Opinion
20-CV-4532 (NSR)
07-10-2020
MIKE WHITE, Plaintiff, v. ERIC GUTWEIN; C. STORY; D. VENETOZZI; T. GRIFFIN; A. ANNUCCI, Defendants.
ORDER OF SERVICE :
Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Green Haven Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He asserts that Defendants denied him procedural due process during a disciplinary proceeding and failed to protect him from an assault. By order dated July 6, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).
Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner's complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the "strongest [claims] that they suggest," Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the "special solicitude" in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits - to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief "that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action," which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
DISCUSSION
A. Claims Against DOCCS Commissioner Annucci
The Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims against Commissioner Annucci in both his official and personal capacities. "[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . ." Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009). "The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents . . . ." Gollomp, 568 F.3d at 366. As New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, and Congress did not abrogate the states' immunity in enacting § 1983, see Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977), the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff's § 1983 claims for damages against Commissioner Annucci in his official capacity.
Under the doctrine set forth in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150-59 (1908), claims for prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities can proceed in federal court, but here Plaintiff seeks only damages.
Because Plaintiff fails to allege any facts that plausibly suggest that Commissioner Annucci had any direct involvement with, knowledge of, or responsibility for the alleged deprivations of Plaintiff's rights, he also fails to state a claim against Commissioner Annucci in his personal capacity. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 ("Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior."); Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013). Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted against Commissioner Annucci in his personal capacity, and the Court dismisses all § 1983 claims against Commissioner Annucci.
B. Service on Named Defendants
Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, he is entitled to rely on the Court and the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service. Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) ("The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process . . . in [IFP] cases."); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (the court must order the Marshals Service to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP)).
Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires that the summons and complaint be served within 90 days of the date the complaint is filed, Plaintiff is proceeding IFP and could not have served summons and complaint until the Court reviewed the complaint and ordered that a summons be issued. The Court therefore extends the time to serve until 90 days after the date the summons is issued. If the complaint is not served within that time, Plaintiff should request an extension of time for service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it is the plaintiff's responsibility to request an extension of time for service); see also Murray v. Pataki, 378 F. App'x 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2010) ("As long as the [plaintiff proceeding IFP] provides the information necessary to identify the defendant, the Marshals' failure to effect service automatically constitutes 'good cause' for an extension of time within the meaning of Rule 4(m).").
To allow Plaintiff to effect service on Defendants Eric Gutwein, C. Story, Special Housing Unit Director D. Venettozzi, and Superintendent T. Griffin through the U.S. Marshals Service, the Clerk of Court is instructed to fill out a U.S. Marshals Service Process Receipt and Return form ("USM-285 form") for each of these defendants. The Clerk of Court is further instructed to issue a summons and deliver to the Marshals Service all the paperwork necessary for the Marshals Service to effect service upon each of these defendants.
Plaintiff must notify the Court in writing if his address changes, and the Court may dismiss the action if Plaintiff fails to do so.
C. Court-Ordered Discovery
Local Civil Rule 33.2, which requires defendants in certain types of prisoner cases to respond to specific, court-ordered discovery requests, applies to this action. Those discovery requests are available on the Court's website under "Forms" and are titled "Plaintiff's Local Civil Rule 33.2 Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents." Within 120 days of service of the complaint, Defendants must serve responses to these standard discovery requests. In their responses, Defendants must quote each request verbatim.
If Plaintiff would like copies of these discovery requests before receiving the responses and does not have access to the website, Plaintiff may request them from the Pro Se Intake Unit.
CONCLUSION
The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff, together with an information package. The Clerk of Court is further instructed to complete the USM-285 forms with the addresses for Defendants Eric Gutwein, C. Story, D. Venettozzi, and Superintendent T. Griffin and deliver to the U.S. Marshals Service all documents necessary to effect service.
The Court dismisses Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against Commissioner Annucci, whether in his official or individual capacity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii).
Local Civil Rule 33.2 applies to this action.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue). SO ORDERED. Dated: July 10, 2020
White Plains, New York
/s/_________
NELSON STEPHEN ROMÁN
United States District Judge
DEFENDANTS AND SERVICE ADDRESSES
1. Eric Gutwein
Green Haven Correctional Facility
594 Rt. 216
Stormville, NY 12582-0010
2. C. Story
Green Haven Correctional Facility
594 Rt. 216
Stormville, NY 12582-0010
3. D. Venettozzi
Green Haven Correctional Facility
594 Rt. 216
Stormville, NY 12582-0010
4. Superintendent T. Griffin
Green Haven Correctional Facility
594 Rt. 216
Stormville, NY 12582-0010