams, No. CV 9:18-2625-MBS-BM, 2019 WL 8375941, at *4 n.6 (D.S.C. Oct. 16, 2019) (noting private physicians contracted by the State to provide medical care to prisoners were state actors for purposes of § 1983), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 9:18-2625-MBS, 2020 WL 702752 (D.S.C. Feb. 12, 2020). For purposes of assessing any official capacity claims against Defendant Baldwin, she is regarded as an employee of SCDC.
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends dismissing the claims against all of Defendants in their official capacities.
B. Individual Capacity Claims
As to Plaintiff's claim against Defendants in their individual capacities, they are analyzed under the deliberate indifference framework set forth above. See Iko, 535 F.3d at 241 (noting a “plaintiff must demonstrate that the officers acted with ‘deliberate indifference' (subjective) to the inmate's ‘serious medical needs' (objective)”).
1. Objective Prong: Serious Medical Need
As an initial matter, Plaintiff's claims regarding his chipped tooth and tooth pain do not meet the objective prong of a deliberate indifference claim. Specifically, a “serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Heyer, 849 F.3d at 210 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Iko, 535 F.3d at 241). Here, there is no evidence before the Court that any physician has diagnosed Plaintiff's chipped tooth or tooth pain as a serious medical condition. Moreover, based upon the allegations in the pleadings, as well as in Plaintiff's sworn testimony, the undersigned cannot conclude that “even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention” for Plaintiff's chipped tooth or tooth pain. See Id. On this basis alone, Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claims against all Defendants should be denied.
2. Subjective Prong: Deliberate Indifference
Additionally, Defendant Baldwin and the SCDC Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege a § 1983 claim against them because he does not present any factual allegations or evidence showing that any of them was deliberately indifferent to any serious medical need. ECF Nos. 68 at 9; 74-1 at 1-3.
The SCDC Defendants also contend that Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed because the matters asserted by Plaintiff “do not fall within the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” See ECF No. 741 at 3-8. Defendants' suggestion is generally incorrect. Section 1983 is a statutory mechanism that allows a person to sue a state actor for a deprivation of a federally protected right, which includes any a deprivation of a person's rights guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights, and the claims he is asserting generally fall within the “scope” of § 1983. See Campbell v. Florian, 972 F.3d 385, 392 n.5 (4th Cir. 2020) (noting, under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the constitution or a federal statute; (2) by a person; (3) acting under color of state law) (emphasis added), as amended (Aug. 28, 2020). Thus, any argument that Plaintiff has brought improper claims under § 1983 is without merit. To the extent the arguments the SCDC Defendants raise address the merits of Plaintiff's claim, they are addressed elsewhere herein.
Plaintiff disagrees with these arguments, noting in his Response to Defendant Baldwin's Motion that he began complaining about his tooth in April of 2022, and was told that he would be on the schedule for an exam and x-ray, but was not seen until he filed his lawsuit in September of 2022. ECF No. 71 at 2. Regarding Defendant Baldwin specifically, Plaintiff argues that, on November 17, 2022, he had his dental exam and x-ray, where Defendant Baldwin told him that he had an infection and needed his tooth removed. Id. Plaintiff contends that he did not get his two teeth extracted until December 15, 2022, such that it took 8 months to be seen for his dental needs. Id. He also contends that, per SCDC policy, Defendant Baldwin had the “position to have Plaintiff transferred out of the institution to have his dental problems handled but instead she did not.” Id.
a. Defendant Baldwin
The allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint, as well as the arguments in his Response, do not meet the “very high standard” of establishing Defendant Baldwin was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. See Young, 238 F.3d at 575-76. There is no allegation that Defendant Baldwin failed to provide Plaintiff with treatment or carried out any treatment in a grossly incompetent way that shocks the conscience or is intolerable to fundamental fairness. See Aten, 2018 WL 4560572, at *6. Moreover, in his Response, Plaintiff admits that he had an exam and x-ray in November of 2022, wherein Defendant Baldwin advised him that he needed his tooth removed. ECF No. 71 at 2. And, Plaintiff subsequently had two teeth removed. Id.
