Opinion
Civil Action 4:22-cv-4469-JFA-TER
07-23-2024
JAMES C. WHALEY, #357132, Plaintiff, v. MULTIPLE UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS, DR. WILLIAMS, LT. KUDRON, Shift Supervisor, ACSD, NURSE AMY REAGAN, CPL. LEAPORD, CPL. BROOKS, MR. RAMOS, former ACSO Deputy, BOWMAN, Security Lt. at ACDC, MIKE HUNT, Sheriff, LT. CLAMP, LT. HARDY, NICK GALLAM, Captain, DEPUTY BURNETT, DANIEL BUSSEY, Deputy, TIMOTHY MEALING, Deputy, CRAIG HALLET, Deputy, SGT. STARKE, LT. BRADLEY, CPL. GIBSON, MR. RIVERS, SGT. ARTHURS, SOUTHERN HEALTH PARTNERS, and MR. BUGGS, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Thomas E. Rogers, III, United States Magistrate Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging various violations of his constitutional rights. Presently before the Court are the Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 107) filed by Defendant Nurse Amy Reagan, and the Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 112) filed by Defendants Lt. Kudron, Cpl. Leapord (more correctly identified as Leopard), Cpl. Brooks, Mr. Ramos, Lt. Clamp, Lt. Hardy, Deputy Burnett, Daniel Bussey, Timothy Mealing, Craig Hallett, Cpl. Gibson, and Mr. Buggs (collectively, “ACDC Defendants). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he was advised pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), that a failure to respond to Defendants' motions could result in the motions being granted and his claims against them dismissed. Plaintiff filed Responses (ECF Nos. 118, 150). All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), DSC. This report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.
All other Defendants in this case have been dismissed. See Order (ECF No. 87).
II. FACTS
Plaintiff's allegations arise from his detention at the Aiken County Detention Center (ACDC). Plaintiff is a civil detainee who is being held by Order for Evaluation Pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act filed October 27, 2020, in Civil Action Number 2020-CP-02-1640, and is awaiting civil commitment proceedings under the Sexually Violent Predator Act. Gallam Aff. ¶ 2 (ECF No. 112-2). Following an initial review of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, the only remaining claims in this action are claims 4, 6, 7, 8, and “MED-3.” See Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 52); Order (ECF No. 87). Claims 4, 6, 7, and MED-3 relate to the ACDC Defendants; claim 8 is asserted against Reagan.
The claim labeled as MED-3 by Plaintiff was not originally included in the Amended Complaint. However, after amending his complaint pursuant to the Proper Form Order (ECF No. 11), Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend (ECF No. 46), which was granted in part. See Order (ECF No. 50). The Order directed the Clerk to attach the Motion to Amend as an attachment to the Amended Complaint to constitute one whole complaint and add parties Southern Health Partners and Buggs as Defendants to the docket. The undersigned then entered a Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 52) and noted as to Buggs that “Plaintiff has stated claims sufficient to surpass summary dismissal as to no medical treatment where Plaintiff had extensive sores covering his entire body.” Report and Recommendation pp. 9-10. Though neither the previous Report and Recommendation or Order identify the claim as the “MED-3 Claim,” they recommend and order that the claim against Buggs survive summary dismissal. The MED-3 claim is the only claim asserted against Buggs.
In claim 4, Plaintiff alleges he told Defendant Bussey the toilet in his cell in D-Max was not working. Bussey refused to look. The toilet flooded feces onto the floor. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Mealing became aware of the feces and said he wanted a supervisor to see the feces, but a supervisor never came. Defendant Hallet was made aware of the condition and stated it was not his job, but he would try to get a plunger; no plunger was brought. Plaintiff was unable to eat in the feces covered cell from December 2, 2022, to December 6, 2022. Am. Compl. p. 11 (ECF No. 19).
In claim 6, Plaintiff alleges cell conditions of urine, feces(spread on walls, floors, and collected in cups), rotten food piles, and flies in C-Pod, specifically Unit C2. All of these issues were in cells other than his own on certain, named dates between July of 2022, through March of 2023. Plaintiff alleges Defendants Clamp, Hardy, Bradley, and Kudron are supposed to inspect pods each shift. Plaintiff alleges he complained to Defendant Kudron and Defendant Clamp did a walk through. Plaintiff alleges Defendants Brooks, Leapord, Burnett, and Gibson did security checks becoming aware of the conditions. Plaintiff alleges that the “exposure to airborne emissions of feces and/or urine is directly harmful to Plaintiff mentally, emotionally, and physically” and it “exacerbates anxiety & depression, exacerbates eczema” and his body is covered in open sores.” Plaintiff alleges when he complained, he was moved to the D-Max cell discussed in claim 4, but he does not say who moved him. Am. Compl. pp. 13-14.
