White Oak Prop. Dev. v. Washington Tp., Ohio

48 Citing cases

  1. Brebberman v. City of Maumee

    No. 23-3683 (6th Cir. Apr. 22, 2024)   Cited 1 times

    ; Grosswiler v. Freudenberg-Nok Sealing Techs., 642 Fed.Appx. 596, 599 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Thornton, 609 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 2010); White Oak Prop. Dev., LLC v. Washington Township, 606 F.3d 842, 854 (6th Cir. 2010).

  2. Wehrly v. Allstate Ins. Co.

    No. 23-5736 (6th Cir. Mar. 27, 2024)

    By failing to challenge the dismissal of his religiousdiscrimination claim, Wehrly has waived this claim on appeal. White Oak Prcp. Dev., LLC v. Washingtcn Tcwnship, 606 F.3d 842, 854 (6th Cir. 2010).

  3. City of Taylor Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Astec Indus., Inc.

    29 F.4th 802 (6th Cir. 2022)   Cited 28 times
    Holding that scienter was adequately alleged when statements of the CEO were “contradict[ed] [by] internal reports” and that the court “need not view” his optimistic statements as “mere ignorance”

    Because plaintiffs do not argue that this "alternative, independent basis" for dismissal is incorrect, "that ruling stands for the purposes of this appeal." White Oak Prop. Dev., LLC v. Washington Twp., Ohio , 606 F.3d 842, 854 (6th Cir. 2010) ; see also Grosswiler v. Freudenberg-Nok Sealing Techs. , 642 F. App'x 596, 599 (6th Cir. 2016) ("Because Plaintiffs have failed to address the district court's alternate basis for its decision, the merit of the issue they do raise is irrelevant."). Compounding their problem, plaintiffs also fail to argue on appeal that Silvious possessed the requisite scienter.

  4. Johnson v. Astec Indus. (In re City of Taylor Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys.)

    No. 21-5602 (6th Cir. Mar. 31, 2022)

    Because plaintiffs do not argue that this "alternative, independent basis" for dismissal is incorrect, "that ruling stands for the purposes of this appeal." White Oak Prop. Dev., LLC v. Washington Twp., Ohio, 606 F.3d 842, 854 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Grosswiler v. Freudenberg-Nok Sealing Techs., 642 Fed.Appx. 596, 599 (6th Cir. 2016) ("Because Plaintiffs have failed to address the district court's alternate basis for its decision, the merit of the issue they do raise is irrelevant."). Compounding their problem, plaintiffs also fail to argue on appeal that Silvious possessed the requisite scienter.

  5. Glennborough Homeowners Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv.

    21 F.4th 410 (6th Cir. 2021)   Cited 34 times
    Finding breach of contract is sufficient injury to confer standing

    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Hanner v. City of Dearborn Heights , 450 F. App'x 440, 444 (6th Cir. 2011) ("[W]here a district court grants a motion to dismiss on the basis of two, alternative holdings, an appellant who challenges only one of the holdings [forfeits] both issues on appeal." (citing White Oak Prop. Dev., LLC v. Washington Twp. , 606 F.3d 842, 854 (6th Cir. 2010) ). True, whether a party lacks " Article III standing is jurisdictional and not subject to waiver."

  6. Hanner v. City of Dearborn Heights

    450 F. App'x 440 (6th Cir. 2011)   Cited 13 times
    Affirming dismissal of Section 1983 deliberate indifference to serious medical need claim against municipality where complaint failed to identify a municipal policy or custom in support of the claim

    We have held that where a district court grants a motion to dismiss on the basis of two, alternative holdings, an appellant who challenges only one of the holdings waives both issues on appeal. See White Oak Prop. Dev., LLC v. Washington Twp., Ohio, 606 F.3d 842, 854 (6th Cir. 2010) (concluding that a party waived its appeal of the district court's dismissal of its claim where appellant failed to address both of the lower court's alternative holdings); United States v. Thornton, 609 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir.2010) (when the district court articulated two dispositive holdings, appellant's failure to address both prompted the court of appeals to decline review of either). Because the unchallenged "ruling stands for purposes of [] appeal," the appellant waives the dismissal of the claim.

  7. Oliver v. Etna Twp.

    2:22-cv-02029 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 24, 2024)   Cited 2 times

    Courts consistently find similar government interests to be legitimate. See, e.g., Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 269-70 (finding denial of building permit for multi-family low-income housing in accordance with rational zoning scheme); Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (“A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs.”); White Oak Prop. Dev., LLC v. Washington Twp., Ohio, 606 F.3d 842, 853 (6th Cir. 2010) (zoning resolution goal of “assisting [in] the preservation of open space, unique natural resources and natural terrain features . . . is a legitimate land use goal, and the curtailment of dwellings to those of the single-family variety bears a rational relationship to that stated purpose”)

  8. Buckle Up Festival, LLC v. City of Cincinnati

    237 F. Supp. 3d 666 (S.D. Ohio 2017)

    The vagueness doctrine has two primary goals: "(1) to ensure fair notice to the citizenry and (2) to provide standards for enforcement [by officials]." White Oak Prop. Dev., LLC v. Wash. Tp., Ohio , 606 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Ass'n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland , 502 F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 2007) ). As such, a law is void for vagueness if it fails to provide a "person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly."

  9. Center for Powell Crossing, LLC v. City of Powell

    173 F. Supp. 3d 639 (S.D. Ohio 2016)   Cited 17 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a mere error in the interpretation of state law is not a violation of due process

    planning committee, because city council retained full discretion to approve, deny or amend the petition); Silver, 966 F.2d at 1036 (holding that a property owner did not have entitlement to a zoning certificate, even when the proposed use was conditionally permitted, because the zoning board had “broad discretion” to decline to issue the certificate). See alsoJ.D. P'ship v. Berlin Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 412 F.Supp.2d 772, 780 (S.D.Ohio 2005) (holding that developer did not have a protected property interest in approval of housing development application because the township's zoning resolution did not require the board of trustees to approve the application); White Oak Prop. Dev., LLC v. Washington Twp., Ohio, No 1:07–cv–595, 2009 WL 961175 at *13 (S.D.Ohio Apr. 7, 2009) (holding that developer did not have a property interest in a development plan because the board of trustees could “either adopt or deny, or adopt some modification” of the zoning commission's recommendation), aff'd , 606 F.3d 842, 853 (6th Cir.2010) ; State ex rel. Harpley Builders, Inc. v. Akron, 62 Ohio St.3d 533, 536, 584 N.E.2d 724, 726 (Ohio 1992) (holding that a municipality has the inherent authority to rescind its preliminary approval of a proposed housing development plan); Grove v. Oxford City Council, No. CA2010–04–076, 2011 WL 193338 at **2–3 (Ohio Ct.App. Jan. 10, 2011) (holding that city's preliminary approval of development plan was “just that, preliminary,” and “did not fix any duties, privileges, benefits or establish any legal relationships with finality”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Powell Crossing points to statements made by two City Council members to the effect that they view their roles as simply checking whether the developer's application and proposed use complies with the zoning laws.

  10. United States v. Sharp

    No. 22-3569 (6th Cir. Jun. 13, 2023)   Cited 2 times

    Because Sharp's briefing ignored this second rationale for the decision to tow the truck, he forfeited any argument that the police could not seize it based on the probable cause to believe it contained drugs. See White Oak Prop. Dev., LLC v. Washington Township, 606 F.3d 842, 854 (6th Cir. 2010). And because the district court relied on this independent rationale, we can affirm its denial of his motion to suppress on this forfeiture ground alone.