The only allegation in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint directly against Defendant Baldwin is that she “has been written also but does not respond.” ECF No. 13 at 7. Plaintiff also alleges that he “ha[s] been awaiting to get x-rays and an exam[.]” Id. Indeed, that allegation is consistent with the Inmate Grievance Form dated August 25, 2022, which Plaintiff attached to and incorporated in the original Complaint, wherein he indicated that he “was told that [he] would be put on the list for an x-ray and exam but ha[s] not been seen yet....” ECF No. 1-1 at 4. In short, Plaintiff's complaint pertains to the delay in having his chipped tooth and tooth pain addressed.
While several months transpired between Plaintiff's complaint and his dental x-ray and exam, there is no allegation in the Amended Complaint, or evidence before the Court, that Defendant Baldwin intentionally or recklessly delayed treatment for Plaintiff. See Aten, 2018 WL 4560572, at *6; see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05 (holding that deliberate indifference may be demonstrated by “intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care”). Nor do the allegations in the Amended Complaint nor the record before the Court evidence any grossly incompetent or inadequate treatment of Plaintiff by Defendant Baldwin. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges in his Amended Complaint that he “asked to have the tooth pulled in April and also [he] need[s] a fill in.” ECF No. 13 at 7. In his Response, Plaintiff admits that he had a dental exam and x-ray in November and his tooth removed in December of 2022.
To the extent Plaintiff contends that instead of having two teeth pulled, ECF No. 71 at 2, he should have received a “fill in” for the second tooth, a “difference of opinion regarding the diagnosis and treatment provided by SCDC does not rise to a constitutional violation.” Broach v. Ozmint, No. CA 0:08-3471-HMH-PJG, 2009 WL 1956699, at *5 (D.S.C. July 7, 2009); see also Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 178 (4th Cir. 2014) (noting that the Fourth Circuit has consistently found disagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate's proper medical care “fall short of showing deliberate indifference”); Wright v. Ozmint, No. CA 2:07-2515-JFA-RSC, 2008 WL 4542915, at *4 (D.S.C. Oct. 7, 2008) (“The mere failure to treat all medical problems to a prisoner's satisfaction, even if actual medical malpractice is involved, is insufficient to support a claim under § 1983.”).
To the extent Plaintiff alleges Defendant Baldwin violated SCDC policy by not referring him to an outside dentist, violations of prison policies and procedures do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Keeler v. Pea, 782 F.Supp. 42, 44 (D.S.C. 1992) (noting § 1983 “does not provide any relief against prison rules violations assuming, arguendo, that such a violation occurred”).
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff is alleging medical negligence by Defendant Baldwin, medical negligence is not actionable via a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Aten, 2018 WL 450672, at *6 (“[N]egligent or incorrect medical treatment (medical malpractice) is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (“[A] a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to support an actionable § 1983 claim against Defendant Baldwin, and the undersigned recommends granting Defendant Baldwin's Motion to Dismiss. See Kinard v. McCall, C/A No. 8:22-cv-03889-RMG-JDA, 2023 WL 3080587, at *8 (D.S.C. Mar. 1, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 8:22-CV-03889-RMG, 2023 WL 3076574 (D.S.C. Apr. 25, 2023) (granting motion to dismiss for failure to state a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference where plaintiff's conclusory allegations did not rise to level of Eighth Amendment violation for deliberate indifference as “deprivations alleged in a conditions-of-confinement claim must be serious and the defendants must be deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's needs”); Davis v. NFN Funerburk, C/A No. 8:08-1105-CMC-BHH, 2008 WL 1826487, at *1 (D.S.C. Apr. 23, 2008) (dismissing prisoner's medical indifference claim based on alleged lack of medical care related to tooth extraction for failure to state a claim).
b. SCDC Defendants
Similarly, Plaintiff cannot establish deliberate indifference by the SCDC Defendants. There is no evidence in the record to meet the “very high standard” of establishing any of the SCDC Defendants was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. See Young, 238 F.3d at 575-76. There is no evidence that any of these Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with treatment or carried out any treatment in a grossly incompetent way that shocks the conscience or is intolerable to fundamental fairness. See Aten, 2018 WL 4560572, at *6.