With respect to the conditions of the units in C-Pod, Nicholas Gallam is the Administrator of the ACDC, avers that
Within the C-Pod, and specifically C-2, there are instances where detainees, and particularly those with mental health issues, act out and throw or smear feces. Such incidents unfortunately can be fairly common in a correctional facility and are not preventable. However, the housing deputies are trained and do respond to such occurrences. Attempts are initially made to try to have the detainee who spread the
feces or soiled their cell perform clean up of that cell. If those efforts are unsuccessful, the detainee is removed from the cell, and cleaning is performed by either inmate workers or the security staff themselves. Such conditions are not allowed to linger for a lengthy period of time. When there is an odor of feces or urine in the unit, that is also unpleasant for the officers who are assigned to and work in the unit as well as the detainees. As a result, steps are generally taken within a reasonable time to clean up the cells or areas outside the cells when this type of conduct has occurred.Gallam Aff. ¶ 10.
In claim 7, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Ramos “falsified” a Southern Health Partners form titled “Refusal of Medical Treatment and Release of Responsibility” dated August 4, 2021, and the lack of prompt care continued Plaintiff's physical pain. Am. Compl. p. 15. The record reflects that the form was completed by the Southern Health Partners nurse who signed the form, and the form was not prepared by the Defendant Kevin Ramos. Rather, Ramos signed only as a witness because the Plaintiff refused to sign. In effect, Ramos was witnessing the refusal to sign by the Plaintiff. Gallam Aff. ¶ 4.
In claim MED-3, Plaintiff alleges that on April 13, 2023, a disciplinary board, with Defendant Buggs presiding, found plaintiff guilty of logging onto another inmate's account. Plaintiff alleges that he was not given prior written notice of the charge or an opportunity to have assistance or gather evidence. Plaintiff alleges that this finding of guilt is currently on appeal with the state court. The sanction imposed as a result of the guilty finding was that Plaintiff could not order food or medicines from the kiosk commissary. As such, he was not allowed to order hydrocortizone cream that was beneficial for his eczema. Am. Compl. Attachment pp. 4-5 (ECF No. 19-4).
In claim 8, Plaintiff alleges that on June 7, 2022, Plaintiff make a sick call request for “acute pain like a stab wound.” Plaintiff alleges that Nurse Reagan and other unidentified defendants falsified a refusal of treatment form. As such, Plaintiff was not seen for his requested sick call. Plaintiff further alleges that he was not seen or treated for a herpes outbreak. Plaintiff alleges that these failures to treat him were directly harmful to him mentally, emotionally, and physically and left him with severe pain in his stomach as well as herpes on his penis and mouth. Am. Compl. p. 16.
