Opinion
C. A. 9:23-0057-BHH-MHC
03-21-2023
Larry A. White, Plaintiff, v. Matthew Brokaw, Steven Fleshman, Bryan Stirling, (Agency Director), Joel Anderson (Deputy Director), Dennis Patterson (Assistant Deputy Director), Willie Davis (Regional Director), Charles Williams (Perry Correctional Institution Warden), Curtis Early (Perry CI Associate Warden), Daniel Harouff (Perry CI Captain), Clayton Holbrook (Perry CI Classification Caseworker), J. Perks (Perry CI Lieutenant), G. Salazar (Perry CI Deputy Warden), John Palmer (Perry CI Deputy Warden), Aaron Joyner (Lee CI Warden), Major Bennett (Perry CI), R. Tisdale (Lee CI, Associate Warden), Kenneth Nelson, Edward Settles, Captain Clark, Corporal Jones, Katurah Gause, and The South Carolina Department of Corrections, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MOLLY H. CHERRY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff filed this action pro se, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of his constitutional rights. ECF No. 1-2. Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. ECF No. 10. Defendants filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion, ECF No. 12, and Plaintiff filed a Reply. ECF No. 13. After an Order for supplemental briefing, Defendants supplemented their response with a Sur Reply. ECF No. 23. The Motion is ripe for review.
Plaintiff subsequently filed two letters, containing additional arguments in support of his Motion, which the undersigned has construed as Plaintiff's response to Defendants' Sur-Reply. ECF No. 29 & 31.
Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), DSC, the undersigned is authorized to review petitions for injunctive relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Judge.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is currently an inmate at Perry Correctional Institution and has been since April 2022. ECF No. 1-2 at ¶ 19. He alleges in his verified Complaint that on June 14, 2022, he was transferred back to Perry Correctional Institution (“Perry”). ECF No. 1-2 at ¶ 23. He contends that he was denied a meal on July 6, 2022; July 20, 2022; July 29, 2022; and November 22, 2022. ECF No. 1-2 at ¶¶ 24, 28, 29; see also ECF No. 23 at 2. Plaintiff also submits an Affidavit with his verified Complaint. ECF No. 1-2 at 91.
Plaintiff has titled the document an “Affidavit,” though his signature is not witnessed or notarized on the document. Plaintiff has made the statements contained therein “under the penalty of perjury,” such that it qualifies as a written declaration made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746.
The Deputy Warden at Perry avers that Plaintiff was initially transferred to Perry for a “program on the yard,” in which he participated for a brief time. ECF No. 12-1 at 2, ¶ 3. In April and May of 2022, Plaintiff was charged with and convicted of several institution violations, including conspiracy to smuggle contraband; possession of a financial instrument; and trafficking, use and/or possession of narcotics, marijuana or unauthorized drugs. Id. at 2, ¶¶ 4-8. As a result of these disciplinary infractions, Plaintiff was placed in the restricted housing unit (“RHU”). ECF No. 12-1 at 2, ¶ 3. Plaintiff is housed in RHU in a single-person cell with no cell mate. ECF No. 23-1 at 2, ¶ 3. Solitary confinement is not a term used by SCDC, and there is no housing designated as “solitary confinement.” Id. Inmates frequently refer to being housed without a cell mate as solitary confinement. Id.
Plaintiff admits to participating in the program on the yard at Perry and being placed in RHU after major disciplinary infractions, though he argues he was not afforded appropriate due process. ECF No. 13 at 1. He contends that he has been over seven months “disciplinary free and has all of his privileges and is still being held in RHU.” Id.
According to the Deputy Warden, RHU policy requires inmates in RHU to comply with the inmate grooming policy. ECF No. 23-1 at 2, ¶ 9. Specifically, RHU policy OP-22.38 requires RHU inmates to comply with policy OP-22.13, which addresses inmate grooming standards. Id. This grooming standard requires RHU inmates to wear clean clothes, to dress as neatly as possible, and to be fully clothed during routine working hours. Id. The grooming standard policy, as well as the food service operations policy, provide that “[a]ctivity deemed to threaten or disrupt security operations as related to the feeding process in the general population may result in the voluntary forfeiture of the current meal. This activity includes, but is not limited to, failure to comply with grooming standards . . . [and] inappropriate behavior going to/while in the cafeteria, etc.” ECF No. 23-1 at 3, ¶ 10. In addition, general population inmates are required to be dressed in their uniform in the cafeteria, and RHU inmates are required to be properly groomed and dressed in their cell to receive their meal. Id. at 3, ¶ 11; ECF No. 12-1 at 3, ¶ 11.
