Opinion
05 Civ. 9227 (DLC).
October 10, 2006
Michael Donnel Wesley, pro se for plaintiff.
Michael A. Cardozo Basil C. Sitaras Corporation Counsel, City of New York New York, NY, for defendants.
OPINION and ORDER
Plaintiff Michael Donnel Wesley ("Wesley") brings this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") to recover damages from the City of New York (the "City"), the New York City Department of Correction ("DOC"), and various employees of the Anna M. Kross Center ("AMKC") at the Rikers Island jail. According to Wesley, his constitutional rights were violated when he was prevented from accessing the AMKC legal library before and during a criminal trial in which he was representing himself. Defendants move to dismiss the amended complaint. For the following reasons, the motion is granted.
Background
The following facts are taken from the amended complaint. In May 2005, Wesley informed AMKC employees that he was representing himself in a criminal trial in Queens County that was scheduled to take place in September. Although the amended complaint is not entirely clear on this point, Wesley appears to claim that he was denied access to the law library at certain times during the months leading up to the trial. The core of Wesley's claim, however, is that he was denied access to the library during the trial itself. In particular, he states that he was only allowed to sign up for library access for times during which he was required to be in court. Moreover, on multiple occasions between September 12 and 22, 2005, Wesley attempted to use the library upon returning to jail from court in the afternoon. Each time, he was told by defendant Officer Canino ("Canino") — who apparently managed inmate access to the library — that he should have his housing officer call the library later in the evening to arrange for a visit. Although those calls were made, Wesley was never allowed to use the library. As a result, he could not conduct necessary research regarding "evidence of guilt" and "cross-examination of an adverse party." Wesley was ultimately convicted at trial of third-degree criminal possession of a weapon.
Wesley also argues that the library is in a state of disrepair and that the books in its collection are out of date. Wesley brought a separate action based on those allegations,see Wesley v. Gadsden, No. 05 Civ. 6580 (GEL), 2006 WL 1517585 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2006), and they will not be addressed here.
On October 31, 2005, Wesley filed this action, alleging violations of his First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and naming the City, DOC, and Canino as defendants. On March 7, 2006, plaintiff amended his complaint to add 11 additional defendants, all of whom appear to be current or former employees of DOC. Defendants Canino, the City, and DOC now move to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that: (1) Wesley's claim is barred because he did not exhaust the administrative remedies available to him; (2) the alleged denial of access to the prison library did not constitute a violation of Wesley's constitutional rights; (3) the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) DOC is a not a suable entity. Discussion
The docket sheet for this case indicates that the 11 defendants added to the action in March have not yet been served with the amended complaint. The moving parties suggest, however, that the arguments made in their briefs would be equally applicable to these additional defendants. The motion will therefore be interpreted as if it were made on behalf of all named defendants.
Dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is proper "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations" set forth therein.Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (citation omitted). Under the pleading standard set forth in Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, complaints must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) (2). "[A] plaintiff is required only to give fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 445 F.3d 586, 590 (2d Cir. 2006).
When considering a motion to dismiss, a trial court must "limit [its] consideration to facts stated in the complaint" or attached or incorporated documents, Nechis v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 421 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2005), and "must accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in [the] plaintiff['s] favor." In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 429 F.3d 370, 384 (2d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The court's duty "is not to weigh the evidence that might be presented at trial but merely to determine whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient." Chosun Int'l, Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324, 327 (2d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). In addition, "[i]t is well-established that when a plaintiff proceeds pro se . . . a court is obliged to construe his pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations." Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 687 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). A pro se complaint may not be dismissed for failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
Although the parties submitted documents outside the pleadings in connection with this motion, they have not been considered here. Therefore, the motion will not be converted to one for summary judgment. See Rule 12(b), Fed.R.Civ.P.
I. Exhaustion of Remedies
Under federal law, prisoners may not bring any action with respect to prison conditions "until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is required even when the relief sought, like money damages, is unavailable through administrative channels. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). A plaintiff's failure to exhaust may not be excused except where defendants have forfeited the defense of exhaustion, defendants themselves have inhibited exhaustion, or other "special circumstances" exist. Braham v. Clancy, 425 F.3d 177, 181-82 (2d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
Defendants argue that although Wesley claims to have filed a grievance, he did not formally appeal it and therefore cannot be said to have exhausted the administrative remedies available to him. In his opposition to the motion, however, Wesley states that prison officials never responded to his initial grievance, and further alleges that he had "very limited access to the inmate grievance office." Defendants do not respond to these statements in their reply and will therefore be deemed to have waived, for the purposes of this motion to dismiss only, the argument that Weseley's claim is unexhausted.