During June 2022, Nurse Reagan, an RN, served as the director of nursing at the Aiken County Detention Center as part of a larger medical team employed by Southern Health Partners. Reagan Aff. ¶ 1 (ECF No. 107-2). In addition to her normal nursing duties, as nursing director, Nurse Reagan assisted in coordinating patient care in the Detention Center. Reagan Aff. ¶¶ 1, 3. On June 1, 2022, Plaintiff entered a kiosk request for Acyclovir, an anti-viral medication that requires a prescription by the physician. See ECF No. 4-2 at 14; Reagan Aff. at ¶ 5. Because Plaintiff's request was non-emergent and required a prescription, he was placed on the sick list. See Id. On June 7, Plaintiff complained of pain through the kiosk. ECF No. 4-2 at 12; Reagan Aff. at ¶ 6. Medical staff responded that he was already on the sick list. See Id. Plaintiff was to be seen by the medical staff on that same day. ECF No. 4-2 at 12, 13; Reagan Aff. at ¶ 6. However, Plaintiff refused treatment. ECF No. 4-2 at 13; Reagan Aff. at ¶ 6. Nurse Reagan filled out the medical refusal form with a corrections officer present. See Id. Nurse Reagan avers she did not falsify any medical records, she simply recorded what was happening which was that Plaintiff refused to be seen by the medical staff. Reagan Aff at ¶ 6. Plaintiff argues that on the refusal form, Nurse Reagan stated that she was “unable to educate” Plaintiff about the risks of refusing treatment and she failed to check the space asking “is inmate alert and oriented.” Therefore, Plaintiff argues, he must have been unresponsive at the time Nurse Reagan attempted to conduct an examination. He states in his declaration that he never refused treatment on June 7, 2022, nor did Nurse Reagan ever come to him and ask him to sign a refusal of treatment form. Pl. Decl. ¶ 1 (ECF No. 123-1). He also states in his response that he did not request additional medical care for the stabbing pain after June 7, 2022. Pl. Resp. p. 4. The next sick call request in the record is dated July 19, 2022, in which Plaintiff requests to be seen for his skin issues because he is itching. Pl. Supporting Docs. p. 17 (ECF No. 4-2). The record reflects he was seen on July 22, 2022. Id.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, the moving party bears the burden of showing that summary judgment is proper. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is proper if the non-moving party fails to establish an essential element of any cause of action upon which the non-moving party has the burden of proof. Id. Once the moving party has brought into question whether there is a genuine dispute for trial on a material element of the non-moving party's claims, the non-moving party bears the burden of coming forward with specific facts which show a genuine dispute for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The non-moving party must come forward with enough evidence, beyond a mere scintilla, upon which the fact finder could reasonably find for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4th Cir. 1991). However, the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Barber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 87475 (4th Cir. 1992). The evidence relied on must meet “the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits.” Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4thCir. 1993).
To show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the party must present evidence supporting his or her position by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A); see also Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Systems, Inc., 33 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 1994); Orsi v. Kickwood, 999 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1993); Local Rules 7.04, 7.05, D.S.C.
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)). A legal action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707, 119 S.Ct. 1624, 143 L.Ed.2d 882 (1999). To be successful on a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988).
The ACDC Defendants first argue that dismissal is appropriate in part because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this case. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires that a prisoner exhaust the available administrative remedies before filing a 1983 action concerning conditions of his confinement. 42 U.S.C.1997e(a). However, as a civil detainee, Plaintiff is not subject to the PLRA's mandatory exhaustion requirement. See Hicks v. James, 255 Fed.Appx. 744, 748 (4th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (unpublished) (collecting cases); Michau v. Charleston Cnty., S.C., 434 F.3d 725, 727-28 (4th Cir.2006) (holding that a person detained under South Carolina's Sexually Violent Predator Act “does not meet the PLRA's definition of ‘prisoner,' ” and thus that the PLRA's requirements do not apply to his claims).
The ACDC Defendants next argue that Plaintiff fails to present sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment as to the conditions of confinement claims raised in claims 4 and 6. As stated above, in claim 4, the Plaintiff alleges that his cell in D-Max did not have a properly functioning toilet, feces flooded from the toilet onto the floor, and that the D-Max area smelled of feces for four days from December 2, 2022 to December 6, 2022. He told Defendants Bussey, Mealing, and Hallet about the conditions but they failed to do anything. In claim 6, the Plaintiff complains about the conduct of other detainees in Unit C-2 (primarily those in cells designated C107 and C108) who allegedly spread feces in their cells or urinated under their cell door or possessed spoiled food. He identifies these conditions as present on various, intermittent days during July 2022 through March 2023. He alleges that Defendants Clamp, Hardy, Bradley, Kudron, Leapord, Burnett, and Gibson knew about these conditions but failed to do anything.
As set forth above, Plaintiff is a civil, pretrial detainee. Until very recently, the law within the Fourth Circuit was that the standard for reviewing conditions of confinement claims by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment was essentially the same as that for a convicted prisoner under the Eighth Amendment-deliberate indifference to an excessive risk of health or safety. Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991 (4th Cir. 1992); Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 871 (4th Cir. 1988) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)). However, on December 8, 2023, the Fourth Circuit held that the Supreme Court's ruling in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) dictates a change in the analysis of claims for pretrial detainees. Short v. Hartman,87 F.4th 593, 607 (4th Cir. 2023) (“The Supreme Court's ruling in Kingsley v. Hendrickson upends the assumption that Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause claims should be treated the same as Eighth Amendment claims.”).