The allegations and evidence before the Court establish that Plaintiff submitted requests in April of 2022 to be seen by the dentist, was told that he would be put on the list for an x-ray and exam, and submitted at least one grievance in August of 2022 because he had not yet been seen by the dentist. ECF Nos. 1-1, 13, 71 at 2-3. The record evidence further shows that on or about August 24, 2022, Plaintiff was prescribed acetaminophen by Defendant Dr. Cynthia Baldwin, after his complaint about his tooth hurting. ECF No. 74-3 at 1.
Plaintiff was then scheduled to be seen on November 3, 2022, but had to be rescheduled because there was another patient who had an emergency. Id. Plaintiff was then supposed to be seen on November 15, but could not be seen for security reasons. Id. Plaintiff was seen on November 17, 2022, where Dr. Baldwin indicated that two of Plaintiff's teeth would likely need to be extracted because of extensive decay. Id.; see also ECF No. 71 at 2-3. Plaintiff was again prescribed acetaminophen and an antibiotic, Cephalexin. ECF No. 74-3. Plaintiff was then seen on December 15, 2022, and teeth numbers 3 and 4 were extracted by Dr. Adam Jenkins. Id.; see also ECF No. 71 at 2-3. Dr. Baldwin assisted Dr. Jenkins in the procedure. ECF No. 74-3. Plaintiff continued to receive dental care into 2023. Id.
While several months transpired between Plaintiff's complaint and his prescription, dental x-ray and exam, as well as his teeth extractions, there is no evidence before the Court evidencing that any of these Defendants intentionally or recklessly delayed treatment for Plaintiff. See Aten, 2018 WL 4560572, at *6; see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05, (holding that deliberate indifference may be demonstrated by “intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care”).
Indeed, the testimony from Dr. Floyd Nicholson, the Dental Director for SCDC, not only provides an explanation for the delays in getting the teeth extracted, but also establishes that the excessive decay in Plaintiff's teeth which necessitated extraction was a condition that occurred over a longer period of time than the months in between Plaintiff's initial complaint and his teeth extraction. ECF No. 74-2. Dr. Nicholson reviewed Plaintiff's x-rays and records and, in his opinion, the outcome necessitating Plaintiff's teeth extractions would have been the same if Plaintiff had been seen in April or August. Id. There is no evidence before the Court establishing otherwise. See Broach, 2009 WL 1956699, at *5 n.2 (D.S.C. July 7, 2009) (granting summary judgment on plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim, noting the plaintiff “presented no medical opinion that the treatment he is currently receiving is inadequate or improper”) (emphasis in original); see also Green v. Senkowski, 100 Fed. App'x 45, 47 (2d Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (finding that a plaintiff's self-diagnosis unsupported by any medical evidence in the record was insufficient to defeat summary judgment on a deliberate indifference claim).
Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff may be alleging medical negligence by any of the SCDC Defendants, medical negligence is not actionable via a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Aten, 2018 WL 450672, at *6; see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
Under these circumstances, Plaintiff cannot establish a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the SCDC Defendants, and their Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.
C. Qualified Immunity
Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff's claim. The doctrine of qualified immunity offers some protection to a government employee being sued in his or her individual capacity, as is the case with the individual Defendants here. The Supreme Court has held that “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Renn by and Through Renn v. Garrison, 100 F.3d 344, 349 (4th Cir. 1996).
“The threshold inquiry a court must undertake in a qualified immunity analysis is whether a plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish a clear constitutional violation.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002). If a violation of a constitutional right in fact exists, qualified immunity nonetheless shields a prison official from liability, unless the violation was of a “clearly established right of which a reasonable person would have known.” Wilson v. Kittoe, 337 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
As set forth in detail above, Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact on any of his allegations of constitutional violations. Because Defendants did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights, they are also shielded from liability by qualified immunity.