Prior to every meal, an announcement is made over the intercom to all cells that feeding will commence and the inmates need to be dressed and ready to physically receive the food tray. ECF No. 23-1 at 3, ¶ 14. After this announcement, officers will roll the food onto the wing and make a second verbal announcement that feeding has started. Id. at 3, ¶ 15. Any inmate who does not receive a meal has chosen not to be dressed, refuses to come to the food flap, or has engaged in behavior that violates policy. Id. at 3, ¶ 16.
Activity logs record all types of activities by inmates at Perry, as well as the correctional officer recording those activities. ECF No. 23-1 at 2, ¶ 4. The activity log for July 6, 2022, indicates that Plaintiff received breakfast, dinner, and lunch meals on that date. Id. at 2, ¶ 5. The activity log for July 20, 2022 indicates Plaintiff received breakfast and dinner that day but did not receive lunch because he refused the lunch meal. Id.
The July 29, 2022, activity log shows that Plaintiff received a breakfast and dinner meal that day. Id. at 2, ¶ 7. The July 29 log also shows that at 10:01 a.m., Plaintiff refused the lunch meal but was still provided the lunch meal at 11:13 a.m. Id.
An incident report from July 29, 2022, indicates that at approximately 9:45 a.m. meals were being served in Plaintiff's dorm. ECF No. 23-1 at ¶ 7. The report indicates that Plaintiff stated he was not going to put on his jumpsuit but demanded to be fed anyway. Id. When the officer walked off the wing, Plaintiff began banging on the food flap and caused other inmates to “rile up.” Id.
On November 22, 2022, Plaintiff received lunch and dinner but did not receive breakfast. Id. at 2, ¶ 8. Plaintiff was marked as refusing his breakfast meal. Id.
“Refused” on the activity log sheet indicates that the inmate physically refused to accept the tray, either verbally or procedurally, or chose not to comply with procedure, policy, or rules, such as refusing to wear his uniform. Id. at 3, ¶ 12. Those behaviors are deemed to be a refusal. Id. Inmates are never denied a meal service from security staff, and it is not allowed for an officer to deny a meal for disciplinary reasons. Id. at 3, ¶ 13.
In his Response, Plaintiff disagrees, arguing Section 15.10.3 of the OP-22.38 policy states “meals will not be withheld.” ECF No. 13. The policy, filed under seal and reviewed by the undersigned, is consistent with the Deputy Warden's affidavit and provides that meals “will not be withheld as a disciplinary sanction.” The OP-22.38 policy also specifically references policy OP-22.13, regarding inmate grooming.
Based upon security concerns, the undersigned directed Defendants to submit RHU Policy OP-22.38 under seal. ECF No. 17. However, Plaintiff filed a letter with the Court, dated March 13, 2023, which contained several policies, including RHU Policy OP-22.38, including section 15.10.3. See ECF No. 31-2.
In his Motion, Plaintiff requests that the Court issue an injunction ordering Defendants to stop: (a) denying Plaintiff meals; (b) housing Plaintiff at Perry Correctional; and (c) housing Plaintiff and other inmates in solitary confinement for excessive amounts of time. ECF No. 10.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff has moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. “The substantive standards for granting a request for a temporary restraining order and entering a preliminary injunction are the same.” MJJG Rest., LLC v. Horry Cnty., S.C., 11 F.Supp.3d 541, 550 (D.S.C. 2014) (citing Virginia v. Kelly, 29 F.3d 145, 147 (4th Cir. 1994) (applying preliminary injunction standard to a request for temporary restraining order)). Accordingly, the undersigned addresses Plaintiff's Motion referring to the standard for a preliminary injunction.
A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy involving the exercise of a very far-reaching power, which is to be applied only in the limited circumstances which clearly demand it.” Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 722 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 811 (4th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The decision whether to grant a preliminary injunction is committed to the equitable discretion of the district court. See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 714 (2010); Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 (4th Cir. 2007).