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) mandates a subjective test for Eighth Amendment claims of deliberate indifference:
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.Id. at 837-38, 114 S.Ct. 1970. Prior to Kingsley, all circuits adopted this subjective test to analyze claims for pretrial detainees as well. Short, 2023 WL 8488148, at *8 (collecting cases).
In Kingsley, the Supreme Court held that to state a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause claim for excessive use of force, a pretrial detainee need only allege that the officer used objectively unreasonable force and was not required to allege a subjective component. Short, 87 F.4th at 608 (discussing Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398). Based on Kingsley, the Fourth Circuit in Short concluded that the subjective element also does not apply to Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claims by pretrial detainees. Therefore, under Short it “is sufficient that the plaintiff show that the defendant's action or inaction was, in Kingsley's words, ‘objectively unreasonable.'” Id. at 611 (quoting Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397). That is, “it is enough that the plaintiff show that the defendant acted or failed to act ‘in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.'” Id. (citation omitted). Still, however, it is not enough “for the plaintiff to allege that the defendant negligently or accidentally failed to do right by the detainee.” Id. at 611-12. While a “showing of subjective intent can still help a pretrial detainee state a claim for action that amounts to punishment,” this showing is no longer required under Short. Id. at 609 (referencing Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398).
With respect to Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claims in claims 4 and 6, he must show (1) that he was subjected to a condition of confinement that posed a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) that “the defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly acted or failed to act to appropriately address the risk that the condition posed”; (3) that the defendant “knew or should have known” that “the defendant's action or inaction posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm; and (4) as a result, the detainee was harmed.” See id. at 611; see also Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2017) (adopting a similar test for claims of deliberate indifference to conditions of confinement under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Defendants do not argue that they were not aware of the conditions; they argue that did not act or fail to act appropriately to address any risks. As set forth by Gallam, whenever inmates create the unsanitary conditions about which Plaintiff complains, ACDC employees act within a reasonable time to either have the inmate clean the units or to clean them themselves. He notes that the conditions are uncomfortable for everyone, including the employees and, thus, they have their own incentive to keep the units clean. Gallam Aff. ¶ 10.
“Deprivation of basic sanitary conditions such as exposure to human waste without the ability to clean oneself can constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.” Jones v. Solomon, No. 1:18-CV-89-FDW, 2018 WL 6247265, at *11 (W.D. N.C. Nov. 29, 2018) (collecting cases and holding that the plaintiff alleged a viable Eighth Amendment claim when he was forced to search through his own excrement for contraband without personal protection equipment or hygiene materials). However, “[c]ases where similar conditions have been found to be an objectively serious deprivation sufficient to violate the protections provided by the Eighth Amendment generally involve either prison officials acting deliberately in creating the unsanitary conditions, the conditions lasting for an extended and unreasonable amount of time, or both.” Whitmore v. W. Reg'l Jail, No. 3:18-CV-01483, 2019 WL 3756396, at *8 (S.D. W.Va. July 19, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3759806 (S.D. W.Va. Aug. 7, 2019) (collecting cases). “The mere smell or presence of human waste is not sufficiently serious to constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Salmons v. W. Reg'l Jail Auth., No. CV 3:18-1447, 2019 WL 5616916, at *6 (S.D. W.Va. Oct. 30, 2019); Canterbury v. W. Reg'l Jail Auth., No. 3:18-CV-01440, 2019 WL 6545328, at *12 (S.D. W.Va. Nov. 7, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 3:18-1440, 2019 WL 6598349 (S.D. W.Va. Dec. 4, 2019) (finding no violation where the plaintiff did not come into direct physical contact with human waste for an extended period of time, or that human waste contacted or contaminated his food); Harris v. FNU Connolly, No. 5:14-cv-128-FDW, 2016 WL 676468, at *5 (W.D. N.C. Feb. 18, 2016), aff'd, 667 Fed.Appx. 408 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that unsanitary cell conditions, including the presence of feces, urine, and vomit was less than ideal, but “[s]hort-term sanitation problems, while unpleasant, do not amount to constitutional violations”) (citation omitted); Bailey v. Rife, No. 1:21-cv-00424, 2021 WL 6496561, at *6 (S.D. W.Va. Nov. 19, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 130746 (S.D. W.Va. Jan. 13, 2022) (one month placement in a “hard cell” containing human waste failed to state a plausible constitutional claim). Of note, the only time Plaintiff was actually exposed to feces in his cell was when he was in the D-Max cell from December 2, 2022, to December 6, 2022. Otherwise, he could smell feces and urine from other cells.
