Opinion
C.A. No. 99C-01-063SCD
Submitted: March 1, 2001
Decided: June 15, 2001
Upon Defendant's Motions for Judgement as a Matter of Law, or in the Alternative, for a New Trial, or in the Alternative for a Remittitur in the case at bar — DENIED.
ORDER
Defendant, Family Dollar Stores of Delaware, Inc. ("Family Dollar"), has filed a post-trial Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial, or in the Alternative for a Remittitur in the case at bar. The case arose from a slip-and-fall which occurred on January 7, 1998. The plaintiff, Roland Wheatley ("Wheatley"), allegedly sustained injuries as a result of Family Dollar's negligence. Wheatley testified that he tripped over boxes stacked outside of the store manager's office and fell down an adjacent flight of stairs. He claims a hand injury that required surgery, and herniation of two discs in his lower back. At trial, expert witnesses testified that the recommended treatment for Wheatley's back injury is spinal fusion surgery.
In support of this motion, Family Dollar argues that Wheatley failed to establish that it was negligent, thus it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In the alternative, Family Dollar argues it should be granted a new trial because the $450,000 awarded to Wheatley by the jury was not based on the evidence presented at trial, that the jury failed in its obligations to carefully consider the evidence, and that the jury acted out of prejudice. Lastly, Family Dollar argues that the jury award was excessive and should shock the conscience of the Court, thus entitling the defendant to a remittitur.
DISCUSSION
Judgment as a matter of law is governed by Superior Court Rule 50(a)(1), which provides:
If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the Court may determine the issue against the party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue.
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 50(a)(1).
Rule 50(b) also provides that a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law can be joined with a motion for a new trial under Rule 59. A Rule 59 motion is granted only if there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict. "If there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support the jury's findings, the motion should be denied." Thus, the Court must determine "whether under any reasonable view of the evidence, the jury could have justifiably found for the non-moving party."
Super. Ct. Civ. R. 50(b).
Jeffries v. Kent Co. Vocational Tech. Sch. Dist., Del. Super., 1999 WL 1863621 (Aug. 26, 1999) (citing to McCarthy v. Mayor and Council of Wilmington, Del. Super., 100 A.2d 739, 740 (1953)).
Id.
Bell Sports, Inc. v. Yarusso, Del. Supr., 759 A.2d 582, 587 (2000) (quoting from Mazda Motor Corp. v. Lindahl, Del. Supr., 706 A.2d 526, 530 (1998)); Jeffries V. Kent Co. Vocational Tech. Sch. Dist., Del. Super., 1999 WL 1863621 (Aug. 26, 1999). See also Storey v. Camper, Del. Supr., 401 A.2d 458, 465 (1979) ("Thus, on weight of the evidence motions, we hold that a trial judge is only permitted to set aside a jury verdict when in his judgment it is at least against the great weight of evidence. In other words, barring exceptional circumstances, a trial judge should not set aside a jury verdict on such ground unless, on a review of all the evidence, the evidence preponderates so heavily against the jury verdict that a reasonable jury could not have reached the result.")
In the case at bar, the jury had ample evidence to support the conclusion that Wheatley's injuries were due to the negligence of Family Dollar. Testimony supports the claim that there were boxes located on the landing at the top of the stairs immediately outside of the store manager's office and that boxes in that location created a hazard. Although the store manager testified that she could not recall boxes being stacked at the top of the staircase at the time in question, she admitted [at deposition, admitted at trial] when presented with photographs of boxes in that location that it was a "typical hazard, very bad hazard" to place boxes on the landing. Another witness testified that she regularly saw boxes stacked on the landing prior to Wheatley's fall, but that the practice was discontinued after the incident. Lastly, Wheatley's wife, a former employee of Family dollar and a plaintiff in this case, testified that she saw boxes on the landing on the day of the incident. The jury's conclusion of no negligence on the part of the plaintiff was also supported by the evidence.
Alternatively, defendant has moved for a remittitur on the grounds that "the verdict given by the jury should shock the conscience of the Court." Family Dollar asserts that in reaching its verdict, the jury failed to follow the instructions of the Court and acted out of prejudice and passion. Specifically, Family Dollar argues that there was no evidence of economic loss to Wheatley other than $20,000 in medical bills. Defendant further argues that there was a dispute as to whether Wheatley would need back surgery to alleviate his condition, and evidence which undermined the causation claim: a preexisting back condition, and an automobile accident after his fall that aggravated his back condition.
Wheatley proved that the accident caused a hand injury that required surgery and a back injury for which surgery has been recommended. Plaintiff notes that he is a master carpenter by trade and that both injuries have severely limited his capacity to work. Furthermore, Wheatley argues that the evidence demonstrated that since the accident, he has required the aid of a "forearm crutch" to walk, has been unable to work, requires spinal fusion surgery, is unable to perform certain tasks that he routinely performed prior to the incident, and has a permanent disability attributable to his fall at Family Dollar. Wheatley recognizes that the verdict is generous; however, he notes that it is not known how the $450,000 was apportioned between his hand injury and his back injury by the jury, and that the back injury alone supported the damages amount.
The Court is required to give "great deference to the role of the jury." In order for the Court to modify a jury's verdict, it must be "at least against the great weight of the evidence," and "so grossly out of proportion . . . as to shock the Court's conscience and sense of justice." Recognizing the great deference due the jury's verdict on damages claimed to be grossly out of proportion, "the courts will yield to the verdict of the jury where any margin for difference of opinion exists in the matter of a verdict."
Moyer v. Owens, Del. Super., 1997 WL 817871, Quillen, J. (June 4, 1997) (citations omitted).
Id.
The plaintiff was at the store on the day in question because he needed to pick up his wife's weekly paycheck. She had been sent to another store and they needed the money. It appears that the family was in difficult economic circumstances; they were receiving Medicaid — evidence which was presented to explain the sequence of his treatment. He was denied permission to go to the emergency room on the day of the accident when his hand began to swell. He was permitted to go to his family doctor shortly thereafter. Ultimately he required a pin to be inserted in his ring finger with the resulting inability to bend his finger. His lack of resources has resulted in a delay of over three years in the treatment of his back condition and a protraction of his pain and suffering.
After considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, I conclude the verdict is not so out of proportion to the injuries as to shock the Court's conscience. The claims of hand and back injuries are supported by expert testimony.
The Motion for New Trial or Remittitur is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.