D. Additional Arguments by the SCDC Defendants
1. Defendants Stirling and Williams
Plaintiff must show Defendants' personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation for liability to attach under § 1983. Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 171-72 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting a plaintiff must affirmatively show that the official acted personally in violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights and finding certain defendants were entitled to summary judgment because “they lacked sufficient personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivations”); Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting liability will lie in § 1983 actions only where it is “affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiffs' rights” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
As to these two Defendants, Plaintiff alleges only that Director Stirling is legally responsible for the overall operation of SCDC and that Defendant Williams is the Warden at Perry Correctional Institution, responsible for inmates housed there. ECF No. 13. Moreover, there is no evidence before the Court to show any personal involvement by these Defendants. Under these circumstances, Plaintiff has failed to allege or show that Defendant Stirling or Defendant Williams had any personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations. See Williamson, 912 F.3d at 171; Wilcox, 877 F.3d at 170 (noting liability will only lie in § 1983 actions where it is “affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiffs' rights” (citation omitted)). Because there are no allegations and no evidence in the record that supports a threshold essential element of a § 1983 claim against these two Defendants, summary judgment is appropriate. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322 (noting the non-movant must provide evidence of every element essential to his action to survive summary judgment).
Plaintiff's claims, as pled against these two Defendants, do not meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8. See ECF No. 13; Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. The Supreme Court has made clear that a plaintiff “must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Plaintiff has failed to plead, with any specificity, any personal involvement on the part of Defendant Stirling or Defendant Williams and, therefore, his claims against them fail.
To the extent Plaintiff may be alleging that Defendant Stirling and Defendant Williams are vicariously liable by virtue of the actions of subordinates, that claim also fails. Pure supervisory liability will not lie in § 1983 actions. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (“The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under this section.” (quoting Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977))). Rather, to hold a supervisor liable for a constitutional injury inflicted by a subordinate under § 1983, Plaintiff must show facts establishing the following elements: (1) the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that a subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to people like the plaintiff; (2) the supervisor's response was so inadequate as to constitute deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the subordinate's conduct; and (3) there is an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's inaction and the plaintiff's constitutional injury. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has not produced any evidence showing any of these required elements as to either of these Defendants. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Defendant Stirling and Defendant Williams is appropriate.
2. Arguments under the PLRA
The SCDC Defendants also argue dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint is appropriate under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) for two reasons. ECF No. 74-1 at 14-15, 18-19. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's action should be dismissed as “frivolous” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See generally Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325-27 (1989) (noting a complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact” and holding federal courts have the power to dismiss a claim based on “an indisputably meritless legal theory” or claims “whose factual contentions are clearly baseless”).
Although the undersigned recommends granting Defendants' Motion, Plaintiff's claims are not frivolous. See McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations are ‘so nutty,' ‘delusional,' or ‘wholly fanciful' as to be simply ‘unbelievable.'”), abrogated on other grounds by Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S.Ct. 1721 (2020). Indeed, Plaintiff's constitutional claims are rooted in legal theories appropriate for a § 1983 action, and many of the factual allegations are corroborated by Defendants' evidence. Cf. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1025 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's frivolous complaint, where Plaintiff “filed two insane complaints charging the United States and China with a conspiracy to ‘bio-chemically and bio-technologically infect and invade' various people including [Plaintiff] with a mind reading and mental torture device that [Plaintiff] calls ‘Mind Accessing and Torturing via Remote Energy Transferring (MATRET)'”); see also Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327 (noting an example of an “indisputably meritless legal theory” is a claim “of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist”).
Second, the SCDC Defendants suggest that the PLRA bars § 1983 claims where a prisoner does not suffer more than de minimis injury. See ECF No. 74-1 at 13-14 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)). However, § 1997e(e) is a “limitation on recovery.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). Thus, “[t]he physical injury requirement is not a bar to filing suit, only a limitation on recovery[, a]nd § 1997e(e) limits a prisoner only from recovering damages that redress, or compensate him for, a mental or emotional injury, when no physical injury is shown.” Hoever v. Marks, 993 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 2021); see also Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting “physical injury is merely a predicate for an award of damages for mental or emotional injury, not a filing prerequisite for the federal civil action itself'); Jones v. Price, 696 F.Supp.2d 618, 62425 (N.D. W.Va. 2010) (collecting cases and holding that “§ 1997e(e) of the PLRA does not bar recovery of nominal or punitive damages in the absence of a physical injury where an inmate can show an injury of constitutional dimensions”).
Accordingly, these arguments under the PLRA do not serve as a basis for dismissal of Plaintiff's claims.
RECOMMENDATION
Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendant Baldwin's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 68, and the SCDC Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 74, be GRANTED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are referred to the Notice Page attached hereto.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).