Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:99-CV-2329-G.
November 2, 2000.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the court is the motion of the defendant Bank of America, N.A.("Bank of America") for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
The plaintiff Gregory J. White ("White") worked for NationsBanc Mortgage ("NationsBanc") from August 12, 1996 until February 1, 1999. Amended Complaint ("Complaint") ¶ 6. White was hired as an account executive, but was subsequently promoted to branch manager of the NationsBanc Mortgage office in Las Colinas, Irving, Texas. Id. In late November, 1998, White was diagnosed with Hepatitis C, a chronic, blood-borne infection that affects the liver and other organs and systems. See Affidavit of Gregory J. White ("White Affidavit") ¶¶ 3, 4, located in Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Appendix ("White's Summary Judgment Appendix") at 2; Oral Deposition of Gregory J. White ("White Deposition") at 122, located in Bank of America N.A.'s Appendix of Summary Judgment Evidence in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment ("Bank of America's Summary Judgment Appendix") at 32. See also Affidavit of Jeffrey S. Crippin, M.D. ("Crippin Affidavit") ¶ 2, White's Summary Judgment Appendix at 29. White informed his supervisor, Terry Peterson ("Peterson"), of his diagnosis and of his need to pursue treatment for the condition. Oral Deposition of Terry Peterson ("Peterson Deposition") at 116, Bank of America's Summary Judgment Appendix at 134. White received antiviral therapy for approximately five months. Crippin Affidavit ¶ 3, White's Summary Judgment Appendix at 29. This treatment normalized, but did not cure, his condition. Id. During the course of his treatment and for six months thereafter, White and his wife were unable to pursue pregnancy due to the potential effects of his medication. Id.
Following a merger, Bank of America, N.A. ("Bank of America" or "the bank") succeeded to the liabilities of NationsBanc Mortgage and is the proper defendant in this action. See Bank of America's Brief in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment ("Bank of America's Brief") at 1, n. 1.
¶ 4. White and his wife had been unable to conceive and had just begun infertility treatment at the time of his diagnosis with Hepatitis C. White Deposition at 34, Bank of America's Summary Judgment Appendix at 10.
White was terminated by NationsBanc on February 1, 1999. Complaint ¶ 6. Bank of America and White have very different versions of the circumstances surrounding his termination. Bank of America alleges that its predecessor entity, NationsBanc, terminated White solely because he had failed to follow his supervisor's directives regarding hiring. Bank of America, N.A.'s Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment ("Bank of America's Brief") at 1. White alleges that prior to disclosing his condition to Peterson, he had received excellent job evaluations. Complaint ¶ 7. Following disclosure, White maintains, his professional and personal relationship with Peterson deteriorated substantially. Id. ¶ 8. White contends that he was terminated without cause and without advance notice or reprimand. Id. ¶ 10.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Evidentiary Burdens on Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence on file show that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.
The disposition of a case through summary judgment "reinforces the purpose of the Rules, to achieve the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of actions, and, when appropriate, affords a merciful end to litigation that would otherwise be lengthy and expensive." Fontenot v. Upjohn Company, 780 F.2d 1190, 1197 (5th Cir. 1986).
The movant makes such a showing by informing the court of the basis of its motion and by identifying the portions of the record which reveal there are no genuine material fact issues. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits, if any, must demonstrate that no genuine issue of material facts exists. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Once the movant makes this showing, the nonmovant must then direct the court's attention to evidence in the record sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. To carry this burden, the "opponent must do more than simply show . . . some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Go., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, the nonmovant must show that the evidence is sufficient to support a resolution of the factual issue in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
While all of the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to White as the motion's opponent, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress Company, 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)), neither conclusory allegations nor unsubstantiated assertions will satisfy White's summary judgment burden. Little v. Liquid Air Corporation, 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc); Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir,), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 825 (1992). Summary judgment in favor of Bank of America is proper if, after adequate time for discovery, White fails to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and as to which he will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act
The Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To establish a violation of the ADA, White must show "that (1) he has a disability; (2) he was qualified for the job; and (3) an adverse employment decision was made solely because of [his] disability." Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Centers, Inc., 84 F.3d 758, 763 (5th Cir. 1996). Due to the absence of direct evidence of discrimination in this case, White must use the three-step, "indirect" or "pretext" method of proof detailed in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Daigle v. Liberty Life Insurance Company, 70 F.3d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1995); Rizzo, 84 F.3d at 762. In the first step, White must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If he produces proof of the elements of a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises. Bodenheimer v. PPG Industries, Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1993). At the second step, Bank of America can rebut this presumption of discrimination by offering a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If Bank of America satisfies this burden of production, the prima facie case dissolves, and the case proceeds to the third step of the analysis. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993). At this third stage, the burden is on White to prove that the reason offered by Bank of America is a pretext for prohibited discrimination. Id. at 507-08.
Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the fact of discriminatory animus without inference or presumption. Mooney v. Aramco Services Company, 54 F.3d 1207, 1217 (5th Cir. 1995); Brown v. East Mississippi Electric Power Association, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993).
1. The Prima Facie Case
To make out a prima facie case of disability discrimination, White must show that he (1) suffers from a disability under the ADA's definition, (2) is qualified for the job in question, and (3) was subject to an adverse employment action because of his disability. Talk v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 1021, 1024 (5th Cir. 1999). See also Taylor v. Principal Financial Group, 93 F.3d 155, 162 (5th Cir.) (citing Daigle, 70 F.3d at 396), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1029 (1996). The ADA defines a "disability" as, inter alia, "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A), The ADA defines neither "substantially limits" nor "major life activities," but the regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") under the ADA provide significant guidance. Hamilton v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 136 F.3d 1047, 1050 (5th Cir. 1998). Under those regulations, an impairment is substantially limiting if it significantly restricts "the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity. . . ." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). Major life activities include: "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." Id. § 1630.2(i). "The threshold issue in a plaintiff's prima facie case is a showing that he suffers from a disability protected by the ADA. . . ." Talk, 165 F.3d at 1024.
White avers that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA because he has Hepatitis C, a chronic medical condition that significantly restricts a major life activity — namely, reproduction. Crippin Affidavit ¶ 4, White's Summary Judgment Appendix at 29. See also Plaintiff's Response and Brief in Opposition to Defendant Bank of America, N.A.'s Motion for Summary Judgment ("White's Response") at 6. Bank of America does not appear to contest that Hepatitis C is a physical impairment within the meaning of the ADA. Rather, the bank argues that White has offered no proof that Hepatitis C caused his infertility. Bank of America's Reply to Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Bank of America's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Bank of America's Reply") at 3. In consequence, the argument goes, White has not shown that Hepatitis C — rather than some other condition — "substantially limits" his major life activity of reproduction, particularly since White and his wife were undergoing infertility treatments even before White was diagnosed with Hepatitis C. See White Deposition at 33-34, Bank of America's Summary Judgment Appendix at 9-10. Furthermore, Bank of America asserts, White's inability to reproduce is only a temporary condition, in that the Rivavirin treatment prescribed for the condition prevented him from pursuing pregnancy for at most eleven months. Bank of America's Reply at 5. Thus, according to the bank, White has not shown that the Hepatitis C is a disability within the meaning of the ADA, citing Hamilton, 136 F.3d at 1050-51 (which quotes Rogers v. International Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 759 (5th Cir. 1996), for the proposition that "[t]he EEOC regulations provide that temporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no permanent long-term impact, are usually not disabilities.").
The court finds these arguments both persuasive and substantial and, were it writing on a clean slate, would be inclined to agree with the bank. It seems likely, however, that these arguments fail in the face of the Supreme Court's decision in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). In Bragdon, the Supreme Court held that even an asymptomatic HIV infection is a disability under the ADA because it substantially limits the major life activity of reproduction. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639. Importantly, the plaintiff in Bragdon did not claim that she had a physical inability to conceive. Id. at 636 (citing 912 F. Supp. at 587). Instead, she argued, and the Supreme Court agreed, that the risk of transmission of the virus to her male partner during unprotected sex or to her child during gestation and/or childbirth substantially limited her ability to reproduce. Id. at 639-40. White, like the plaintiff in Bragdon, is infected with a chronic viral infection that often results in serious, and indeed, potentially fatal, complications. Crippin Affidavit ¶¶ 2, 3, 5, White's Summary Judgment Appendix at 29-30. Here, as in Bragdon, if White attempts to conceive a child, he may infect his partner with the virus. See White Deposition at 15, lines 14-17; 225, lines 15-16; 238, lines 16-17, Bank of America's Summary Judgment Appendix at 5, 57, 61. Also, as in Bragdon, "[c]onception and childbirth are not impossible . . . but, without doubt, are dangerous to the public health. This meets the definition of a substantial limitation." Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641.