A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish all four of the following elements: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). A plaintiff must make a clear showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim. Id. at 22. Similarly, he must make a clear showing that he is likely to be irreparably harmed absent injunctive relief. Id. at 20-23. Only then may the court consider whether the balance of equities tips in the plaintiff s favor. Finally, the court must pay particular regard to the public consequences of employing the extraordinary relief of injunction. Id. at 24.
Plaintiff has failed to make a clear showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim or that he is likely to be irreparably harmed absent injunctive relief. Plaintiff's allegations regarding his meals and confinement implicate the Eighth Amendment. See Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 233 (4th Cir. 2016). The Eighth Amendment provides protection with respect to “the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Mickell v. Stirling, No. CV 6:15-4656-RBH-KFM, 2016 WL 11410921, at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 1, 2016), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Mickell v. Reynolds, No. 615CV04656RBHKFM, 2016 WL 3049358 (D.S.C. May 31, 2016).
However, the constitutional prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment “does not mandate comfortable prisons, and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Mickell, 2016 WL 11410921, at *1 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Eighth Amendment protection from cruel and unusual living conditions has both objective and subjective components. Id. First, deprivations must be objectively serious in the sense that they violate contemporary notions of decency. Id. (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981)). Second, the plaintiff must show that subjectively the prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. (citing Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993)). In other words, to demonstrate a violation of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish (1) a serious deprivation of a basic human need and (2) deliberate indifference to prison conditions on the part of the defendants. Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir. 1991).
Regarding the four meals Plaintiff contends he did not receive in July and November of 2022, the record reflects that he received at least two meals on three of those days, and three meals on one of the days. On the three occasions Plaintiff did not receive a meal, he was deemed to have refused the meal for not conforming to the policies implemented at Perry. Notwithstanding the parties' dispute over why Plaintiff was not served one meal on these three occasions, it appears he was fed two other meals on those days. There is no evidence before the Court otherwise. These allegations alone do not show a serious deprivation of a basic human need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Scinto, 841 F.3d at 234 (“Only an ‘extreme deprivation' is actionable under the Eighth Amendment.”).
As to Plaintiff's housing, specifically his request to move from Perry or out of RHU, there is no constitutional right for a state prisoner to be housed in a particular institution, at a particular custody level, or in a particular portion or unit of a correctional institution. Mickell, 2016 WL 11410921, at *2 (citing Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983)). In other words, the placement and assignment of inmates into particular institutions or units by state corrections departments are discretionary functions and are not subject to review unless state or federal law places limitations on official discretion. Id. (citing Hayes v. Thompson, 726 F.2d 1015, 1016-17 & n.1 (4th Cir. 1984) (collecting cases)). South Carolina law confers no protected liberty interest upon inmates of the South Carolina Department of Corrections from being classified, or being placed in administrative segregation, in a particular prison, or in a particular section of a prison. Id. (citing Keeler v. Pea, 782 F.Supp. 42, 43-44 (D.S.C. 1992)). Under these circumstances, Plaintiff has not made a clear showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim.
Second, Plaintiff has not made a clear showing that he will be irreparably harmed if injunctive relief is not granted. Notably, Plaintiff does not contend that he has not been fed at all. Instead, he was denied three meals over a lengthy period, and he has control over receiving meals by adhering to the grooming policy or not otherwise being deemed to have refused a meal. Moreover, Plaintiff has not shown he will suffer irreparable harm based upon his housing at Perry or in RHU.
Because Plaintiff has not made a clear showing of a likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm, the Court need not reach the remaining two Winter elements. Nevertheless, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the balance of equities necessitates, or that the public interest would favor, entry of an injunction in this instance. Indeed, the Court must pay particular regard to the public consequences of employing the extraordinary relief of injunction. Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. It is well established that absent the most extraordinary circumstances, federal courts are not to immerse themselves in the management of state prisons or substitute their judgment for that of the trained penological authorities charged with the administration of such facilities. Taylor v. Freeman, 34 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 1994); see generally Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995) (explaining that “federal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment” and that such “flexibility is especially warranted in the fine-tuning of the ordinary incidents of prison life”). Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief, and his Motion should be denied.
RECOMMENDATION
Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 10) be DENIED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are referred to the Notice Page attached hereto.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).