Opinion
No. 04-04-00326-CR
Delivered and Filed: February 2, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH.
Appeal from the 81st Judicial District Court, Karnes County, Texas, Trial Court No. 03-02-00007-Crk, Honorable Olin Strauss, Judge Presiding. Affirmed.
Sitting: Alma L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice, Catherine STONE, Justice, Karen ANGELINI, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Charles White appeals his conviction of aggravated assault of a public servant. On appeal, White contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's finding that the victim was a public servant and that White knew the victim was a public servant. We affirm the trial court's judgment. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The victim, Karissa Green, was employed as a clerk in the medical department of a prison. On the day of the offense, Green was scheduling medical appointments for inmates. Green went into her office to put something in her desk. As she turned back toward the door, White was standing at the door. Green did not know White and had never had any contact with him. White told Green that they needed to talk, and Green told White to leave her office. White shut the door, pulled out a shank, grabbed Green by the hair, and held the shank to Green's throat. Green was wearing a long-sleeved smock. Green stated that she was a medical clerk for the University of Texas Medical Branch, and she was assigned to the prison. Green testified that she is paid by the University of Texas Medical Branch which is contracted through the state. "Public servant" is defined as a person, elected, selected, appointed, employed, or otherwise designated as an officer, employee, or agent of government. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 1.07(1)(41)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2004). White contends that Green does not meet this definition because she is an employee of the University of Texas Medical Branch whose services are contracted by the government. White relies on section 22.01 of the Texas Penal Code as evidence of the legislature's intent to distinguish between contractors and employees who meet the definition of public servant. Section 22.01 provides for increased punishment if an assault is committed against:
(1) a person the actor knows is a public servant while the public servant is lawfully discharging an official duty, or in retaliation or on account of an exercise of official power or performance of an official duty as a public servant; or
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(3) a person who contracts with government to perform a service in a [correctional] facility . . ., or an employee of that person:
(a) while the person or employee is engaged in performing a service within the scope of the contract, if the actor knows the person or employee is authorized by the government to provide the service; or
(b) in retaliation for or on account of the person's or employee's performance of a service within the scope of the contract.Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.01 (Vernon Supp. 2004). We need not discern the legislature's intent in amending section 22.01 to resolve White's first issue. Under the facts presented, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury's finding that Green was a "public servant." See Buster v. State, 144 S.W.3d 71, 79-80 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2004, no pet.) (holding instruction that mental health liaison employed by the University of Texas Medical Branch and assigned to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division is a public servant was a correct statement of the law under the facts presented). In performing services on behalf of the prison, Green was otherwise designated as an agent of government. See Tyler v. State, 137 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (defining agency as a consensual relationship between two parties where one, the agent, acts on behalf of the other, the principal). White further contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that he knew Green was a public servant. A defendant is presumed to have known the person assaulted was a public servant if the person was wearing a distinctive uniform indicating the person's employment as a public servant. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.02(c) (Vernon Supp. 2004). In this case, Green was in the medical department and was wearing a long-sleeved smock. White approached Green and told her that he needed to talk to her. Green later discovered that White wanted to be transferred to administrative segregation. The jury could infer from White's actions that he believed that Green was in a position to assist him with the transfer. In addition, Green told White to leave "her" office. The jury could infer that White knew Green was a public servant since she claimed rights to an office in the medical department. This evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury's finding that White knew that Green was a public servant. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.