Because Bragdon almost certainly means that, notwithstanding the bank's substantial arguments to the contrary, White has a disability within the meaning of the ADA, the court next turns to the other two elements of his prima facie case. The bank, however, does not dispute these remaining elements. The court will therefore assume that White has met his initial burden under McDonnell Douglas. See Taylor, 93 F.3d at 162.
2. Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Reason
To rebut White's prima facie showing of discrimination on the basis of his disability, Bank of America claims that White was terminated for failing to follow his supervisor's directives on hiring. Bank of America's Brief at 1. The bank submitted evidence that White hired, and then terminated, Ellen Dinkins without obtaining the appropriate managerial authorization, at a cost to the bank of $9000.00. Terrell L. Peterson's February 17, 1999 letter to Greg White Personnel File ("February 17 letter"), Bank of America's Summary Judgment Appendix at 176. The bank contends that even after receiving instructions from his supervisor to obtain approval of every hire, White continued to make verbal offers to employment prospects without the requisite approval. See id. See also Peterson Deposition at 85-86, Bank of America's Summary Judgment Appendix at 127. This evidence is sufficient for the court to conclude that Bank of America has met its burden of producing evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating White.
3. Pretext
To overcome a motion for summary judgment, White only needs to produce evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact concerning pretext, but his summary judgment proof must consist of more than "a mere refutation of the employer's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason." Moore v. Eli Lily Co., 990 F.2d 812, 815 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 976 (1993) (quoting Bienkowski v. American Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503, 1508 n. 6 (5th Cir. 1988)). To avoid summary judgment, White must present evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the legitimate reason offered by Bank of America for termination of White's employment was not the true reason but that discrimination was. Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at 957; St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 515-16. Thus, White can avoid summary judgment "if the evidence taken as a whole (1) creates a fact issue as to whether each of the employer's stated reasons was what actually motivated the employer and (2) creates a reasonable inference that [White's disability] was a determinative factor in the actions of which [White] complains." Vadie v. Mississippi State University, 218 F.3d 365, 374 n. 23 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993-94 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). In certain cases, "a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2109 (2000). As Reeves makes clear, however, a prima facie case of discrimination, combined with some evidence of falsity of the employer's stated reason for termination, does not mandate a conclusion that the employer unlawfully discriminated. See id. at 2109.
In support of his argument that Bank of America's stated reason for his termination was pretextual, White contends that his personal and professional relationship with Peterson deteriorated following disclosure of his condition in late November or early December of 1998. White's Response at 8. White attributes the deterioration of his relationship with Peterson to disclosure of his illness, Id. White's proof on this point is one of timing. He argues that because the change in the relationship followed closely on the heels of his disclosure of his illness to Peterson, that disclosure must have been the impetus for the change. Id. Even if the assumption is made that Peterson's treatment of White changed for the worse in late November or early December, 1998, this evidence is insufficient to raise a factual issue as to disability discrimination. First, in the related context of determining whether retaliation (a form of discrimination prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) motivated an employer's adverse employment decision, it has been recognized that "[a]lthough the court may consider proximity in time as a factor supporting causation, proximity alone is a slender reed on which to avoid summary judgment." Underwood v. East Texas State University, 1998 WL 204624 (N.D. Tex. 1998) at *7 aff'd, 182 F.3d 915 (5th Cir. 1999) (table). See Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Company, 55 F.3d 1086, 1092 (5th Cir, 1995) (affirming summary judgment for employer despite employee's claim that causation was shown by proximity in time between protected activity and adverse employment action); Shirley v. Chrysler First, Inc., 970 F.2d 39, 44 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Consideration of such dates is part of our analysis, but not in itself conclusive of our determinations of retaliation."). Second, pretext cannot be established by White's subjective interpretation of Peterson's conduct. See Underwood, 1998 WL 204624 at *4 (plaintiff's inferences about her supervisor's conduct, despite the undisputed fact that they were once lovers, insufficient to show that employer's stated reason for terminating her was a pretext for sex discrimination); Southard v. Texas Board of Criminal Justice, 114 F.3d 539, 555 (5th Cir. 1997) (a plaintiff's "subjective interpretation of [her supervisor's] comments is insufficient to raise a fact issue as to sexual harassment."); Wallace v. Texas Tech, 80 F.3d 1042, 1048 n. 6 (5th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff's interrogatory answers stating that "African-American players were referred to and addressed with hostile and profane language whereas white players did not receive such treatment" insufficient to avoid summary judgment on claim of racial discrimination in employment). See also Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330, 337 (5th Cir. 1997) ("To establish pretext, a plaintiff cannot merely rely on his subjective belief that discrimination has occurred. . . ."); Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) ("It is more than well-settled that an employee's subjective belief that he suffered an adverse employment action as a result of discrimination, without more, is not enough to survive a summary judgment motion. . . .").
