Opinion
No. 3:20-cv-305-D-BN
08-27-2020
TIMOTHY JAMAL WHITE, #4194-19, Plaintiff, v. MELANIE REED, ET AL., Defendants.
FINDINGS , CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Timothy Jamal White, at the time detained at the Wayne McCollum Detention Center, in Ellis County, filed this pro se action asserting that the named defendants (state officials) obstructed justice by forging an illegal indictment related to his then-pending state criminal prosecution and thereby violated his civil rights. See generally Dkt. No. 3. White's action has been referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference from Senior United States District Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater.
Citing the pendency of the state criminal proceedings, the Court stayed and administratively closed this action under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), on February 11, 2020. See Dkt. No. 4. On May 27, 2020, the Court docketed White's motion to re-open this action, in which he contends that his Ellis County criminal proceedings have concluded. See Dkt. No. 7. And, on June 2, 2020, the Court re-opened this case and, to further the screening of White's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, entered an order requiring that he file verified written responses to the Court's interrogatories by July 1, 2020. See Dkt. No. 9 (warning White that "[f]ailure to timely provide complete and verified answers to all questions may result in the dismissal of the [complaint] for failure to prosecute and obey an order of the Court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b)").
It is now almost two months past that deadline and White has failed to obey the Court's order or otherwise contact the Court.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) "authorizes the district court to dismiss an action sua sponte for failure to prosecute or comply with a court order." Griggs v. S.G.E. Mgmt., L.L.C., 905 F.3d 835, 844 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing McCullough v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)); accord Nottingham v. Warden, Bill Clements Unit, 837 F.3d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 2016) (failure to comply with a court order); Rosin v. Thaler, 450 F. App'x 383, 383-84 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (failure to prosecute).
This authority "flows from the court's inherent power to control its docket and prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases." Boudwin v. Graystone Ins. Co., Ltd., 756 F.2d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962)); see also Lopez v. Ark. Cnty. Indep. Sch. Dist., 570 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Although [Rule 41(b)] is phrased in terms of dismissal on the motion of the defendant, it is clear that the power is inherent in the court and may be exercised sua sponte whenever necessary to 'achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.'" (quoting Link, 370 U.S. at 631)).
The Court's authority under Rule 41(b) is not diluted by a party proceeding pro se, as "[t]he right of self-representation does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Wright v. LBA Hospitality, 754 F. App'x 298, 300 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting Hulsey v. Texas, 929 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting, in turn, Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981))).
A Rule 41(b) dismissal may be with or without prejudice. See Long v. Simmons, 77 F.3d 878, 879-80 (5th Cir. 1996).
Although "[l]esser sanctions such as fines or dismissal without prejudice are usually appropriate before dismissing with prejudice, ... a Rule 41(b) dismissal is appropriate where there is 'a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff and when lesser sanctions would not serve the best interests of justice.'"Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 441 (quoting Bryson v. United States, 553 F.3d 402, 403 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (in turn quoting Callip v. Harris Cnty. Child Welfare Dep't, 757 F.2d 1513, 1521 (5th Cir. 1985))); see also Long, 77 F.3d at 880 (a dismissal with prejudice is appropriate only if the failure to comply with the court order was the result of purposeful delay or contumacious conduct and the imposition of lesser sanctions would be futile); cf. Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 442 (noting that "lesser sanctions" may "'include assessments of fines, costs, or damages against the plaintiff, conditional dismissal, dismissal without prejudice, and explicit warnings'" (quoting Thrasher v. City of Amarillo, 709 F.3d 509, 514 (5th Cir. 2013))).
"When a dismissal is without prejudice but 'the applicable statute of limitations probably bars future litigation,'" that dismissal operates as - i.e., it is reviewed as - "a dismissal with prejudice." Griggs, 905 F.3d at 844 (quoting Nottingham, 837 F.3d at 441); see, e.g., Wright, 754 F. App'x at 300 (affirming dismissal under Rule 41(b) - potentially effectively with prejudice - where "[t]he district court had warned Wright of the consequences and 'allowed [her] a second chance at obtaining service'" but she "disregarded that clear and reasonable order").
By not responding to the June 2, 2020 order, leaving the impression that he no longer wishes to pursue the relief sought in his complaint, White has prevented this action from proceeding and has therefore failed to prosecute his lawsuit.
A Rule 41(b) dismissal of this lawsuit without prejudice is warranted under these circumstances. The undersigned concludes that lesser sanctions would be futile, as the Court is not required to delay the disposition of this case until such time as White decides to obey the Court's order or contact the Court.
The Court should therefore exercise its inherent power to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and sua sponte dismiss this action without prejudice.
Recommendation
The Court should dismiss this action without prejudice under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41(b).
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).
DATED: August 27, 2020
/s/_________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE