Opinion
October 5, 1954.
November 8, 1954.
Equity — Jurisdiction — Construction of agreement — Adequate legal remedy — Declaratory judgment — Sewage disposal system — Joint control — Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act of 1923, P. L. 840 — Act of May 1, 1933, P. L. 103.
In a suit in equity seeking clarification of rights under a written contract relating to a sewage disposal system, it was Held that (1) there was an adequate remedy at law in the form of a declaratory judgment and (2) the agreement did not create any right of joint control of the sewage disposal system.
Argued October 5, 1954. Before STERN, C. J., STEARNE, JONES, CHIDSEY, MUSMANNO and ARNOLD, JJ.
Appeal, No. 253, March T., 1954, from decree of Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Jan. T., 1954, No. 2449, in case of White Oak Borough Authority v. City of McKeesport et al. Decree affirmed.
Bill in equity.
Defendants' preliminary objections sustained and decree entered dismissing bill, before McNAUGHER, P.J. and NIXON and O'BRIEN, JJ. Plaintiff appealed.
By a written contract dated September 9, 1939, between the City of McKeesport and the Township of Versailles the latter agreed to pay a specified portion of the cost of the former's enlarged trunk line sewer and was given permission to connect its sanitary sewers system with said trunk line at specified places at its own expense. The contract also provided: "Fourth: If and when the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania shall order and direct the installation of a system of sewage disposal, [Township of Versailles] shall pay its proper and proportionate share of the cost of such part as shall be jointly used; as also the proper and proportionate share of the cost of maintenance thereof."
The plaintiff sued as successor to the rights of Township of Versailles.
A portion of the opinion of McNAUGHER, P.J., is as follows:
"The White Oak Borough Authority brought a complaint in equity against the City of McKeesport, its elected officials, the Municipal Authority of the City of McKeesport, and its appointed officials, seeking clarification of rights under an agreement entered into September 9, 1939; praying that the assignment to the Municipal Authority by the City of McKeesport be declared subordinate to the terms of the said agreement; that the defendants be enjoined from interfering with the use of the sewers contemplated under said agreement; that the defendants be enjoined from individually constructing any sewage treatment plant except as provided by the agreement and the statutes appertaining thereto; that the property owners of the drainage area of White Oak Borough be declared third party beneficiaries of the easements established by the said agreement; and that the defendants be restrained from entering into any contracts or other obligations in connection with the construction of a sewage treatment works except under the said agreement. . . .
"It is our opinion that equity does not have jurisdiction in this case because a full, adequate, and complete remedy is provided by law in the form of a Declaratory Judgment. It is true that the plaintiff in the bill of complaint asks that the defendants be enjoined from engaging in certain activities, but it has made no application for an injunction pending the outcome of the case, and under the circumstances we see no occasion for granting an injunction. Section 2 of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act of 1923, P. L. 840 (12 Pa.C.S.A. § 832) reads as follows: 'Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise, and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.'
"The prayers of the plaintiff's petition are all based upon the agreement of September 9, 1939 and the rights and duties arising thereunder and they seek a 'clarification' and interpretation of the agreement in the light of the sewer statutes.
"But even if it were held that equity does have jurisdiction, the arguments of counsel for the plaintiff would not apply because the claim to the right of joint control of the sewage disposal system is wholly based on the agreement of September 9, 1939, which is silent on that subject. . . .
"The appointment of a joint sewer board under the language of this Act [of May 1, 1933, P. L. 103, § 1540, as amended] is made optional and since provisions for its creation and for joint control were not included in the agreement which the plaintiff relies upon, its contention has no validity. If it desires to avail itself of the sewage disposal system set up by the Municipal Authority of the City of McKeesport, it must then comply with paragraph 'Fourth' of the agreement and pay its proportionate share of the cost and of maintenance."
Alexander J. Bielski, for appellant.
Harry H. Meizlik and William Moldovan, Solicitors, for appellees.
The order entered by the court below sustaining defendant's preliminary objections and dismissing the Bill of Complaint is affirmed on the opinion of the learned President Judge McNAUGHER.