White asserts that Peterson did not return telephone calls or messages and that Peterson ignored requests from White for guidance and information relating to work and health issues. White's Response at 8. Furthermore, White maintains that on one occasion, he was left waiting outside Peterson's office for a lengthy period of time for no apparent reason. Id.
This change in Peterson's treatment of White came about two weeks after Peterson learned of White's promise to pay Dinkins $9000 in severance. Peterson Deposition at 85, Bank of America's Summary Judgment Appendix at 127. Under the circumstances, Peterson's negative treatment of White could just as easily have resulted from his annoyance over White's handling of the Dinkins' situation as from discriminatory intent. See Dreijer v. Girod Motor Company, 294 F.2d 549, 555-56 (5th Cir. 1961) (rejecting an inference of causation based on "post hoc ergo propter hoc" reasoning where other inferences were equally probable); National Labor Relations Board v. National Paper Company, 216 F.2d 859, 869 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1954) ("no inference as to [the employer's] discriminatory motivation in discharging [an employee] may properly be drawn merely from the fact that her union membership antedated her severance from employment."). Given the fact that this inference is at least equally plausible, no reasonable factfinder could find it more probable than not that White's disability — rather than Peterson's dissatisfaction with White as an employee — actuated the adverse employment decision at issue here. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252 (in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "[t]he judge's inquiry . . . unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict"); cf. Rizzo, 84 F.3d at 763 (plaintiff alleging disability discrimination in employment must show "an adverse employment decision was made solely because of [his] disability") (emphasis added).
White also argues that because he did not have unilateral hiring and firing authority, Bank of America's stated reason for terminating him — that he gave employment offers to two potential account executives and promised severance to another — is transparently pretextual. White's Response at 9. Bank of America does not contest that White lacked unilateral power to hire and fire account executives. Bank of America's Reply at 3 n. 1. Rather, the bank asserts that it terminated White because in spite of the fact that he was required to obtain prior approval of hiring decisions, he continued to make verbal offers and instruct the bank's recruiting department to send out offer letters. Id. The mere fact that White was without authority to make hiring decisions does not mean that the bank's stated reason for firing him was pretextual. As stated above, White's subjective belief that this demonstrates pretext is not sufficient to raise a factual issue of disability discrimination.
White has failed to meet his burden under Vadie and Rhodes. Neither White's subjective interpretation of Peterson's behavior, nor the mere fact that he could not make unilateral staffing decisions, raises a factual issue as to whether Bank of America's stated reasons for firing him were pretextual. Furthermore, even if it is assumed that White's evidence creates a factual issue as to whether the bank's stated reasons actually motivated his termination, that evidence does not create a reasonable inference that his disability was a determinative factor. Because White has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact concerning pretext, Bank of America is entitled to summary judgment on White's ADA claim.
See Waggoner v. City of Garland, Texas, 987 F.2d 1160, 1166 (5th Cir. 1993):
"In closing, we reiterate that in all of [the employee's] evidence one important element is absent — a genuine issue of fact that the [employer's] proffered non-discriminatory reason for [the employee's] discharge was a pretext for age discrimination. Hamilton [a manager] and Phillips [a supervisor] may have disliked [the employee]; they may even have sought to concoct a reason for his discharge. Yet, unless [the employee] can connect that dislike to his age, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding age or age based discrimination."
