Opinion
04-08-1904
WHITE et al. v. DALY et al.
Willard P. Voorhees, for complainants. Alan H. Strong, for defendants.
Suit by Michael White and others against Sarah Daly and others. Decree for complainants.
Willard P. Voorhees, for complainants.
Alan H. Strong, for defendants.
STEVENS, V. C. I think there can be no doubt that complainants must fail as to the Bishop street property, for the reasons stated on the argument. As to the Commercial avenue property, the case is different. The grantor was 84 years old when he made the deed. He was totally blind,and perfectly helpless. His daughter, Sarah, the grantee, was obliged to dress and undress him, to comb his hair, and to prepare his meals for him. He was absolutely dependent upon her, and both he and she were, at the time the deed was made (January 24, 1899), laboring under a feeling of deep resentment against the two sons, who were excluded from their father's home. Beyond all question, a confidential relationship existed as between father and daughter. Now, what happened? The father conveyed to the daughter—she having before received her mother's property and the Bishop street property—the only property that he had left. The gift was improvident, because he would have needed it, or the proceeds of it, for bis own support, if his daughter had, through sickness or any other cause, ceased to minister to him, or if she had died. The deed did not contain a power of revocation, and there was no covenant or other written agreement for future support. The attorney who drew the deed did not make the grantor understand or appreciate the full effect and consequences of his act, nor did he suggest a power of revocation or a covenant for support. The situation is obvious—a relation of trust and confidence on the one side; an improvident deed, the product of that trust and confidence, on the other. That the influence was a constantly operating influence is undeniable; that it was an undue influence is demonstrated by the fact that the transaction was improvident, and that the only gainer by it was the person under whose influence the grantor was. In view of the admitted facts, it is idle to say that this influence did not continue while the deed was being executed because the grantee was not in the room. The case is, in my opinion, a much stronger one than Coffey v. Sullivan, 63 N. J. Eq. 297, 49 Atl. 520. In that case I was unable to infer from the facts proved that a confidential relationship existed closer than the relationship which ordinarily subsists between parent and child, and consequently I thought that the burden of showing undue influence lay upon those who alleged it. Had I made the correct inference—the inference the Court of Errors thought I ought to have made—I must have come to the same conclusion that the appellate court came to, for the deed there was voluntary, and, in a sense, improvident. In this case I have no difficulty whatever on the only question upon which I then had doubt.
It is said, however, that the deed can be sustained on the principle laid down in Le Gendre v. Goodridge, 46 N. J. Eq. 419, 19 Atl. 543; Id., 48 N. J. Eq. 308, 23 Atl. 581. There one of the objections to the voluntary conveyance was that it did not reserve a life interest to the grantor, as was the intention. It was held by Vice Chancellor Van Fleet, and he was affirmed on appeal, that, inasmuch as the grantor had died, and inasmuch as she had during her lifetime actually received the rents, the conveyance would not be set aside. There the court had previously found (1) that a relationship of trust and confidence (in the legal sense) did not exist, and (2) that there had not been in fact any undue influence exerted. Moreover, it did not appear that the transaction was improvident. Under these circumstances the only question was whether the deed should be avoided, after the grantor's death, merely for the mistake of the scrivener. The case in hand is very different. The relation of confidence existed, the transaction was improvident, and the grantee was the gainer by it. To hold that the grantee might retain the gift, the product of the influence unduly exerted, would be very largely to abrogate the rule which is founded upon the public policy of preventing persons who stand in a position of trust or confidence towards another from abusing it—from making a personal profit out of it, Coffey v. Sullivan is a direct authority against the defendant's contention on this point. It did not appear in that case that the grantor had suffered from his improvident act. It is no doubt true that the sons treated their father badly, but it would be quite impossible in cases of this kind to enter into a general inquiry as to what disposition of his property a father should, in point of justice, have made among his children.
The mortgage said to have been put by Sarah on the lot should be, as between the sons and daughter, charged upon her share.