Though Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee and thus, the Fourteenth, rather than the Eighth, Amendment is applicable, cases discussing similar claims under the Eighth Amendment are instructive at the least as to the objective portion of such claims.
Plaintiff has also failed to show that Defendants' inaction or delay in cleaning the cells posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm. Nor does Plaintiff present sufficient evidence to show that he was, in fact, harmed as a result of the unsanitary conditions. Though Plaintiff alleges that he suffered emotionally and physically with open sores and an inability to eat as a result of living in these conditions, “he has failed to produce competent medical evidence indicating that he has suffered any kind of injury-or risk of injury-resulting from any of his alleged conditions of confinement.” Hall v. Williford, No. 9:23-CV-00883-SAL-MHC, 2024 WL 2884358, at *8 (D.S.C. May 7, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No. 9:23-CV-883-SAL, 2024 WL 2883291 (D.S.C. June 7, 2024) (applying the standard set forth in Short); Tolbert v. Haug, No. 7:23-CV-00533, 2024 WL 1719936, at *3 (W.D. Va. Apr. 22, 2024) (finding a plaintiff failed to state a conditions of confinement claim where the complaint did not “allege that [plaintiff] has actually suffered any harm as a result of” the alleged conditions of confinement); Crouchman v. Pickens Cnty. Council, No. CV 9:16-0804-CMC-BM, 2017 WL 767185, at *11 (D.S.C. Feb. 3, 2017) report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 9:16-804-CMC-BM, 2017 WL 749393 (D.S.C. Feb. 27, 2017) (“While Plaintiff alleges in his [verified] Complaint that he is suffering sinus or respiratory problems that he contends are the result of his stay at the Detention Center, he has submitted no actual medical evidence that shows this to be the case, or to tie any serious medical issues he may be having to anything that happened to him while at the Detention Center.”); DePaola v. Ray, No. 7:12CV00139, 2013 WL 4451236, at *10 (W.D. Va. July 22, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 4453422 (W.D. Va. Aug. 16, 2013) (finding that the plaintiff's claim that he “suffered from nausea [and psychological trauma] due to the smell of other prisoners smearing their feces/urine while in the B-3 pod” did not demonstrate a violation of a basic human need or a sufficiently serious or significant injury); Emilien v. Weeks, No. CV 0:21-1647-RMG-PJG, 2022 WL 2500228, at *6 (D.S.C. May 27, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 0:21-CV-1647-RMG, 2022 WL 2168011 (D.S.C. June 16, 2022) (noting that the plaintiff's weight loss due to his refusal to eat because of what he believed to be unsanitary conditions did not state an compensable injury). Plaintiff fails to present sufficient evidence to show that he suffered an injury as a result of being exposed to feces and urine.
For the reasons discussed above, summary judgment is proper as to claims 4 and 6.
Next, in claim 7, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ramos “falsified” a Southern Health Partners form titled “Refusal of Medical Treatment and Release of Responsibility” dated August 4, 2021, and the lack of prompt care continued Plaintiff's physical pain. Am. Compl. p. 15. The record reflects that the form was completed by the Southern Health Partners nurse who signed the form, and the form was not prepared by the Defendant Kevin Ramos. Rather, Ramos signed only as a witness because the Plaintiff refused to sign. In effect, Ramos was witnessing the refusal to sign by the Plaintiff. Gallam Aff. ¶ 4. Plaintiff declares that he did not refuse treatment that day. Pl. Decl. p. 4 (ECF No. 150-1). He alleges in his complaint that he found out about the falsified form in August of 2022 through discovery in another case, and it caused him emotional harm once he realized it. He also alleges that he was “angry about being denied the assessment because it would have prompted care sooner that received. Contribute to future physical pain [sic].” Am. Compl. p. 15. Plaintiff does not provide facts regarding the type of care he needed and was denied on August 4, 2021, or specifically what medical harm occurred as a result of the denial. As alleged, he was not even aware that he was denied care on that date until a year later when he saw his medical records.