C. The ADEA
The ADEA prohibits employers from discharging employees based upon their age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). To establish a violation of the ADEA, White must prove intentional discrimination. Armendariz v. Pinkerton Tobacco Company, 58 F.3d 144, 149 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1047 (1996). Since the record in this case contains no direct evidence of age discrimination, a three-step analysis applies. See Hanchey v. Energas Company, 925 F.2d 96, 97 (5th Cir. 1990); see also St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 506-11; Texas Department of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. at 252-56; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-05. In the first step, White must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that he was: (1) discharged; (2) qualified for the position; (3) within the protected class; and (4) either (i) replaced by someone outside the protected class, (ii) replaced by someone younger, or (iii) otherwise discharged because of his age. Armendariz, 58 F.3d at 149. When an employee has been replaced, prongs (i) and (ii) of the fourth element apply. See Meinecke v. H R Block of Houston, 66 F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1995).
As in the ADA context, if White produces proof of these elements, a presumption of discrimination arises. See Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at 957. At the second step, Bank of America can rebut this presumption of discrimination by offering a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for White's discharge. Id. If Bank of America satisfies this burden of production, the effect of White's prima facie case dissolves, id., and the case proceeds to the third step of the analysis. At this third stage, the burden is on White to prove that the reason offered by Bank of America is a pretext for age discrimination. Id.
When the analysis has proceeded to this third step, White — to avoid summary judgment — must produce evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find that Bank of America's stated reason was not the true reason for the employment decision and that unlawful discrimination was. Id. (emphasis in original). Accord Moore v. Eli Lilly and Company, 802 F. Supp. 1468, 1471-74 (N.D. Tex. 1992), aff'd, 990 F.2d 812, 816 and n. 24 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 976 (1993); Waggoner v. City of Garland, Texas, 987 F.2d 1160, 1166 (5th Cir. 1993); see St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 515-16.
1. Prima Facie Case and Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Reason
The court will assume, for the purposes of this motion, that White has presented a prima facie case of age discrimination. Bank of America has offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for White's discharge. See Section II.B.2, supra. Thus, in order to survive summary judgment on his ADEA claim, White must satisfy his pretext burden.
2. Pretext Burden
As evidence of pretext, White states that he "believes he was terminated because his experience based in part on his age and years in business made him an expensive employee, the responsibilities of whom could be assumed by less expensive employees." White's Response at 4. White offers no evidentiary support for this conclusory statement. White's subjective opinion on this point, without supporting evidence, is insufficient to establish pretext. Price, 119 F.3d at 337; Douglass, 79 F.3d at 1430. White also refers this court to the same evidence of pretext for his ADEA claim that he has offered for his ADA claim. For the same reasons, that evidence is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact concerning pretext in the ADEA context. In short, White has failed to present "substantial evidence" from which a jury could infer that Bank of America's legitimate reasons for discharging him were mere pretexts for age discrimination. Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 994. For that reason, Bank of America is entitled to summary judgment on White's ADEA claim.
D. State Law Claims
Federal court jurisdiction exists over an entire action, including state law claims, when the federal and state law claims "`derive from a common nucleus of operative fact' and are `such that [a plaintiff] would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.'" Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 349 (1988) (quoting United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)). Yet supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims is a "doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. Consequently, "a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that court involving pendent state-law claims." Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350.
When the federal claims are dismissed before trial and only state law claims remain, the balance of factors to be considered under the supplemental jurisdiction doctrine weigh heavily in favor of declining jurisdiction; therefore, the federal court should usually decline the exercise of jurisdiction over the remaining claims and send them to state court. See id. at n. 7. According to the Fifth Circuit, "[o]ur general rule is to dismiss state claims when the federal claims to which they are pendent are dismissed." Parker Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Industries, 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1989)).
Here, the federal claims against the defendants have been dismissed and only state law claims remain. Because the federal claims are being dismissed before trial, the factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity suggest that this court ought to decline jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims against these defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Those claims are therefore dismissed without prejudice.
III. CONCLUSION
Bank of America has carried its summary judgment burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to White's claims of disability discrimination and age discrimination. On both of these claims, White — lacking direct evidence of discrimination — relies on the indirect or pretext method of showing prohibited discrimination. His proof, however, even when viewed in the light most favorable to him, fails to create an issue of fact that disability or age motivated the bank's decision to discharge him. Because White will bear the burden of proof at trial on these issues, this lack of evidence is fatal. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. Accordingly, Bank of America's motion for summary judgment on White's ADA and ADEA claims is GRANTED. Further, because no federal law claims remain in this case, White's remaining claims against Bank of America — all of which are governed exclusively by state law — are DISMISSED without prejudice to White's refiling them in state court.
SO ORDERED.