Opinion
No. CV-05-4005174 S
September 27, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is a decision on the defendants' motion to strike, dated August 24, 2005, which seeks to strike the second and fourth count of the plaintiff's complaint.
On August 3, 2005, the plaintiff, Sarah West, filed a four-count revised complaint against the defendants, Kristen Sheehan (Sheehan) and William Griffin (Griffin). The plaintiff alleges in the first count that she was injured as the result of being involved in a automobile accident with the defendant driver, Sheehan on August 30, 2003. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that her vehicle was struck when the defendant turned left in front of her as she proceeded on West Main Street, in the city of Waterbury. She alleges that the accident and resulting injuries were as a result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the defendant, Kristen Sheehan.
In the second count, the plaintiff claims statutory recklessness against the driver, Sheehan, pursuant to C.G.S. § 14-295. In the third count, the plaintiff claims the defendant owner, Griffin is vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver. In the fourth count, the plaintiff claims statutory recklessness against Griffin, pursuant to C.G.S. § 14-295.
The defendants have moved to strike the second and fourth counts claiming that they fails to state sufficient facts to support recklessness claims. Griffin also seeks to strike the fourth count and claims that an action based upon vicarious liability is impermissible under Connecticut law.
The plaintiff objects to the motion and has filed a memorandum in opposition, dated September 6, 2005.
I. CT Page 13210
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any [complaint] . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates, 244 Conn. 269, 270, 709 A.2d 558 (1998). The role of the trial court in ruling on a motion to strike is "to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997). "In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 240 Conn. 580. "[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied . . . Moreover . . . [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lombard v. Edward J. Peters, Jr., P.C., 252 Conn. 623, 626, 749 A.2d 630 (2000).
II.
The defendant Sheehan claims that the second count of the complaint should be stricken as it fails to set forth sufficient facts to constitute a claim for statutory recklessness.
There is a split of authority among the judges of the superior court in Connecticut as to the requirements for a plaintiff to sufficiently plead statutory recklessness. As stated by Judge D'Andrea in Bell v. Harrow, No. CV980167961S (Nov. 29, 2001) 2001 Ct.Sup. 15776:
the appellate courts have not indicated what facts a plaintiff must plead in order to establish a cause of action pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295, and there is a split of authority in the Superior Court on this issue. The first line of Superior Court cases requires a plaintiff to plead specific facts to support a claim of recklessness at common law in addition to alleging a violation of one of the enumerated statutes in § 14-295. See, e.g., Pitka v. Ullrich, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at New London, Docket No. 530000 (November 16, 1994, Austin, J.) ( 13 Conn. L. Rptr. 32) (simple allegation that defendant deliberately or recklessly violated certain motor vehicle statutes is insufficient to support claim under § 14-295); Lezotte v. Hanover Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury at Waterbury, Docket No. 112067 (January 6, 1993, Sylvester, J.) ( 8 Conn. L. Rptr. 199, 200) (same); Gaudet v. Ziobran, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex at Middletown, Docket No. 061126 (June 10, 1992, Austin, J.) ( 6 Conn. L. Rptr. 862, CT.Sup. 15780).
The second line of cases holds that a plaintiff must only allege that the defendant violated one or more of the motor vehicle statutes enumerated in § 14-295 and that this violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries. See, e.g., Nelson-Hlebogiaxmis v. Lee, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 167571 (May 17, 1999, Hiller, J.); Price v. Paccar Leasing Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of New London at New London, Docket No. 538888 (February 19, 1997, Booth, J.); St George v. Connecticut Car Rental Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 554923 (February 27, 1996, Spada, J.)."
This court has sided with the second line of cases and has held that a plaintiff must only allege that the defendant violated one or more of the motor vehicle statutes enumerated in § 14-295 and that this violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries. Since the plaintiff has so alleged that the defendant, Kristen Sheehan violated C.G.S. §§ 14-218a, and 14-222 which are enumerated in § 14-295, the defendants' motion to strike the second count is denied.
III.
The defendant, Griffin claims that the fourth count of the complaint should be stricken. First, he claims the count should be stricken as it fails to set forth sufficient facts to constitute a claim for statutory recklessness. The court has addressed that issue in Part II above, and will not strike the count on those grounds. Also, the defendant claims that § 14-295 does not permit cause of action nor support a claim for punitive damages against a non-operating owner of a vehicle.
"It is well settled that in construing statutes, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . . and that [t]he meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wallingford v. Werbiski, 274 Conn. 483, 489 (2005).
In Chetty v. Pallay, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 02 0471200 (August 16, 2004, Arnold, J.) ( 37 Conn. L. Rptr. 719) the court stated: "This court agrees with and adopts the reasoning in Aurio v. Allstate Ins. Co., Superior Court, Docket No: CV 02-0175465 (November 26, 2003, Gallagher, J.) ( 36 Conn. L. Rptr. 39), which states, `It appears that the legislature has clarified its original intent by the addition of the last sentence,' and `finds that neither General Statutes § 52-182 nor § 52-183 permits imposing liability for double or treble damages on the non-operator owner of a motor vehicle.' Section 14-295 of the statutes unambiguously applies to vehicles operated by a defendant. Punitive damages are therefore inappropriate given the language of the law which authorizes them. The purpose of statutory punitive damages is to deter egregious conduct and imposing them in this case could not serve to deter the owner from conduct in the manner of `operation' of the motor vehicle by the driver which, albeit wrongful, the owner did not cause or have reason to know about or expect. Aurio v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra." (Emphasis added.)
Since the plaintiff alleges, in count four, that Griffin was the owner of the motor vehicle Sheehan was operating, and the plaintiff specifically prays for treble damages under § 14-295 as to the fourth count, count four is governed by the language of that statute and the motion to strike count four and the accompanying prayers for relief is granted.
IV.
In conclusion, the motion to strike count two is denied. The motion to strike count four is granted.
Mattasavage, J.