Moreover, the evidence demonstrates that the Plaintiff was not deprived of medical care during the time frame encompassing August 4, 2021, even if he now disputes whether he refused medical care on that date. As the evidence demonstrates, the Plaintiff was first booked into ACDC on July 29, 2021. Gallam Aff. ¶ 3. Based on his medical records, the Plaintiff was seen by the nursing staff on the date of his admission, July 29, 2021. The medical records also show that he was started on medications on that date. Gallam Aff. ¶ 4, Ex. A. Additionally, the Medication Administration Records for July and August 2021 show that the Plaintiff had, with only a few exceptions, daily interaction with a nurse or med tech during medpass when he received his medications. Gallam Aff., ¶ 4 Ex. A.
Under Short, the standard for reviewing medical indifference claims by pretrial detainees is substantially the same as the same as that set forth above for conditions of confinement:
(1) the[ plaintiff] had a medical condition or injury that posed a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly acted or failed to act to appropriately address the risk that the condition posed; (3) the defendant knew or should have known (a) that the [plaintiff] had that condition and (b) that the defendant's action or inaction posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm; and (4) as a result, the [plaintiff] was harmed.Short, 87 F.4th at 611. The evidence shows that the Plaintiff was not deprived of any access to medical care in early August 2021. Had Plaintiff needed specific medical care during that time, he could have requested it. There are no medical records indicating that he requested a medical encounter during that time nor does he even allege as much. Thus, as to claim 7 against Ramos, Plaintiff fails to show that he had a medical condition or injury that posed a substantial risk of serious harm, that Ramos acted or failed to act appropriately, that Ramos's actions posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm, or that Plaintiff was harmed. As such, his claim against Ramos fails, and summary judgment is appropriate.
The ACDC Defendants did not originally address Plaintiff's MED-3 claim in their motion, but addressed it in their Reply after Plaintiff raised it in his Response. This claim is asserted only against Defendant Buggs, who Plaintiff alleges presided over a disciplinary hearing during which Plaintiff was found guilty of logging into another inmate's account and sanctioned with not being allowed to purchase medication through the kiosk, namely hydrocortisone cream for his eczema. Am. Compl. Attachment pp. 4-5 (ECF No. 19-4). Defendants first argue that Plaintiff's claim regarding the disciplinary hearing is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because a judgment in Plaintiff's favor would imply the invalidity of his conviction. However, Heck applies to prison disciplinary matters only when the loss of good time credits is involved. See Moskos v. Hardee, 24 F. 4th 289, 295-96 (4th Cir. 2022). Plaintiff does not assert that he lost good time credits as a result disciplinary hearing at issue here. Thus, Heck is in applicable.
Defendants next assert without discussion that Buggs, in her role as presiding over a disciplinary hearing, is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Judges and prosecutors performing official duties related to the judicial phase of the criminal process are immune from civil actions for damages. Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 249 (4th Cir.1999)(citations omitted). The Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit also have extended this liability shield to “ ‘quasi-judicial' agency officials,” Id. (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508, 511, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978)), including officials in state as well as federal agencies. Butz, 438 U.S. at 496-500. This quasi-judicial immunity is extended when (1) the nature of the official's functions are similar to those of a judge, (2) a strong need exists for the official to perform essential functions for the public good without fear of harassment and intimidation, and (3) adequate procedural safeguards exist to protect against constitutional deprivations. Ostrzenski, 177 F.3d at 249. Defendants have not addressed these requirements for quasi-judicial immunity to apply to Buggs. Thus, the court cannot conclude that Buggs is entitled to such immunity, and summary judgment is not appropriate.
Plaintiff asserts claim 8 against Defendant Nurse Reagan. In claim 8, Plaintiff alleges that on June 7, 2022, Plaintiff made a sick call request for “acute pain like a stab wound.” Plaintiff alleges that Nurse Reagan and other unidentified defendants falsified a refusal of treatment form. As such, Plaintiff was not seen for his requested sick call. Plaintiff further alleges that he was not seen or treated for a herpes outbreak. Plaintiff alleges that these failures to treat him were directly harmful to him mentally, emotionally, and physically and left him with severe pain in his stomach as well as herpes on his penis and mouth. Am. Compl. p. 16. As stated above, for a pretrial detainee to prove a medical indifference claim, he must show
(1) the[ plaintiff] had a medical condition or injury that posed a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly acted or failed to act to appropriately address the risk that the condition posed; (3) the defendant knew or should have known (a) that the [plaintiff] had that condition and (b) that the defendant's action or inaction posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm; and (4) as a result, the [plaintiff] was harmed.Short, 87 F.4th at 611.
