Opinion
No. CA11-54
11-16-2011
CICELY WHITE-PHILLIPS APPELLANT v. ARKANSAS CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, ALI RAJA, M.D., and RICHARD FISER, M.D. APPELLEES
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SIXTH DIVISION
[NO. CR10-4408]
HONORABLE TIMOTHY DAVIS FOX, JUDGE
AFFIRMED
ROBERT J. GLADWIN , Judge
Appellant Cicely White-Phillips appeals the October 5, 2010 order of the Pulaski County Circuit Court dismissing her claims against appellees Ali Raja, M.D., Richard Fiser, M.D., and Arkansas Children's Hospital (ACH). Appellant argues that the circuit court committed a procedural error in entering its order dismissing appellees. We disagree and affirm.
On July 29, 2010, appellant filed suit against doctors Raja and Fiser and ACH, asserting a claim for medical negligence arising from the care and treatment provided on July 21, 2008, to her son, Joseph Phillips, d/o/b March 23, 1995. Drs. Raja and Fiser filed a motion to dismiss on September 1, 2010, alleging that appellant's claims were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations, and on September 29, 2010, ACH filed a motion to join their motion to dismiss. On October 5, 2010, appellant filed a brief in support of her motions to (1) proceed to trial, (2) suppress appellees' motion to dismiss, and (3) dismiss counterclaim, to which appellees did not respond. In a judgment entered the same day, the circuit court granted dismissal in favor of appellees.
In cases where the appellant claims that the circuit court erred in granting a motion to dismiss, appellate courts review the circuit court's ruling using a de novo standard of review. Floyd v. Koenig, 101 Ark. App. 230, 274 S.W.3d 339 (2008). Appellate courts will not reverse a finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. Additionally, the correct application of an Arkansas statute is a question of law, which the appellate court reviews de novo. Hempstead County Hunting Club, Inc. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 2009 Ark. App. 511, 324 S.W.3d 697, aff'd as modified, 2010 Ark. 221. This court is not bound by the circuit court's interpretation of a statute, but "in the absence of a showing that the trial court erred in its interpretation . . . that interpretation will be accepted as correct on appeal." Hodges v. Huckabee, 338 Ark. 454, 459, 995 S.W.2d 341, 345 (1999).
Appellant's pro se brief appears to assert that, because the motion seeking dismissal and the order dismissing her complaint with prejudice was submitted for signature by the circuit judge without an accompanying brief in support, pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(2) (2010), it should not be recognized. Appellant also submits that because appellees failed to timely file a response to her motions, a favorable ruling should have been given to her for the relief sought and to the full extent allowable per Arkansas law and all other applicable jurisdiction and practices that are deemed lawful. Ark. R. Civ. P. 55 (2010).
Appellant's alleged notice of appeal and the amendment thereto are not in compliance with Rule 3(e) (2010) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure-Civil, in that it is confusing as to who is actually taking the appeal and fails to designate the contents of the record on appeal. While the filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional, appellate courts have required only substantial compliance with the procedural steps set forth in Rule 3(e). See Helton v. Jacobs, 346 Ark. 344, 57 S.W.3d 180 (2001). This court has stated that a notice of appeal that fails to designate the judgment or order appealed from, as required under Rule 3(e), is deficient, but such a defect is not necessarily fatal to the notice of appeal. See Racine v. Nelson, 2011 Ark. 50, ____ S.W.3d ____. For these reasons, we address the merits of appellant's arguments.
We hold that the circuit court was correct in determining that appellant's claims are barred by the two-year statute-of-limitations period set forth in the Arkansas Medical Malpractice Act (the Act). Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-203(a) (Repl. 2006). Appellant's complaint constituted an action for "medical injury" against a "medical care provider" as set forth and governed by the Act, codified at sections 16-114-201 to 212 (Repl. 2006). Drs. Raja and Fiser are medical physicians licensed to practice in the state of Arkansas, and ACH is a hospital that provides medical services. Throughout the complaint, appellant consistently alleged that the surgical procedure and related care that took place on July 21, 2008, and July 27, 2008, constituted medical negligence. Appellant specifically alleges that the injuries claimed were a result of "medical malpractice," which demonstrates that this was an action for medical injury as it was an "adverse consequence arising out of or sustained in the course of the professional services being rendered by a medical care provider . . . ." Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-201(3).
Pursuant to section 16-114-203(a), "all actions for medical injury shall be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues." Additionally, "[t]he date of accrual of the cause of action shall be the date of the wrongful act complained of and no other time." Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-203(b). Appellant's complaint alleged injury that stemmed from a surgical procedure that occurred on July 21, 2008, and intubation that occurred on July 27, 2008, under the Act, she was required to file her complaint no later than July 21, 2010, and July 27, 2010, respectively. Because appellant's complaint was not filed until July 29, 2010 and July 27, 2010, respectively, it was barred by the governing two-year statute of limitations and was properly dismissed with prejudice by the circuit court as a matter of law. See Quality Optical of Jonesboro, Inc. v. Trusty Optical, LLC, 365 Ark. 106, 225 S.W.3d 369 (2006).
As a final note, appellant fails to cite any authority in support of the argument that the circuit judge erred in dismissing her complaint. Appellate courts do not consider an argument where the appellant makes no convincing argument or cites no authority to support it. See, e.g., Hendrix v. Black, 373 Ark. 266, 283 S.W.3d 590 (2008). We simply do not address issues on appeal that are not appropriately developed. Id.
Affirmed.
ROBBINS and HOOFMAN, JJ., agree.