Opinion
C. A. 3:22-2119-SAL-PJG
11-09-2022
Reverend Dr. Samuel T. Whatley, Plaintiff, v. Richland County Family Court Columbia South Carolina; Phoebe S. Whatley; Monet S. Pincus; Michelle M. Hurley Leevy-Johnson; GAL Thomas M. Neal, III; Richard G. Whiting; Kristin Cannon; Kelly B. Arnold; Larry Medlin; Christian Counseling Center First Presbyterian Church Columbia SC; Marc Harari; Jewett Dooley; Mary Mundy; Dr. Sobotowica; Cassy Paschal; Wendy Levine; William T. Watlington; Neighbor Destroyed Trees; Richland County Sheriff Department on Truancy et al., Defendants.
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Samuel T. Whatley, proceeding pro se, purports to bring this action for civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The court issued a Recommendation on August 11, 2022, recommending that Plaintiff's Complaint be summarily dismissed pursuant to the court's initial review procedures. (ECF No. 17.) Plaintiff filed objections to the Report and Recommendation, a motion to amend or correct the Complaint and a proposed amended complaint, and a supplement to the proposed amended complaint. (ECF Nos. 20, 21, 26.) The Honorable Mary Geiger Lewis referred this matter to the undersigned for consideration of the motion to amend and supplement. (ECF No. 27.) Having reviewed the motion to amend, proposed amended complaint, and supplement in accordance with applicable law, the court denies the motion to amend and recommends that this action be summarily dismissed without prejudice and issuance and service of process.
The factual allegations of the original complaint are summarized in the court's previous Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 17 at 1-2.) The proposed amended complaint appears to be identical to the original complaint, except the proposed amended complaint includes a new section titled “Description of Defendants that Caused Injury to Plaintiff.” (ECF No. 21-1 at 1724.) In that section, Plaintiff lists each defendant and what allegations he brings against them, but he does not provide any new allegations that were not already raised in the original complaint. Plaintiff does add new allegations and points of law in the supplement (ECF No. 26), such as allegations that he was illegally summoned to the Richland County Family Court because the summons was not signed by a judge. Plaintiff argues, therefore, that the clerk of the family court should be criminally charged. (ECF No. 26 at 5.)
The court concludes that despite having availed himself of the opportunity to amend his pleading, Plaintiff still fails to state a plausible claim upon which relief can be granted against the defendants. As explained in the court's previous Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff's broad, generalized allegations of harm fail to plausibly show he states a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 (requiring that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief'); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (stating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it requires more than a plain accusation that the defendant unlawfully harmed the plaintiff, devoid of factual support). For instance, Plaintiff claims Defendant Whatley “preplanned and executed a marital fraud injury against the Plaintiff' and Defendant Whiting “knowingly distorted facts within the illegal proceedings and injuries against the Plaintiff.” (ECF No. 21-1 at 20-21.) Those claims assert legal conclusions without supporting facts that would plausibly show that the defendants are liable to Plaintiff. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
And, while Plaintiff provides more detailed factual allegations against the family court judges, that does not alter the court's conclusion that the defendant judges are immune from suit because Plaintiff is seeking damages against them for their adjudicative actions in Plaintiff's family court case. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (providing that judges are entitled to absolute immunity from suit, not just the ultimate assessment of damages, for judicial actions taken within their jurisdiction); Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) (“It has long been settled that a judge is absolutely immune from a claim for damages arising out of his judicial actions.”). Nor do Plaintiff's new allegations change the fact that he is seeking to be relieved of the family court's judgment, which is relief this court cannot provide. See generally Friedman's, Inc. v. Dunlap, 290 F.3d 191, 197 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts may not consider either issues actually presented to and decided by a state court or constitutional claims that are inextricably intertwined with questions ruled upon by a state court.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court. We regard the doctrine as jurisdictional.”).
Therefore, Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint (ECF No. 21) is denied because the proposed amended complaint still does not state a plausible claim for relief. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (holding that a motion to amend may be denied for futility); see also Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co. 785 F.2d 503, 510 (4th Cir. 1986) (“Leave to amend, however, should only be denied on the ground of futility when the proposed amendment is clearly insufficient or frivolous on its face.”). And consequently, the court recommends that this matter be summarily dismissed without issuance and service of process.
To the extent Plaintiff seeks damages against defendants that are immune from suit, those claims must be dismissed with prejudice. See, e.g., Smith v. Swanson, Civil Action No. 9:18-251 -RMG, 2018 WL 1225110, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 7, 2018) (citing Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 253 (4th Cir. 1999)); see, e.g., Brown v. Daniel, 230 F.3d 1351, at *4-5 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision). The other claims should be dismissed without prejudice.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).