The record reflects that during June 2022, Nurse Reagan, an RN, served as the director of nursing at the Aiken County Detention Center as part of a larger medical team employed by Southern Health Partners. Reagan Aff. ¶ 1 (ECF No. 107-2). In addition to her normal nursing duties, as nursing director, Nurse Reagan assisted in coordinating patient care in the Detention Center. Reagan Aff. ¶¶ 1, 3. On June 1, 2022, Plaintiff entered a kiosk request for Acyclovir, an anti-viral medication that requires a prescription by the physician. See ECF No. 4-2 at 14; Reagan Aff. at ¶ 5. Because Plaintiff's request was non-emergent and required a prescription, he was placed on the sick list. See Id. On June 7, Plaintiff complained of pain through the kiosk. ECF No. 4-2 at 12; Reagan Aff. at ¶ 6. Medical staff responded that he was already on the sick list. See Id. Plaintiff was to be seen by the medical staff on that same day. ECF No. 4-2 at 12, 13; Reagan Aff. at ¶ 6. However, Plaintiff refused treatment. ECF No. 4-2 at 13; Reagan Aff. at ¶ 6. Nurse Reagan filled out the medical refusal form with a corrections officer present. See Id. Nurse Reagan avers she did not falsify any medical records, she simply recorded what was happening which was that Plaintiff refused to be seen by the medical staff. Reagan Aff at ¶ 6. Plaintiff argues that on the refusal form, Nurse Reagan stated that she was “unable to educate” Plaintiff about the risks of refusing treatment and she failed to check the space asking “is inmate alert and oriented.” Therefore, Plaintiff argues, he must have been unresponsive at the time Nurse Reagan attempted to conduct an examination. He states in his declaration that he never refused treatment on June 7, 2022, nor did Nurse Reagan ever come to him and ask him to sign a refusal of treatment form. Pl. Decl. ¶ 1 (ECF No. 123-1). He also states in his response that he did not request additional medical care for the acute pain after June 7, 2022. Pl. Resp. p. 4. The next sick call request in the record is dated July 19, 2022, in which Plaintiff requests to be seen for his skin issues because he is itching. Pl. Supporting Docs. p. 17 (ECF No. 4-2). The record reflects he was seen on July 22, 2022. Id.
The record reflects that Nurse Reagan did not intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly act or fail to act to appropriately address Plaintiff's herpes or his acute pain. Nurse Reagan put in a request for medication to treat herpes and, since the medication required a prescription, Plaintiff was placed on a sick call list to be seen by a doctor. The same day that he was scheduled on the sick call list, Plaintiff made a request via the kiosk to be seen for acute pain. He was told that he was already on the sick call list for that day, but when the time came for his appointment, Nurse Reagan avers that Plaintiff refused to be seen by medical personnel, which she documented for his records. Plaintiff disputes that he refused to be seen and that he must have been unresponsive at the time Nurse Reagan approached him. Nevertheless, even if an issue of fact exists as to whether Plaintiff refused to be seen, he has failed to show that he was harmed by not seeing a doctor on June 7, 2022. It is undisputed that he did not request to been seen again for acute pain or herpes after June 7, 2022. His next request for sick call was on July 19, 2022, for itching. He was seen on July 22, 2022. Though he makes general statements that he suffered pain and a herpes outbreak, as stated above, “he has failed to produce competent medical evidence indicating that he has suffered any kind of injury-or risk of injury-resulting from” Nurse Reagan's actions. Hall, 2024 WL 2884358, at *8; see also Lewallen v. Mitchell, 2021 WL 5813119, at *15 (D.S.C. Oct. 19, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 5810512 (D.S.C. Dec. 7, 2021) (“[A] detainee complaining that a delay in medical treatment rose to a constitutional violation must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of delay to succeed. Plaintiff has not done so here.”). Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate on Plaintiff's claim against Nurse Reagan.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Nurse Reagan's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 107) be granted and the ACDC Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 112) be granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, it is recommended that the ACDC Defendants' motion be granted as to all Claims and all Defendants except for Plaintiff's MED-3 claim against Defendant Buggs.