II. Violation of a Constitutional Right
To prevail on a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate "the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 159 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). "Prisoners, including pretrial detainees, 'have a constitutional right of access to the courts.'" Bourdon v. Loughren, 386 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977)). The right, which is grounded in the guarantees of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, "requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828. Bounds does not, however, "create an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). Instead, it merely acknowledges "the (already well-established) right of access to the courts." Id. at 350.
The Second Circuit has held that "the appointment of counsel can be a valid means of fully satisfying a state's constitutional obligation to provide prisoners, including pretrial detainees, with access to the courts" in conformity with constitutional requirements. Bourdon, 386 F.3d at 94. In other words, if a state supplies an inmate with "adequate assistance from persons trained in the law" through the provision of a court-appointed lawyer, id. at 97, it is not also obligated to give the inmate access to a legal library. Id. at 96 ("To provide the access constitutionally mandated, a state may be required to offer affirmative assistance to prisoners, but that assistance is not prescribed in narrow or specific terms or limited in form.")
The Second Circuit recently declined to rule on the issue of whether the same reasoning would apply in the context of a defendant who has elected to proceed pro se:
We express no view as to whether the appointment of counsel could adequately protect the right of access to the courts of a defendant who has . . . exercised his Sixth Amendment right to waive counsel and conduct his own defense.Id. at 94 n. 9. The circuit, however, has previously expressed deep skepticism about the proposition that "even if the state provides adequate legal services to prisoners, complete libraries must still be maintained to serve those who do not wish to be represented by counsel." Spates v. Manson, 644 F.2d 80, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1981). Although the circuit recognized "that the right to represent oneself in criminal proceedings is protected by the Sixth Amendment," it stated that "the right does not carry with it a right to state-financed library resources where state-financed legal assistance is available." Id. at 85.
This view accords with those of most other circuits, which have found that defendants who voluntarily decline publicly funded counsel and choose to represent themselves have no constitutional right of access to a law library. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 42, 45 (6th Cir. 1990); United States ex rel. George v. Lane, 718 F.2d 226, 231 (7th Cir. 1983); and United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1360 (4th Cir. 1978). But see Bribiesca v. Galaza, 215 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted) ("An incarcerated criminal defendant who chooses to represent himself has a constitutional right to access law books or other tools to assist him in preparing a defense.). Because the Second Circuit is unlikely to find that the right asserted by Wesley is guaranteed by the Constitution, his claim will be dismissed.
The Supreme Court recently acknowledged that there was a Circuit split on this issue but declined to resolve it. Kane v. Garcia Espitia, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 407, 408 (2005).
III. Qualified Immunity
Defendants argue that even if Wesley's constitutional rights had been violated, the DOC employees who were sued in their individual capacities would be entitled to qualified immunity. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, a government official may be shielded from liability "if his conduct did not violate clearly established rights or if it would have been objectively reasonable for the official to believe his conduct did not violate plaintiff's rights." Reuland v. Hynes, 460 F.3d 409, 419 (2d Cir. 2006). In determining whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the relevant inquiry is whether the right that was allegedly violated was "clearly established at the time of the defendant's behavior." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201. "The essence of the principle is that officers sued in a civil action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have the same right to fair notice as do defendants charged with a criminal offense." Pena v. DePrisco, 432 F.3d 98, 115 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). In assessing a qualified immunity claim, a court must consider:
(1) whether the right in question was defined with reasonable specificity; (2) whether the decisional law of the Supreme Court and the applicable circuit court support the existence of the right in question; and (3) whether under preexisting law a reasonable defendant official would have understood that his or her acts were unlawful.Pena at 115(citation omitted).
At the time that Wesley was allegedly denied access to the library, neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit had held that a defendant who declines state-funded representation is entitled to any access to a prison library — let alone access at a given time of day. Indeed, as noted above, the Second Circuit had expressed strong doubt that such a Constitutional right exists. And soon after the events at issue took place, the Supreme Court ruled that, to the extent a pro se defendant might have a constitutional right to access a law library, it was not "clearly established" enough to entitle him to habeas relief if it was violated. Kane, 126 S.Ct. at 408. Under these circumstances, the right claimed by Wesley cannot be said to have been "clearly established" for the purpose of a Section 1983 action, and the individual defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity.
IV. DOC's Amenability to Suit
The New York City Charter provides that "[a]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law." New York City Charter § 396. As a result, City departments, including the Department of Correction, cannot be sued. See, e.g., Westin v. New York City Dep't of Corr. Serv., No. 05 Civ. 578(LAK), 2005 WL 1253938, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2005). Therefore, even if Wesley had stated a constitutional claim, he would be unable to proceed against DOC. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint is granted as to all defendants. The Clerk of Court shall close the case.
SO ORDERED.