See generally, e.g., Maddox v. River Sea Marine, Inc., 925 P.2d 1033, 1035 (Alaska 1996).See Alaska R. Civ. P. 56(e) and, e.g., West v. City of St. Paul, 936 P.2d 136, 140 (Alaska 1997); Broderick v. King's Way Assembly of God Church, 808 P.2d 1211, 1215 (Alaska 1991). B. The Bradys Have No Viable Common-Law or Equitable Claims Arising from the Moose Pass Negotiations.

to those who rent boats (should they choose to seek it), that boaters can themselves observe weather and sea changes and ascertain water temperature, and that the ability of boaters to do this is not in any way dependent upon what marinas do or do not tell them.” Id. at 873 ; see also, e.g. , Grant v. Wakeda Campground, LLC , 631 F.Supp.2d 120, 128 (D.N.H. 2009) (“Both the inherent unreliability of weather forecasts and the fact that weather changes constantly justify not imposing on defendant a greater duty to monitor the weather than can be expected of plaintiffs.... [T]here is no basis to impose a duty to monitor the weather as part of the duty to keep the [campground] safe.”); Petition of Binstock , 213 F.Supp. 909, 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (prospective boat purchaser died in a storm while testing the boat; the court ruled that the seller had no duty to warn of weather conditions when “such perils as may have existed were equally apparent to and cognizable by [purchaser and seller]”); West v. City of St. Paul , 936 P.2d 136, 139 (Alaska 1997) (“Because most weather conditions are open and obvious, and can be discovered with reasonable diligence, a wharfinger does not have a duty to warn of such dangers.”); cf. Black v. United States , 441 F.2d 741, 744 (5th Cir. 1971) (ruling in a plane-crash case that any negligence of flight controller was superseded by pilot's negligence because “[i]t was the pilot's responsibility to obtain a weather briefing” and the pilot could have obtained weather updates “merely by monitoring the stations along his route”); Croce v. Hall , 657 A.2d 307, 312 (D.C. 1995) (landlord had no duty to monitor weather reports so that he could be prepared to immediately clear sidewalk of snow; “weather predictions are often wrong”).

The Court agrees with Walmart that Alaska courts have applied the open and obvious doctrine, at least in some negligence cases. See, e.g., McGlothlin v. Mun. of Anchorage, 991 P.2d 1273, 1279 (Alaska 1999); West v. City of St. Paul, 936 P.2d 136, 139-40 (Alaska 1997). Compare Dkt. 26 at 12 (arguing “Alaska has not adopted any ‘open and obvious' test”) with Dkt. 30 at 4 (citing Alaska cases in which the court applied the open and obvious doctrine).

See In re Aramark Sports & Entm't Servs., LLC, 831 F.3d 1264, 1282 (10th Cir. 2016) ("Because most weather conditions are open and obvious, and can be discovered with reasonable diligence, a wharfinger does not have a duty to warn of such dangers." (quoting West v. City of St. Paul, 936 P.2d 136, 139 (Alaska 1997))); Bangor & A. R. Co. v. Ship Fernview, 455 F. Supp. 1043, 1062 (D. Me. 1978) ("A wharfinger is under no duty to advise an approaching vessel of weather reports at the pier or of other conditions arising during the ordinary course of navigation or docking and which are readily apparent to the ship." (citing Bunge Corp. v. M/V Furness Bridge, 558 F.2d 790, 800 (5th Cir. 1977))).

The affidavit is admissible evidence, but it is "too conclusory" to present a genuine dispute of material fact regarding MJ Corp.’s claim for conversion.West v. City of St. Paul, 936 P.2d 136, 140 (Alaska 1997) ("To avoid summary judgment once a movant has made out a prima facie case, the non-movant must set forth specific facts reasonably tending to dispute or contradict the movant’s evidence and demonstrating the existence of a material issue of fact.").

Mahan v. Arctic Catering, Inc., 133 P.3d 655, 661 (Alaska 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). West v. City of St. Paul, 936 P.2d 136, 140 (Alaska 2006) (internal citations omitted). Greywolf v. Carroll, 151 P.3d 1234, 1241 (Alaska 2007) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).

By our review, we seek "to determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."United Airlines, Inc. v. Good Taste, Inc., 982 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Alaska 1999) (citing West v. City of St. Paul, 936 P.2d 136, 138 (Alaska 1997)).Id.

See Brady v. State, 965 P.2d 1, 8 (Alaska 1998). United Airlines, Inc. v. Good Taste, Inc., 982 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Alaska 1999) (citing West v. City of St. Paul, 936 P.2d 136, 138 (Alaska 1997)). See State, Dep't of Transp. and Pub. Facilities v. Sanders, 944 P.2d 453, 456 (Alaska 1997) (citing Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Bar Club, Inc., 921 P.2d 626, 627 (Alaska 1996)).

See Brady v. State, 965 P.2d 1, 8 (Alaska 1998).United Airlines, Inc. v. Good Taste, Inc., 982 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Alaska 1999) (citing West v. City of St. Paul, 936 P.2d 136, 138 (Alaska 1997)).State, Dep't of Transp. Pub. Facilities v. Sanders, 944 P.2d 453, 456 (Alaska 1997) (citing Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Bar Club, Inc., 921 P.2d 626, 627 (Alaska 1996)).

We therefore reverse the superior court's order granting summary judgment and remand for further proceedings on Alaska Foods's claim that Nichiro failed to use its "best efforts."See West v. City of St. Paul, 936 P.2d 136, 140-41 (Alaska 1997); Fomby v. Whisenhunt, 680 P.2d 787, 792 (Alaska 1984). Hikita's affidavit also alleged that Nichiro wrongfully abandoned the Adak facility. Nichiro did attempt to rebut this claim.